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Wesley Morris has devoted himself to no less 
ambitious a task than to attempt a synthesis of a 
large number of theoretical critical perspectives 
usually treated as mutually exclusive. It is the 
measure of his achievement that he has been 
able to bring theoretical unity to the work of a 
rich variety of recent critics and to reconcile 
structuralism and poststructuralism with the 
divergent systems of such writers as Cassirer 
arid Wittgenstein, the existentialist Sartre, 
phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty and 
Poulet, and the linguists Chomsk  y and Jakob­
son — critics whose schools are thought to be 
antagonistic, not only to the structuralist and 
poststructuralist phenomena , but to one an­
other as well. 
The design of Friday's Footprint serves to 
guide the reader toward a theory of literary in­
terpretation, the primary issue of which is to 
define the literary "text" and its "context." Pro­
fessor Morris begins with a discussion of Wil­
liam Faulkner's Go Down, Moses as an example of 
this author's "uses" of myth in forging his novel 
—"uses" being a term that, he points out, must 
be read as ambiguous, since it is not clear to 
what degree Faulkner uses the " M y t h of the 
South" and to what extent (as Claude Lévi-
Strauss would insist) the myth uses him; It is 
clear from this discussion, however, that be­
cause the novel "belpngs to" culture, it also re­
flects the problematics of all h u m a  n being and 
belonging; and insofar as the novel is an articu­
late text, the problematics of belonging poses 
questions of meaning, style, and self-expression 
that must be examined in light of both tradi­
tional romantic philosophies of language and 
the challenges to that tradition raised by con­
temporary structuralist and poststructuralist 
theory. 
The discussion of the philosophy of language 
and stylistics in succeeding sections represents 
an attempt to deal with these problems in a 
sçries of dialectical engagements with major 
philosophers and critics. In Plato, Wittgen­
(Continued on back flap) 
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Let the earth speak, therefore, since the m e n are beyond our 
grasp. Over and above the delights which it had given m  e by the 
river's edge, let it at last answer up and yield the secret of its 
unspoiledness. W h a  t lay behind those confused appearances 
which are everything and nothing at one and the same time? If I 
take any particular scene and try to isolate it, that tree, that 
flower could be any other tree, any other flower. Could it also be 
a lie, that whole which gave m  e such delight, that whole whose 
parts vanished as soon as I tried to examine them individually? If 
I had to admit that it was real, I wanted at least to master it, all of 
it, d o w n to the smallest detail. I turned a prosecutor's eye upon 
the enormous landscape, narrowing it d o w n to a strip of clayey 
river-marge and a handful of grasses: nothing there to prove that 
when I next raised m  y eyes to the world about m  e I should not 
find the Bois de Boulogne stretched out all round that 
insignificant patch of ground which was trodden daily by the 
most authentic of savages but from which M a  n Friday's footprint 
was absent. 
Lévi-Strauss, Tristes tropiques 
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Preface: A M o d e  l for the Reader 
The writing of this book has been accomplished over a four-year 
period and not in strictly chronological order. Th  e subjects of 
language and style first presented themselves to m  e and emerged 
as independent texts, but I found I could not long remain in the 
rarified air of pure theory. Parts 2 and 3, then, lay dormant while 
I rushed to test m  y original impulses against the recalcitrance of 
literature itself, and slowly Parts 1 and 4 arose, more or less 
simultaneously, to round off m y essay. It was not until this latter 
stage of development that I discovered precisely (or at least 
vividly) what I was writing about, and this discovery convinced 
m e  , more terribly than could any abstract conjectures, of the 
impossibility of formulating a complete statement on the inter­
pretation of literary works. I have awakened at times to the 
frantic urgency with which I was writing, to a feeling of 
frustration juxtaposed with exhilaration. Yet this intensity of 
feeling did not arise because I was on the brink of formulating 
truly new and original ideas; rather I found myself confronting a 
crisis of consciousness, a disruptive m o m e n  t of revolutionary 
transition both professional and cultural. 
The insignificance of this present work in the face of such 
grand feelings should be obvious to any reader; but if I have not 
been adequate to it, the following pages must reveal that I have 
been faithful. This short preface reflects both m  y unwillingness 
to stop writing, m  y fear that I have not finished, and m  y doubt 
about what I have done that must be explained at least another 
time. The occasion for m  y writing comes from what seems to m  e 
an instructive division in the world of literary criticism. This 
division is not the same as the often-noted fragmentation of 
modern theory in our post-romantic world, not the same as our 
comfortable play with multiple perspectivisms. O u  r century in 
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Western society has been dominated by a multitude of 
romanticisms, but romanticisms nonetheless. W  e have engaged 
in endless debates over the adequacy of various interpretive 
methodologies, battles between N e  w Critical formalism and 
historicism, between symbolism and realism, between phenom ­
enology and explication de texte, between existentialism and 
aestheticism. W  e have supported countless volumes of quibbles 
between subgroups of larger groups; w  e have spawned schools 
within schools, and countermovements to countermovements. 
Each fragmented system proclaims its newness, its achievement 
of greater insight, and its inviolable integrity. But all of this 
conflict has been no more than internecine war; the context has 
always been romanticism, and even the self-proclaimed classicists 
of the early twentieth-century Anglo-American literary world 
were, on some reflection, merely extensions of post-Kantian 
aesthetics. 
I do not mean to say that this extended romantic period 
renders all of these schools identical; I do claim, however, that 
they have all been trapped within the fundamental problematics 
of romantic philosophy. It is perhaps not m u c h more than the 
tyranny of a specific terminology, the ubiquity of a vocabulary 
sustained by words like "becoming," "organicism," "symbol," 
"metaphor," "experience," "humanism," "time," "pastness," 
"subject," and a host of others too numerous to list. N o  w in the 
nineteen sixties and seventies one must be blind indeed not to 
sense the presence of a truly "other" movement , what I here will 
call (for lack of a better term) a ne  w classicism, which seems bent 
on the total destruction of romantic meanings and values. It is no 
wonder that w e , w h o are so steeped in the agony of our post-
Kantian universe that it has become familiar and safe, tend to 
lash out against this encroachment on our sacred territory. W  e 
reject, condemn, engage in ad h o m i n e m attacks, even try to ignore 
the penetrating questions leveled at our cherished beliefs, 
although w e do so to little avail. 
It is particularly the specter of a many-headed giant called 
"structuralism" that disturbs us; its several mouths shout anti­
humanism, antisubjectivism, antihistoricism with belligerent 
forcefulness, and w e respond somewhat quixotically with cries of 
our o w n well-worn phrases. I have been throughout this book 
consistently reluctant to give up m u c h of m  y romantic heritage, 
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but I discovered that some territory had to be yielded in order to 
reach firmer ground. O n c e having done this, I found that m y 
world survived this strategic m o v e  , and at that point the 
encounter with the enemy became more familier than I could 
have possibly imagined on our first meeting. W h a  t suddenly 
disclosed itself was that the enemy was a projection of myself, 
that classicism was no opposition at all but a companion to 
romanticism in a world greatly enriched and more expansive than 
that I had previously inhabited. M  y temptation was to give this 
new world a romantic twist, to describe structuralism (like all 
other twentieth-century movements) as an aberrant form of 
romantic aestheticism, to put a neat Hegelian schema on it so that 
the new classicism seemed to be an antithetical system generated 
in the belly of romanticism itself. Yet none of these solutions 
worked; structuralism, in terms of the practical effects of its 
explanatory models, was not simply a version of romanticism. 
A n y historical schema of contrasting theoretical movements was 
distorting, for romantic and classical methods of interpretation 
both belong to a more encompassing, a more universal, problem 
of "knowing." Interpretation is both an act of consciousness (a 
condition of consciousness and thereby subject to time) and a 
context for consciousness (a prior condition for thought itself, 
which provides the necessary basis for knowing and thereby 
transcends time). 
Classicism and romanticism are different visions of h u m a  n 
experience and knowledge that define the limits of man's 
capacities to k n o w  . If this sounds like a surrender to 
structuralism, I hasten to add (still defensively) that this 
nontemporal, expanded point of view is neither included by nor 
excludes historicity, subjectivity, and humanism. A theory of 
m a n in in the cosmos (structuralism) does not cancel out a theory 
of m a n as the cosmos (romanticism). Thus if Kant succeeded in 
recentering m a  n in his world through a counterrevolution of 
Copernicus's earlier decentering, Lévi-Strauss has decentered 
m a n once more with a third revolution that brackets the tran­
scendental subject of Kant's philosophy. T h  e extraordinary fact 
in these seemingly cataclysmic whirlings and turnings is that m a  n 
remains firmly on his earth throughout. Although shifts of 
universal perspective betoken alterations of social structure and 
culture, no shift is possible without the two terms of difference. 
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Lévi-Strauss, of course, has not given us a mere reproduction of 
the pre-Copernican, Ptolemaic cosmology. The world is not 
merely repeating itself; but m a  n finds from time to time that his 
world has grown inward or expanded outward too far, and he 
wants (both in the sense of needs and desires), at these extreme 
times, to reorder his perspective. All in all, man's finitude 
remains unchallenged; whether w e see him as uniquely individual 
with the romantics or as a minute and anonymous fragment of 
the infinite cosmos with the n e w classicists, man's role in life's 
game remains pretty m u c h the same: his identity and security are 
never assured, and his responsibility and moral accountability are 
ever present but never static. 
So too must w e view man's actions and creations as always a 
projection of his finitude, as struggles to join his dreadful sense 
of self and his sublime sense of grander systems in an identity-
guaranteeing work. I will be accused here of having returned to 
romanticism, but I plead for tolerance since m  y struggle against 
romantic terminology remains deadlocked despite m  y best 
efforts. T  o m a k  e m  y point clear I a  m forced to resort to a device 
that I see as both classical and romantic: the telling of a story. A  s 
a classical device it is intended to function as a model for all I 
want to say in the pages that follow, as a text about a text that 
does not explain the latter text but at least recognizes it as text. A  s 
a romantic device it takes the form of a parable, or, perhaps 
better, a fragment of narrative that is partly true, partly imagined, 
and recounts a m o m e n  t of insight. 
In the south-central highlands of Mexico, in the state of 
Oaxaca, above the low coastal shelf on either side that separates 
this region of mixed heritages and topographical contrasts from 
the Gulf of Mexico on the north and the Pacific Ocean on the 
south, beyond the dry deserts and humid rain forests that must 
be torn through to open the valley, is the tiny village of San 
Bartolo de Coyotepec. Touched by the paved highway that man's 
insistent progress has poured in a thin, sterile ribbon over the 
fertile, living earth, the village holds its silent space, forgotten by 
travelers w h  o rarely pause as they pass by. It rests anonymously 
on the floor of the valley, in full view of the dark green mountains 
that surround it—if its space were not so insignificant from a 
distance, and if its earth-formed brick buildings were not so 
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continuous in color with the ground out of which they arise. 
There is dignity in the stillness of the village, in the tinkling 
sounds of bells on red-brown goats moving slowly along the 
dusty streets, of a radio blaring somewhere, unlocatable but 
distinct, of an occasional h u m a  n voice; there is a dignity 
unmindful of the fact that a neighboring village, less than a 
kilometer away, has stolen its name , Coyotepec, and of the more 
crushing nonexistence conferred on it by Mexican roadmaps. 
There is a highway marker, a wide gravel shoulder where some 
have turned because they missed their destination, and there is a 
sign that points laconically to the hacienda of D o n a Rosa. 
Oaxaca is famous for a most unusual black clay pottery m a d  e 
in the region. M  y wife and I had com e there, at least in part, to 
buy some typical examples. W  e found it in the shops that came 
with the opening of the valley by the roads, in stalls at the 
Saturday Indian market, in every shape from simple mescal 
bottles to tiny toy whistles formed as birds or other animals for 
tourists. Barbara and I had traveled two thousand miles to find 
these treasures, but w  e were bewildered by their plentifulness. 
Can fame be valued by the commonplace? At the market pots lay 
in neat rows on the dusty streets like curious pebbles arranged by 
a playful child. In shops they were stacked row upon row in 
precarious m o u n d  s that seemed in constant danger of toppling 
over, shattering, and mingling once more with the indistinguish­
able earth from which they came. Indeed they did drop, from 
time to time, slipping from the seemingly careless fingers of the 
Indian w o m e  n w h  o sold them; they cracked, chipped, and caught 
dust from the heavy stale air that hung over the market. I turned 
hundreds of them over in m  y strange hands, examining them for 
indications of shoe polish that would mark them as inauthentic, 
as having been mass-produced instead of slowly molded, stroked 
swiftly with a rough stone in a process that turned the finished 
product to a glossy rather than a dull black, and lingeringly fired 
in an oxygen-poor kiln. W  e found some that interested us, bar­
gained for pennies of value, and stuffed our purchases gingerly 
into our shopping baskets. 
I wondered always if w e had detected the polish; was the tell­
tale soot of our possessions really soot or was it a lingering 
deposit of bootwax? Yet I was not sure w h y it mattered. W h o  , 
after all, would know? W a  s not the result of each process equally 
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glossy, equally unusual in its bright blackness? A m o n  g the 
plenitude of such pots, so casually regarded by the artisans w h  o 
m a d e them, w h y did w e show this ostentatious concern for 
authenticity? 
Monte Alban is located on a small outcropping of mountains 
just south of Oaxaca City, towering above the valley and holding 
view for miles in all directions. The top of the highest peak is 
leveled, and there, in extraordinary symmetry, are the magnifi­
cent ruins of civilizations that hide under curtains of vegetation 
and erosion. Oaxaca is a vast storehouse of such ruins, a 
preserving area where the ground one stands on breathes with the 
monumental traces of worlds removed from our view but that 
n o w and again thrust upward into the air. The main plaza on 
Monte Alban is composed of expansive, open terraces, marked at 
regular intervals by swiftly rising pyramids, layers upon layers, 
hand-hewn and arranged so that they give clear evidence of the 
two cultures once centered there and n o w scattered throughout 
the region. The ruins are partly excavated, but on this day they 
were utterly deserted to the winds that rush with soft, lonely 
sighs across the plaza. Monte Alban is marked with hundreds of 
burial tombs, n o w numbered in random sequence, but most still 
unexplored and veiled with rumors of riches a thousand times 
greater than the stunning gold and silver necklaces dotted with 
semiprecious stones already unearthed. Following a crude tour-
guide m a p  , w  e struggled d o w  n the steep mountainside, clutching 
roots and loose stones, in search of the famous burial chamber 
where archaeologists had worked for eight days without sleep to 
sift the dust for more and more of the delicate filigree that n o w 
glares from glass cases in the tiny Oaxaca m u s e u m  . W  e did not 
find it, but every swelling of the earth seemed a mark inscribed 
outside of time, the absent footprints m a d  e by m e  n from mysteri­
ous civilizations, rich cultures filled with immensities of lived 
experience, of religious rituals and bewildering, alluring myths. 
Excited far more from half-seen riches than from harsh, opened 
storehouses where jewels once lay, w  e returned to the plaza and 
stood holding hands for long moment  s listening to voices 
speaking in the ageless freedom of the wind. 
Th  e technique of making black pottery had been lost, had 
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faded back into the dust of crumbling ruins to be unearthed by 
curious scholars in shards that seemed insignificant when placed 
beside the exquisite jewelry. Thus entering the realm of time and 
history, it awaited the m o m e n t when, by "accident" the legend 
goes, it was rediscovered by D o n a Rosa. She unknowingly 
scraped a pot before firing; it came out glossy instead of powdery 
black. The day after our visit to Monte Alban, Barbara and I 
decided to drive to D o n  a Rosa's hacienda in San Bartolo de 
Coyotepec. She was famous n o w  ; her hacienda was the largest 
and the finest in the village; she displayed proudly the pictures of 
her visit from the president, and she gave regular demonstrations 
of her technique to tour groups. She also signed her work—or 
rather her son signed for her. She could not write. 
I was troubled still by the dilemma of authenticity, but I was 
sure that on this day w e would find the real thing. A s w e drove, 
the mountains around us hid behind a haze spawned from the 
marriage of w a r m summer sun and the humid air of the rainy 
season. Yet I could see the outlines of Monte Alban, and the 
vividness of the open terraces floated across m  y mind. Yesterday 
we had stood on the central pyramid, alone as rainclouds 
gathered over the mountains, looking d o w  n as the mountain 
looked d o w n on tiny farms, narrow roads, on the city of Oaxaca 
with its cathedral of pale green stone—but unaware of San 
Bartolo de Coyotepec. N o w  , as w  e turned off the paved highway 
onto the rutted dirt street that led to D o n a Rosa's hacienda, I was 
aware of the imposing presence of Mont  e Alban as never before, 
towering over the anonymous village. 
It was Sunday; no one was at Doiia Rosa's for a demonstration. 
W  e hesitated outside the plain brown walls that enclosed her 
gardens, walls precisely like those of other smaller houses where 
other village potters lived, continuous with their walls and with 
the dusty road. There was something of reverence in our motion, 
and in m  y voice as the tiny Indian w o m a  n with her brownish, 
furrowed skin came toward us. I asked if the shop was open, but 
it was no shop, only a corner of her h o m e dedicated to the ageless 
pottery that had made her famous. She nodded to us and sat at a 
wide, crude table under the portico facing the garden, lush, green, 
filled with flowers blooming; she sat staring not at us, perhaps 
not at anything, while w  e browsed self-consciously through 
several simple shelves of glossy black pots. W  e held hands and 
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whispered, not because w  e were afraid she would hear, for she 
spoke no English, but because it was Sunday, and because this 
tiny w o m a  n with miniature hands of dark skin mad  e richer by 
the earth she molded for eighty years, whose hands could not 
sign her name but whose name was famous because of her hands, 
guided by what deathless spirit no one knows, discovered a 
technique as old as Monte Alban itself, and older yet, because 
this was D o n a Rosa, and this was Sunday, and this ground was 
sacred to strange gods that filled us with awe and peace. 
I turned the pots in m  y hands as I had done a hundred times 
before in the Oaxaca market, with the same awkward carefulness 
of one w h o is afraid to break the silence with some clumsy 
accident, yet in the presence of their creator whose unconcern 
ridiculed m  y care. W  e selected a few, but almost in silence and 
completely free of that ostentatious show of testing their 
authenticity w  e had affected in the market shops. It was not the 
guarantee of the name crudely scratched in the clay, not the 
prideful claim of ownership that D o n a Rosa would not and could 
not express, not the simple, graceful, yet wholly functional and 
only faintly decorated shapes of the pottery, but the slender, 
clay-colored hands of the silent w o m a n  , those hands that 
touched the same earth of other civilizations with the same magic 
as the other craftsmen w h  o also mad  e fragile, useful, glossy black 
shapes, those hands that accidentally worked the clay in the same 
way as the other craftsmen, yet whose discovery made her 
famous, named her D o n a Rosa for a world of people she will 
never see. 
M y exaggerated care for our purchases was less important than 
before as w e thanked D o n a Rosa and turned to go, although our 
treasures were far greater than any others w e were to find. The 
feeling that swirled around us with the wind on the mountainside 
at Monte Alban descended to the valley and raised the dust from 
the barren ground, and touched us lightly and settled on our 
clothes and our D o n  a Rosa pots. W  e talked excitedly, full of that 
energy released when one emerges from a cathedral, with a 
happiness of discovery like that of the archaeologists w h  o did not 
sleep for eight days while they sifted the treasures of an ancient 
tomb. W e , too, would take our finds from their native soil to rest 
awkwardly on our display shelves two thousand miles away. N o 
one would k n o w  , of course, if they were authentic or shoe polish 
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imitations, yet the dust of Dona Rosa's porch would appear on 
our treasures no matter h o w often w e wiped them—as if the clay, 
fired hard and glossy black, emitted some of its o w n substance to 
turn the little, encased world around them once more into the 
dry brown dirt of Oaxaca. A s we bumped slowly back onto the 
paved highway and forced the car out of the dusty ruts that 
gathering rainclouds would turn into m u d  , and summer sun 
behind the rain would bake hard, and soft sobbing winds would 
brush once more into dust, a glimmer of sunlight pierced m  y 
eyes, a flash of green trees and bare stones that rose out of the 
valley floor toward the obscuring clouds. Looking d o w n on San 
Bartolo de Coyotepec, and on the strangers bearing their 
treasures, was Monte Alban. 
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S 
The conversations that eventuated in this book began several 
years ago with m  y friend and colleague M a r  k Scheid. Since that 
time m  y course has taken man y turns, but I remain conscious of 
these origins. I a m grateful to Alan Grob for his encouragement 
at a m o m e n t when m y commitment to this project wavered; it is 
quite possible that without his efforts on m  y behalf I would not 
have the opportunity here to express m  y thanks. Hayden White 
read the manuscript with unusual care and thoroughness; his 
critique was invaluable, and his gift of time to evaluate and 
correct m  y project is the highest compliment that I could wish 
for m y work. I a m equally indebted to Frank Lentricchia, whose 
knowledge and judgment I respect most highly; he has read m  y 
work and responded not only with encouragement but also with 
the critical concern of true friendship. I owe, far beyond the scope 
of this work, lasting appreciation to Murray Krieger; he is a 
teacher, colleague, and friend for w h o  m simple thanks are 
insufficient. Finally, I renew here again m  y prayers for Blake and 
Michael Morris that theirs will be a future of happiness and 
fulfillment. 
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Part One 
The Pilgrimage of Being 
T H E USES O F M Y T H 
Standing in the present, w  e have been taught to look with 
somewhat haughty indulgence upon all the past, "primitive" 
cultures that flourished within their comforting and accom­
modating myths. Those myths appear to us as the ruins of 
ancient fortresses erected against the ever-threatening invasion of 
manifold reality or as crumbling towers of communication thrust 
upward toward heaven. W  e reluctant, proud moderns m a y 
begrudgingly admit that the societies of the past evidence a 
simpler, happier, more innocent world, the loss of which gives 
validity to man's contemporary existential anguish; yet one w h o 
would brashly seek to revive myth today, or suggest the "need" 
for (not so m u c h as the existence of) a modern myth, risks being 
scorned as a borrower of convenient fictions or as a romantic 
dreamer. The relentless onrush of time, virtually hypostatized by 
idealistic philosophy (even against its will), has breached the 
fortress walls with waves of phenomenal plentitude and brought 
d o w  n the tower with disharmonious blasts from the trumpets of 
absurdity. In all, however , m y t h has s h o w n remarkable 
resilience. It endures not merely as curious narratives labeled and 
filed by the scholar, but with persistent vitality in culture and 
culture's guardian spokesman, literature. M y t h has proved 
impervious to man's intellect and has only recently revealed its 
richest resources in the deep unconscious levels of man's being. 
Here it gains indisputable victory over time, not by denying it but 
by making it meaningful. 
The rediscovery of myth has occasioned something like 
apocalyptic enthusiasm, although this rediscovery is, in truth, an 
illusion covering a newly expanded understanding of h u m a  n 
cognition, which is at once simpler and more complex than w e 
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had dreamed. Moreover, despite the various disciplines that n o w 
claim to have myth under close scrutiny, only the slenderest 
threads of accord foreshadow a general agreement. Thus in this 
first essay I will somewhat boldly anticipate what exists only in 
potentia, yet I do not hope to offer a definition of myth. F r o m 
the anthropologists, historians, linguists, literary critics, 
philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and theologians I will 
draw insights about myth in order to discuss its "uses" in 
literature. Through this process a better understanding of myth 
m a y evolve, but the focus of m y essay will remain on the 
problems of literary interpretation. M y method, then, describes a 
lopsided circle: on the basis of a few preliminary assumptions 
about the general nature of myth I will examine its specific uses in 
William Faulkner's Go Down, Moses; in turn, the specific uses 
will no doubt help refine the original assumptions. But at this 
point the trajectory of m  y discussion will divert toward general­
izations about the essential structure and language of literature; 
and, as a curious by-product, it will raise for us the most 
problematical aspect of modern literary theory: the determina­
tion of literature's socio-historical involvement. 
T  o focus on literature's uses of myth indicates no cavalier 
disregard for the latter's broader cultural dimensions. Indeed, I 
a  m anxious not to overshadow such "functions," although this is 
frequently the result of myth-oriented^ literary criticism. For 
example, Northrop Frye's very successful Anatomy of Criticism 
eventuates in a peculiar, aestheticized version of myth; the myth 
that Frye speaks of is wholly literary despite his struggles to give 
it a socio-historical respectability.1 It is better, though I confess 
more clumsy, to keep literature and myth at least at an arm's 
length from one another. The illuminating studies of myth by 
contemporary ethnographers, myths very unlike the traditional 
literary versions w  e have c o m  e to k n o  w through the history of 
western art, m a y yield an even more significant "myth criticism," 
but not if w e continue to see them in the same light that w e view, 
to cite only the most familiar instance, the marvelous myth 
stories of our ancient Greek ancestors. M y t h criticism must 
break free of the "allusionist" domination; the literary use of 
myth does not simply convey the idea of an author's esotericism. 
Such an approach confuses the relationship between myth and 
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literature because allusions are almost always to other literary 
uses of myth rather than to myths themselves. Only slightly less 
objectionable is the idea that literature takes narrative fragments 
of myth stories to use as plot structures. T h e theory of 
"displaced" myth, 2 like allusionism, implies a recognition theory 
of literature; the critic's task is to expose the writer's half-clad 
borrowings to a near-sighted and ignorant audience.3 
At best, allusion and displacement are only partial 
explanations. T h  e assumption supporting both is that complete, 
preformed myth structures exist in order to be alluded to or 
displaced, but it is difficult to establish the "objective" reality 
(either cultural or psychological) of any myth. In the broadest 
sense, a myth is no more and no less than the expression of a 
cognitive strategy that defines man'  s sense of belonging to his 
world. "Expression" here, however, is an inclusive term ranging 
from elaborate and aesthetically oriented narratives of highly 
acculturated societies to simple pragmatic actions asserted 
through patterns of culturally organized behavior. A myth, 
therefore, is not so m u c  h a "thing" as a psychosocial process; it is 
not a collection of old stories but a cognitive system that fades 
into the vague outlines of general culture. A  s Claude Le'vi-Strauss 
argues, "there is always something left unfinished. Myths , like 
rites are 'in-terminable.'"4 Thus , what a literary work alludes to 
is at least partly an unreal construct in the critic's mind; what is 
displaced is no more than the "literary tradition" as defined by 
T . S. Eliot and transformed into " m y t h " by Frye. 
This aspect of allusionism and displacement is in itself 
instructive. A myth in the broad sense need not be written d o w n 
and preserved in the cultural archives of h u m a  n history. There is, 
to be sure, no better way to establish the death of a myth than by 
finding it indexed in an encyclopedia and shelved in one of our 
vast libraries of knowledge. Myths belong to societies and not to 
individuals. They are unconscious systems of thought and not 
"beliefs" in the form of dramatic manifestations. Myth is not 
synonymous with religion.5 T h e function of myth is to organize 
material phenomena and to structure h u m a  n behavior. For an 
observer to become aware of a myth as myt  h very likely betokens 
the cessation of that myth's cognitive functioning for that 
observer, and this defines roughly a distinction between the user 
and the analyzer of myths. For the latter w e might substitute the 
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more traditional term interpreter; but in a very real way the user of 
myths also interprets, although his deeper and more basic activity 
is best labeled understanding. The task of analysis is to identify 
and describe a myth structure; yet because the myth has no 
"real" existence prior to the analysis, the analyzer must do more 
than merely describe. H  e must bring the myth into being; he 
"objectifies" it over against the messy empirical background of 
its general culture.6 T o do so precludes immediate interest in any 
particular uses of myth, for he has m o v e d on to what w e might 
call, following the trend of recent philosophical jargon, the level 
of "meta-interpretation."7 O  n the other hand, borrowing 
terminology from Wittgenstein, the uses of myth can be 
"shown" but not "said": one can "experience" the force, 
function, and energy of myth only if it has not been objectified.8 
O n c  e its energy has been "conserved" in a self-regulating, whole, 
and "visible" structure, one can only " k n o w " the myth in its 
density as object. The analyst/interpreter of myths is confronted 
by a "principle of indeterminacy" equally as confounding as 
that faced by the m o d e r n physicist in q u a n t u m theory. 
Nevertheless, the use of myth lies in the dynamic nature of its 
cognitive functioning, and myths are used when , as Lévi-Strauss 
says, they "operate in men's minds without their being aware of 
the fact."9 
The division of myth into "functional" and "objective" 
structures is, of course, a mere device for the purposes of m  y 
explication.10 Nonetheless, it enables m  e to discuss a peculiar 
aspect of the underlying cognitive potential of any myth. The 
structuring "power" that operates unconsciously in men's minds 
has an explanatory force that exceeds the empirical limitations of 
any user. That is, the structuring capacity, which is necessarily 
whole and adequate, cannot be exhausted in the life span of any 
one m a  n or in the duration of the collective social group.11 It is 
this potential that transcends individual and race and can be 
abstracted into a roughly adequate structural model by the 
analyzer of myths. T  o use the familiar linguistic analogy, the 
finite structure or system of grammatical rules is capable of 
generating an infinite number of individual utterances, more than 
any individual or group could possibly formulate in their day-to­
day speaking to specific occasions or experiences.12 There is, 
therefore, a "surplus" of explanatory power built into the system, 
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the "ghost" of perfect knowledge that leaves its lingering "trace" 
in every specific use of the system.13 But this powerful structure 
is only "potential" in any individual culture or any single 
m e m b e  r of a culture; it is "real" only in the analyzer's objectifi­
cation. O  n the empirical level w  e find that particular experience 
comes fragmented, momentary, and infinitely plentiful, defying 
the totalizing powers of this incipiently synchronie system with 
the diachronic nature of discrete experience. If there is a surplus 
of explanatory power in the system, there is also a surplus of 
experience to which the system m a y be accommodated.1 4 T h e 
analyzer w h  o abstracts the synchronie structure in order to 
penetrate to the source of man' s potential for knowing and, 
hence, reach the very ground of what Dilthey long ago called 
"intersubjectivity" must bracket the empirical dimension of his 
studies, yet in so doing the myth he identifies becomes a "funda­
mental form of inauthenticity."15 
The analyzer engages willfully in an act of "bad faith" in order 
to objectify a cognitive system; it is never a wholly satisfactory 
movement , for the vitality of the experiential manifold, which 
brings the unconscious forward into conscious activity, defies 
abstraction. Moreover, w e k n o w the logical possibility or 
"necessity" of such a system of surplus explanatory power, its 
existence as "Cartesian mind," only in its particular manifesta­
tions. The reality of the system is revealed in a sense of 
"absence," as a system always with inadequate content that 
pushes m a  n toward the experiential world, forces him to speak 
the system to the plentiful, and truly surplus, particularity. Both 
system and discrete experience, form and content, are sterile and 
meaningless in themselves. Each shows a fundamental lack that 
needs completion in the other. It is true, as Le'vi-Strauss says, that 
m a n is more possessed by his structuring myths than he possesses 
them, but so too is he possessed by experience. T h e key to any 
myth, then, is in its uses, in its confrontation with the world of 
surplus content, in its assertion of man' s Heideggerian "being-in­
the-world." It is a twofold action designed to exhaust both 
system and experience, to achieve a prefect equilibrium between 
inner and outer worlds, but because each is an infinity of surplus 
this is a never-ending quest.16 
The analyzer of myths, therefore, must first "understand" 
them as a user before he can interpret and describe them.17 T h e 
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interpreter must penetrate to the deepest and most profound 
levels of the myth where he experiences its cognitive force, where 
he "thinks" it not as abstract or propositional but in its 
specificity, with direction and active purpose toward the 
empirical world. Ironically, here he becomes a part of the very 
system he is to analyze, but only in this way can he "intuit" the 
"rich and rewarding" nature of myth. 1 8 This intuitive level of 
interpretation involving the use of myth concerns m  e directly in 
this chapter. It is only at the level of understanding that one 
comes near the native user's unconscious, natural thinking, and it 
is this understanding that defines the literary use of myth. 
For the ethnologist, understanding demands field work; he 
must live within the culture he studies where the day-to-day 
manifestations of myth in the thoughts and actions of the 
m e m b e r s of the culture are not merely observed but are to some 
degree open to participation. A s imperfect as this living the 
culture m a y be, it is indispensable, for only at this level can one 
see myth thinking itself to (it does not think about) experience in 
the gestures and words of the natives. T h e ethnologist must find 
myth on both the sacred and profane levels of society. Yet one 
particular manifestation of myth has a special value; myths 
"told" or "sung" by an official singer of myths have a privileged 
position in culture. T h  e singer is not an analyzer but his act of 
singing raises the myth out of the diffuseness of general society; 
the energy of normal, daily functioning is transformed into the 
gestures and words of singing. T h e official act of singing, 
however, does not sever the myth from culture; on the contrary, 
it reinforces the cultural basis of the myth through the dynamics 
of its psychosocial process. T h e singing of a myth asserts the 
individuality of the singer w h o , nevertheless, works only within 
the collective sanction. T h  e individual voice of the singer of 
myths involves the hearers in the very form and activity of his 
performance, yet the willingness of the audience to be involved is 
tantamount to the granting of permission for the singer to sing, 
the making of a contract.19 If the analyzer's myth, as objectified 
structure, represents a meta-interpretive dimension, a general 
code that is, according to Le'vi-Strauss, "anonymous ," nonfunc­
tional, even contentless,20 the myth articulated by an official 
singer is open to subjectivity, privileged functionality, and the 
full range of the culture's experiential content. It is s o m e h o  w 
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more than the private, daily, unconscious operations of myth in 
each individual m e m b e  r of the society, but it is less than the 
abstract, a n o n y m o u s myth of the analyzer. Its privileged function 
is to reinforce the hearers' sense of "belonging" to the group,21 
and it is filled with the familiar, immediate, experiential content 
of the singer's and hearers' world. 
The articulated myth , existing between the purely functional 
reality of ordered material p h e n o m e n a and the a n o n y m o u s 
structure of the analyzer's abstractions, creates an ideal mental 
space in which the singer and hearers dwell. It is here that the 
surplus of explanatory power in the structure and the surplus of 
empirical content play a crucial role. Neither sacred nor profane, 
this ideal mental space reveals a trace of the whole, self-regulating 
system, the ghost of perfect knowledge and order, while it 
grounds its expression in the concrete, immediate, familiar 
experiential plenitude. This myth , which exists only in the act of 
articulation, is, nonetheless, m o r e than mere momentary experi­
ence, for it implies membership in an enduring community . T h e 
singer creates, then, what Heidegger calls "world," a dynamic 
space wherein he and his audience dwell by virtue of his act of 
articulation. 
The world is not the mere collection of the countable or 
uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are just there. But 
neither is it merely an imagined framework added by our representa­
tion to the sum of such given things. The world worlds, and is more 
fully in being than the tangible and perceptible realm in which we 
believe ourselves to be at home. World is never an object that stands 
before us and can be seen. 
. .  . By the opening up of a world, all things gain their lingering and 
hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits.22 
T h e articulated myth shows a m o r e radical form of mythical 
thinking than that represented by the structuralist studies of 
Levi-Strauss. Beneath the collective system, "belonging" implies 
the existence of an individual "ego" w h  o belongs; the act of 
singing a myth , in order to function as a reinforcement of the 
individual's awareness "of his roots in society,"23 must also m a k e 
him aware of himself as m e m b e r . 
In this creation of world, or an ideal mental space, w  e glimpse 
what Ernst Cassirer calls the rudimentary symbolic level of 
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mythical thought. H  e too describes the symbol as combining raw 
sense experience and abstract formal totalities in such a way as to 
be reducible to neither. "It is only in these activities as a whole 
that mankind constitutes itself in accordance with its ideal 
concept and concrete historical existence; it is only in these 
activities as a whole that is effected that progressive differentia­
tion of 'subject' and 'object,' T and 'world,' through which 
consciousness issues from its stupor, its captivity in mere 
material existence, in sensory impression, and affectivity, and 
becomes a spiritual consciousness."24 This fundamental basis of 
mythical thought and mythical consciousness defines the 
subjectivity of the myth singer, yet it allows him to create a world 
wherein he and all individual m e m b e r  s of the society, with their 
o w  n individual identities, m a  y truly belong. This is not, then, the 
agonizing self'Consciousness of moder  n existentialist philosophy, 
but it is the emergence of personal identity in what might be 
called, with acknowledged paradox, a "collective individuality."25 
W  e k n o w too little about the sanctioning of myth singing in 
most societies, ancient or contemporary, to do more than 
speculate about its limits and purposes. S o m  e cultures do not 
seem to encourage such activity, and m u c h of the material of 
"sung" myths has c o m e to us either in written, literary form or in 
abstract accounts of ritual ceremonies. It is clear, however, that 
the singer's subjective role is important and that there is a 
significant "provincialism" in sung myths that consists of both 
an emphasis on specific local detail and in the suggestion of 
broader limits to social belonging.26 It seems a necessary 
component of articulated myths that they be localized, given a 
familiar ground against which is raised the somewhat unfamiliar 
but embracing ideal mental space. 
Herein the privileged articulation provides an obvious and 
instructive analogy to the literary use of myth. T h e singer of a 
myth must concern himself with the aesthetic problems of 
language, form, and execution (performance), but he must do so 
within the psychosocial and historical limits placed on him by his 
subject matter and the "occasion" for articulation.27 This latter 
factor is both helpful and a hindrance; the occasion is generally 
"given" to him by the homogeneous situation of his singing. His 
audience is already familiar with the language, tradition, locale, 
and cognitive system, but because this is so they function not 
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merely as passive receivers but as active and critical participants 
in the performance. The product of this given occasion is the 
strong provincialism of mythic thought—a provincialism that is 
not a matter only of shared geographic and historical details, of 
familiar facts, themes, and actions, but is m o r e broadly 
experiential in that singer and audience share a system of mental 
constructs, a "local system . .  . of significant choices,"28 that 
organizes mere familiar material phenomena and social behavior 
into ideal mental spaces, into what finally must be seen as an 
ideological context that does not so m u c  h determine individual 
thinking as it delimits the field of discursive possibilities. 
The literary use of myth is similar in that it involves the 
individual "voice" of a writer w h  o would articulate a myth or 
cognitive system to particular, familiar experience; yet the writer 
cannot assume the "givenness" of his occasion for articulation, 
and he must struggle against the limitations of his written 
language, which lacks the experiential immediacy of oral 
speech.29 H  e must create or recreate the occasion within which 
the myth as a "system of significant choices" can speak to 
appropriate material phenomena, and he m a y utilize any number 
of verbal devices, the creation of metaphoric or poetic forms, to 
give the illusion of oral singing. T h e literary use of myth, 
therefore, is situationally, though not functionally, different 
from the "natural" or cultural use of myth. 
The response of writers to the need for a created occasion 
varies widely; in the specific example of this chapter Faulkner 
brings forth, out of his o w  n "real" experience, a fictional, 
homogeneous culture within which he works in almost all of his 
individual performances.30 H  e provides his readers with the 
"province" of Yoknapatawpha County, Mississippi,31 but the 
province is not under the same constraints as the individual 
performance (work). This occasion for articulation is no more 
than a necessary assumption of homogeneity and familiarity. T h  e 
reader unfamiliar with Faulkner's total corpus is sometimes 
frustrated, but the province manifests itself in the "attitude" the 
writer takes toward details and fragments of experience that, 
without proof or demonstration, he simply treats as a loosely 
woven fabric of background. These fragments remain loose and 
unarticulated until the work is raised into the foreground against 
them. Yoknapatawpha County, like the given occasion of the 
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myth singer, remains an endless possibility, an infinite manifold 
of potential discrete experiences, taking on meaning w h e n raised 
into the ideal mental space of the created work. 3 2 
O n  e very significant constraint placed on the native myth 
singer arises from the narrow sanctions of his given occasion. 
His intuitive understanding of both tradition and local detail will 
be strictly measured by his audience, and a failure of understand­
ing would result in an improper use of myth, what w e might 
generally term "failed interpretation." M o r e than mere inaccu­
racy of detail, such failure is, in effect, improper thinking and 
results in either the failure to create an experientially viable and, 
hence, embracing ideal mental space or in a revolutionary 
cultural expression; it results in nonsense or n e  w ideas. For the 
literary user of myths the problem is at least partly (but only 
partly) aesthetic, since the province or occasion is also created. 
The literary artist will not be judged only by fellow tribesmen on 
the basis of a singer/hearer homogeneity (although he will in part 
be so judged), but rather by his heterogeneous audience accord­
ing to h o  w convincingly he gives the necessary details of occasion. 
T h  e materials of this created province, the sense of time and 
place, which circumscribes but is not circumscribed by the work, 
has traditionally been treated as irrelevant detail, local color, or 
texture. It is, of course, not at all irrelevant and can be seen as 
such only by critics w h  o focus on abstract structure or theme as 
the "soul" of the work. T h e necessary and given provincialism of 
the myth singer's performance must, for the writer, be removed 
one step from his "real" world. T h e experiential detail of the 
writer's world enters into the fabric of his created occasion and is 
thereby realized for the reader. Th  e action gives the artist 
aesthetic control over it, but no less an obligation to understand 
it as the most basic ground of his act of articulation. Unable to 
assume the familiarity of his audience with this detail, he must 
first selectively, and hence aesthetically, m a k  e it familiar, then 
raise out of this familiarized detail the unfamiliar but embracing 
ideal mental space. 
In a novel like Go Down, Moses, however, it is not enough to 
say that characters misunderstand one another or themselves or 
their situations; rather, the complex structure of failed and 
successful interpretations involves the reader directly and creates 
the novel's powerful affective dimension.33 T h e reader learns the 
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characters' limitations in regard to their fictive worlds only by 
coming to terms with the process of understanding and interpret­
ing that enables him, as reader, to achieve a sense of belonging in 
his o w n real world. Through participation in the order of 
language created by the author's articulation, the reader experi­
ences the basic h u m a  n struggle to stabilize his o w n  , always 
tentative, being. The world of the novel is what Susanne Langer 
called "virtual" space and time34; therein w  e experience 
Faulkner's "vision" of his world as w  e live in his articulated 
version of that world. It is a continuous and profoundly histor­
ical struggle that brings the affective and expressive dimensions 
of art into a true c o m m u n i o n . T h e author invites his readers into 
his world not simply to see "what" he saw but to experience "as" 
he experienced. The provincialism of the artist's articulation 
transports the reader to another place and time not in the 
fragments and details of material phenomena "pictured" for him 
but in the vision in which the reader dwells through his intuitive 
or sympathetic understanding. N  o single work, moreover, ex­
hausts the experiential possibilities of the author's or reader's 
real worlds. Thus w e find authors continuing to write, each work 
calling forth a n e w vision and building a "collectivity" of works. 
Beyond the corpus of any single writer there is an even looser 
composite of works that form the collectivity of a general literary 
tradition. 
N e  w articulations arise, transforms occur as a result of man' s 
driving need to speak his myths to the endless variety of 
experience. The tradition composed of these efforts is neither 
linear nor homogeneous; it is a conglomerate of fits and starts. 
The goal, unconscious but fundamental, is to exhaust the surplus 
of experience, to fill the surplus of structuring potential with 
infinite content and achieve therein a oneness with the world that 
precludes the need for ideal mental spaces or virtual symbolic 
orders. It is this oneness that Frye proclaims "the total dream of 
m a n " ; 3 5 but because it remains a dream the tradition is never 
closed. M a n '  s "pilgrimage of being"36 is an endless quest for the 
future perfect, the "I will have been" that is stronger than "I will 
be" (the always unattained), weaker than "I a m  " (the always 
illusory and fleeting), and more hopeful than "I was." H u m a  n 
history is the record of this struggle, filled with great m o m e n t  s 
where it seemed, but only for a m o m e n t , that the dream had been 
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realized and the "I a m  " fixed. Dispersed in this history, part of it 
but not fully symbolic of it, the greatest works of our literary 
tradition stand forth as privileged m o n u m e n t s  , articulated out of 
their o w  n time, enabling us to return to the ideal mental space 
spoken on an occasion at another hour in another land. These 
m o n u m e n t s are, perhaps, the only still vital expressions of man's 
agonizing pilgrimage. 
B E L O N G I N G A S TYPICAL: S A M F A T H E R S 
A s m u c h as any of Faulkner's works, his short story "The 
Bear" has attracted almost universal critical acclaim. It has been 
frequently and revealingly interpreted, yet one structural pecu­
liarity has never been fully explained: what is the relation of the 
long fourth section to the other, chronologically arranged parts 
that narrate the hunt for old Ben? Perhaps the answer lies hidden 
in Faulkner's remark that the fourth section belongs to the novel, 
Go Down, Moses, as a whole;37 thus, instead of trying to integrate 
this obviously different section into the traditional narrative of 
adventure, w  e might emphasize its contrast with that narrative. 
Considerations of "Th e Bear" in its larger form apart from the 
whole novel have resulted in partial explanations. The relation­
ship of section four to the rest of the story has been said to be 
mediated by the character of Isaac McCaslin, w h  o learns of his 
family heritage in the fourth section and w h  o is the self-conscious 
hero of the hunt sequences. In an allegorical interpretation that 
follows this emphasis on character, section four is seen as 
depicting a fallen world tainted by original sin and in conflict 
with the innocent world of the forest and the hunt. Still further, 
the world of part four, viewed sociohistorically, describes an 
economy where blacks are dominated and exploited by whites 
while the Edenic world of the hunt denies such social hierarchies. 
All of these observations are true to some extent, but instead of 
explaining away the difference they clearly emphasize it. 
W  e must begin with the assumption that the insertion of 
section four marks a break that signifies a necessary difference, a 
structural and thematic juxtaposition of different, though not 
simply opposed, elements of the complete novel. O  n further 
investigation w  e will also find that the elements so juxtaposed are 
not merely stories or moral lessons; they are disjunctive cognitive 
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systems, one clearly mythic and the other (initially historical) 
aspiring to the condition of myth, perhaps in a form w e can 
legitimately call "anti-myth."38 There is a tension between these 
two systems; but there is also a structural congruence in their 
manifestations, and on the basis of this complex relationship 
Faulkner is able to c o m m e n t on the limits of h u m a n understand­
ing and action. H e posits on the one hand the extreme of 
fragmented and discontinuous experience and on the other hand 
the extreme of order, wholeness, and continuity. This is not to 
suggest that in Go Down, Moses he creates a modern myth. 3 9 
Rather in his use of myth he tests its integrity and durability, 
while at the same time he asserts the viability of history as a m o d e 
of thought, not unlike myth, born of the interplay of collective 
and individual consciousness. 
The most obvious mythical dimensions of "The Bear" concern 
the hunt for old Ben. Traditionally this is characterized as a 
primitive nature myth (a sloppy and inaccurate designation) or as 
a totemic myth involving a ritual of initiation. The latter is 
accurate but frequently given a misdirected focus that illuminates 
the role of old Ben but excludes other crucial factors. The 
totemic aspects of the myth are expressed not through Ben but 
through S a  m Fathers, through the cognitive strategies that define 
his world, his being and belonging. T  o fully understand this myth 
we must separate S a m from the romanticized version of him 
fostered by Ike McCaslin. It is only in Ike's eyes that S a  m recalls 
a watered-down version of Rousseau's "noble savage" or e m  ­
bodies the rather simplistic Christian virtues of humility and 
prelapsarian purity. Perhaps the most obvious example of this 
misconception is found in the different treatments of the n a m  e 
"Fathers."40 For Ike the word raises questions of genealogy and 
patrimony. Hence, S a m belies his n a m e and betokens a terrible 
sense of an ending for the noble Indian race (already tainted in 
Sam's mixed blood) " n o w drawing toward the end of its alien 
and irrevocable course, barren, since S a m Fathers had no 
children" (p. 165).41 The factual accuracy of Ike's observation 
joins two ideas that S a m himself might not associate; that S a m 
has no children and that the Indian race is disappearing have 
almost a causal connection in Ike's mind, but the n a m e "Fathers" 
does not function to m a k e the same connections for S a m . W  e 
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should see his treatment of his n a m e in the same context as the 
title he applies to the great buck of "The Old People," the breath­
taking animal he addresses: "'Oleh, Chief . . . Grandfather'" 
(p. 184).42 
S a  m is a chief43 although the privileged, hierarchical nature of 
this role is played d o w n  ; he is a chief without a tribe; he rules not 
by election or rights of descent but by a "natural" right. In part, 
Ike recognizes this: "there was something running in S a m 
Fathers' veins which ran in the veins of the buck too" (p. 350), 
yet Sam's reverence before the stag means neither that he 
confuses his actual parentage with that of the animal nor that he 
recognizes his h u m a  n grandfather reincarnated as a deer. Either 
belief would prevent him from hunting these sacred animals. 
Rather than taboo, the buck is a totem animal for S a m . It 
identifies his tribal belonging, membership in what w e might call 
the "deer tribe" whose primary social and "economic" activities 
are hunting.44 W e should remember that S a m is never at h o m e in 
civilization, and he leaves his "shop" to return to the forest as a 
hunter (pp. 173-74). T h e great buck "mediates" conflicts 
inherent in the hunt between forces on which the tribe's very 
existence depends. Deer are both the product for sustaining life 
(food) and the focus of an activity that ends life (death as the goal 
of the hunt). Sam's identity, therefore, is bound up with the 
totemic myth of hunter and prey and is not dependent on 
"humility" and sinless "purity." His hunting prowess is natural, 
not supernatural or mystical, and his myth gives him certain 
charter rights to the forest, detailing for him autochthonus 
origins that take no notice of the white man's legal "owner­
ship."45 S a  m is not confronted with the problem of patrilineal 
inheritance that disturbs Ike; he does not feel, as Ike does, that it 
is a "sin" to sell the wilderness (in fact his father did sell it), and 
he does not (nor, ironically, could his father) even conceive of 
that manner of ownership. 
H  e belongs to the forest, to his tribe, and to the practical 
function of hunting; his membership in this collective group 
confers on him an individual identity that is at the same time a 
kind of "typicality." Here, as Cassirer says, "the feeling of sel/" is 
"immediately fused with a definite mythical-religious feeling of 
community."*6 But it is not therein a loss of self, for " M y t  h is one 
of those spiritual syntheses through which a bond between T and 
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'thou' is made possible, through which a definite unity and a 
definite contrast, a relation of kinship and a relation of tension, 
are created between the individual and the community."4 7 S a m , 
without confusing the self and the other, identifies with his 
grandfather through the mediating totem of the deer, which is 
not a symbol of generation but a unity of opposites—life and 
death, food and the kill. Sam's sense of belonging is an assertion 
of his collective individuality. "The whole [community or myth] 
and its parts are interwoven, their destinies are linked, as it 
were—and so they remain even after they have been detached 
from one another in pure fact."48 
Accordingly, Sam's attitude toward the hunt for old Ben is 
very different from Ike's. A s a hunt it demands the testing of 
strength between opposing forces; it necessitates, in this partic­
ular instance, the proper dog. This is both a practical need and a 
reflection of the eternal conditions of hunting, a paradoxical 
balancing of life and death. S a  m accepts the conditions without 
apparent emotion just as he matter-of-factly states that " 'some­
body is going to [kill Ben] someday' " (p. 212). W h e  n the proper 
dog arrives, S a m greets him with "neither exultation nor joy nor 
hope," and Ike thinks that " S a m had k n o w n all the time . . . it 
had been foreknowledge in Sam's face that morning" (pp. 214" 
15). It is, of course, "foreknowledge" based on recognition and 
simple faith. The arrival of Lion, the proper opposing force for 
Ben, is guaranteed by Sam's natural world of the hunt, a 
continuous, orderly tension between hunter and prey that de­
fines the extremes of life and death for him. This is the heart of 
the lesson that S a  m tries to teach Ike: that, to use Ike's o w  n 
cryptic and not quite comprehending terms, "by possessing one 
thing other, he would possess them both." (p. 296). 
Ike's response to Lion is wholly different, a repeated refrain: 
"So he should have hated and feared Lion" (pp. 209, 212, 226); 
the dog's sudden and seemingly magical appearance foreshadows 
for him an apocalyptic ending and a permanent loss. "It seemed 
to him that there was a fatality in it. It seemed to him that 
something, he didn't k n o w what, was beginning; had already 
begun. It was like the last act on a set stage. It was the beginning 
of the end of something, he didn't k n o  w what except that he 
would not grieve. H e would be humble and proud that he had 
been found worthy to be a part of it too or even just to see it too" 
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(p. 226). His nostalgia, fitted out with stoic acceptance, re­
awakens a questioning sense of moral worthiness and freedom 
from sin. The end here is an end of innocence, and he argues but 
gets no response from S a m , that " 'it must be one of us [to kill 
Ben]. So it won't be until the last day'" (p. 212). N o n e of these 
considerations occurs to S a m ; there is for him no temporality 
eventuating in fatalism; there is only the recurrence of the eternal 
act of the hunt here raised to the level of the typical. Typicality, 
therefore, is more than the mere familiar plenitude of experience, 
but less than the apocalyptic. "Out of the mass of impressions 
which pour in on consciousness in any given m o m e n t of time 
certain traits must be retained as recurrent and 'typical1 as 
opposed to others which are merely accidental or transient; 
certain factors must be stressed and others excluded as non­
essential."49 Typicality results from man's most basic efforts to 
order his experience, efforts that can be shared in a sense of 
community but that resist, then, intrusion from alien cultures. 
Ike attempts to impose his attitudes on S a m , "It was almost over 
n o w and he [Sam] was glad" (p. 215); for S a m , however, the 
hunt is no end but a culmination of the vital forces of life, no last 
day but a most typical day. T h e inevitable conflict between Lion 
and Ben betokens for S a  m an embracing, participatory, continu­
ation of life, not an apocalyptic m o m e n  t that, as Ike sees it, 
excludes all those w h  o are unworthy. 
Significantly, Ike's most unselfconscious m o m e n t of participa­
tion comes not in the hunt but in listening to Sam's stories. Here 
Faulkner promotes S a  m Fathers to the role of myth singer, and 
through his voice Ike is drawn into Sam's world. 
As he talked about those old times and those dead and vanished men 
of another race from either the boy knew, gradually to the boy those 
old times would cease to be old times and would become part of the 
boy's present, not only as if they had happened yesterday but as if 
they were still happening, the men w h o walked through them 
actually walking in breath and air and casting an actual shadow on 
the earth they had not quitted. And more: as if some of them had not 
happened yet but would occur tomorrow, until at last it would seem 
to the boy that he himself had not come into existence yet. . . . [P. 
171]. 
This passage is an instructive one for several reasons, some of 
which I will merely set forth here as anticipations of later 
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discussion. The focus is on both the affective and expressive 
(creative) dimensions of story telling, and in the self-conscious 
repetition of "as if" our attention is called to the narrow gap that 
exists between fiction and factual history.50 It is an act of 
articulation to experience wherein "the one w h  o speaks is able to 
effect a rebirth, through his discourse, of an event and his 
experience of that event."51 T h  e discourse itself, of course, is an 
event, an "as if" event that presents a past event as present 
experience. It is the storyteller's lie; words uttered in the here and 
n o  w can evoke, refer to, events, persons, things that have n  o 
present existence. The affective import of this special event, 
however, is primarily a characterization of young Ike's growing 
romantic consciousness. Th  e storyteller's lie is an act of illu­
sionary presencing (literally a rebirth), a filling up of space and 
time in what w e might call a narrative "digression" from 
temporal flow. Ike's driving passion is (will be) to dwell in the 
virtual space of a timeless world as a digression from life. T h e 
immediacy of Sam's oral narrative, the nowness and hereness of 
the event of telling the story, is transferred to the world of 
historical eventuality in order to stop time in a dream of 
timelessness. T h  e romantic association of oral language with 
presence will serve as a refuge from the "written" world that 
threatens to dismantle Ike's dream wish. 
N  o greater tribute could be given to the singer of tales than 
recognition of his powers of resurrection, his ability to grant 
corporeal existence through the "breath and air" of his voice. 
The experiential world of Kantian spatiotemporal unity is therein 
contracted into an immediate and present consciousness. A  s he 
listens, Ike feels nearer to belonging to S a m '  s world than he does 
at the m o m e n t of ritual initiation over his first kill (pp. 164, 
177^78),52 or w h e n he shares in the vision of the great buck S a m 
calls "grandfather," or even in his confrontations with old Ben 
(pp. 208, 211) . T h e timelessness of S a m ' s stories requires of Ike 
the total surrender of his o w n  , separate-world identity if he is to 
participate in them, and only this once can he manage to resign 
the time-dominated apocalypticism that haunts him throughout 
his life. 
The experience is not the same for S a m as it is for Ike. T h e 
radical disjuncture of temporality that twists the past into the 
future reflects a kind of "mythical m e m o r y  " through which S a  m 
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knows what was and what will be in terms of what is. Like his 
foreknowledge of Lion, his m e m o r  y of the past is confirmed by 
the eternal presentness of his world, and both serve as a 
guarantee of the future. S a  m belongs to the forest world, as Ike 
never can, because his world expresses for him a pattern of 
belonging. It is not, one m a  y assume, a pattern that he could 
describe as an abstract structure, but it is one that he naturally 
articulates in his stories. It is orderly, though not peaceful, and 
organized by a code of relationships that have a fundamental and 
infinite explanatory power for him. His lack of surprise at the 
arrival of Lion robs the event of any suggestion of the merely 
accidental; in Sam's world, predicated on the eternal balancing of 
the hunter and the hunted, Lion's appearance is not mere chance 
but meaningfully necessary in terms of Sam's myth. It is merely a 
matter of time. Such a code, of course, explains Sam's attitude 
about his o w n death, for w e cannot say with the country doctor 
that S a m (nor Joe Baker) just "quit" as old people do (p. 248). 
W h a  t appears to Ike and the others as stoical acceptance is, in 
fact, a carrying out of the code of his existence. Here too it 
signifies less an ending than a continuation, and S a  m "helps" Joe 
Baker in a ritualistic death as Boon Hogganbeck helps S a m 
(P. 254). 
Boon, himself one-quarter Indian, is logically the only one of 
the hunting party to perform this crucial function. But his Indian 
blood is insufficient to confer on him membership in Sam's 
cognitive world even though his mixed heritage excludes him 
from the world of the white hunters. Moreover, Boon is a 
perpetual child often (p. 232) and, hence, never a " m a n  " in Ike's 
terms (Ike crosses into " m a n h o o d " at twelve). H e is condemned 
to time-innocence "as though time were merely something he 
walked through as he did through air" (p. 228). Because of 
Boon's simple-mindedness Ike misjudges him, believing that it 
will not be Boon w h o kills old Ben (p. 235), that Boon, clearly, is 
not worthy. Yet it is Boon, along with Lion, w h o accomplishes, 
unknowingly, the mythical repetition of the eternal hunt. Boon 
gains temporary entrance into Sam's world by "marriage," 
through the half-comic, sexless wedding of the mongrel dog, 
Lion, and the mongrel manchild, Boon, described by Faulkner 
with self-conscious confusion of sexual identities (p. 220). The 
final mythical struggle, therefore, is a conflict between the 
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hunter, Boon-Lion, and the prey, Ben. They meet, with a further 
extension of the sexual imagery, in an embrace that is "almost 
loverlike" (p. 240). For a m o m e n t they seem to arrest time in an 
enduring stillness that "almost resembled a piece of statuary" 
(p. 241), but the hesitating terminology of this passage (the 
repetition of "almost") defies the apocalyptic freezing of the 
m o m e n t . The conflict of hunter and prey in a violent act of 
courage and self-destruction is not an end but, Laokoon-like, is 
an act of love, a preservation and continuation of life in its most 
typical actions. 
At the same time Boon's fragile belonging is shattered, first by 
the death of Lion and finally by the ritualistic death of S a  m in 
which Boo  n finds his o w  n last and self-expelling act of participa­
tion. Unlike Ike and the other hunters, he cannot return to the 
world of business and city dwelling. H  e is left alone, reduced in 
his last scene to a terrifying madness. This last appearance of 
Boon in the novel, carefully placed after Ike's long internal 
struggle with his o w  n identity and heritage in section four, stands 
as a warning that belonging is more than mere choice, mere 
acceptance or repudiation, more than an act of will. Boon's only 
h o m e , humorously yet tragically, is as sheriff of Hoke's lumber 
camp, halfway between civilization and the wilderness, between 
two different yet potentially embracing worlds. His fate, not 
properly attributable to either his simple-mindedness or his 
confused parentage, is to be excluded from both of the cognitive 
worlds of significant choices that define being and identity for the 
other characters. A n even more frightening, though similar, fate 
awaits Isaac McCaslin. 
B E L O N G I N G AS A R C H E T Y P A L : L U C A S B E A U C H A M P 
The fate of B o o n Hogganbeck would lose m u c h of its affective 
force were it not for the startling disjuncture of section four, 
which infuses another cognitive structure into the narrative. This 
structure, composed of the piecemeal fragments of the McCaslin 
genealogy, describes a world apart from and clearly in conflict 
with the wilderness of the hunt. Though it is not a myth in the 
familiar sense of the term, it nevertheless defines "being" and 
"belonging" and even at this level of generalization reveals som e 
qualities similar to the totemic myth of S a m Fathers. Like all 
2o Friday's Footprint 
myths it functions to mediate contradictions on the level of 
* 'mythical logic" (as Sam's deer totem mediates the forces of life 
and death) that cannot be resolved on the empirical level. But 
these similarities serve also to point up significant differences 
between the myth of the hunt and the anti-myth of the McCaslin 
family. The latter resembles what E d m u n  d Leach, braving the 
contradiction, calls "the precipitate of the development of an 
historical tradition"; its importance in the total structure of G o 
Down, Moses grows from its emphasis on the same kinds of 
structuring myths Leach finds in his analysis of the Old Testa­
ment.5 3 N  o doubt this results from the influence of a southern 
Biblical tradition on Faulkner himself, making the concern with 
"kinship," with culturally operative systems of "exchange," 
marriage rules and property ownership, of central thematic and 
structural importance to his novel. 
The fragmentary manner in which the McCaslin family myth is 
presented to us makes it a more problematical structure than the 
seemingly comforting totemic myth of S a m Fathers. Yet neither 
myth is inherently more orderly, complex, or adequate to 
experience than the other. Both meet the challenge of the 
empirical manifold with an exhaustive system of classifications, 
although the McCaslin myth, involving as it does questions of 
patrimony and descent, is more continually and self-consciously 
open to the threat of time and mere chance. T  o combat the 
dehumanization of a world ruled by accidentals, the myth of 
genealogy establishes a permanent, explanatory sense of origins, a 
genetic nexus that allows any m e m b e  r of the kinship chain to 
defy chance with the bravado of the reversible claim: "in m  y 
beginning was m  y end." Rather than a chaotic, linear tempo­
rality, therefore, such a strategy proves the legitimacy of belong­
ing by transforming temporal succession into the circular 
structure of a spatially deployed myth; its genetic characteristics 
do not emphasize origins and final ends in the traditional linear 
sense but utilize genealogical charts of descent in order to define a 
perpetually present sense of belonging. That is to say, genealogy 
become myth, in its spatiality, draws its historicalness into a 
circular structure around a defining center or mediating figure. 
This center need not be the "first of the line" but becomes the 
most legitimate measure of belonging to the line; the center is an 
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archetype that functions as a prototype for those w h  o claim to 
belong to the family. 
There is, then, a crucial distinction to be m a d  e between this 
historical myth and the nongenealogical, nonhistorical myth of 
S a m Fathers; the mediating element of Sam's totemic myth 
embraces the contradictory extensiveness of his experiential 
reality through the cognitive ordering of "typicals." Sam's world 
has no center because its identity-conferring power comes not 
from a kinship chain but from an integral interpénétration of 
discrete parts in an eternal natural order. O n the other hand, the 
legitimizing function of the archetype is a powerful organizing 
principle that grants not only identity through kinship but titular 
rights to family property. The totemic myth of S a m Fathers with 
its playing d o w  n of blood kinship and assertion of autochtho­
nous origins and natural "charter" rights regularizes time into 
patterns of repetition that are, in their typicality, of little threat to 
the myth structure's stability. But genealogical myth , with its 
emphasis on succession and kinship rules m a d e stable only 
through the enduring power of its archetypal center, seems 
always open to self-destruction. Legitimacy is often measured in 
terms of length of tenure; the oldest family has a privileged 
position. Yet the center is prey to both inner and outer forces of 
corruption; the purity of descent is threatened by exogamous 
marriage and by decay through the weakness of m e m o r y . Indeed, 
the genealogical myth, once it has achieved stability, seems to 
deliberately open itself again to the challenge of linearity and the 
threat of chance. 
Faulkner begins his use of genealogical myth by emphasizing 
the vague sense of beginnings in the McCaslin family. T h  e title of 
the first story of G  o Down, Moses is simply " W a s , " and it opens 
for the reader, almost without his being aware of it, a series of 
questions about origins. T h e copula "was" suggests that "some­
thing" was at "some" undefined time in the past. Faulkner has 
forced the verb form to serve as a noun, and w e ask not only 
"what was?" and "when?" but also "what is the particular 
significance of this pastness?" The title, however, gives only a 
direction, and the story itself gives only partial answers. T h  e 
McCaslin family is without a clear genetic nexus (a reflection of 
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Faulkner's sense of the fractured history of southern aristocracy); 
and before it can be transformed into genealogical myth it must 
find an organizing center—a center that, as it turns out, never 
defines the "original origin" very clearly. 
The function of the copula, then, becomes a crucial structural 
key. Because it grammatically joins both anterior and posterior 
elements, it suggests not only pastness but linear and h o m o g e n  ­
eous temporality; in a word, it suggests history. T h e function is 
essentially métonymie: the emphasis on a linear arrangement of 
elements in a structurally coherent chain; but it is also open at 
both ends, and this sets up a sense of structural (and spatial) play. 
" W a s  " evokes both a feeling of system (the potentially closed or 
limited) and a feeling of boundless movement  , transformation, 
and change within the very concept of infinite systernaticity. Its 
métonymie nature is historicity in small, the shuffling and 
organizing of endlessly plentiful particularity (moments or events) 
under the ever-present suggestiveness of order; one could say that 
history so conceived is "fallen" mythology or, conversely, a 
special form of discourse that aspires to the condition of myth 
(although it must never be confused with myth) . Faulkner takes 
this complex suggestion of history, however, and adds another 
dimension to it. By using the verb "was" in the traditional 
position of a noun, he opens up another structural order that 
allows the infinite possibilities of meaningfulness in the individual 
m o m e n  t or particular event to defy either historical or mythical 
reductiveness; the particular stands on its o w  n significance yet 
without denying its dependency on more comprehensive struc­
tural orders. 
T h  e subject of the first story, the subject element of the copula 
"was," is the first story itself, but there is a typical Faulknerian 
disjuncture in this self-reflexiveness. T h e story is a separable 
element with its o w  n adequate structure or Aristotelian whole­
ness. T h e theme of marriage, which drives the plot to comple­
tion, is neatly wrapped up in the case of the slaves Tennie and 
Terrel, and the parallel marriage plot, involving the whites 
Sophonsiba Beauchamp and Buck McCaslin, has at least a false 
resolution in Buck's temporary escape from the persistent 
Sophonsiba. In its seeming internal wholeness the story presents 
itself, therefore, as a privileged m o m e n t  , an objectified fragment 
of the past, but the suggestion of infinite regression in the title 
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denies this m o m e n t , and any m o m e n t , privileged status. This 
conflict implanted in the reader's mind forces him to acknowl­
edge the discrete "presence" of the individual story, its humorous 
and lively characterization, rich descriptive detail, and satisfying 
plot while it also raises the question of "absence," the "when  " 
and "where" of a covering structure to which this isolated 
m o m e n t belongs as one m o m e n t among m a n y . The reader's 
response to such a conflict is reinforced by the unexplained and 
surely abrupt "naming" of the novel's hero, Isaac McCaslin, on 
the first pages of " W a s .  " Ike is not a part of the story itself, nor 
even present to remember the action (p. 4); the m o m e n t took 
place before he was born. " W h y ,  " the reader wonders, "is he 
introduced here; w h  o are the people told about and what is Ike's 
relation to them?" W  e are trapped between the m o m e n  t and the 
pattern. 
The plot of " W a s ,  " activated by Terrel's plan to marry Tennie 
over the objections of their respective masters, suggests a most 
significant set of relationships for the novel as a whole. Terrel, 
somewhat cryptically, reveals his strategy to Ike's cousin 
McCaslin E d m o n d s : "'Anytime you wants to git something 
done, from hoeing out a crop to getting married, just get the 
women-folks to working at it.'" (p. 13). The idea is to entangle 
his o w n fate with that of Sophonsiba and Buck, and the device 
Faulkner uses to convey that entanglement is a poker game. It is 
marvelously adequate to this end; humorous and entertaining, 
this supposed game of chance establishes the crucial terms of the 
McCaslin genealogy through a superficially confusing but finally 
logical system of bluffs and betting ploys. Slaves, w o m e n  , money  , 
and property function as equivalent media of exchange. M o r e  ­
over, in the process of the games the two major branches of the 
McCaslin family interact; the black and white descendants of old 
Carothers McCaslin share a c o m m o  n fate without, however, 
clear thematic association. 
The interaction of the two McCaslin lines continues through­
out Go Down, Moses. This is the central action of the second story 
"The Fire and the Hearth" whose hero Lucas Beauchamp is the 
son of Terrel and Tennie. The question raised here involves the 
legitimacy of various claims to the McCaslin land. Lucas is one of 
only two patrilineal descendants of the patriarch, Carothers 
McCaslin, but Lucas is black. The other direct male-line heir is 
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Isaac McCaslin, the son of Sophonsiba and Buck, w h o is white 
but has repudiated his claim to the land. Thus, actual possession 
of the farms has fallen to the matrilinear line beginning with 
McCaslin E d m o n d s  , and continuing through his son Zack and 
grandson Roth. The legitimacy of ownership is as complicated as 
the poker game of " W a s ,  " but lacks even the suggestion of the 
element of chance. The problem is to establish the proper rules, 
and this involves the primary consideration of laws of exchange, 
the proper transference of w o m e n , slaves, money, and property 
within the kinship system. Lucas Beauchamp expresses the 
confusion neatly in an excellent Faulknerian inversion: "'Old 
Cass [McCaslin E d m o n d s ] a McCaslin only on his mother's side 
and so bearing his father's n a m  e though he possessed the land 
and its benefits and responsibilities; Lucas a McCaslin on his 
father's side though bearing his mother's n a m  e and possessing 
the use and benefit of the land with none of the responsibil­
ities'" (p. 44). This conflict within the kinship structure makes 
the fundamental questions of belonging and being subject to the 
same confusion. 
The system of exchange established in " W a s  " is reactivated in 
"The Fire and the Hearth"; the conflict between the black and 
white, patrilineal and matrilineal, lines comes to a focus on 
Lucas's wife Mollie. It is resolved only through a ritual confron­
tation that gives rise to a mediating, archetypal figure. O  n the 
empirical level, however, there is only contradiction. Lucas, even 
after the ritual action has mediated the conflict, still ponders its 
experiential impossibility: " ' H o  w to G o  d . . . can a black m a  n 
ask a white m a n to please not lay d o w n with his wife? A n d even if 
he could ask it, h o w to G o d can the white m a n promise he 
wont?' " (p. 59). Yet as he muses on this dilemma he has already 
asked for and received the promise, not so m u c  h as a verbal 
agreement but in an archetypal m o m e n  t of union through 
conflict. Lucas has already asserted his rights within the kinship 
rules, the patrilineal rights that make his wife taboo to other m e n . 
These rights (though empty of "legal" import) are guaranteed 
against the encroachment of Zack, the matrilineal descendant, 
but they are not guaranteed against Zack's assertion of his white 
supremacy. W h e  n Lucas tells Zack, '"I wants m  y wife,'" he 
speaks in the legitimacy of his blood descent; he is the grandson 
The Pilgrimage of Being 25 
(and great grandson) of old Carothers McCaslin, whose inces­
tuous relations with his o w  n half-black slave daughter resulted in 
the birth of Terrel, Lucas's father. Unde  r the laws of patrilineal 
descent it is unclear whether or not Carothers's taking of his o w  n 
daughter is forbidden; it is clear, however, that the doubling of 
Lucas's patrilineal rights gives him strong claim against Zack, for 
Mollie cannot be freely exchanged without risking a break in the 
line of male descendants. Carothers, however, has also broken a 
social taboo that separates the black and white races, and in this 
sense Zack's taking of Mollie represents a continuation, a mythic 
repetition that will be repeated again. 
Th  e sense of repetition for a brief time stymies Lucas; there is a 
social and genealogical inevitability to Zack's actions. Signifi­
cantly, Lucas recalls the events leading up to the the taking of 
Mollie in mythological terms. H  e is sent across swollen rivers to 
fetch a doctor for Zack's white wife dying in childbirth (the child 
is Roth). It is a journey into and return from death, a rebirth 
from the river "Lethe" only to find "a world . . . subtly and 
irrevocably altered" (p. 46) . At this point Lucas wishes to 
reestablish his life the way "it had used to be" (p. 48) , but this 
wish is fulfilled not simply by returning to the "good old days." 
The wish actively raises the inherent conflicts of his heritage 
(reawakened by Zack's taking of Mollie to replace his dead wife) 
to a mythical level—a level where mediation is possible. Lucas's 
rebirth is, therefore, rebirth into essential knowledge; m e m o r y is 
transformed from nostalgic yearning to that "mythical m e m o r y " 
that is of past, present, and future. 
Thus Lucas realizes what he must do almost as if he had already 
done it; he asserts his patrilineal rights by taking Mollie back. H  e 
challenges Zack to a physical confrontation and carries the fight 
to him w h e n Zack seemingly will not respond. H e enters Zack's 
bedroom in the early d a w n for what is, on the empirical level, a 
final confrontation between black and white, yet as he does so he 
begins to m a k  e manifest in his actions the conflicts of his and 
Zack's family heritage. Holding his open razor prepared for the 
sacrifice of the peaceful, sleeping victim—a sacrifice that in 
actuality will never be—Lucas forces the empirical to the level of 
myth. "In the first of light he mounted the white man' s front 
steps and entered the unlocked front door and traversed the 
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silent hall and entered the bedroom which it seemed to him he 
had already entered and that only an instant before, standing with 
the open razor above the breathing, the undefended and defense­
less throat, facing again the act which it seemed to him he had 
already performed" (p. 52). Here in an instant of timelessness 
past and future are joined in a present composed of the conflicts 
between black and white, patrilineal and matrilineal lines. The 
two m e n , though significantly unlike, are, Lucas tells us, 
'"brothers, almost twins'" (p. 47). The potential for mediation 
is here in the dioscuri, but only if Lucas can force Zack into an 
active response. T h e process is gradual but finally successful, and 
the climactic m o m e n t comes (so m u c h like the violent m o m e n t 
of the killing of Ben) over the "center of the bed" (p. 57), the 
sacred spot that functions as what Leach calls the * 'middle 
ground, abnormal, non-natural, focus of all taboo and ritual 
observance."54 In a m o m e n t of time transformed by ritual action 
into the echo of a myth, the precarious balance of irreconcilable 
opposites is held in tension. 
The significance of this m o m e n t reverberates throughout the 
novel. Indeed, the conflict of crossed cultural codes is a frequent 
narrative structure in Faulkner's novels that speaks nothing less 
than a cultural myth, the myth of the author's South. Complex 
and unresolvable in their m a n  y manifestations, the fundamental 
terms of this contradiction in Go Down, Moses are relatively 
simple. The codes involved express two immutable laws: (1) that 
lines of descent are measured through the heritage of the father 
and son, are patrilineal, and (2) that marriage rules are racially 
endogamous, thereby supporting the cultural hierarchy where 
whites rule blacks. The endogamous system, however, is severely 
restrictive upon the white group; it depends upon a plentiful 
supply of white females in the culture—on availability. It is 
further restricted by another code (only vaguely present in Go 
Down, Moses but explicit in m a n  y other Faulkner novels) out­
lining the taboo against incest. A s a result of this complex of rules 
certain exceptions have arisen. T  o preserve the scarce supply of 
white w o m e  n and the racial "purity" of the feudal South an 
extraordinarily strict code bars relations between white females 
and black males, but the inverse is not true. Relations between 
white males and black females are "permissible" with the crucial 
provision that no offspring of such a union be given "legal" 
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Carothers 
I white, female, ^ ^ v ,  - black, female, 
white,ith  male, with only secon- ^ £  ,  with no "legal"  "leg "	 §/)
rights	 dary "legal" "^ rights 
rights--deferring 
to any white male 
i N 
Ike "Cass" black, male, 
with no "legal" 
rights, but with 
equal claim to 
patrilineal 
Zack priority/ 
Roth	 Lucas 
rights to the inheritance of property, that is, be allowed to join 
the ruling white class.55 
The McCaslin family patriarch, old Carothers, has, with one 
"possible" exception, abided by these codes, but that exception 
has seemingly raised an unresolvable conflict. A simplified chart 
of these codes m a y help in visualizing the problem. It is the 
broken line of "incest" that disrupts the balance of the chart; this 
is, of course, what Ike sees as the McCaslin "sin," but more 
importantly it is the act that gives Lucas equal status with Ike in 
the patrilineal system. T h  e confrontation between Lucas and 
Zack, therefore, brings several codes into play. Zack, as a white, 
has the advantage over Lucas, a black, but Lucas, as a "double" 
direct male descendant, has the advantage over Zack, a descen­
dant on the female side. They are not quite equally balanced, and 
the symbolic "marriage" of the dioscuri only momentarily 
mediates the conflict. 
A  s the tension breaks itself apart, Lucas emerges into an 
archetypal presence through his confrontation with the "other." 
It is he w h  o possesses the icon of the struggle, the misfired bullet, 
still "live" as it contains "two lives" (p. 58); it is Lucas w h o , 
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through his mixture of white and black blood, gains the slight 
advantage over Zack in order to assert his patrilineal dominance 
over the matrilineal line. H  e is, henceforth, the centering force of 
the McCaslin genealogical m y t h — a position recognized by Roth 
E d m o n d s m a n y years later even though he does not k n o w of the 
ritual confrontation (p. 114). 
H e could see Lucas standing there in the room before him . . . the 
face which was not at all a replica even in caricature of his 
grandfather McCaslin's but which had heired and n o  w reproduced 
with absolute and shocking fidelity the old ancestor's entire genera­
tion and thought—the face which, as old Isaac McCaslin had seen it 
that morning forty-five years ago, was a composite of a whole 
generation of fierce and undefeated young Confederate soldiers, 
embalmed and slightly mummified—and he thought with amaze­
ment and something very like horror: He's more like old Carothers than 
all the rest of us put together, including old Carothers. H e is both heir and 
prototype simultaneously of all geography and climate and biology which 
sired Old Carothers and all the rest of us and our kind, myriad, countless, 
faceless, even nameless now except himself who fathered himself, intact 
and complete, contemptuous, as old Carothers must have been, of all blood 
black white yellow or red, including his own. [P. 118] 
For Roth, Lucas centers the myth so completely that he contains 
m o r e of life than that represented in the McCaslin line; he stands 
for the conflicts of the whole southern tradition, unresolved, 
preserved, and born again in another form. 
It was as if he were not only impervious to that [McCaslin] blood, he 
was indifferent to it. H  e didn't even need to strive with it. H  e didn't 
even have to bother to defy it. H  e resisted it simply by being the 
composite of the two races which made him, simply by possessing it. 
Instead of being at once the battleground and victim of the two 
strains, he was a vessel, durable, ancestryless, non-conductive, in 
which the toxin and its anti stalemated one another. . .  . [P. 104] 
Ultimately, Ike too affirms Roth's conclusion, in charactis­
tically m o r  e romantic terms. H  e argues that Lucas takes only 
"three quarters" of his grandfather's, Lucius Quintus Carothers 
McCaslin's, first n a m e , " 'taking the n a m e and changing, altering 
it, making it n o longer the white m a n ' s but his o w n , by himself 
composed, himself selfprogenitive and nominate, by himself 
ancestored, as, for all the old ledgers recorded to the contrary, 
old Carothers himself w a s ' " (p. 281) . 
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It is crucial to note here the subtle distinctions between Roth's 
and Ike's descriptions of Lucas. Ike's romantic imagination is 
obsessed with origins and endings, with the romantic idea that 
time can be overcome in the archetype of self-creativity; the act 
of self-naming is conflated with the egocentric dream of self­
progenesis. Roth, though tempted by the egoism of the arche­
typal center, perceives the endless reverberations and echoes 
through time, across space, that shatter the family myth in order 
to project a more encompassing cultural myth of the South. For 
Roth, Lucas represents a "loop" in the narrative flow of family 
(genealogical) and cultural (southern) history, a repetition that 
turns back upon itself and stands as an archetype for the history 
of the culture. In Lucas a mediating answer is found for the 
infinitely regressive temporality of " W a s .  " T h  e necessity of 
origins, missing from the McCaslin ledgers, emerges in Lucas; it 
is, of course, a violent emergence, momentary, metaphorical in its 
expression through the "click," a tenuous centering of the 
genealogical/cultural (mythical) conflicts that cannot hold 
against its o w  n internal tensions, although Ike desperately wants 
the center to hold against the threat of time. 
Whatever Ike desires, the novel makes us aware that this is no 
more and no less than a symbolic centering; Lucas reverses the 
master/slave roles in order to symbolically replace, act as 
"supplement" for, the absence of an "original" family patriarch. 
H  e takes the " N a m e  " of the (great) (grand)father thereby 
displacing all other claimants, including Ike,56 but this is not to 
say that Lucas transcends his o w  n position in the family structure, 
that he becomes the present, timeless, apocalyptic, egocentric 
embodiment of the genealogical myth. T h e distinction I want to 
m a k  e here concerning Lucas's role in the novel can be expressed 
in two different ways. Linguistically, Lucas's act of self-naming is 
a form of catachresis, a misuse of language involving a dis­
junction in transmission or etymology. "Lucius" (old Carothers) 
is corrupted into "Lucas," the latter bearing, as Ike notices, a 
dissimilar similarity to the former. T h  e catachresis reveals not 
only change and alteration (Ike's temporal terms) but also the 
timeless process of linguistic substitution (the paradigmatic 
function where one term is allowed to take the place of another). 
Free exchange in the Lucius/Lucas ratio speaks for a free 
inversion of the master/slave roles. It is, therefore, the idea of a 
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centering archetype (overextended by Ike) that "Lucas" (the 
n a m e  ) represents in the narrative; w  e are encouraged to read 
"Lucas" with every mention of "Lucius" and, conversely, 
"Lucius" for "Lucas." Such is the force of patronymia, which in 
this present issue tells us m u c  h about the McCaslin (and 
Southern) desire for a stabilized family (cultural) myth marked 
by originary presence. 
This desire can be expressed in another way: in terms of the 
psychosocial relationships of the family. Family history, gene­
alogical myth, in Go Down, Moses must not be interpreted 
literally, that is, in the familiar (visual) manner w e all often use in 
saying that a child is the "image" (Roth uses the term "replica") 
of one or the other parent. Lucas is the "image" of old Carothers 
through the act a "mapping."57 Lucas fills the function-role of 
imaging forth old Carothers because it is designated to him by the 
other m e m b e r s of the family. After all, Roth has never seen old 
Carothers, and Ike's claim that Lucas consciously corrupted 
Lucius's n a m e is mere speculation. This designatory action 
(which Lucas only gradually comes to accept, never understands, 
and learns to exploit) expresses an intense sense of "need" 
(familial and cultural). For Roth the need arises from the 
"inherited" weakness of his matrilineal claim to the McCaslin 
land, but it also springs from a sense of guilt (familial and 
cultural), even if unconscious. Lucas is established in a role of 
circumscribed power, as authority and yet as ward, as father and 
yet as child. Lucas's archetypical function bears, for Roth, the 
ambiguity of the McCaslin and southern codes, both threatening 
and comforting, self-destructive and conserving. This twofold 
movement is even more clearly represented through Ike, whose 
romantic delusions of selfprogenesis designate Lucas as the image 
of McCaslin origins in a direct countermovement to his o w n 
great repudiation of the role of family patriarch. That repudia­
tion is an unsettling, an opening that not only needs to be filled 
but also calls attention to the self-destructive potential hidden 
within the family and southern social structure, in the revolu­
tionary idea that one can reject one's heritage. 
The significance of this patterning for the narrative of Go 
Down, Moses
 y for Faulkner's work as a whole, and, perhaps, for 
the general theory of narrative, cannot be overstated. It reflects 
both a theory of language usage and of cultural functioning. Th  e 
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matter is hopelessly tangled, for Ike, in the issue of original sin: 
the fact of the sin is clear but the origin and consequences remain 
clouded in the infinite regression of " W a s .  " That "initial" story 
opens the door partway by establishing the social economy of the 
family and culture based on the exchange of w o m e n  , slaves, 
money , and property; yet it remains for Ike, in the fourth part of 
"The Bear," to discover the value restrictions of that social econ­
o m  y in the McCaslin ledgers. There m o n e y  , writing, property, 
slaves, marriage, and sin are mingled, and because of this 
mingling "original" sin m a  y not be established as "originary." 
The sin is not a beginning act but an enabling act, the very essence 
of the exchange system itself, which, therefore, reflects no 
beginning or ending, no before or after. This, then, is the source 
of Ike's neurotic fear of time. 
The system of exchange as it is presented in " W a s  " equates 
w o m e n  , slaves, money  , and property, but such an exchange 
economy is too simple for an agrarian-capitalist system (which 
still bears traces of feudal morality) like that of the old South. 
The later stories m a k e the value restrictions m u c h clearer. 
W o m e  n w h  o are not slaves (white w o m e n  ) are exchangeable, 
through marriage contracts (conventions), only on specific levels 
of society. The exchange has to do with a heirarchy of the ruling 
white class (land owners) that permits upward mobility for white 
w o m e  n only whe  n scarcity of class-equal white w o m e  n is intense 
(see Faulkner's Absalom, Absalom! ). W o m e n w h o are also slaves 
(black w o m e n  ) function in a freer system of exchange because 
they cannot function as media for the transmission of "legal" 
rights. They can, ironically, transmit a " n a m e " insofar as w e are 
justified in seeing "Lucas" as a corrupt borrowing of "Lucius." 
This n a m e is a mark of biological kinship, but it is not a sign of 
legal rights; it is not the family n a m e  . A  s a result of this set of 
restriction-distinctions, the exchange of white w o m e  n is remark­
ably limited, whereas the exchange of black w o m e  n is potentially 
unlimited.58 Moreover, the distinction between white w o m e  n 
and black w o m e  n as media of economic exchange involves a 
radical distinction in function value; it is a distinction not unlike 
that in linquistics between "icon" and "sign."59 The white 
w o m a n as "icon" is society (hence, the antithesis of an antisocial 
act like incest). A  s icon she embodies a host of seemingly 
incompatible ideas: (1) the idea of repression and postponed 
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gratification of sexual desires (in the sacralizing of the marriage 
ritual),60 (2) the consequent displacement of "natural" desires 
(values) into artificial "needs" (values) as in the amassing of 
wealth or in the artificial inflating of values like those of the icon 
itself, (3) authoritarian control of the m e d i u  m of exchange 
(money),6 1 (4) conservatism, and (5) scarcity and exploitation. 
The black w o m a  n functions as a sign possessing only "exchange 
value,"62 as in the "free" substitution one for another. The black 
w o m a  n as sign expresses: (1) unrepressed desire or promiscuity, 
(2) consequently, the ideal of "natural" or nonartificially inflated 
values, (3) unrestricted flow of the m e d i u  m of exchange, (4) 
anarchy, and (5) the ideal of plenitude. 
This is a cultural myth considerably more inclusive than can be 
expressed by any one or all of Faulkner's novels. Yet the 
disturbances of family/cultural stability that drive forward the 
narrative of Go Down, Moses uncover these mythic patterns; 
those disturbances arise for two reasons. First, the extraor­
dinarily restrictive exchange value of the icon makes it less 
functional (less available and artificially more valuable) in social 
commerce than the sign. Second, these two functions, icon and 
sign, are not discrete elements in the social structure: if black and 
white w o m e  n are distinct as to race, they are indistinct as to 
gender and the function of transmitting biological kinship (recall 
Lucas's corrupt name) . This latter function must not be 
misunderstood (as, for example, Ike misstates it); the black 
w o m a  n conveys biological kinship even if the black child of a 
white father inherits no legal rights.  W e cannot, therefore, 
dismiss the distinctive treatment of black w o m e  n and white 
w o m e  n by drawing a line between sex (promiscuity) and 
marriage (purity), for biological kinship is a possible issue of 
both. Old Carothers's sin must be viewed ambiguously, as sin 
and not'Sin, as both the affirmation and questioning of a social 
law that runs to the very heart of the social structure. O n  e cannot 
say simply that incest taboos apply to white w o m e  n and not to 
black w o m e n , for that would necessitate an absolute distinction 
between white w o m e  n as "of society" and black w o m e  n as 
"outside society" (as "natural").63 
T h  e genealogical obsession with forefathers in Go Down, Moses 
exposes a complex of cultural attitudes. There is expressed in this 
an Oedipal subjugation to the father/archetype, a sense of guilt 
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that has as its basis little more than the awarding of priority to the 
father/archetype (hence, Roth's inability to take action against 
Lucas). Yet it also asserts the longing to be at one with the 
forefathers (the desire for atonement). This "at-oneness" is 
unavoidably repressive; it is the basis for a differentiation 
between belonging and exclusion, between master and slave. O  n 
the cultural level it is the basis of segregation, the ideology of 
racial purity, and authoritarian political power. Repression here 
appears as the foundation of social order by defining through 
prohibitions the distinction between culture and nature. T h e 
incest taboo, in fact, can be said to create (promisicuous) desire 
in order to exclude it from culture, and thus southern culture can 
be said to invest in the black w o m a  n all of those promiscuous 
desires that, through prohibition, negatively define the culture of 
the white (master) race.64 Black w o m e  n as slaves, however, are an 
essential m e d i u  m of exchange in society. They are not absolutely 
distinct in function from white w o m e n w h o are also a m e d i u m of 
exchange (if highly restricted) in social commerce . 
W h a t Ike discovers as the family "scandal"65 is the conven­
tional emptiness of the incest taboo, its arbitrary or "sign­
function" value. It is not the fact of incest as sexual act or even as 
psychological desire that is shocking. It is the ambiguous manner 
of its social encoding. T h e word "incest" never appears in the 
ledgers, and its absence tempts us to assign it magical powers, as a 
kind of negative icon asserted by its exclusion from the articulate, 
written world of family/social orderliness. T h  e ledgers, as a 
commercial narrative history of the McCaslin family, assert their 
existence (and the family's existence) over against the non­
existence of the term "incest." T h  e iconic presence of the 
family /social order is based on the prohibition (repression) of 
incest, its absence. But the illusion of negative iconicity here 
proves to be just that, an illusion. T h e ledgers' wilfull silence on 
the matter does not really exclude it from society. W h a  t should 
be guilt for sin is expressed in terms of an exchange of m o n e y  . 
Sin, literally, can be bought off; incest has a price in the 
commercial structure of exchange. M o r e importantly, the con­
fusion of m o n e y  , slaves, property, and w o m e  n (white and black) 
argues for a series of linguistic exchanges that explains the 
economic as well as moral basis of the family/society. 
For example: (+ or - ) incest correlates with (black or white) 
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close-kin w o m a n . T h e distinction is nothing more than a matter 
of convention, for presumably (-) incest or incest prohibition 
comes into play w h e n the (white) option is selected as an 
attribute of close-kin w o m a n  . But the ledgers overreact to this 
convention by "silencing" the term "incest" altogether, and that 
overreaction (guilt) creates the family riddle that Ike is 
compelled to solve, to articulate. H  e must speak the unspeakable, 
a paradoxical activity that forces him to see that (-) incest or 
incest prohibition does correlate with (black) w o m a n  , otherwise 
the m o n e y payoff would not have been necessary and the 
primary clue to the riddle's solution would not have been written. 
Finally, if (-) incest or incest prohibition is not the mark that 
separates family/society from "nature," from anarchy and 
promiscuity, if it is not the basis for an absolute distinction 
between the "icon" or culture (as racial purity and authority) 
and the "sign" of nature (as unrepressed desire), then anarchy 
and desire creep into the very fabric of culture itself. T h  e icon is 
little more than an overdetermined sign; the class structure 
contains the seeds of its o w  n destruction; revolution is contained 
in the potential of inversion of terms (e.g. master/slave, 
white/black) through unrestricted exchange (substitution). 
It is not the dog Lion, but the McCaslin ledgers that Ike fears. 
It is an attitude that causes him to fear writing in general, to 
prefer the oral society of S a  m Fathers as a type of Rousseauistic 
retreat. Ike's Rousseauism, however, is confounded by the same 
contradictions that underlie the McCasl in family m y t h . 
Expressed in a series of geographical/moral clichés, the "South" 
is opposed to the "North" in order to define cultural value on 
the basis of privileged origins. Rousseau's oppositional categories 
easily merge with similar distinctions articulated by defenders of 
the American South. T h e South is associated with passion (often 
expressed in the desire for origins), with agrarian love of the soil 
(or the primeval forest), and the illusion of eternal presence or 
plenitude. T h  e South is tribal; it is preliterate (a lingering ideal 
still extant in the special treatment of oral contracts in the South, 
the giving of one's word) , and, therefore, it is not only the 
repository of, but is also possessed by, oral language. T h e North 
replaces passion with cold logic, replaces love of the soil with the 
commerce of restricted commodity exchange, and replaces the 
dream of plenitude with the fear of scarcity that creates artificial 
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need (the basis of industrial productivity and overproductivity 
for profit/wealth). The North is national or international as 
opposed to tribal; it is essentially literate (emphasizing the 
supplementarity of exchange involving ownership of real 
property and contractual communality). T h e southern myth 
establishes the North as destroyer of the idyllic South, and it is a 
natural association that allows Ike to fix the destruction of the 
South in the very fact of writing (the ledgers).66 T h e North is the 
dreaded otherness, foreign, inauthentic; the North debases 
southern passion (desire for origins) into northern need/scarcity 
(originless supplementarity). 
But the fatal irony of Ike's discovery is the revelation of the 
dreaded northern otherness within the South itself. Insofar as the 
southern myth is embodied in the icon of the white w o m a  n 
(purity, innocence) it is, from the beginning, threatened by 
need/scarcity, by the too great restrict!veness that necessitates 
exceptions to the rules of exchange for the sake of self-
preservation. Thus northern supplementarity (sign-functioning) 
comes to "be" at the very m o m e n t that the southern icon is 
"conceived." Rules of restrictive usage like the incest taboo 
operate as repressive forces on one level (with regard to white 
w o m e n  ) and are relaxed as an indulgence of passion on another 
level (with regard to black w o m e n )  . Ike discovers in the 
McCaslin ledgers the written evidence of supplementarity within 
the myth of presence, which is to say that he discovers writing (as 
corruption) already there. 
There is, of course, som e justification for the southern claim 
that a northern invasion is a prelude to a fatal dispersal. T h  e 
oppositions—industrial versus agrarian, technological labor 
versus h u m a  n labor, centralized government versus local control, 
liberal versus conservative (as a series of not quite congruent 
pairs)—express the dread of the fall from plenitude and 
authenticity, the dread that paternalistic authority can be 
replaced by an anonymous authority. T h e North, as representa­
tive of industrial capitalism, is attacked for its dispersal of the 
biological family unit in order to replace that unity with the 
"company family," in order to replace the biological father with 
the "corporate father." T h e dehumanizing effect on the worker 
(child) of the corporate family is easily seen in the free substi­
tution that takes place throughout the national/international 
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structure of the company; " transfer rals" are the same as free 
"sign-supplements." Northern industrial capitalism, of course, 
m a y not be any more dehumanizing and exploitative than 
southern agrarian capitalism; southern bond slavery itself 
substitutes easily for northern wage slavery. But the issue here is 
not at this level moral (although it must ultimately be so 
understood). W h a  t is to be grasped is that otherness, as a 
necessary element in self-definition, self-preservation (or even 
using Ike's term, selfprogenesis), is not a simple outwardness to 
be excluded by an easy differential definition. Endogamy 
discovers within itself a necessary exogamy (as reciprocity);67 
oral language as myth of plenitude and presence reveals an 
inward "writing" as scarcity and supplementarity;68 belonging (as 
to a family or a society) is a matter of conflicting impulses 
between repression and rebellion. Lucas's emergence as the 
McCaslin archetype articulates this conflict; he is the origin 
(preservation) and self-destruction of the McCaslin family. 
Lucas's archetypal presence, however enduring and mythical 
it is, does not rob him of his individuality or particularity. H  e 
lives in the world, in its petty, daily circumstance, supported by 
the confidence of his position in the family myth. His status in 
that world gives him certain power over it, and his freedom to act 
within the permissive limits of his myth (the myth that he himself 
centers) often results in Faulkner's best h u m o r  . Lucas's comic 
willfulness is the subject of the other half of "The Fire and the 
Hearth," the action that results from the finding of a buried gold 
coin. Th  e scene is filled with mythic possibilities; the mone  y 
comes from the earth, from a potentially sacred place called the 
"Indian m o u n d . " But Lucas sees it in terms of his o w n myth, as 
m o n e y once buried by old Buck and Buddy McCaslin and, hence, 
his o w  n property by rights of inheritance. Lucas is tempted by an 
apocalyptic view of the incident worthy of Ike, but all this is 
wrapped in the temporality of his o w n genealogical myth. "For 
the next five hours he crawled on hands and knees a m o n g the 
loose earth, hunting through the collapsed and n o  w quiet dirt 
almost grain by grain, pausing from time to time to gauge by the 
stars h o  w m u c  h remained of the rapid and shortening spring 
night, then probing again in the dry insensate dust which had 
yawned for an instant and vouchsafed him one blinding glimpse 
of the absolute and then closed" (pp. 38X39). T he phrasing of 
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the passage is extraordinarily rich, measuring Lucas's "absolute" 
right to the m o n e  y as "heir and prototype" against the m o m e n  t 
by m o m e n t  , "grain by grain," "time by time" (and later in the 
same passage, "coin by coin"), temporality of his existence. The 
story of Lucas's search for gold takes on the form of the tall tale, 
the frontier h u m o r so prevalent in Faulkner's later work. Lucas 
becomes here the trickster, duping almost everyone and narrowly 
escaping terrible calamity, but this is a confirmation of his 
archetypal status, not a denial of it. H  e is a version of Jung's 
trickster, the clownish figure w h  o represents the fact that "some 
calamity or other has happened and been consciously 
understood,"69 that, w e might say, some conflict or other has 
been momentarily mediated. 
The archetypically centered genealogical myth, however, does 
not confer upon, all of its members the same reassuring barriers 
against temporality. The historicity of such a myth challenges 
time in a manner very unlike Sam's totemic myth, for the 
archetypal center draws into itself the diversity born of 
unmediated conflict and forces all to accept its paradoxical 
embracing of difference. Only Lucas manages to operate, clown­
ishly, within his mixed and conflict-ridden heritage. Roth 
E d m o n d s  , in his acknowledgment of Lucas's centrality, falls 
victim to the myth he belongs to. A s a child he k n e w only Mollie 
Beauchamp as a mother; yet she is not his mother, and she cannot 
confer on him the patrilineal heritage of Carothers McCaslin nor 
the black blood that would allow him to rival Lucas. In the 
innocence of childhood Roth accepts the fire and hearth of 
Mollie's cabin as the center of his world. "Even before he was out 
of infancy, the two houses had become interchangeable: himself 
and his foster-brother [Lucas's son, Henry] sleeping on the same 
pallet in the white man's house or in the same bed in the negro's 
and eating of the same food at the same table in either, actually 
preferring the negro's house, the hearth on which even in 
summe r a little fire always burned, centering the life in it, to his 
o w n " (p. 110). But the symbol of the hearth cannot prevent his 
fall into experience; the archetypal center does not deny time and 
reality but organizes it, gives it meaning. Th  e "interchangeable" 
function of the "houses" (family divisions) is not innocent but 
problematical. For Roth this necessitates an entering into the 
conflicting terms of myth. "Then one day the old curse of his 
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fathers, the old haughty ancestral pride based not on any value 
but on an accident of geography, stemmed not from courage and 
honor but from wrong and shame, descended to him" (p. 111). 
The presence of the centering archetype contains the nemesis 
of myth in the accident of geography. The myth confers on the 
accident a special meaningfulness, but Roth is, nevertheless, 
caught in the relentless history of the old ledgers, the "fading 
sequence" returning to the "anonymous, communal , original 
dust" (p. 261). The same fate does not await Lucas: he seems 
beyond time. H e will, Roth says, "'not only outlive the present 
E d m o n d s as he had outlived the two preceding him, but [will] 
probably outlast the very ledgers which held his account'" 
(p. 117). For Roth the awareness of his plight is swift and final. 
"Then one day he knew it was grief and was ready to admit it was 
shame also, wanted to admit it only it was too late then, forever 
and forever too late" (p. 112). In the story "Delta A u t u m n  " he is 
condemned, by the force of the centered myth, to repeat the sins 
of his fathers without resolving them, to repeat old Carothers's 
sin and bring the family full circle again around Lucas as the 
center. But by this point in the novel such matters cannot be 
assigned to mere accident. "Delta A u t u m n " opens with what 
seems like an irrelevant discussion of "circumstance" and 
"Happen-so" (p. 346) and closes with Ike's lament that Roth's 
partially black child was born "'just because a box of groceries 
happened to fall out of a boat'" (p. 360), yet to leave it at this 
point is too easy. Roth, once again like old Carothers, tries to 
buy his way out of the incestuous guilt of his actions with the 
black w o m a n , and once more the family confusion of w o m e n , 
slaves, and mone  y as media of exchange is reasserted. This story 
neither ends the McCaslin line nor cancels out Lucas's role as 
archetype. It does not, significantly, end the novel. It emphasizes 
the temporal opening outward of the archetypal center through 
Roth's child of mixed blood come "back to h o m e " (p. 362). 
The archetypal presence of Lucas does not stop time but proves 
it in its eternal repetitions; it tames accident into meaning. If the 
McCaslin myth is less comforting than the totemic system of S a m 
Fathers, it does not fail to speak to experience in order to mediate 
its inherent conflicts. 
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A P O C A L Y P S E A N  D T H E LOSS O F BEING: IKE McCASLIN 
The two worlds that emerge through the cognitive strategies of 
these separate myths stand in tension throughout Go Down, 
Moses, but their importance to the reader of the novel lies not so 
m u c  h in their epistemological functioning as in the pattern of 
complex moral commitments that they illuminate. O  n this level 
distinctions are not easily m a d e  , and it is clearly inadequate to fall 
back on a simplistic moral thematics that juxtaposes the 
"innocent" prelapsarian world of S a  m Fathers against the 
"fallen" world of the McCaslins, or the wilderness of natural 
piety against the culture of enslavement and exploitation. T  o do 
so is to be trapped by Ike's terminology, to reflect uncritically his 
romantic sentimentalism. Each of these two worlds makes 
demands on those w h  o would belong. Sam's totemic myth 
preserves individual identity as "typicality" through its collective 
system of differentials; it is an orderly world grounded on the 
principles of meaningful, balanced conflict, but it can be entered 
only by sacrificing modern man's obsession with origins and 
ends, by relinquishing altogether our romantic reverence for 
uniqueness and originality. Sam's centerless world affects a 
negative and leveling tyranny by disallowing any significant 
hierarchy of values within the structure of its discrete parts. It 
denies even Sam's truly privileged stature just as it renders the 
hunt for old Ben a typical rather than an atypical m o m e n t in 
time. Conversely, the archetype-centered myth subjugates all 
w h o seek to belong by relegating them to mere imitations of the 
archetype, and with its premium on origins and originality it 
encourages a cult of "personality." Yet unlike the collective 
system of typicals in the centerless myth, the archetypal myth 
exists under the constant threat of dissolution from the pressure 
of surplus experientiality. Th  e assertive, even violent, emergence 
of the centering personality sets the pattern for a constant 
revolution, a series of discontinuous, cataclysmic presencings of 
newly centered myths. 
The opportunity for such a rebellion is offered to Roth 
E d m o n d s in "Delta A u t u m n " ; through an act of love he could 
join the black and white, patrilineal and matrilineal McCaslin 
lines in a marriage that would exclude the heritage of enslave­
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ment and exploitation. Through the strength of the black 
w o m a n , w h o could truly "have m a d e a m a n of him" since she 
offers him a reunion with the patrilineal line of Carothers 
McCaslin, Roth might have accomplished what Ike never does. 
But the archetype-centered myth, open as it is to the challenge of 
temporality, proves its enduring qualities in "Delta A u t u m n  " by 
absorbing both Roth and Ike into the subjugating terms of its 
orderliness. Roth repeats the sin of Carothers, and Ike humiliat­
ingly repeats his earlier futile acts of atonement, once more 
attempting to buy off that sin. It is, perhaps, Ike w h o suffers most 
when confronted by the tragic failure of his life. The piercing 
truth of the black w o m a n ' s accusation that he is most responsible 
for Roth's downfall, that his "repudiation" damned Roth to the 
McCaslin sin, reaches him despite his effort to explain it all away 
as an accident, " 'because a box of groceries happened to fall out 
of a boat.' " The McCaslin myth traps him at this m o m e n t into an 
assertion of the very bigotry and racism that he sought to avoid. 
" H e cried, not loud, in a voice of amazement, pity, and outrage: 
'You're a nigger!"' (p. 361). 
The weariness of tone in this pivotal story no doubt reflects 
Faulkner's sense of his o w  n enslavement to the epistemological 
and moral limitations of his society; he allows his hero, Ike, to 
rebel only to fail to bring about the recentering of a new myth, 
and as a result there is a deepening of romantic individualism 
until it eventuates in an agonizing existential aloneness. But w  e 
would be too hasty if w e condemned Faulkner for a pessimism 
that simply bows to the morality of exploitation; the very conflict 
between the two worlds, between the totemic and McCaslin 
myths, affirms a h u m a n historicity that encompasses more than 
any one cognitive system, more than any one myth. Although 
this does not guarantee a better world in the future, it at least 
makes possible the freedom to strive for such a world. Thus in 
the failure of his hero, a failure so often repeated in his novels, 
and in the long struggle of his career as a writer, w  e see the 
constant testing of man's myths, social systems, and moral orders 
in an effort to articulate to experience a structure of equality and 
h u m a  n dignity.70 If Faulkner implies that m a  n has yet to attain 
such a world, it is less a resignation to man's impotence than a 
recognition of fact; the fragmentation of h u m a  n society into a 
plurality of epistemological, moral, and political systems, m a n  y 
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of which are enslaving and exploitative, reflects not Faulkner's 
failure to construct in this novel an exemplary, idealized aesthetic 
order, but his vivid articulation of the failure of misguided 
romantic humanism. 
Having repudiated his heritage (not merely his inheritance), 
Ike chooses for himself the wilderness world of S a  m Fathers to 
which he attributes moral superiority in its egalitarian structure. 
There Ike hopes to find that black/white distinctions, indeed, 
that all social and political differences are "indistinguishable" 
(p. 294) in a " c o m m u n a l anonymity of brotherhood" (p. 257) . 
But Ike is unable to realize this dream, and his abortive efforts to 
do so result in an ironic exclusion from the brotherhood he so 
deeply believes in. His "initiations" in the forest are designed to 
help him reverse the inexorable process of moral maturing, to 
m o v  e instead from experience to innocence, age to youth, from 
the culture of enslavement to the world of natural piety. Roth's 
early perspective on Ike seems to argue that he had accomplished 
these ends: "born into his father's old age and himself born old 
and become steadily younger and younger until . . . he had 
acquired something of a young boy's high and selfless innocence" 
(p. 106). Ike's understanding of Sam's world, however, is 
imperfect; rather than a structure of indistinguishable and 
anonymous parts, it is a structure that elaborates differences. Its 
order is a result of the balancing of opposites, of conflict, so 
clearly manifest in the hunt, in the vital forces of life and death. 
The essential characteristic of this world is its voracious inclusiv­
ism, its power to embrace the extensiveness of experience 
without denying to any particular its individuality. Ike, of course, 
never views this world from within; his perspective, dominated 
by its natural temporality, distorts Sam's wilderness in what w e 
might call overinterpretation. Ike's romantic high seriousness 
invests every particular m o m e n t  , or, better, certain selected 
moments  , with extraordinary meaning, fixes each m o m e n  t 
against the onrush of time not in the collectivity of the embracing 
orderly structure but in uniqueness and exclusive apocalyptic-
ism. His effort to escape time, therefore, affirms it through his 
obsession with "last-dayism"; his consciousness is dominated by 
the fear of a wilderness shrinking before man' s blind rush for 
progress. The natural world for him is filled with "momentary 
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gods";71 "truth" is not k n o w  n logically or experientially but is 
intuited, k n o w n in the "heart" (p. 260). A s a consequence Ike's 
life is a patchwork of discontinuous apocalyptic moments  . 
The anonymous brotherhood eludes him, and his selfless 
innocence belies a destructive egotism rather than an assertion of 
c o m m u n a l belonging. Interestingly enough, Roth's opinion of 
Ike changes by "Delta A u t u m n " ; he no longer sees him as an 
innocent young boy but as a foolish old m a n . Moreover, it is 
clear in this story that Ike's escape from the McCaslin heritage is 
only partial, that his initiations into innocence in "The Bear" 
were fatally disrupted by the insertion of section four. There Ike 
senses that unless the "fading ledgers" can be purged, replaced by 
a new myth (or an old but morally superior one), the McCaslin 
family will be condemned to repeat endlessly and meaninglessly 
the sins of their fathers. Even here, however, his solution is 
apocalyptic; he would "complete" the story elliptically told by 
the ledgers (p. 273) and pay off the inheritance that old 
Carothers willed to his black heirs. His efforts are futile for two 
reasons: he cannot locate them all (Tennie's Jim has disappeared) 
and, most crucially, in the very act of trying to complete the story 
he continues it. In "The Bear" and, with the haunting return of 
Tennie's Jim's descendants in the black w o m a  n and child of 
"Delta A u t u m n , " he repeats his grandfather's effort to buy off 
the white man's guilt. Thus in the dispirited final years of his life 
the McCaslin myth traps him once more in a renunciation of his 
Utopian dream and into a self'debasing racism. Ike is too m u c h of 
a self-righteous individualist to submit himself to Lucas's 
superior, archetypal position; he wants to center his o w n myth, 
but in trying to do so he is exclusive rather than inclusive. H  e 
does not find mediation for the contradictions of his experience; 
he merely turns them away or reduces them to apocalyptic 
moments . Such a myth, of course, provides him with no identity 
through belonging; his fate, ironically, is precisely what he feels 
Lucas thinks of him, that he "reneged, cried calf-rope, sold [his] 
birthright, betrayed [his] blood" not for "peace but oblitera­
tion" (pp. 108-9). 
Th  e significant factor revealed through the character of Ike 
McCaslin is the enormously complex epistemological and moral 
confusion that results from his repudiation. Faulkner creates not 
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only a representative modern character type but a setting, 
occasion, or world in a state of transition. T h  e agony of his hero 
results not simply from being caught between two cultures, the 
one ancient and dying and the other modern and invincible, nor 
from the simple, though frightening, realization that time relent­
lessly alters the familiar face of empirical reality. Ike faces a 
dilemma m u c h deeper and more puzzling, a muddling of epis­
temologies and moral values that isolates him from other m e  n 
and neutralizes the effects of his moral commitments. The novel 
tells of his eighty-year pilgrimage of being only to arrive at the 
status of "Uncle" Ike; his n a m e  , an obvious parody of S a  m 
"Fathers," also expresses the weakest of kinship links in the 
patrilineal McCaslin line, and Faulkner's mocking heroic epithet, 
"uncle to half a county but father to no one," reinforces the 
insignificance of his role in the family system and in the c o m  ­
munity. The confusion that torments him is best illustrated in the 
action of the fifth section of "The Bear," where he returns to visit 
Sam's grave and is surprised by a huge snake. H e draws back both 
in fear and reverence uttering Sam's words, "'Chief . . . Grand­
father' " (p. 330), but it is a blatantly ineffectual bit of plagiarism. 
Whereas S a m hailed his tribal totem in unconscious recognition 
of the deer's mythical mediating function, Ike substitutes an 
apocalyptic Christian symbol that belies his freedom from the 
enslaving yellow ledgers by evoking the image of his grandfather, 
Carothers McCaslin. Th  e snake, "ancient and accursed" (pp. 
329-30) , is inappropriate to Sam's world; it carries with it Ike's 
obsession with original sin and man's "fall" into linear tempo­
rality, chronological history. 
Ike's metaphors and analogies constantly return upon him 
with devastating effects. In "Delta A u t u m n ,  " as he rides once 
more to the annual hunt, the repetitious and meaningless cycle of 
his life presses in upon him. H e searches for one last analogy that 
will give proof to his existence, will give him an identity, but his 
choice is fatal. H  e notes that his beloved wilderness is disappear­
ing year by year, and he thinks: "the territory in which game still 
existed [was] drawing inward as his life was drawing inward, until 
n o w he was the last of those w h o had once m a d e the journey 
. . ." (pp. 335-36) . The diminishing outward world reflects his 
inward being as the circular horizon of his sense of belonging 
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contracts to the narrow midpoint of his o w  n consciousness. 
Driven inward u p o  n himself, alone in a world increasingly alien 
to h im, he returns once m o r e to his apocalyptic visions. 
Then suddenly he knew why he had never wanted to o w n any of it, 
arrest at least that m u c  h of what people called progress, measure his 
longevity at least against that m u c  h of its ultimate fate. It was because 
there was just exactly enough of it. H  e seemed to see the two of them 
—himself and the wilderness—as coevals, his o w  n span as a hunter, a 
woodsman, not contemporary with his first breath but transmitted 
to him, assumed by him gladly, humbly, with joy and pride, from 
that old Major de Spain and that old S a  m Fathers w h  o had taught 
him to hunt, the two spans running out together, not toward 
oblivion, nothingness, but into a dimension free of both time and 
space where once more the untreed land warped and wrung to 
mathematical squares of rank cotton for the frantic old-world people 
to turn into shells to shoot one another, would find ample room for 
both—the names, the faces of the old m e n he had k n o w n and loved 
and for a little while outlived, moving again among the shades of tall 
unaxed trees and sightless brakes where the wild strong game ran 
forever before the tireless belling immortal hounds, falling and rising 
phoenix-like to the soundless guns. [P. 354] 
T h  e m o v e m e n  t of the passage depicts a too easy transition in 
Ike's m i n d from the terrifying, discontinuous temporality of the 
"spans running out togeher" (that should logically end in 
oblivion, nothingness) to a denial of oblivion in the assertion of 
the apocalyptic, immortal world of soundless guns. T h e lesson of 
S a m ' s totem, which mediates the conflict of life and death, is here 
transformed into the metaphor of the phoenix, but the metaphor 
is a failure because, unlike S a m ' s totem, it cannot transform 
empirical reality into eternality, nor can it banish absence 
(obliteration) in the assertion of a magical presence. T h  e long 
journey that the hunters m a k e  , longer every year, denies the 
apocalypse, and Faulkner jars his readers out of the metaphorical 
allure with the abrupt short sentence that follows this passage: 
M H  e had been asleep" (p. 354) . Even the analogy of Ike's inner 
and outer worlds is destroyed a few m o m e n t s later w h e n one of 
the young hunters says, "'Uncle Ike . . . aint got any business in 
the w o o d s this morning'" (p. 355) . 
Oblivion, nothingness, and obliteration have pursued Ike 
relentlessly, and n o  w the very wilderness against which he has 
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measured his o w n being is not only disappearing but has become 
alien to him. The reverence and respect that young Ike held for 
Sam Fathers is not perpetuated for Uncle Ike in the attitudes of 
the young hunters he instructs (p. 335), and Ike's apocalyptic 
dreams have proved no stay against time. The poverty of Ike's 
being results from a very narrow and romanticized version of the 
Cartesian cogito ergo sum. The words Faulkner attributes to Ike in 
the form of an indirect quotation, introduced in the long passage 
above by "he knew," purport an existence for Ike that follows 
from the very act of thinking itself, "from the issuance of any 
proposition whatever."72 The entire dream passage functions as 
such a proposition (although it erodes into metaphor), and 
through its power as a performative act attributes being to the 
speaker in the form of a mind that knows. But it is a very narrow 
being at best, unmindful of the other, of the experiential reality 
that surrounds the thinker-speaker. It is a being without spatio­
temporal presence (hence, the fall into failed metaphor), 
bloodless, fleshless and, because it asserts being only in the 
performative act, fatally impermanent, requiring assertion again 
and again. Tending toward a discontinuous sequence of 
apocalyptic moments , such a being is subjective, devoid of 
experiential content, and removed from the possibility of action 
or moral commitment. 
In response to this morally empty life, Roth makes the first of 
two devastating comments to Ike in "Delta A u t u m n , " asking him 
"'where have you been all the time you were dead?'" (p. 345). 
Yet it is the black w o m a n  , extending Roth's question, w h  o forces 
us to see Ike's plight. " 'Old m a n , . . . have you lived so long and 
forgotten so m u c h that you don't remember anything you ever 
knew or felt or even heard about love?' " (p. 363). In the name of 
moral c o m m i t m e n t Ike's repudiation turns out to be a 
repudiation of life and love, first with his wife (pp. 314-*15) and 
thereafter with all mankind. H  e fails to project himself into life, 
to open himself up to a future, whether this be of mythical 
repetitions or historical progress, and he is condemend to merely 
dream of the days of "better m e n " (p. 345). The apocalyptic 
world of "anonymous communal brotherhood" eludes him to 
the very end, and he finds himself sending the black w o m a n away 
proclaiming that the time is "not n o w " (p. 361). H e gives her 
Roth's money and old General Compson's powder horn (pp. 
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362^63) as a token of her belonging and as an unspoken, half-
realized admission of his o w  n failure to complete the McCaslin 
myth. Ike has sought peace beyond the conflicts of experience 
and found only obliteration. Far from dead, the black w o m a  n 
and her child live on, as the McCaslin myth lives in them, with 
her strength in her love. 
Ike's repudiation, reverberating throughout the family/cul­
ture, stands forth to demand moral judgment. O n e must not, 
however, judge motivations here, only implications. Lucas's 
emergence into archetype, the inverse result of Ike's retreat, 
preserves the conflicts that trap Roth and reveal Ike's prejudices. 
Ike's apocalypticism reasserts the desire for self-preservation, 
based on the negative actions of repression and exploitation, that 
marked the cultural icon. The ideal of purity (racial, sexual) 
ironically results in a restrictiveness that denies passion, procre­
ation, love, and humanity. Thus Roth's fall is into promiscuity 
with its threat of chaos. Roth's chance for a truly revolutionary 
defiance of the family/culture myth, through marriage to the 
black w o m a n  , is forfeit under the terms of his o w  n heritage, and 
he is not able to erase those terms. It is a revolutionary option 
Faulkner confronted frequently in his works, never without 
anxiety. 
F O R G I N G T H E N O V E L : A G R A M M A T I C A L M O D E L 
At this point I hope the reader is at least predisposed to admit 
that myths enter literature in rather complex ways. T  o be sure, 
they provide fragments of meaning in the allusive surface of the 
work and are displaced into narrative structures, but often they 
are used in a more integral manner. The process is similar to what 
Jacques Derrida calls "deconstruction." This is neither the 
creation of a n e w myth nor the destruction of an old one; decon­
struction, seen as a "literary strategy," involves simultaneous 
countermovements, distinct yet mutually dependent.73 
The first of these movements is "démystification."74 O n e 
primary effect of deconstruction is to undercut the tendency of 
mythical thought to assert itself in an aloofness from immediate 
empirical reality. The artist forces the objectified or "subsistent" 
mythical theme-structure to emerge in the living, experiential 
world, to "accommodate" itself to "reality."75 M y t h ceases to 
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belong to the supernatural and the abstract or to purify itself as 
contentless, deep structure. T h e process draws myth d o w n to 
earth, scandalously making it speak to individual h u m a  n 
experience. Démystification, however, exists only in opposition 
to a countermovement on the empirical level. There, the merely 
familiar, habitual, unnoticed flow of experience is raised to the 
foreground of our perception; the familiar is "defamiliarized,"76 
m a d e distinct or "strange" in an activity parallel to what Piaget 
calls "assimilation," with its set toward "repetition" and 
"typicality."77 Both defamiliarization and démystification are 
positive m o v e m e n t s , giving to the sequential, métonymie 
narrative its metaphoric tendencies and symoblic suggestiveness. 
Like the operation of Kant's aesthetic judgment, which is neither 
pure reason nor pure sense experience, the deconstruction of 
myth is neither the surrender to the infinite surplus of familiar 
experience nor to the surplus explanatory power of gnostic 
orderliness. 
Faulkner's use of myth makes him an ideal representation of 
what Roland Barthes calls the "structural m a n ,  " whose creative 
act is a double process like the one I have described: "decompo­
sition" then "recomposition" or "dissection" and then "articula­
tion."78 But most crucially, deconstruction drives at the symbolic 
basis of mythical thought; it is a radicalization of myth in the 
sense of Paul Ricoeur's claim that: "symbols are more radical 
than myths. . . . Myths [are] a species of symbols, . . . symbols 
developed in the form of narrations and articulated in a time and 
space that cannot be coordinated with the time and space of 
history and geography. . . ,"79 Deconstruction, however, does 
not simply yield a discrete literary or aesthetic symbol that is 
merely suggestive of reality. N o  r does démystification produce 
fragmentation: the scandal is not atheistic but is, at worst, 
agnostic. The act of radical articulation creates distinctness 
without alienating "unity" or "form." According to Barthes, 
form "is what keeps the contiguity of units from appearing as a 
pure effect of chance: the work of art is what m a  n wrests from 
chance"; it is "a kind of battle against chance."80 T h e artist's 
articulation raises the particular to distinctness, gives "meaning" 
to experience, and forces the merely empirical dimension of 
reality to emerge into formal presence. 
The key word here, of course, is "meaning," and m  y funda­
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mental assumption is that meaning arises only in the act of 
articulation where it shows itself as a composite of form and 
experiential content, and as the product of an individual voice. 
Perhaps a somewhat eccentric point of view, this reflects m  y 
conviction that it is better to see all abstract, contentless, logically 
consistent and anonymous discourse (whether this be philo­
sophical thought or mythical deep structures) as meaningless 
until spoken to experience by a subject. W i t h such an assumption 
a profound humanism is injected into the study of myth, litera­
ture, and philosophy, and the questions of the temporal and 
spatial, the historical and geographical dimensions of articulation 
are unavoidably raised. In his earlier work on myths Claude Levi-
Strauss seemed very m u c h concerned with such an existential 
humanism, calling it "esprit"; for his effort he has been m u c h 
criticized even by those w h o profess to be his disciples,81 but 
surely what interests us about myths is the " h u m a n mind" as it 
"shows" itself in its particularity and social being.82 
Articulation asserts meaning as both individuation and 
collectivity. T h  e following syntagma tic chain depicts a familiar 
form of utterance, wherein the symbols A and B represent wholly 
meaningless slots that have, nevertheless, relational, logical, or 
grammatical functions: 
(All) A ' s are not B's. 
W h a  t particular signs w  e can substitute for A and B depends 
upon the interaction of three variables (rules simplified here to 
fit the present discussion): (1) the position of the slot in relation 
to other slots, (2) the culturally available items that form a class 
of permissible substitutions, and (3) the occasion, or spatio­
temporal context, of the articulation, the by and to w h o m  , for 
what, when , and where of the speech act. The process of selection 
and substitution, the paradigmatic function, is remarkably 
complex, having to satisfy a number of variables at one time. 
Apropos of Go Down, Moses w  e might m a k  e the following 
selection/substitutions: 
(All) bears are not m e n  . 
If the paradigmatic act satisfies all of the variables, is consistent 
with universal laws of ordering, cultural classification, and 
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contextual intention, the sentence will be meaningful. Meaning, 
therefore, implies the idea of "sanction" (decoding, interpreta­
tion). Sanction is not mere recognition of what has been said 
before or even of what could have been said before; meaning is 
neither mere grammatical regularity nor Truth. The idea of 
Truth, of course, is problematic; Truth is neither a fact nor an 
idea nor a statement but a convoluted relationship of all three. 
The Truth of any statement of fact is contingent upon "agree­
ment" under the concept of "the K n o w n ,  " or Knowledge. The 
truth value of a statement is its propositional function, the 
subsuming of the statement under a general law; but not all 
meaningful statements are true in this sense, for they m a  y 
articulate what has not yet been codified into Knowledge, what 
for which there is no general proposition or even what m a y 
appear to contradict the K n o w  n (hence, a Falsehood). 
Meaning, however, results from the sanctioning of the articula­
tion on the specific occasion of its utterance. Thus, for the 
average American schoolchild the statement "Bears are not m e n  " 
is meaningful and True, although perhaps trivial in its empirical 
referentiality. The opposite, "Bears are m e n ,  " is more problem­
atic. It is clearly False, but that determination seems to rest on a 
prior condition that allows us to say that it is meaningful before 
w  e even test it for Truth or Falsehood. Clearly, such a statement 
is not trivial, and the sanctioned meaningfulness rests firmly on 
the ground of the occasion of its utterance, on a sense of factuality 
that is very complex. For example, w h e  n Faulkner gives to S a  m 
Fathers the slang phrase referring to old Ben, "'He's the m a n '  " 
(p. 198), the hearers, both Ike and the readers, must be aware of 
the context (occasion) and culturally operative cognitive systems 
that are brought into play. T  o some extent the statement echoes 
the earlier story " A Justice," in which m u c h of Sam's heritage is 
related; s o m  e significant details of this earlier story are 
contradicted in Go Down, Moses, and, in fact, the idyllic view that 
Ike has of Sam's Indian ancestry is very m u c h denied by the 
violent struggles for power that are revealed in "  A Justice" where 
the forest world has been already corrupted through property 
(slave and land) ownership. This information is withheld from 
Ike in Go Down, Moses; it was Quentin C o m p s o n w h o listened to 
Sam's stories in "  A Justice." The phrase "He's the m a n ,  " 
however, opens this past to us as it subverts Ike's misapprehen­
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sion of its meaning. In part reflecting black slang referring to the 
slave owner, "the m a n ,  " the designation more specifically 
indicates old Ikkemotubbe, whose n a m e " D o o m  " was a corrup­
tion of the French du homme. D o o m had adopted this n a m e as a 
designation of power, magic, as an assertion of his intention to 
become chief. It is this heritage that S a m applies to old Ben, the 
concept of chief through violent power that carries with it both 
grudging respect and some distaste. For Ike the statement in its 
contradiction of the mutually exclusive categories of his language 
and systems of thought, and in its transcendence of empirical 
factuality, begins a series of comparisons that eventuate in a 
metaphorical apotheosis of Ben. First, Ben is the unique bear w h o 
has earned a man's n a m e and is more than animal; then, moving 
toward transcendence, Ben is a bear-man, hence, more than m a n ; 
and finally he is a sacred, godlike creature, truly taboo. Ike allows 
the slang phrase to impute a rich, apocalyptic meaningfulness to 
Ben that would be impossible for S a m Fathers, and here in this 
simple, almost unnoticed phrase, Faulkner hints at the vast, 
unconscious, and unbridgeable gulf that exists between the 
worlds of these two characters. 
Such a radical act of articulation forces us to see, as Barthes 
claims, "not m a  n endowed with meanings, but m a  n fabricating 
meanings,"83 and herein lies the primary function of "literary 
discourse," which calls attention to itself as a meaningful 
statement, and to the act of articulation (the artist and his 
experiential context) as well. W  e might say, then, that all 
discourse ranges between the realm of pure, discontinuous 
experience expressed in grunts of satisfaction or howls of repul­
sion on the one hand and the realm of pure Knowledge expressed 
in profound nods and winks of recognition on the other. Grunts 
and nods, of course, are not insignificant, but they are weak 
discourse, "formulaic" communication, and it is the ideal of a 
strong, immediate, communicative discourse that dominates 
literature. This impossible goal leads the literary artist to test 
both extremes in his act of articulation. H  e must raise his state­
ment of particular experience to the level of communication, out 
of the private into the public domain, but he must not lapse into 
the collective system of recognizable propositions if he is to 
preserve the experiential meaningfulness of what he says. The 
collective system would d a m n him to plagiarism, to the loss of 
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his voice, as well as the content of his statement, so that he says 
only what is sayable. T h e radical articulation of the writer, 
therefore, is neither anarchistic nor totalitarian, liberal nor 
conservative. Whether the act of deconstruction attacks myth , 
science, politics, or any other cultural structure of Knowledge, it 
preserves the possibility of structure in order to speak to 
experience. Similarly, it rescues experience from the dissipating 
outflow of energy in the flux of the elan vital, conserves energy as 
it isolates and foregrounds a fragment of familiar reality. 
This concept of meaning perhaps plays havoc with our 
traditional sense of the term and should dislocate our most 
cherished critical assumptions about literature. In one respect it 
would seem to argue that all acts of articulation assert themselves 
as uniquely meaningful. Insofar as this would further destroy the 
shibboleth of literature's privileged meaningfulness, forever 
banish such distinctions as those between the inspired creative 
madness of the poet and the cool logical reasonableness of the 
scientist, between nonreferential, organic literary discourse and 
referential, prosaic logical discourse, I a  m inclined to accept the 
consequences. But the definition of "meaning" I offer m a y have 
these consequences only with qualifications. T h  e idea that all acts 
of articulation are uniquely meaningful sounds too radically 
atomistic, and it must be remembered that every articulation is 
circumscribed by a complex contextuality that makes possible 
the very act of meaningful speaking. T h  e attempt to define this 
contextuality is the most crucial function of this book. 
The atomistic fallacy of meaningfulness seems to m  e to be the 
fate that relentlessly dogs the heels of recent speech act theory 
and reduces highly technical arguments to purposeless quibbles. I 
have used the term articulation to preserve at least s o m  e of the 
sense of "performative" utterance as developed by J. L . Austin,84 
but the utterance as act is meaningless in m  y sense w h e  n severed 
from a contextuality vastly more complex than either linguistic 
convention or explicitly expressible cultural rituals. If speech act 
theory is ever to be of use to literary critics (and Austin had no 
idea that it would be), it must be applied within a consideration 
of such a context. Even N e  w Critical contextuality is not enough. 
It helps, of course, to read each individual statement in the 
context of a whole " w o r k , " but this ignores the fact that the 
work itself is nothing less than a complex statement within an 
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even broader context. This is not to say that the work as text has 
no limits; rather I would argue that such limits result from the 
performative or articulated nature of its being. The writer (or 
speaker) m a  y consider his performance "over," completed—but 
such an ending (even whe  n apparent to the audience like the fall 
of the final curtain) never proscribes the reverberating 
meaningfulness that exceeds that limited textuality. 
If this is so, and I hope to demonstrate that it is, several old 
"certainties" about literary meaningfulness vanish. Meaning is a 
function, here, not merely of what is said (of "these words in this 
order") but in a peculiar way of what is not said. Meaning always 
remains hidden behind the text—or partly so—in the realm of 
language's and culture's systematicities, conventions, rules, 
myths, and beliefs. O u r traditional concern with textual integrity 
becomes a trivial issue,85 though textuality, the "what" was 
actually uttered, remains as the focal point of meaning. Old 
theories of mimesis based on the referential nature of language 
must also be seen as subissues of larger questions concerning the 
referentiality of the text to broader systems of language, culture, 
and myth. W  e cannot even explore with contentment (if w e ever 
did) the established issues of "point of view," for the reliability 
or unreliability of any fictional narrator /character remains 
clouded in the larger issue of the text's meaningfulness, in the 
dilemma of meaning dependent upon what is not said, on the 
silent term of meaning, the unuttered, unarticulated surplus of 
potential meaningfulness that belongs to linguistic/cultural 
systems.86 
T  o partly explain this problem I would like to call upon one 
unusual example. In his discussion of the "performative" actions 
of the "shaman," Lévi-Strauss hints that the "magic" of the 
shaman's performance results from a kind of balance that he is 
able to strike between too m u c h and too little meaning. "So 
called normal thought," he argues, "always suffers from a deficit 
of meaning, whereas so called pathological thought (in at least 
some of its manifestations) disposes of a plethora of meaning." 
Through the shaman's actions "an equilibrium is reached 
between what might be called supply and demand on the psychic 
level. . . ,"87 The "curative" or "magical" function of his 
performance comes in his adjustment of the two extremes, in his 
achieving a perfect fit between the myth/ritual's structural 
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potential for meaning and the seemingly unexplained event (the 
experience of physical pain, a chance happening or seemingly 
supernatural action). That is, the shaman brings into balance the 
forces of accommodation and assimilation; he speaks infinitely 
potential systematicity to the infinite plenitude of experientiality. 
I would not equate the literary artist with the savage shaman in 
simplistic terms, nor call literary creativity "magic" (although to 
do so would be neither distorting nor n e w ) , but I would argue 
that the fullness of literary meaningfulness, its balancing of 
system against experience, implies that meaning exists not in the 
circumscribed text or completed performance, but in the balance 
of extratextual elements. Meaning is found in the unexpressed 
fullness of the systems that remain behind as the ground of 
articulation itself in what Derrida calls the "trace." M y definition 
of "meaning" here differs from that proposed by E . D . Hirsch, Jr. 
For Hirsch the meaningfulness of any text is arrived at through a 
process of narrowing one's focus, through the cutting away of 
"potential" meanings until one arrives at the meaning of the 
"intrinsic genre" or the work itself.88 M  y sense of meaningful­
ness, on the other hand, is radically inclusive; its very "validity" 
is that it is tentative, occasional, and essentially incomplete. At its 
best (I do not shrink from the value term), in our greatest literary 
works, meaning cannot be narrowly circumscribed, for it is 
neither normative nor pathological. It is both. 
S o m  e will object that such meaningfulness is too vague, 
elusive, even chimerical. Indeed it is, but not to the extent that it 
opens literature to impressionistic criticism; the text does not 
m e a  n whatever any individual reader wants it to m e a n  . T h  e 
reverse is true, for m  y sense of meaningfulness militates against 
impressionism; a text means within its context and in relation to 
its occasion. Moreover , it thrusts beyond this historical 
relativism in its performative nature, by engaging the reader 
in the experientiality of its dynamic structure. The act of articula­
tion is in essence a violence against both system and experience; it 
enlivens the former and tames the latter. Thus the paradigmatic 
function I have emphasized above is activated by a voice whose 
articulation is an assertion of being (or Heidegger's "being­
there") against the anonymity of normative systems (linquistic or 
cultural) and against the indistinguishable flux of experiential 
plenitude. T  o select words, concepts, to force them into 
54 Friday's Footprint 
meaningless slots in a syntagmatic chain, is to speak being 
meaningfully. But this is heroic, and artistic, only w h e  n the act, 
the selection and substitution, refuses to reduce particular items 
(words, concepts) to stereotypical deadening roles in the 
systematic structure and refuses to fracture the system into a 
plethora of atomistic parts, into the plenitude of nonsystematic 
experience. T  o resign ourselves to either extreme, to either the 
"beyond" of "nods and winks" or the "beyond" of "grunts and 
cries," would be to fall into "silence," into nonbeing, and to die. 
W  e would surrender to the noise of plenitude's buzz and h u  m or 
to the noise of the system's static. 
It must be plainly noted, of course, that the activity I have 
designated as "articulation to experience" does not assert a 
simple referentiality in language usage, the idea of a one-way 
relation between a word and a thing in the world. Articulation to 
experience is an experiential event in its o w  n right; its referen­
tiality is comprised of the arrangements of things in the world and 
cultural/personal attitudes toward those arrangements (an idea 
discussed more fully in part 2 as "states of affairs"). Meaning is 
not referential but attitudinal (what Kenneth Burke in a most 
Kantian m o m e n  t once called "the dancing of an attitude"), and it 
can be presented in three forms: (1) what an experience can 
m e a n , (2) what an experience is likely to m e a n , and (3) what an 
experience does m e a n . T h e first has to do with the logical limits of 
meaningful information available for communication. These 
limits are, practically speaking, infinite, and thus an experience 
can m e a n anything. That is to say, the articulation of an 
experience can convey information for what seems to be 
unlimited purposes; this expresses the function of language as 
total signifying system, as langage, the all-inclusive potential for 
meaningful articulation. T h  e second presentation of meaning 
(the is likely) represents the cultural limits or designated limits of 
meaningfulness, or langue. This is the ghostlike system that 
defines, and is defined by, the elastic horizons of culture or 
subculture. All meanings are not always available in all systems of 
communication (cultures). This is the level of statistical pre­
dictability, but must not ignore the third level (the does m e a n ) 
that calls attention to the individual act of articulation at a 
specified time and place, under the pressure of an occasion. This 
third level, or parole, evidences the struggle for identity and being 
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in the world; to be k n o w n for one's words strikes against the 
cultural limitations of what m a y or m a y not be meaningfully 
articulated, and it can do so because of the unlimited potential or 
langage (which has been only conventionally repressed by 
cultural langue). Langage is a threat to langue as unrepressed 
desire is a threat to social order, but langage is also a threat to 
parole, for identity and being are cultural concepts. O n  e comes to 
be, to have identity, only in culture, in langue, and this is the 
conspiracy of langue and parole against langage, against the 
infinitely potent meaningfulness that is timeless, placeless, 
anonymous, and meaningless.89 
Because of this complexity w e can say with U m b e r t o Eco that 
"every h u m a  n experience . . . can be translated into terms of 
verbal language, while the contrary is not true."90 This he calls 
the concept of effability, but the term translated here covers a 
polymorphic activity ranging from the categorizing of particulars 
under general concepts to the expression of passionate desire for 
something. That an experience can be expressed meaningfully by 
exercising the potentiality of langage has nothing to do with 
whether or not the expression is adquate to existential fact; yet 
adequation is a function of the level of langue, expressing the idea 
that culturally predictable meanings are always adequate to 
experience since a culture permits only conventional meaningful­
ness (and by implication only conventional experientiality) to be 
expressed. This sense of adequacy m a y at times seem inadequate, 
which leads to the artistic struggle for the right word and the 
frustration at not finding it available, at the need to m a k  e the 
old word fit the seemingly n e w experience. W h e r e desire for 
individuation is blocked by cultural adequation there is created 
the driving force of lack or need. At this point w e m o v e from 
what Eco calls a "rule-governed creativity" (the adequation of 
langue) to a "rule-changing creativity"91 (a conspiracy of parole and 
langage against langue). This is the opening up of unrestricted 
commerce and communication and the introduction of the idea 
of "intentionality" (towardness) into the idea of closed 
systematicity. T h  e conspiracy is a powerful tool; it is the echo of 
anarchy and natural desire that must be repressed, and it is the 
scene, the situation, and occasion of art. Again from Eco, "It is 
indeed difficult to avoid the conclusion that a work of art 
communicates too much and therefore does not communicate at all, 
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simply existing as a magic spell that is radically impermeable to 
all semiotic approach."92 Here w e have again the idea of too 
m u c  h meaning, which blurs the outlines of what an articulation 
does mean , but this is the essence of literary art. 
It must be understood that this schema of relationships be­
tween langage, langue, and parole implies no hierarchy and does 
not define mutually exclusive categories. T h  e function of langue 
is chimerical: to exclude (repress) langage (as anarchistic) and to 
show langage within itself. Thus there is no inside/outside 
distinction to be m a d  e here, for parole too excludes/shows both 
langue and langage, and langage is the very possibility of both 
langue and parole. T  o the extent that langue evidences (cultural) 
limits (limits of Truth), langue is a machine for producing 
meaningful truths, but the machine is blind to its o w  n potential 
for untruths, blind to its o w  n problematical status. Moreover, it 
is not technically correct to say that revolution comes from 
within the closed cultural system of such a langue, for it is the 
conspiracy of parole and langage, within and beyond langue, that 
gives rise to a countermovement, a n e w problematical struc­
ture.93 A n  y langue, as presented here, tends toward the status of 
an ideology or dogma; its very tendency to delimit Truth 
precludes the generation of a n e  w ideology wholly from within 
the old. Change, revolution, and history, therefore, assume the 
form of a series of discontinuous eruptions.94 T h e more repres­
sive any langue (ideology) becomes, the more the otherness 
within and outside it shows itself as the possibility for a wholly 
n e  w problematical structure. 
T h e complexity of these chimerical relationships also 
precludes the traditional view of literature as comprised of a 
special language outside normative language, as radically unlike 
normative language. Literature is the act of articulation that 
makes perfect use of language's capabilities, and, as neither 
normal nor pathological, exhibits language to its fullest. Here, it 
seems to m e , is a definition of literature's privileged status more 
exalted than any yet proposed. N  o longer superior to either 
language or experience, not free from language's systematicities 
nor the infinite variety of lived experience, literature profoundly 
deconstructs what has been said as well as what might be said 
through the dynamics of démystification and defamiliarization. 
It is possible, in this oscillation between démystification and 
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defamiliarization, to measure historical periods according to their 
relative cultural stability. Moreover, this sense of cultural 
movement has a precise structural parallel in the way that systems 
of literary criticism react to n e w works. A s Claudio Guillen says, 
"Systems will tend, generally speaking, to absorb change and 
assimilate innovation. . .  . In this connection, the roles of critic 
and reader are important. Most critics . . . view a n e w work 
'through' a system. . . . T h  e critical intelligence 'assimilates' and 
'accommodates' nearly in the sense that the psychologist Jean 
Piaget gives to these terms."95 Th  e radical act of articulation 
threatens to disrupt the stasis by speaking the unspeakable, yet 
there are two sides to the temporality implied in the duality of 
deconstruction. O n e  , at its extreme, is illusory since it captures 
change within the limits of permissibility; the emphasis is on 
defamiliarization, on the assimilation of experience to a 
communicable form. The best model for such change is found in 
contemporary linguistics, where alterations in the surface 
structure of language are controlled by "transformational­
generative" rules. A  n extension of Saussure's "synchronie" 
linguistics, such a system emphasizes the static nature of its 
internal motion, for all apparent variations are "permitted" by 
the basic code else they are adjudged ungrammatical and, 
perhaps, meaningless. The existence of transformational m o v e ­
ments and their essential regularity has been firmly demonstrated 
by N o a m C h o m s k y , but a nagging question remains: w h y , under 
what impetus, do they occur? T h e laws explain h o w they operate 
but not w h  y they operate. Th  e answer is relatively simple and 
introduces us to the other temporality I have been at pains to 
describe. Transforms occur w h e  n an individual speaker at a 
specific time and place attempts to speak the general (generative) 
structure to particular experience. Here w  e reintroduce 
Saussure's diachronic dimension to language and emphasize the 
activity of démystification, the accommodation of system to 
reality. 
The essential characteristics of the synchronie linguistic model 
have been brilliantly applied by Michel Foucault in his analysis of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cognitive systems (in 
the fields of biology, monetary exchange, and theories of 
signification). H  e describes in The Order of Things fixed, 
synchronie taxonomic structures that arose within their specified 
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historical contexts and were solidified into Knowledge; that is, 
the structures have an operational validity in a given spatio­
temporal milieu. Within their carefully defined limits the 
structuring powers of the systems permit certain regularizable 
speakings to experience, but as Foucault describes them, they do 
not necessarily derive from a universal core of thought nor do 
they arise out of previous structures. Moreover, the decay or 
decline of these seventeenth- and eighteenth-century systems 
takes place only under what w e must see as a cataclysmic event. 
The emergence of n e w classificatory systems in the nineteenth 
century cannot be explained by an evolutionary movement , but 
only in terms of what Foucault repeatedly calls the "discovery of 
m a n ,  " a radically revolutionary shift in h u m a  n thinking.96 A  s a 
historian of ideas Foucault gives us here a "general history,1' what 
Claudio Guillen defines as a "succession of totalities," or what 
Foucault himself calls a "series of series."97 
The cataclysmic nature of the transition between discrete 
totalities, however, cannot be so easily ignored; the discovery of 
m a  n surely betokens a reorganization of thinking that justifies 
extraordinary claims on the magnitude of Kant's "second 
Copernican revolution," and such is the very stuff of which 
history is composed. In part, a n e w m o d e of organizing implies a 
n e  w awareness; old structures are fractured, even replaced, by 
radical articulations to experience, by speaking the unspeakable. 
The result is a n e w way of saying things and the constitution of a 
n e w reality, not necessarily better or more accurate, but, from 
inside the system, more immediately meaningful. The parallels in 
the languages of myth and literature should be obvious; at the 
base of any form of discourse, and any structure of Knowledge, is 
man's impulse toward an experiential world, toward "life." A s 
Ernst Cassirer says, with acknowledgement to Humboldt , " m a  n 
puts language between himself and the nature which inwardly 
and outwardly acts upon him; . . . he surrounds himself with a 
world of words in order to assimilate and elaborate the world of 
objects, and this is equally true of the configurations of the 
mythical and aesthetic fantasy."98 Th  e stability of discrete 
systems is always threatened by the recalcitrance and inexhaust­
ability of h u m a n experience; with the act of assimilation comes 
also that of accommodation—even to the point of a cataclysmic 
rejection of the old structure. 
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Th  e self-reflexive temporality of synchronie structures, the 
illusory sense of change within the permissible limits of trans­
formational laws reflects, perhaps, one basic h u m a n fact: man' s 
urge toward order, stasis, and the conservation of energy. Th  e 
understanding of such an urge, particularly in its linguistic 
manifestation, spells the end of traditional linear, continuous 
history; for the literary historians it m a y provide a better means 
of getting at those elusive units w  e call "literary periods."99 But 
the experiential dimension of man '  s everyday life and its 
tendency toward discrete particularity are equally important, and 
it is here that literature, rather than the linguist's finite generative 
grammars, might be the most significant model . T h e creation of a 
literary work is an act of presencing that proposes that work as an 
experiential object, but the act remains always a proposition, 
existing somewhere below the collective, all-consuming egali­
tarianism of the structure of Knowledge and above the flux and 
blur of sense experience. Literature fragments and vitalizes 
society, not anarchistically, not by plunging us into chaos, but by 
repeating once more man ' s desire to m a k e meaningful the world 
he senses around him. Literary history is, therefore, not linear 
continuity but the energy of continuous emergence, and such a 
history cannot ignore the personal elements of vision and^style 
without at the same time denying collective order itself. A s Emile 
Benveniste argues, it is by virtue of "the polarity of I:you," the 
polarity of "I" and all "others," that "the individual and society 
are not at all contradictory terms, but rather complementary 
terms."100 
Furthermore, the author's vision is a correlative of such 
literary categories as "style" and "structure." In G  o Down, Moses 
Faulkner comes face to face with the mutually dependent polarity 
of the two temporalities that I have been at pains to describe 
above: one reflecting illusory m o v e m e n t within the culturally 
delimited model of a transformational system, or langue, the 
other a radically expansive and open-ended expression that seeks 
to speak the unspeakable, or parole. T h  e former, of course, 
manifests the conspiracy of langue and parole against langage; it 
spreads out the culturally sanctioned confrontation with 
experience as if across the surface of the page, giving the illusion 
of linear m o v e m e n  t while it disguises the deep structure of the 
unarticulated (disguises the repressive laws of cultural limita­
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tions). T h e latter, which manifests the conspiracy of langage and 
parole against langue, breaks through the surface to dwell on the 
endless potentiality of what is not articulated, thus risking 
exposure and violation of the repressed. This warfare of con­
spirators and double agents (notice the dual function of parole) is 
most easily illustrated in a w o r k like Go Down, Moses by focusing 
on the grosser levels of structure, on plot, but w e need to 
reconsider the term plot in w a y  s unlike the traditional 
Aristotelian definitions of a causally arranged sequence of events 
reflecting the artist's "imitation" of the "actions of m e n . "  1 0  1 Plot 
is this and m u c h more; fundamentally it is a juxtaposition of 
meaningful articulations to experience. T  o return to the 
syntagmatic/paradigmatic grammatical model above: plot is a 
certain relational sequence of selected incidents along a temporal 
axis. T h e axis is temporal not only w h e n it is causal, w h e n it 
imitates chronology, but also because it must be read sequen­
tially. Plot has coherence, but not necessarily logical progression, 
and the coherence of a literary narrative is simply another term 
for meaningful articulation. 
T h  e plotting of Go Down, Moses demands our recognition of 
the discrete character of the stories, for it is the struggle of these 
units to break free of traditional narrative restrictions, to defy 
even the sequential motion of reading, that makes plot crucial to 
the sense of history Faulkner wants to present. So it is with the 
story " W a s ,  " which institutes in the reader's mind an ill-defined 
time-set understandable only in terms of the novel as a whole. 
T h e story is a complete unit, composed of its o w n arrangement 
of incidents, yet it belongs to a broader framework hinted at in 
the somewhat cryptic naming of the hero, Ike McCaslin, whose 
life is recapitulated in the first paragraph. T h  e fact that the first 
story belongs to a history (Ike's) reveals Faulkner's narrative 
strategy and illustrates what I would like to call the first law of 
plot structure: that no narrative can be allowed to undercut the 
immediacy and independence of the incidents that comprise the 
narrative as a coherent whole. T h  e parts are always m o r  e than the 
whole in the sense that the presence of an individual incident 
implies that there is m o r e than what is being presented, that the 
making distinct of the individual experience necessarily results in 
a loss or blurring of contiguous details. It is here that w  e get the 
fullest sense of irrelevant texture, but this surplus also points up 
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the surplus power of the total narrative structure, the excess of 
explanatory capacity that suggests that the whole could contain 
more than it does. T  o speak of one of these surpluses is to speak 
of the other. T h  e novelist's task, unlike that of the historian, for 
example, is to allow the rich particularity of the m o m e n  t full 
sway in its battle against the totalizing powers of systematicity. 
The historian, confronting a multiplicity of details and perspec­
tives, must always resist the explosiveness of the particular event; 
he chooses always within the prescribed limits of his structural 
assumptions, according to the discursive principles of his o w  n 
half-perceived cultural schema. T h e novelist risks the danger of 
allowing his typified experiences to assert a life of their o w  n and 
is faced with the disruptiveness of something like Ike's apocalyp­
tic vision, which fractures coherence into a discontinuous series 
of discrete, "supermeaningful" m o m e n t s  . 
Literary and historical narratives differ insofar as each 
demands a certain, peculiar "attitudinal leaning" from its reader. 
This has nothing to do with truth functions, but it does involve a 
distinction between explanatory and nonexplanatory systems.102 
W  e might say again that historical narrative aspires (hopelessly) 
to the condition of myth. T h e historian selects from the myriad 
possibilities of events (or texts) a subset of such events (or texts) 
that "stands for" the whole.103 It must seem to the reader (in a 
kind of optical illusion) that the narrative, based on the free 
transformation of the subset through endless permutations and 
repetitions, is adequate in its explanatory force to the period 
covered. This necessitates that the historian efface his personal 
voice so that it appears he is spoken by his myth/system rather 
than that the narrative is spoken by him. T h e historian's ideal is 
to be absorbed in the anonymity of his discursive system, to 
project the center of his narrative structure outside himself as 
other and assure his o w  n absence from it. 
T h  e literary artist reverses the historian's drive toward self-
effacement by insistently asserting his presence. But he does not 
do so by characterizing himself as narrator—as the express or 
implied "I" of his story; as Barthes claims "the one who speaks (in 
the narrative) is not the one who writes (in real life) and the one 
who writes is not the one who is."104 T h  e matter of authorial voice 
or presence is vastly m o r e complex than our traditional questions 
about point of view led us to believe.105 T h  e author's presence is 
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marked by his treatment of the narrative as "meaningful asser­
tion" and not as explanatory system. Th  e explanatory force of 
the historian's text, which subordinates the majority of partic­
ularities to the transformational unfolding, is corrupted by the 
literary artist's unpredictable expansion of particularities. That is 
to say, literary narrative seeks not to explain but to render 
meaningful. The reader is drawn into this engagement, into the 
questioning of meaningfulness, because the explanatory force of 
the narrative has been pushed aside—leaving in its place a 
pluralistic, dynamic text as meaning-event. 
This is simply the sense w  e all share that literary narrative is 
freer than historical narrative, in its allowing the m o m e n  t to 
distort the whole, but it is an illusory freedom at best. Barthes, 
speaking of narrative in general, characterizes neatly what I would 
call literary narrative in particular. " F o r m in narrative is marked 
essentially by two governing forces: the dispersion of signs 
throughout the story and the insertion of unpredictable 
expansion a m o n g them. These expansions appear as opportu­
nities for freedom; nevertheless, it is in the nature of narrative to 
absorb such 'discrepancies' as a part of its language."106 This 
would seem to take away with one hand what is being offered by 
the other, but such is the problematics of the case. A balance is 
struck between the "discrepancies" and the regularizing flow of 
the whole in literary narrative, and this balance deflects us away 
from the explanatory function toward the meaning function. 
Literary narrative is full of gaps; to raise certain m o m e n t  s to 
disruptive prominence relegates others to an irrelevant back­
ground. Meaning resides tenuously in these gaps, both within and 
outside the m o m e n t , both within and outside the text as a c o m ­
pound of m o m e n t s , as the imaginary locus of the balance 
between particularity and system. 
T h  e pattern of narrative writing that I suggest above has a 
remarkably wide currency in contemporary literary theory. There 
is no space here for an inclusive discussion of the study of 
"narratology," but several parallels might help clarify the central 
issues of m  y argument, issues not always treated with the same 
attitude by all commentators on narrative form. The pattern of 
linear flow and disruption can be expressed as the interplay of the 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic functions, of the métonymie and 
metaphoric poles, or simply as the idea of narrative digression. 
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However, digression, like the "unpredictable expansions" cited 
by Barthes, must be seen as rule-bound freedom; it is, perhaps, 
more like the assertion of the idea of freedom, a sanctioning of 
the narrator's right to give the lie to normative ideology. T h  e 
concept is at least as old as H o m e r  , embodied in the character of 
Odysseus, whose prodigious talent for deception (lying) is 
closely allied with his unquestioned abilities as storyteller. 
Digression, as I want to use the term, is the revelation of the 
possibility of the "lie," which is precisely the problem with 
literature that so worried Plato: its power to meaningfully "say 
that which is not." Digression reveals that the surface ordering of 
a sanctioned meaningfulness (like the historian's explanatory 
systematicity) is the repression of free play, the repression of 
the promiscuous interlinking of all possible meanings, of infinite 
meaningfulness (which bears the threat of nonmeaning and 
death). 
There is m u c  h to indicate that excessive and self-conscious use 
of digression, which calls attention to a need/desire for order, 
reflects the artist's sense of a fragmented world; this lends 
support to the efforts of theorists like Georg Lukâcs and Julia 
Kristeva to define the novel as the art form of m o d e r n frag­
mented social consciousness.107 O  n the other hand, the degree to 
which such digressions seem to be playfully indulged by an 
audience, as Odysseus's stories are applauded and urged on by 
his listeners, m a  y reflect a social stability or sense of belonging 
and cultural identity of a high degree. If w  e were to follow this set 
of ideas it would be necessary to devise a distinction between 
digression as rebellion against repression and digression in the 
service of repression (social order),108 but m  y interests are simply 
in the revelation of the pattern. 
Roland Barthes has been mentioned already in this connection, 
but a closer look at his suggestive reading of a short story by 
Balzac in S /  Z provides us with the clearest example of the 
narrative of linear flow and disruptive digression. Barthes's 
approach consists in positing five "codes," or lexical elements, 
that uncover various narrative patterns. O { the five codes two are 
clearly linear and three/are disruptive, or, as Jonathan Culler 
points out, two reflect Emile Benveniste's concept of distribu­
tional functioning and three reflect Benveniste's concept of 
integral functioning.109 Barthes's "proairetic code," with its focus 
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on the sense of plot as "sequence," and his "hermeneutic code," 
with its emphasis on the formulating of questions and delaying of 
answers, are oriented toward linearity. T h  e remaining three 
codes are: the "semic," which concerns signifiers that "create 
characters, ambiances, shapes"; the "symbolic," which is very 
close to the traditional sense of "sign functioning," providing "a 
vast symbolic structure" for " m a n  y substitutions"; and the 
"cultural," which marks a referentiality in the text to culturally 
sanctioned "knowledge or wisdom"; these three codes tend 
toward the disruption of linearity, toward the endlessly expan­
sive digression on character (in the romantic-organic sense), on 
the overcoding of sign-function patterns that permits endless 
choices and substitutions, and on the opening of literary 
textuality to cultural (even mythic?) contextuality.110 
In S /  Z Barthes emphasizes the act of reading and rereading; he 
emphasizes the multifunctioned nature of the text, but he does 
not emphasize the interplay of linearity and digression in quite 
the way I have presented it. Such a syntagmatic/paradigmatic 
interplay has been proposed by Tzvetan Todorov as the basis of 
narrative structure, and a recent study of narrative by Harold 
Toliver discovers similar patterns of interplay between horizontal 
and vertical motion.111 A  . J. Greimas has also constructed a 
grammatical model of narrative dynamics that resembles a scaled-
d o w n version of the famous Proppian dramatic approach to the 
narrative structures of Russian folktales.112 T h  e insistent linearity 
of Propp's thirty-one syntagmatic functions called forth, as a 
corrective, some greater emphasis on the paradigmatic function 
from both Greimas and Todorov.1 1 3 T o be sure, the Proppian 
analysis with its diachronic, dramatic bias has c o m  e to be directly 
opposed to the synchronie, homological analysis of (mythical) 
narratives developed by Lévi-Strauss;114 together they represent 
the poles of a tension in narrative structure. It is, I would suggest, 
in the discursive unfolding of Barthes's practical analysis in S /  Z 
that w e can best see the mediation of these two views, even if that 
is not Barthes's primary concern. 
A  s always, w  e are better able to examine this interplay through 
critical analysis than through abstract argumentation, and thus it 
has been one of the goals of this first essay to show that this 
pattern is the crucial organizational device of Go Down, Moses. 
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N o w h e r e , moreover, is it m o r e clearly at w o r k than in the seem­
ingly inexplicable and disruptive insertion of the story 
"Pantaloon in Black" into the pattern of thematically related 
stories of the McCaslin family. This m a  y be the best of all the 
individual stories; it is surely the most intense and economical in 
form and expression. M o s t commentators on Go Down, Moses 
have either ignored its relation to the rest of the novel or have 
connected it thematically, but few have accepted Faulkner's 
ironic claim that it was included merely to give his readers their 
money's worth.115 There is nonetheless s o m e truth to this claim, 
for the story is an excellent example of the not-so-irrelevant 
detail of narrative form. Here Faulkner is at his descriptive best, 
as in the passage telling of the black hero Rider's struggle to lift a 
huge log. 
H  e had done it before—taken a log from the truck onto his hands, 
balanced, and turned with it and tossed it d o w  n the skidway, but 
never with a stick of this size, so that in a complete cessation of all 
sound save the pulse of the exhaust and the light free-running whine 
of the disengaged saw since every eye there, even that of the white 
foreman, was upon him, he nudged the log to the edge of the truck-
frame and squatted and set his palms against the underside of it. For 
a time there was no movement at all. It was as if the unrational and 
inanimate wood had invested, mesmerised the m a n with some of its 
o w n primal inertia. Then a voice said quietly: " H e got hit. Hit's off 
de truck," and they saw the crack and gap of air, watching the 
infinitesimal straightening of the braced legs until the knees locked, 
the movement mounting infinitesimally through the belly's insuck, 
the arch of the chest, the neck cords, lifting the lip from the white 
clench of the teeth in passing, drawing the whole head backward and 
only the bloodshot fixity of the eyes impervious to it, moving on up 
the arms and the straightening elbows until the balanced log was 
higher than his head. "Only he aint gonter turn wid dat un," the 
same voice said. " A n d when he try to put hit back on de truck, hit 
gonter kill him." But none of them moved. Then—there was no 
gathering of supreme effort—the log seemed to leap suddenly 
backward over his head of its o w  n volition, spinning, crashing and 
thundering d o w  n the incline; he turned and stepped over the slanting 
track in one stride and walked through them as they gave way and 
went on across the clearing toward the woods even though the 
foreman called after him: "Rider!" and again: "You  , Rider!" 
[Pp. 145-6] 
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Faulkner dwells on the scene with such rapt fascination that it 
alone threatens to break free of the narrative flow. For an 
unmeasurable m o m e n t all motion is stopped, lingered over by 
Faulkner's play with words, concentrated into stillness yet 
containing the potential of a mighty eruption of energy. But the 
narrative, the force of temporality, pushes in again, opened by 
the short, breathless and quiet comments of an onlooker, 
whereupon the scene rushes to its conclusion. 
A scene so powerful begs for interpretation. W h a  t does it tell 
us of the hero, Rider? Is it merely a demonstration of his 
strength? Does it express in physical action Rider's tormented 
drive for self-destruction, his agony at the unexplained death of 
his wife, Mannie? Does it depict the awful laughter of some 
deranged god w h  o allows Rider to triumph here even though the 
grief-torn black m a  n wants to fail, to have the agonizing breath of 
life crushed out of him? Is it a parable on existence, on the eternal 
struggle between the forces of life and death where Faulkner tips 
the balance ever so slightly in favor of the former? Perhaps the 
passage says all of these in varying degrees, but none exhausts its 
rich experiential value. Th  e descriptive force draws the reader 
into the struggle, causes our breaths to suck in as Rider strains 
against the tree. It is, moreover, a quality that pervades the entire 
story and calls for our participation in the vitality of h u m a  n 
experience without the effort of explanation. It is a virtuoso 
performance on the part of author and character that does not 
depend on the other stories for its effect; so far as w e k n o w , the 
time and place of the action is not specified and Rider's relation 
to the McCaslins or S a  m Fathers is not given in the text.116 M o r  e 
or less instinctively w e place it in Yoknapatawpha County, 
Mississippi, and roughly at the time of "Delta A u t u m n ,  " and w  e 
acknowledge the thematic congruence it has with the other 
stories of race relations. But little of this has any direct bearing 
on its affective strength. 
Let m  e return for a m o m e n  t to the passage of Rider's struggle 
quoted above. It concludes with the voice of the foreman twice 
naming the character, "Rider." That in itself m a y be somewhat 
surprising—because Rider is addressed by n a m  e and not by a 
racially pejorative term such as "boy." This is not to put words 
in Faulkner's mouth; the force of the passage, stronger than any 
other in the story, is to confer on Rider an identity so sharply 
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defined that it resists reduction to racial stereotypes. T h  e passage, 
then, is descriptive of Rider's actions while it also performs for 
the reader a singular act of characterization. It takes on the feel of 
what w  e traditionally call poetry through the author's play with 
language. "Poetry" implies that an unusual attention has been 
given to words and structure themselves; every element of the 
poem's form is crucial, fixed, contextual. A p o e m is "these words 
in this order" and permits no alteration. T  o label this passage 
"play" or "poetry," however, is not enough, for what is at issue 
in the formula "these words in this order" is the degree of 
motivation revealed in the language, and Faulkner's poetic play in 
this passage demonstrates a shift in emphasis from relatively 
arbitrary selectivity to an intensely motivated performance. 
The terms arbitrary and motivated I have somewhat roughly 
borrowed from Saussure, whose famous dictum on the arbitrari­
ness of the linguistic sign could have produced a theory of 
language as a multitude of discrete elements, a lexical chaos, if 
not restricted by some rule. Thus it is through the concept of 
"relative arbitrariness" that Saussure introduces into language 
study the idea of "system." T h  e structure of langue has only a 
limited arbitrariness because of "associative and syntagmatic" 
forces that bind signs together into "bundles." For example, the 
Latin term inimicus is not absolutely arbitrary for it bears the 
trace of an elaborate class of signs through its elements, in and 
amicus.117 Inimicus, then, is very highly motivated through its 
syntagmatic bindings; the whole class lies unexpressed behind the 
expressed term. 
T  o be sure, Saussure's thoughts on arbitrariness are ambigu­
ous. Primarily concerned with the arbitrary relation between 
signs (words) and things in the world, Saussure seems also to see 
it is a factor in the internal relationship of the sign itself, as in the 
arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified, between 
acoustical image (sound) and thought content (concept).118 It is, 
however, the business of langue to repress the anarchistic force of 
the arbitrary (or langage). O  n the level of langue the relation 
between signifier and signified must be rendered "necessary"119 
or "motivated." 
Within the system of less arbitrary or motivated meaningful­
ness w e must also take notice of the function of parole, of the act 
of choice. T h  e term motivation here begins to take on a deeper 
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significance. T h  e motivating force of langue is relative to general 
classes of substitutable items and the rules for their selection. It is 
the function of parole, sometimes in conjunction with the 
freedom (arbitrariness) of langage, to render the articulated 
poetic utterance with a m u c h more intense sense of motivation— 
not the motivation of class substitutions but of particularities of 
experience. Ironically, at this level it is impossible to say whether 
the poetic utterance is radically motivated or radically arbitrary; 
it is a matter of perspective, a double vision that glances at the 
poetic passage simultaneously from inside cultural limitations 
(langue) and from outside such limitations (langage). W h a t is 
revealed in this double vision is intentionality, not the actual 
thoughts of the author but the fact of his activity of choice, the 
fact of his articulation to particular, irreducible experience. 
W  e are trapped once more in the obscurities of distinctions of 
degree, or, I would prefer, by the endless adjustments of an 
integral system. There is, therefore, nothing absolutely unmoti­
vated about any particular act of articulation; hence Faulkner's 
description of Rider's efforts to lift the log can only be spoken of 
as more or less arbitrary. T h e key to understanding the passage 
comes to us only in the act of calling attention to motivation. 
That choices were m a d e is obvious. But Faulkner moves from 
broad views of the scene in the hustle and bustle of the c a m  p to 
the more specific details of the lifting of the log, to even further 
specificity in the infinitesimal details of arching chest and 
clenched teeth. T h  e effect is to break the general descriptive 
scene d o w  n into smaller and smaller units, and to emphasize 
more and more the arbitrary nature of the author's choices—or 
at least to emphasize the vastness of details available for his 
choice. Mos t important, however, is a countermovement that 
arises necessarily from this breaking d o w n  . T h  e pace of the scene 
seems to slow even as the details multiply; overwhelmed by 
particularities the reader begins to search for an orderly focus. At 
the point where such a focus should c o m e , however, at the 
m o m e n  t of balanced tension with the log held aloft, the reader is 
forestalled by the disrupting voice of an anonymous onlooker 
(who speaks breathlessly for us?): "'Only he aint gonter turn 
wid dat u n . ' " A turn will c o m e , but at this unmeasurable 
m o m e n  t of pause w  e find in the language of the passage a disturb­
ing absence, a lack of a focal center that contains the opposing 
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forces within itself, the absence of a true metaphor to unite the 
multiplicity of métonymie particularities. 
W  e get instead only the relatively impersonal third person 
pronoun "he"; yet the pronoun shifter calls our attention to 
what is missing: to the unexpressed motivation for the descrip­
tive passage, and the tension of such a gap or absence is 
intolerable. The pause suddenly breaks open and the passage 
rushes to a conclusion; then, and only then, do w e find the 
metaphor that w  e sought, but w  e find it outside the descriptive 
articulation itself. This belated fulfillment is very significant, for 
the focal metaphor could not be n a m e d in the passage without 
being reduced to the status of the other details, without 
becoming merely one métonymie detail a m o n g the others. Left 
unexpressed, it retains a fullness of meaning even in its absence, 
and w e cannot avoid recalling here, by way of contrast, the weak 
metaphor of the phoenix dreamed by Ike as a banishing of all 
absence (time) through its magical presence. T h  e container for 
the tensions of the passage, the unity for the seemingly endless 
details, can only be said afterwards in the n a m  e "Rider," into 
which n a m  e rush all the expressed and unexpressed details of the 
scene as a whole. Ike's phoenix metaphor does not work as an 
effort to deny absence; the naming of Rider as metaphor does not 
deny but recognizes the affective force of absence. Saying the 
name , of course, consigns all that explicitly and inexplicitly went 
before to absence, but the battle has been w o n . 1 2 0 T h e n a m e 
"Rider" has become radically motivated, allowing us to see 
motivation ambiguously as a matter of both character develop­
ment and literary articulation. If it is true, as Eugenio Donato 
argues, that our Western culture has grown more and more 
obsessed with the idea that proper names are privileged signs that 
confer identity,121 the rush of the chaotic and relatively arbitrary 
details of the passage into the n a m e , the replacing of the pronoun 
with "Rider," lends an intensity of identity to this particular 
character, confers on him an "authenticity," that nothing in the 
remainder of the story can efface.122 
Such authenticity, of course, is an illusion of linguistic 
utterance, not because Rider is a fictional character but because 
the idea of authenticity itself is illusory. T h  e disruptive force of 
Rider's metaphoric naming functions as a paradigm for all 
assertions of being, for the winning of experiential presence out 
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of the anonymity of structural absence. This, too, is a 
philosophical and critical idea with a broadly romantic history. 
The idea of a privileged m o m e n t of being, of the arresting 
m o m e n t , the emergence of metaphor, is no more than a sense of 
"wonder"1 2 3 or "apocalypse,"124 two characteristics already 
attributed to Ike's romantic turn of mind. Parallels can be found 
ranging from Kant's definition of the "sublime" to Cassirer's 
description of "momentary gods" or "mana-experiences," to 
Joyce's religious/aesthetic "epiphanies," to Eliseo Vivas's "rapt 
intransitive attention."125 Ezra P o u n  d idealized the poetic 
m o m e n  t in the "vortex," Wallace Stevens in the crystalline 
"fiction," and T  . S. Eliot in the "still point." Confining himself 
to the level of style, Barthes has spoken of the "perverse" 
pleasure w  e receive from such a disruptive opening in the text, a 
kind of orgasmic rapture, experiential but unspeakable.126 Deep 
within us Jung located the "archetype" of a timeless, racial 
heritage, and Freud, perhaps most suggestively of all, defined the 
experience of disjunctive temporality as the "uncanny," the 
m o m e n  t of the strange that is not strange in the midst of the 
familiar.127 Freud is particularly significant here because his sense 
of the uncanny can be read in a way that drives out the romantic 
argument that these m o m e n t  s are literally "unique," unrepeat­
able, and even ineffable. The essence of the Freudian uncanny is 
its recurrent patterning, its revelation of a repressed absent 
meaningfulness, yet it is never free of the aura of wonder, of the 
two m u c h meaningfulness of metaphor, or of the paradox of the 
familiar (half'remembered) defamiliarized. 
Thus w e see that Rider's defamiliarization, though a singular 
act of parole that cannot be erased, calls attention to the very act 
of linguistic (and impersonal) substitution that allows us to put 
the " n a m e " in the place of the pronoun. W  e are aware of the 
choices that not only relegate "he" to the stockpile of unused 
signs, but also negate culturally determined racial stereotypes 
such as "boy." That awareness does not c o m e to us at the 
wondrous m o m e n t of Rider's naming but only in the course of 
the story itself; it comes with our growing awareness of Rider as a 
disruptive force infused into a cultural system of dehumanizing 
stereotypes. It is a profound c o m m e n t on the rigidity of society 
that at the same time, in the textual violence of Rider's naming 
paralleled by the violence of his self-destructive actions, makes us 
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witnesses to the power and self-destructive violence of metaphor 
itself. Faulkner's articulation to experience, therefore, speaks the 
tensions of revolution or impending change. It is not prophecy so 
m u c  h as recognition again, here in this seemingly irrelevant story, 
of the internal tensions of the southern culture that w  e also see in 
the self-destructive repudiation m a d e by Ike McCaslin and in the 
archetypal emergence of Lucas Beauchamp. Failure to confront 
this internal pressure for change, of course, will result in the 
dreaded invasion of the North; the corruption from within will 
unleash a corruption from without, the same corruption that Ike 
half perceives in the disappearance of the forest and openly fears 
in his discovery of the written ledgers. 
The addition of the white deputy sheriffs monologue serves as 
a crucial counter-voice, as another failed interpretation. The 
deputy never engages Rider's story at the level of experience; he 
does not, as one critic notes, "recognize humanity w h e  n he sees 
it."128 The stupid insensitivity of his remarks angers us not just 
because they are racist, but because they also rob Rider of a 
unique, experiential being that w e  , as readers, have already 
granted him under the compulsion of Faulkner's language. T h e 
deepest level of interpretation—the radical level of articulated 
meaningfulness—defies the detached voice of a disengaged 
observer-analyst armed only with stereotypes and abstractions. 
The deputy's language fails him, for on the propositional level 
Rider's suffering, and his essential being, is silent. The reader 
feels the story c o m  e alive with meaningfulness as Faulkner draws 
us in through the "gestural" nature of his language, and the 
story's title calls attention to this dimension of literary discourse 
by reminding us of the conventions of m i m e performance where 
communication through physical m o v e m e n  t challenges the 
hegemony of mere words. It demands dramatic participation, a 
hermeneutic engagement, that is not available on the level of 
conceptual or abstract Knowledge. 
Here again w  e affirm the provincialism of articulated cognitive 
structures; the failed interpretation of the white deputy recapit­
ulates the failure of Ike McCaslin to reinterpret, for his o w  n 
romantic purposes, the totemic world of S a m Fathers. Myths are, 
then, nontransferable, and Faulkner, dealing with several myths 
in his novel, must not allow the readers to confuse them as his 
characters often do. Close attention to Faulkner's novel, to its 
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pattern of failed interpretations, should warn the reader and 
professional critic alike that it is not a structure but the 
potentiality of structure that is universal: the distinction is a 
crucial one. T h e linguist's dream of describing a finite gener­
ative gramma r that is universal,129 yet permits infinite variations 
in its manifestations, cannot be solidified into a sense of universal 
sameness in all h u m a  n expressions. It is the meaningfulness of 
literary articulation that is proof against such a theory. Yet m u c  h 
of m o d e r n criticism, influenced by this very linguistic model of 
universal structure, has denied literature this function. 
T h e result has been an overemphasis of the conservative forces 
of the structuring process. In the alliance of T  . S. Eliot and 
Northrop Frye the dominance of "tradition" or the "dream 
world" of literary m y t h overshadows the "individual talent" or 
the uniqueness of the "displaced" m o n a d . 1 3 0 M o r e recently John 
Barth has extolled the virtues of Jorge Luis Borges to define 
literary creativity as a kind of plagiarism, Robert Scholes, chary 
of the word "conservative," has defined what he calls the 
"illiberal imagination."131 A  s a corrective for the exaggerated 
emphasis on progressivism in twentieth-century philosophy, the 
trend is admirable, but it risks the opposite extreme by rejecting 
all philosophies of change and branding all versions of existential 
humani s  m as irrationalism.132 There is in this conservatism an 
irrational fear of irrationalism and the expression of a nostalgic 
yearning for simpler and temporally self-reflexive primitivism. 
T h  e old adage that all literature is about literature assumes a n e  w 
and restrictive focus; for Borges the world of discourse (which is 
the world) is a vast library catalogued and ordered wherein one 
discovers the source of all possible utterances. It is an exhaustive 
system of permissible transforms reflecting, as John Barth says, 
every novelist's desire to rewrite Don Quixote.133 T h  e fact that all 
fictions repeat other fictions to some extent, however, does not 
necessarily argue for Borges's closed library. Even for the 
conservative Eliot, faith, universal stability, and Knowledge, the 
tradition of literature and Christianity, all had to be w o  n in the 
articulation of his Four Quartets, in the speaking to experience 
through his very personal voice. 
In Go Down, Moses Faulkner sets for himself no such task as 
Eliot chose in Four Quartets. T  o prove the functional validity of a 
universal schema, to show its meaningfulness, is alien to his 
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vision where different worlds exist side by side in the same 
narrative. Thus , if one cannot return to the embracing wilderness 
of S a m Fathers, one is not necessarily condemned to the dissipa­
tion of energies in a chaotic world that defies meaningfulness. If 
anything, Faulkner depicts a world of surplus meaningfulness 
where general systems and discrete experiences abound. Lucas, 
Ike, and S a  m are not part of one world but of a multiplex world, 
full of interactions and conflicts that threaten them all with the 
terrifying specter of discontinuity. Yet the narrative encompasses 
this diversity, not by regularizing it into a series of permissible 
transforms, but by allowing history to express itself in an 
elaborate pattern of emergences, each of which holds for its space 
against the violence of mere temporality. For Lucas and S a  m the 
myths succeed in raising experience to meaningfulness even 
though neither exhausts empirical reality. O  n the other hand, 
Ike's apocalypticism evidences the most spectacular failure of all, 
for he drags discrete experience out of temporality by fixing it in 
a timeless, mystical sacredness. Ironically, this thrusts him back 
into the discontinuousness of temporality; because he cannot live 
in time, cannot bring meaningfulness into presence in a "world" 
that "worlds," his apocalyptic imagination, his egotism, fails to 
create for him the stability of being he so desires. 
Ike's overinterpretations are nowhere m o r e clear than in his 
response to the fading McCaslin ledgers; these dusty volumes 
become for him a personal Bible, a holy book . 
To him it was as though the ledgers in their scarred cracked leather 
bindings were being lifted d o w n one by one in their fading sequence 
and spread open on the desk or perhaps upon some apocryphal 
Bench or even Altar or perhaps the Throne itself for a last perusal 
and contemplation and refreshment of the All-knowledgeable before 
the yellowed pages and the brown thin ink in which was recorded the 
injustice and a little at least of its amelioration and restitution faded 
back forever into the anonymous communal original dust. [P. 261] 
The ledgers are his Old Testament, the history of the McCaslins 
like the history of the Israelites and their captors. O l d 
Carothers's sin is the primal sin of A d a m  , and Ike's Egypt is the 
South "cursed" by G o d (p. 298) . This holy book, with its 
dialogue between the gospellers Buck and B u d d y , infringes u p o n 
the mythical world of S a  m Fathers, forcing Ike to see the 
wilderness as a n e w Eden and S a m as a n e w A d a m . 
74 Friday's Footprint 
In a very crucial way Ike's ledgers represent his enslavement by 
the written word. T h e inexorable logic of this text has the force 
of history, of m e t o n y m y  , which in its orderliness strives for the 
condition of myth. W  e must not be fooled by Faulkner's teasing 
presentation of the information in section four of "The Bear"; 
the ruthless simplicity of Buck's and Buddy's dialogue is not a 
designedly elliptical presentation. It is a purified form of script, 
which notes events only insofar as they follow the cultural 
schema of the authors. The terror of these chronicles for Ike is in 
part this very starkness, the relentless m o v e m e n  t of the pattern 
from which he finds no escape. Unable to alter the course of this 
text, he fears that soon his n a m  e will be the focus of its progress, 
that his hand will be drawn into the dialogue, into a continuation 
of the history he abhors. Th  e result is Ike's dread of time, which 
the ledgers have reduced to chronology; he is a slave to prose 
unable to transform it into an autobiographical narrative, 
unwilling to b o  w to Lucas's mythicizing of the family history, but 
stained by it so that he cannot enter Sam's collective myth, which 
is spoken, not written, by the univocal voice of S a  m and Sam's 
ever-present ancestors. 
Most significantly, however, Ike's exaggerated interpretation 
reflects his o w  n sense of a deep personal guilt; it is the 
manifestation of his romantic consciousness, similar to what Paul 
Ricoeur says is man' s assertion of himself as "tribunal" of 
himself thereby bringing about his "alienation" from mankind. 
In Ike w  e observe not only "self-righteousness" but also the 
"curse attached thereto." Here the supreme "sin consists . . . in 
the vain attempt to justify oneself."134 A s a result Ike comes to 
live on the fringes of society, not unlike the man-child B o o n w h o 
belongs neither to the wilderness nor to culture, and whose end is 
presented to us as madness. 
But Ike's position is instructively different from Boon's. Ike's 
guilt/fear of the family ledgers expresses his entrapment by the 
McCaslin genealogical myth, what w e must call his subservience 
to it and to the cultural patterning (authoritarian, patriarchal, 
and racist) that it reveals. Such a pattern is undeniably Oedipal as 
it measures belonging (to race or family) by means of subser­
vience (political or personal) to the master race of the (fore)­
fathers. Regardless of his histrionic rebellion/repudiation, Ike is 
never able to break free from this myth; to do so would be too 
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frightening a revolt, and perhaps Ike's failure unveils Faulkner's 
o w  n drawing back. Faulkner gives us, in his characters of racially 
mixed heritage, several openings toward a truly revolutionary 
cultural action, yet these characters never express a truly alterna­
tive culture. Lucas is absorbed into the genealogical myth , very 
m u c h by his o w n choice, in order to function as its archetype. 
The child of Roth E d m o n d s and the black w o m a n of "Delta 
A u t u m n  " is literally ejected from the South, sent away by Ike 
himself. A n d B o o n , whose time-innocence and arrested Oedipal 
development makes him the most promising anti-Oedipal figure 
in the novel, suffers a fate familiar to all of Faulkner's readers; he 
is condemned to madness, to an antisocial status where his 
breaking of the pattern no longer threatens the pattern itself.135 
Thus Ike's solution to his dilemma is inevitably apocalyptic; he 
would write an ending to the ledgers, to the narrative text that is 
his (family and cultural) life, but his problem with endings has its 
inverse in the problematics of beginnings.136 H  e would have the 
renunciation of his heritage carry with it the renunciation of 
patrimony, even though this leaves h im alone, able to assert 
himself as an "original original" only in a weak emulation of 
Christ. T i m e becomes his enemy, and he is submerged in a 
surplus of apocalyptic meaningfulness that is endlessly 
repeatable. Edward Said describes Stendhal's romantic hero 
Julien Sorel in terms that seem also to fit Ike. 
Such a character is hungry for the distinctions of more and more 
originality. His time is no longer the possession of the community, 
nor of the family m a n  , but is rather an illicit dream of projected 
fulfillment whose high subjective purpose at the end is radically 
underminded at the beginning by refusals, the sacrifices, the 
renunciations, and the selfishness on which it is based. A life so lived 
is less an orderly biography than a series of collisions and 
compromises . . . ; this new private affair—especially when it 
becomes compulsive—substitutes irresponsible celibacy for fruitful 
marriage.137 
It is very significant, indeed, that Ike neither begins (he is 
merely introduced in " W a s "  ) nor ends the novel, for the detailed 
experiential reality of Faulkner's fictional province is too m u c  h 
for his apocalyptic imagination. T h u  s the title story of the novel, 
the last story of the collection, defies his sense of endings; this 
story is what R  . P. A d a m  s calls "a contextual expansion of what 
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has gone before,"138 and it puts Ike outside the burgeoning life 
that Faulkner describes. Molly Beauchamp's choral lament 
dominates the final narrative segment as an expression of her 
grief over the execution of her grandson, Samuel W o r s h a m 
Beauchamp, for the murder of a Chicago policeman. Signifi­
cantly, it takes on the terms of Ike's confusion of the Bible and 
the McCaslin family history; Molly's song, too, associates the 
black McCaslins with the captive Israelites and the white 
McCaslins with the oppressing Egyptians. " 'Roth E d m o n d s sold 
him. . . . Sold m y Benjamin. Sold him in Egypt. Sold him to 
Pharaoh. Sold him to Pharoah and n o w he dead'" (p. 380). 
Roth of course, had no direct responsibility for Sam's death, but 
the song re-evokes the slave market morality established in 
" W a s  " as the system of exchange that supports the McCaslin 
myth, the exact terms that Lucas utilized in his assertion of 
mythical-archetypal presence. 
The traditional spiritual from which the story's title comes is a 
prayer for deliverance from bondage, for a n e w Moses, while it is 
also a defiant assertion of the slave's sense of belonging to a 
"chosen" people. Here too the chanting of Molly and the other 
blacks reflects in its participatory function a sense of collective 
being that closes out others—most particularly Gavin Stevens 
and his world of practical concerns (pp. 3 8 O 8 1 )  . Gavin is the 
last of the novel's long list of failed interpreters stretching all the 
way back to Buck and Buddy McCaslin w h o fail to understand 
w h y the violated slave, Eunice, "drowned herself" (p. 267). 
Gavin's efforts to keep the story of her grandson's death from 
Molly are not merely futile but unnecessary, for Molly's world 
encloses Samuel within its o w n mythical terms. Her reaction, 
which ignores the "facts," becomes, then, not so m u c h an act of 
foregiveness as an assertion of her o w  n perfectly adequate 
rationale; for Gavin it is a puzzling dilemma that seems to say 
Molly "doesn't care how he died" (p. 383). But that is only 
partly true. Molly's acceptance reflects what Ricoeur calls a sense 
of "the 'reality' of sin—one might even say the ontological 
dimension of sin which must be contrasted with the 'subjectivity' 
of the consciousness of guilt."139 The final story, therefore, also 
closes out Ike, whose subjective guilt condemns him not only to 
fail in his pilgrimage of being, to fail to find the promised land, 
but even, unlike Moses, to glimpse it. T o borrow once more 
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from Ricoeur, Ike remains perpetually at the crises m o m e n  t of 
h u m a n consciousness * 'after which myth and history are 
disassociated. Mythical time can no longer be co-ordinated with 
the time of events that are 'historical' . . . mythical space can no 
longer be co-ordinated with the places of our geography."140 Ike 
can neither m o v  e forward into history nor backward into the old 
myth; tortured by what Mircea Eliade called "ontological 
thirst,"141 he finds himself, to paraphrase Lucas Beauchamp, 
excluded from the true benefits of belonging yet not free from 
the genealogical myth's heavy burden of responsibility. 
O N M E T A P H O R A N D M E T O N Y M Y : 
A STYLISTIC ANALYSIS O F " N O W  " A N  D " T H E N " 
Faulkner's style, distinctive, daring, and powerfully affective, 
has often been discussed in relation to the recurrent theme of 
time in his novels, and there is an exemplary stylistic device of 
this kind in the repetition of the words " n o w " and "then" that 
contributes forcefully to the impact of Go Down, Moses. The 
former term (indicating a priviledged presentness that is also 
closely associated with the term "still," and thus indicates an 
absence of sound and motion as well as a continuous present­
ness) and the repetitive patterning of the latter (a parataxis 
emphasizing a disjuncture between two successive points in time) 
are frequently used to counteract one another. The long descrip­
tive paragraph quoted above where Rider lifts a heavy log from 
the lumber truck depends upon this balancing of movement and 
sound against stillness and quiet. The paragraph begins with two 
"thens" and introduces us to the busy, loud commotion of the 
millyard. The images raise the picture of random, though 
purposeful, m o v e m e n t  , something like beehive or anthill 
activity. "Then the trucks were rolling again. Then he could stop 
needing to invent to himself reasons for his breathing, until after 
a while he began to believe he had forgot about breathing since 
n o  w he could not hear himself above the steady thunder of the 
rolling logs . . ." (p. 145). But, as w e have seen, Rider cannot 
forget, cannot diffuse his agonized being in the furious activity of 
sound and motion. The rolling logs reach a temporary end and he 
prepares to test his strength against the last one, doing what "he 
had done before . . . but never with a stick of this size. . . .  " His 
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effort not only seems to stop all motion but even to still the 
thunderous noise. "For a time there was no movement at all. It 
was as if the unrational and inanimate w o o d had invested, 
mesmerised the m a  n with some of its primal inertia." The primal 
inertia brings us to a m o m e n  t of equilibrium, and Rider stands in 
the center of everyone's attention, "in a complete cessation of all 
sound save the pulse of the exhaust and the light free-running 
whine of the disengaged saw. . . . " The struggle between the 
opposed forces, however, is not really a total lack of motion as 
the pulse of the engine and whine of the saw show; here the 
descriptive force of Faulkner's style reveals the massive 
concentration of pulsing, straining, vital energy that m a  y 
explosively erupt at any m o m e n t . There is, as well, no real pause 
in the forward movement of the prose. W  e have only the illusion 
of a pause created by the insertion of a simple short sentence, 
"For a time there was no movement at all," between a long, 
rambling sentence telling of exhausts, trucks, saws, and the 
crowd watching Rider and the contemplative restful "as if" 
sentence, which mesmerizes the reader with its abstract specula­
tion about primal inertia. 
The equilibrium of forces, therefore, cannot be long main­
tained, and the stillness and quiet of the vibrating m o m e n  t are 
broken by the inexorable onrush of the narrative. Both sound 
and movement are reintroduced suddenly, but softly, in another 
"then" clause: "Then a voice said quietly: ' H e got hit.'" The 
hushed, disembodied voice, seeming to feel that it voilâtes the 
sacredness of the m o m e n t , is also prophetic, for it opens the way 
to movement once more: "The movement mounting infinites­
imally through the belly's insuck." At first the progress is halting, 
"until the knees lock," and "until the balanced log was higher 
than his head," pausing again while "none of them moved ," and 
finally erupting, only to be interrupted one last time by a negative 
phrase offset with dashes, but that cannot hold back the flow of 
temporality. "Then—there was no gathering of supreme effort— 
the log seemed to leap suddenly backward over his head of its 
o w  n volition, spinning, crashing and thundering d o w  n the 
incline. . . . " The "then" clause violently reintroduces through 
the active verb "leap" and the triple present participles the busy 
movement and "thundering" noise that opened the paragraph. 
There is a sense, as w  e have seen in the naming of Rider, that 
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metaphor is no more than a n a m e w e give to the idea of 
conserving vital energy in equilibrium. It is an absence that makes 
possible a presence, a unity that violently breaks itself apart. Here 
the metaphoric function of language rises to "stillness" and 
"nowness" out of and against the pull of metonymy , and in this 
tenuous assertion of presence, metaphor shows itself to be the 
stylistic expression of the philosophical idea of a centering 
archetype. Similarly, the emergence of Lucas Beauchamp finds its 
affective power through the interplay of metaphor and 
metonymy; it is this that gives Lucas's archetypal presence its 
crucial prototypical function, establishing through the play of 
language the extensive explanatory power of the McCaslin 
genealogical myth. 
O  n the day of ritual confrontation with Zack, Lucas, the direct 
male descendant of old Carothers, appropriately waits for the 
woman-born McCaslin to come to him. "Then the light 
disappeared. H  e began to say quietly, aloud: ' N o w  , N o w  . H  e will 
have to have time to walk over here.' H  e continued to say it long 
after he kne  w the other had had time to walk back and forth 
between the two houses ten times over" (p. 51). Zack does not 
come, and Lucas's waiting for the sacred, archetypal " n o w " falls 
victim to the passing of time. "Then he knew that the other was 
not even waiting, and it was as if he stood already in the bedroom 
itself, above the slow respirations of sleep, the undefended and 
oblivious throat, the naked razor already in his hand" (p. 51). 
Jarred from his passive waiting, Lucas thrusts the " n o w  " into a 
vision of the future; he must make that future a present; and 
when he does so, it will be as if he had already performed the 
ritual sacrifice (p. 52), an exercise of his "mythical m e m o r y . " Yet 
the momentousness of that timeless " n o w " continues to elude 
him. " H e was waiting for daylight. H e could not have said w h y . 
H  e squatted against a tree halfway between the carriage gate and 
the white man's house, motionless as the windless obscurity itself 
while the constellations wheeled and the whipporwills choired 
faster and faster and ceased and the first cocks crowed and the 
false dawn came and faded and the birds began and the night was 
over" (p. 52). Only halfway toward the future " n o w , " the 
universe whirls in m a d , accelerating motion around him, but he 
has not yet earned the right to center the wheeling stars, to 
emerge from obscurity into archetypal presence. The syntagmatic 
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pull of the sentence jerks us forward in tiny fragments of blurred 
events linked only by a chain of "ands." 
W h e  n he enters the inner sanctum of Zack's bedroom all is 
again silenced, but this is only the prelude to the " n o w . " The 
relentless series of "thens" continues. "Then he found the eyes 
of the face on the pillow looking quietly up at him and he knew 
then why he had to wait until daylight" (p. 52). H e has come not 
to murder in darkness the m a  n w h  o stole his wife but for a 
ritualistic confrontation. H  e throws away his razor to equalize the 
oppositions, but Zack does not at first accept the challenge; "still 
the other didn't m o v e " (p. 53). Lucas knows instinctively what 
Ike never learns from S a m  , that by possessing one thing other 
you possess them both. His emergence into being, the establish­
ing of his identity, necessitates the active participation of "the 
other," Zack. The scene wavers for a while between the two m e n . 
Zack enters the contest by retrieving his pistol from the drawer, 
but as he does so Lucas is momentarily stilled: "still Lucas didn't 
m o v e " (p. 54). Lucas attempts to provoke Zack into holding the 
gun while he rushes him, but Zack, too, knows the rules of 
equilibrated confrontation and tosses the gun on the bed between 
them. Suddenly, the to-and-fro play bursts into simultaneous 
action; a series of "then" clauses cascades around us. "Then 
Lucas was beside the bed. H e didn't remember moving at all. H e 
was kneeling, their hands gripped, facing across the bed and the 
pistol" (p. 55). Locked in confrontation they kneel in reverence 
to the m o m e n t . "Then he cried, and not to the white m a n and the 
white m a n knew it; he saw the whites of the negro's eyes rush 
suddenly with red like the eyes of bayed animal—a bear [!], a fox 
[the trickster] . .  . I was wrong, the white m a  n thought. I have 
gone too far" (p. 55). "Then they did not m o v e save their 
forearms, their gripped hands turning gradually until the white 
m a n ' s hand was pressed back—downward on the pistol. 
Motionless, locked, incapable of moving . . . " (pp. 55-56). 
Physically motionless, Lucas fills the m o m e n  t with an 
extraordinary recapitulation of the events preceding it, almost as 
if he must be certain that the ritualistic procedures have been 
properly observed. "'I give you your chance,' Lucas said. T h e n 
you laid here asleep with your door unlocked and give m  e mine. 
Then I thro wed the razor away and give it back. A n d then you 
throwed it back to m e ' " (p. 56). The sacred " n o w " has not yet 
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come  , the to-and-fro movemen t still dominates, but the time of 
the past few hours has been concentrated into the seconds of this 
speech, into another very rapid sequence of "thens." The 
m o m e n t , therefore, begins to draw the past and present into itself 
so that even in its finite, discrete, metaphoric timelessness it will 
be expansive and inclusive. The conflict is more than the 
confrontation of Zack and Lucas, or of two m e n  , or of the "I" 
and the "other." Its context becomes that of the McCaslin 
history transformed by the power of language into the universal, 
identity-conferring conflict between master and slave, and not 
that conflict only in the sociological sense of southern history, 
but in the phenomenological sense of Hegel. The "I" and the 
"other" c o m  e to be only within the historical context, and this 
context, if w e recall Benveniste's insistently triadic model, takes 
shape only in the confrontation of the "I" and the "other."142 
Significantly, it is Zack, the "master," w h  o must actively 
confer identity on Lucas, w h o must acknowledge the " n o w . " 
"The white m a  n sprang, hurling himself across the bed, grasping 
at the pistol and the hand which held it. Lucas sprang too; they 
met over the center of the bed where Lucas clasped the other 
with his left arm almost like an embrace and j a m m e d the pistol 
against the white man's side and pulled the trigger and flung the 
white m a  n from him all in one motion, hearing as he did so the 
light, dry, incredibly loud click of the miss-fire" (p. 57). The 
rapid actions are here accelerated into what is almost simul­
taneity, centered over the bed in an embrace and concentrated 
into an instant of sound in the metaphoric click. Clearly a 
narrative foreshadowing of the statue-like culmination of the 
conflict between Boon-Lion and old Ben presented later in the 
novel, the reduction of time to a spatial point gives to the 
m o m e n  t a ritualistic presence. But there is a crucial difference: 
the conflict of the hunt is typical and will be repeated again and 
again in actuality, whereas the symbolic marriage of opposites 
here will never actually occur again; it is the opening of an 
absence, the making of space for an archetype that is " s u m m a r y " 
or functions only as prototype to be imitated. Even here, of 
course, the métonymie pressures of the prose defy a true 
stopping of time; the concentration of motion into the click is 
achieved by a stylistic illusion, first in the not wholly convincing 
claim that all of this happened in one motion, and more effec­
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tively through the violent hiatus in the narrative that follows this 
passage. There is, after the "miss-fire," an open space on the 
page, a graphic stillness or absence, which announces a radical 
time shift out of the flashback sequence. Before being plunged 
back into the world of time, where images of revolving seasons 
pass quickly before our eyes, w  e are suspended in the blankness 
where a metaphor should be, in an absence where the magic word 
goes unwritten yet, like certain arresting sounds that even when 
no longer heard seem to linger in the mind, which word silently 
holds our attention. After this m o m e n t a metaphor is written, in 
the "cartridge" from the miss-fire, but the metaphor's graphic 
presence takes its force from the absence that m a d  e a place for it 
in the text. 
W h e  n w  e confront the metaphor as written, therefore, w  e 
cannot forget that the scene of symbolic marriage between Zack 
and Lucas grows out of a tradition of exploitation and eternalizes 
it. The master/slave relationship of Zack and Lucas undergoes a 
violent reversal in the struggle. The dominant white partner Zack 
is provoked into action only to be suddenly forced to undergo 
the passive marraige role of the female—as the w o m a n - b o r  n 
McCaslin. The reversal is crucial if Lucas's archetypical presence 
is to contain the essential conflicts of the McCaslin heritage, and 
Lucas gains not only an identity here but also a position of 
unquestionable (male) dominance, exploiting Zack for his o w n 
satisfaction (it is Lucas w h  o fires the pistol) then roughly flinging 
him aside. This action reveals the power of the archetype, which 
continues to exercise its repressive force over the other 
descendants of Carothers McCaslin, over Roth and Ike, for 
belonging necessitates an acceptance of the conflicts and, hence, 
an acceptance of Lucas. Lucas, therefore, carries with him not 
only the past but extends the forces of the McCaslin myth into 
the future. H  e is the keeper of the McCaslin "icon": "the live 
cartridge, not even stained, not corroded, the mark of the firing-
pin dented sharp and deep into the unexploded cap—the dull 
little brass cylinder less long than a match, not m u c h larger than a 
pencil, not m u c h heavier, yet large enough to contain two lives" 
(p. 58). 
Ou t of the world of merely familiar items, pencils and 
matches, this small cartridge has been infused not merely with 
two lives but with a family/social heritage. The bullet, so 
The Pilgrimage of Being 83 
c o m m o  n an item in this novel filled with the violent but 
ritualistic world of hunting, has been defamiliarized into 
metaphor. Unexploded, its conserves the energy of conflict 
unspent, concentrating into itself the polysemantic, multi-
experiential world of the McCaslins and Faulkner's South, 
closing out the totemic world of S a  m Fathers. It is the radical 
symbol of another mythical world, a world of repression, 
exploitation, racial conflict, and self-destructive idealism, all 
manifest in the narrative of Ike's family, which speaks to a dead 
god, not the god of Christian myth nor the deer totem of Sam's 
tribe, but to old Carothers. Appropriately, Lucas himself 
acknowledges this deity: " *I needed him and he came and spoke for 
me*" (p. 58). The symbolic cartridge, articulated in the click, 
asserts the power, limited but essential, of metaphor to do battle 
against the m e t o n y m y of prose and the randomness of change, 
but as it does so it extracts from those w h  o would belong to the 
myth of the McCaslin family commitments that are harsh. These 
commitments Isaac McCaslin is unwilling to m a k e , although in 
his retreat he fails to find a better world comprised of better m e n  . 
Perhaps, too, w e must see the world of S a m Fathers as in its o w n 
way equally harsh, for it makes demands to which Ike, alien to its 
mythical terms, cannot accede, although he is willing. Caught 
between these two worlds, he is a m a  n without a history, feebly 
projecting his personal apocalyptic visions on experiences that 
defy his thrust toward order and stasis. So, then, he becomes a 
paradigm of the modern, ahistorical, and uncommitted existential 
m a n  , but although Faulkner's vision143 of true historical m e a n  ­
ingfulness escapes Ike, it does not escape the reader. Faulkner's 
novel is, certainly, neither history nor myth, yet it strives to give 
us an immediate experience of the force of each working its way 
through our daily lives. It is a vision of history to which only the 
capabilities of a literary language are adequate. 
Part Two 
The Centrality of Language 
The centrality of language in the interpretation of literature m a y 
at first appear to be obvious. It is not. Language is the m e d i u  m of 
creative expression, but what sort of medium? It lacks the 
corporeal solidity of the sculptor's marble and the sensual purity 
of the musician's sound waves. M o d e r  n aestheticians, following 
the lead of nineteenth-century philosophers, have tended to 
argue that language paradoxically partakes of both the corpo­
reality of stone and the incorporeality of sound, but this is a 
metaphorical way of speaking indicating only that language, as a 
m e d i u m for artistic expression, should be defined by its o w n 
characteristics. 
A T H E O R Y O F LITERARY L A N G U A G E 
A major contribution to the theory of language as a m e d i u  m 
for creative expression was developed in the 1930s and 1940s by 
the American N e w Critics.1 Parallel, though not always identical, 
attitudes were also presented by the Russian Formalists,2 the 
Prague Linguistic Circle,3 and the French promoters of explica­
tion de texte.* Yet the N e  w Criticism provides the most available 
and instructive model on which w e m a y begin our analysis of the 
problems of language and its artistic uses. Metaphorically, the 
N e  w Critics argued that language is a vital medium—living, not 
dead. In the creative process language, by its o w n peculiar 
characteristics, contributes to the making of the p o e m . It is not a 
mere vehicle or form into which one pours content or meaning. 
The source of this doctrine lies in nineteenth-century romantic 
aesthetics.5 Coleridge's long response to Wordsworth in the 
Biographia Literaria revolved essentially on the point that 
language is an integral part of the p o e m . The form of poetic 
The Centrality of Language 85 
language, particularly its meter, is its distinguishing character­
istic, and Coleridge claimed, "I write in meter, because I a  m 
about to use a language different from that of prose."6 Actually, 
he means that he is going to use language differently than does the 
prose writer, and this leads to his emphasis on meter. The 
rhythmic qualities of poetic language d  o not merely embellish the 
poem's content; they are the vital characteristics of the p o e m 
itself—its life. They reflect the energy of aesthetic creativity and 
beyond that the creative vitality of natural life, the natura 
naturans. Thus, for Coleridge, poetry is tied to the creative life of 
the universe, is an echo of the creative spirit of G o d  , and is 
qualitatively unlike the mere prosaic use of language. 
The difference between poetry and prose in this theory, I 
would emphasize, is how the writer uses language, for Coleridge 
argues that "a p o e m contains the same elements as a prose 
composition; the difference therefore must consist in a different 
combination of them, in consequence of a different object being 
proposed."7 This different combination is not so mechanical as it 
sounds; it is not merely the working over of a dead m e d i u  m or a 
clever use of words. The poet revitalizes language; he restores it 
to its essentially creative function of infusing life into lifeless 
objects, of creating wholly n e w combinations springing from n e w 
and individual intuitions. "[The poet] diffuses a tone and spirit 
of unity, that blends and (as it were) fuses, each [part] into each, 
by that synthetic and magical power , to which I would 
exclusively appropriate the n a m  e of Imagination."8 It is the 
imagination that fuses form and content into the organically self-
sufficient p o e m . All the rest is mere fancy, the mechanical use of 
language as already fixed and definite, the production of prose.9 
This essentially Kantian idea leads to the theory of the p o e  m or 
symbol as a dynamic object to be contemplated for its o w  n sake, 
with "disinterested interest." T h  e N e  w Critical formalism that 
follows from this tradition assigns to poetry a unique status in 
being, but it, too, was not a theory of static form and always 
implied the affective dimension that involved the reader in the 
dynamism of the aesthetic object itself. 
After Coleridge's rather eloquent defense, it has never been 
easy to break d o w  n the barriers between poetry and prose.10 
A m o n  g the later romantics, Verlaine summarized this doctrine 
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for the French Symbolists by extolling the "art poétique." H  e 
disparaged other uses of language claiming "tout le reste est 
littérature." Henri Bergson argued that the prosaic use of 
language is symptomatic of man's separation from the vital flux 
of life. Language had, in its general use, fallen to the level of 
"fixities and definites" that could not express reality. Bergson 
urged that w e turn away from this "counter" language toward a 
truly poetic, or metaphoric, expression that is more nearly in 
tune with the vital energy of reality—with the natura naturans.11 
Benedetto Croce, and his disciple R . G . Colling w o o d , went so far 
as to collapse the m o d  e of expression (language) into the act of 
perception itself, calling the entire process "intuition" and 
grounding it in man' s epistemological capacities.12 
At this point, however, the exact nature of poetic language 
seems to disappear into the mystery of h u m a  n consciousness. 
Croce's radical idealism reduces the creative function of language 
to a wholly internal operation of the mind. This necessitates 
another order of language, a prosaic order, to externalize the 
internal perceptions, and for the literary critic this raises the 
question: W h e r e is the poem? Internal or external? The N e w 
Critics, although influenced by romantic idealism, never went this 
far. They admitted that the creative use of language was the 
defining characteristic of the artistic imagination, but poetic 
language was not wholly internal. It had an external form, an 
ontic status.13 A s Colerdige argued, the p o e m contains the same 
elements as prose but combines them in different ways for 
different purposes. 
The N e  w Critical approach to poetic language was not without 
opposition. W i t h its debt to idealism it came under the direct 
attack of logical positivism for its tendency to lapse into meta­
physical speculation. For mathematicians and logicians like 
Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege language was a system for 
logical communication, and an imperfect system at that. A s a 
result, they sought to develop a language that would be logically 
valid, that would avoid what Gilbert Ryle later called the 
"systematically misleading expressions" of normal language 
usage.14 Philosophy's first order of business was to build an 
adequate philosophical language based on logico-mathematical 
structures (which were themselves fundamentally linguistic). 
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Questions of aesthetics were ignored or generally pushed aside as 
wholly subjective, even mystical. 
There was opposition as well from traditional historians of 
language like F.  W . Bateson. Repeatedly Bateson argued that " T o 
discover [the meanings of words in the p o e m ] w e have to ask 
what they meant to their author and his original readers."15 For 
Bateson the culturally determined meanings of words delimited 
their meaning-functions in the context of the p o e m  ; and, with 
this emphasis on historical relativism, Bateson sought to return 
literary criticism to its old scholarly tradition. Rejecting the N e  w 
Criticism and the claim that poetic language is the product of a 
peculiar, creative use of language, Bateson argued that the proper 
interpretation of a p o e m is historical. The distinction between 
poetry and prose—the N e  w Critical distinction in "kind"—he 
could not accept. 
This has been, from the beginning, the central problem of 
radical N e  w Critical aesthetics: to explain the relationship 
between historically determined language (prose) and the unique 
poetic object wrought out of this language. Often the N e  w Critics 
m a d e the distinction so severe that no relationship could be 
described; poetry and prose appeared to be opposed. Croce 
warned against this very absolutism w h e  n he rejected the prose-
poetry dichotomy developed by Hegel. H  e attacked Hegel for 
seeing all "distincts" as "opposites"; the Hegelian triadic 
dialectic, he claimed, tends to m a k  e anything that is distinct 
appear to be opposed. Croce's idealism led him to emphasize the 
unifying element of h u m a  n consciousness; distincts operate in 
matters of degree—where one m a y be part of another though the 
second is not identical with or part of the first. "Poetry can exist 
without prose (although it does not exlude it), but prose can 
never exist without poetry; art does not include philosophy, but 
philosophy directly includes art."16 
With this a very practical question emerges. In the study of 
"poetic" language, do w e begin with the poetic use of language 
seen as the generating principle of all other language uses (as 
Croce's theory implies), or with the general system of language 
within which the peculiar poetic use can be defined as a deviation 
(as the positivists argue)? These two views have effectively 
separated the disciplines of literary criticism and linguistics, for 
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the literary critic takes the first option defining poetry as a 
unique and originating use of language, whereas the linguist takes 
the second option defining poetry as a special, even aberrant, use 
of normal language functions. 
The N e  w Critics were firmly in the first tradition. This arose 
largely from their promotion of the organicist doctrine and their 
stand on the related question of the form-content dichotomy. 
They saw the p o e m as a discrete and timeless object, meaningful 
in its o w  n right as an individual and irreducible act of speech. 
The essence of poetry was metaphor. I. A  . Richards argued that 
the language of poetry is "non-referential"; that is, there is no 
separable "content" for which the word-structure of the p o e  m 
functions as a "sign."17 But for prose, the form-content 
dichotomy is its defining characteristic; prose seeks to convey 
information, and words function as "signs" pointing to an 
unambiguous content. T h e nature of prose is linear and 
métonymie because its structure sets up logical relationships 
between words, and between their contents. 
The form-content dichotomy, in its m a n y ramifications, is 
finally part of a mor  e general and pervasive philosophical 
dilemma: the result of Cartesian rationalism and the mind-body 
dualism. The N e  w Critics could reject the separation of form and 
content because Coleridge defined poetry for them by defining 
the characteristic operation of mind that produces it: the 
imagination. This is the implication of his claim that the poet and 
his p o e m are the same. Poetry is neither thought encased in 
language nor the Crocean externalization of the artist's intuition. 
Poetic language "fuses" thought and form, giving the p o e  m its 
o w  n peculiar ontic status. Language, at least in its poetic usage, 
has a unique and exalted function, for it is intimately involved in 
the actual process of h u m a  n consciousness. It is not merely a 
conventional system of signs (Bergsonian "counters") for the 
communication of preformed perceptions of the world. Poetry is 
part of the activity of comprehension, inseparable from the 
operations of the faculty of understanding itself. It is in poetry, in 
the poetic act of mind, that the gap between inner and outer 
worlds is bridged. The objects of poetic imagination become the 
immediate and present objects of aesthetic experience. Inevi­
tably, therefore, N e  w Critical aesthetics, with its basis in Kantian 
idealism, becomes entangled in psychology and epistemology, 
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and language in this theory must be seen as both dynamic form 
and static substance. 
For the more radical followers of Coleridge, this active 
dimension of poetic discourse provides the basis for a distinc­
tion between the creative and the instrumental uses of language. 
Creative language is more than the instrument for carrying 
messages through a system of neurological impulses, from one 
mind to another mind, but h o w m u c h more? Creative language 
usage emphasizes the process of forming messages, calls attention 
to that process and thereby activates a special kind of awareness 
in both speaker and hearer, an awareness not only of the message 
as message but also of the context or occasion of its formation 
and transmission, of characteristics such as motivation, will, and 
intention. The importance of this dimension of linguistic activity 
has even been noticed by Jacques Derrida, whose philosophy of 
language is militantly anti-idealistic, anti-creative. F o r  m is, for 
Derrida, "force"; the poetic utterance is a strategy of words 
expressing the effort of the artist to express.18 There is no reason 
why Derrida should not extend this idea of force to the more 
traditional sense of poetic language as creative, as grounds for the 
utterance of individual (we might call them original) ideas (or 
perceptions). Unfortunately, he is more inclined to exert his 
energy toward the debunking of the ideas of originality and 
privileged poetic perception.19 Nevertheless, it is m  y contention 
that Derrida does not stumble upon the idea of force without 
reason; in fact, I will go further: the sending of messages of any 
kind necessitates some such idea and thereby provides us with an 
insight into a startling kind of communication, the blending of 
the very processes of thinking in two separate minds. 
T o reduce language to mere instrumentality, to a system of 
signs functioning as content-carrying vehicles, is to deny the 
possibility of this form of true communication. Rather than 
drawing author and reader together the instrumentalist function 
distances t h e m — a n d distances both, by the process of 
abstraction, from the world. Derrida's temperament leads him, 
not without anxiety, in this direction, into what might almost be 
called the worldlessness of words. O  n the other hand, poetry, as 
its most eloquent apologists claim, mediates this distance and 
draws closer together the author's world as he k n e  w it and the 
reader's world as he is coming to k n o w it. Poetry gives life to the 
go Friday's Footprint 
world, to its dead objects, by involving the author, the reader, 
and the world in the act of creative perception. It is this unique 
power that Poulet describes w h e n he says that literature deals 
with objects, but objects that are "subjectified." "In short, since 
everything [described in a literary text] has become part of m  y 
mind, thanks to the intervention of language, the opposition 
between the subject and its objects has been considerably 
attenuated. A n  d thus the greatest advantage of literature is that I 
a  m persuaded by it that I a  m freed from m  y usual sense of 
incompatibility between m  y consciousness and its objects."20 
A N O U T L I N E O F P R O C E D U R E 
This is, admittedly, a romantic, a phenomenological, and 
perhaps an illusory, solution to the mind-body problem, but it 
rests squarely on a theory of language that, if it can be developed, 
provides interesting solutions to m a n  y of the problems faced by 
linguists and literary critics alike. I will outline here briefly the 
course to be followed in m  y progress toward the construction of 
a theory of literary hermeneutics. In the succeeding sections I 
propose to focus on the poetry-prose dichotomy as a convenient 
heuristic device. The precise division between them is not likely 
to be so radical as the N e  w Critics seemed to claim; but w  e m a  y 
find them to be distinct even if they are not opposed. The central 
question of the form-content dichotomy will also be redefined 
and will be useful in raising certain essential points for 
discussion. If Coleridge is correct and poetry differs from prose 
because it proposes for itself different ends, and poetry is 
structured by the peculair power of the imagination to achieve 
these ends, then three basic and traditional areas of interest 
to literary criticism emerge: (1) W  e must explain the so-called 
creative act of structuring that gives form and existence to the 
p o e  m and the relationship of this act to the poet's o w  n individual 
perception of reality, to his "world;" (2) W  e must explain the 
nature of the poem's structure as p o e m ; and (3) Finally, w e must 
explain the effects of this structure on the reader. That is, w e 
must explain the "act of interpretation" as it is involved in the 
process of understanding. 
In m  y effort to arrive at these explanations, I will be concerned 
with the relationship of the poet's individual expressive act 
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(parole) and the linguistic system within which he works (langue). 
I will consider also the relationship between the p o e  m as an 
individual expression and the general linguistic system that 
envelops the reader. This inevitably leads m  e to the historical 
problem of the relation between the general systems of language 
of the author and reader, for I m a  y safely assume that the farther 
author and reader are separated across space and time the more 
difficulties one encounters in comparing the general language 
systems of each. Thus, w e are finally confronted with the most 
crucial of all aesthetic questions: H o  w does the poet c o m m u n i  ­
cate with his reader through the m e d i u  m of the p o e  m across vast 
periods of time? Is such communication possible? 
T H E PHILOSOPHY O F L A N G U A G E : WITTGENSTEIN 
" W h a  t is language?" This question has been asked and 
answered so often, and from so m a n  y perspectives, that it is 
difficult to k n o  w where to begin. In general, w  e m a  y say that 
language comprehends a system of meaningful utterances utilized 
for the communication of thoughts and feelings between 
particular speakers (writers) and particular listeners (readers). 
Language, because it is both written and spoken, tends to 
bifurcate itself, and this problematic duality will need to be 
treated at some length below, but for the m o m e n t w e must focus 
on more general issues. If language, written and spoken, is 
"systematic," one might begin a discussion of it by analyzing the 
system into basic rules that govern its operation as a whole. This 
approach is traditional, but it is often misleading. O  f the m a n  y 
efforts to do this, few of them agree upon the basic nature or 
scope of the system that is being studied. They have produced a 
multiplicity of rules, m a n y of which are contradictory. Thus a 
second level of analysis has arisen that might be labeled "meta-
linguistics," the attempt to go behind the superficial manifesta­
tions of the language system to the very core of man's linguistic 
capacities. Linguists and philosophers of language have searched 
for a descriptive schema of language by studying the mental 
operations that seem to be most intimately involved in language 
usage. The nature of language has become embedded in the study 
of man's cognitive capacities, a more abstract or philosophical 
endeavor that focuses on questions that w e might generally 
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designate as "humanistic." It is necessary to distinguish between 
this philosophical study and another level of language analysis 
that I will refer to as "stylistics"; the latter presupposes the 
former, for it is the general functioning of language as an act of 
mind that defines the limits of stylistic meaningfulness. Style will 
be the primary subject of part 3. 
For our present discussion, w e can find a most instructive 
example of the problematics of the relationship between language 
and cognition in the early philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein belongs, at least in this early phase, in the c a m  p of 
the logical positivists. H  e thereby seems to be removed from m  y 
interest in the aesthetic dimension of language, but even w h e  n he 
is nearest the positivism of Russell and Frege, Wittgenstein is not 
wholly unmindful of the broader implications of his o w  n logico­
mathematical theory. There is the hint of both phenomenalism 
and idealism in his philosophy, and this provides a convenient 
opening for m  y development of a general literary theory that 
extends beyond Wittgenstein's o w  n goals. 
M a  x Black characterizes Wittgenstein's affinity for logical 
positivism in a way that provides an escape from the narrow 
strictures imposed by Russell. 
Distrusting the ambiguity and formlessness of ordinary language, 
[Russell and Frege] had hoped for a symbolism that would perfectly 
reflect logical form. Although Wittgenstein also demands "a sign-
language that is governed by logical grammar" (Tractatus, 3.325a) he 
thinks that ordinary language, just as we know it, is "in perfect 
logical order" (5.556a). So the ideography is for him merely an 
instrument in the search for the essence of representation that is 
present in all languages and in all symbolisms.21 
The distinction is crucial; for it does not split apart man ' s logical 
capacities from language as w e k n o w it, but rather welds the two 
together by claiming that the logical, cognitive operations of the 
h u m a n mind and the underlying structure of language in general 
are the same. Hence to study one is to study the other; to 
understand the logical form of language is to understand the 
cognitive capabilities and limitations of m a n  . T h  e theory, even at 
this level, has a definite Kantian dimension. 
Wittgenstein begins his study of language, in the Tractatus, at 
what he considers its most basic level: the relationship between 
words and things. This is, of course, a complex relationship and 
The Centrality of Language 93 
an important one for literary theory, for it reactivates one of the 
oldest principles of aesthetics, the doctrine of mimesis. H o w 
language relates to reality is the focal problem, for example, of 
Plato's Sophist, where it is part of a larger metaphysical question 
that must explain the relationship between a world of (false) 
appearances and the realm of (Real) Ideal Forms. 2 2 Plato's 
attention here is specifically on false statements, on the use of 
language to "say that which is not." By saying the "unreal" the 
sophist (or poet) utters false representations; but saying the 
"unreal" is saying some-thing, and thus the "unreal" paradox­
ically is both real and unreal. It is a false picture of reality, an 
imitation that is a mere semblance, a phantasma, both like and 
unlike reality.23 
The metaphysical problems here are less interesting to a 
modern reader than the extraordinary idea that falsehood always 
has about it the aura of truth, for to "say that which is not" 
implies: ( 1 ) that falsehood is a species of truth, and (2) enormous 
power in the hands of a clever "user" of language. The former 
proposition is at once Platonic and anti-Platonic and must be 
elaborated. T  o "say that which is not" is necessarily to misuse 
reality (Truth). Plato's example is as follows: a true statement, 
"Theaetetus sits," is composed of a n a m e , "Theaetetus," which 
has reference to an identifiable being, to a perceptible fact, and of 
a separate term, "sits," which refers to an identifiable state of 
affairs, "sitting," which is also a separate perceivable fact. In 
addition, the state of affairs, "sitting," is a specific case of an 
Ideal F o r m , "Sitting," from which the specific case derives its 
meaning. There is a similar relationship to be established between 
Theaetetus as being and the Ideal form of Being, although this is 
more of a Heideggerian concept than a Platonic one. O  n the other 
hand, a false statement, "Theaetetus flies," is also composed of 
two terms, the same n a m e with the same reference functions as 
the n a m e in the true statement, and the term "flies," which 
corresponds to a state of affairs, "flying," which is a specific case 
of an Ideal F o r m , "Flying," from which the specific case derives 
its meaning. The false statement is as meaningful as the true 
statement. The false statement is logically composed of separate 
and meaningful terms, and even if w  e ignore Plato's transcen­
dental Idealism and argue that the false statement is composed of 
terms that are meaningful in m a n  y different contexts, w  e are left 
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to say, as is Plato, that "falseness" or "that which is not" is some­
thing that distorts or is "different" from that which "is."24 
"Difference" here has to do with the relationship between 
separate and meaningful terms; w  e might say that the true state­
ment is composed of a logical ordering of terms that defines or 
"pictures" a possible relationship of things in the world. The 
false statement, conversely, is composed of a logical ordering that 
pictures an impossible state of affairs in the world. Both 
statements are logically meaningful. A s a result, w e must distin­
guish between two kinds of meaning, what Frege called Sinn and 
Bedeutung; the former or "sense" reflects logical meaningfulness 
irrespective of empirical verification; the latter is "referential" 
meaningfulness that "indicates" (points toward) actual things or 
states of affairs in the world.25 The sophist and the poet, for 
Plato, have the power to misuse reality by falsely picturing the 
world in meaningful statements. This is, in Platonic philosophy, a 
misuse of Knowledge and is the basis for Plato's general distrust 
of language. But the examples imply the necessity of a world of 
empirical fact as a ground for the idea of truth and falsehood, a 
ground that traces all verbal propositions through the realm of 
empirical fact, "that which is (not)," to the level of the Ideal, 
"that which can(not) be ." Meaning and truth (Sinn and 
Bedeutung) are different matters that meet in the function of 
mimesis. O n  e can imitate the world truly or falsely, but in both 
there is imitation. 
This unique feature of language allows Aristotle to focus on 
imitation without regard to questions of Truth. Aristotelian 
mimesis posits an analogy of form between wor  k and world that 
allows for "probable impossibilities," or logical presentation of 
"that which is not."26 The mimetic theory after Aristotle was 
generally corrupted into a m u c  h narrower doctrine, simplistically 
into a naive realism under the rule oiutpictura poesis, and, finally, 
by displacement, into the doctrine of "imitate the ancients" for, 
as Pope proclaimed, " H o m e r and nature are the same." In these 
corruptions a barrier is raised between language and world 
(subject and object) and all of the Platonic/Aristotelian 
complexity is lost. The necessary mutuality of Sinn and Bedeutung 
is destroyed, and it is not until Kant's "Copernican revolution," 
that a n e  w and revitalized relationship between language and 
world emerged. 
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Wittgenstein's opening propositions in the Tractatus are part 
of this post-Kantian reawakening; clearly n  o simple restatement 
of the narrow doctrine of ut pictura poesis, his "picture theory" 
revitalizes the Platonic problematics of "saying that which is 
(not)" by affirming Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung interplay. 
The proposition is a picture of reality. 
The proposition is a model of reality as w e think it is. [Tractatus, 
4.01]27 
Here he is not far from Ernst Cassirer, w h  o describes the basic 
structure of Kantian idealism in the following passage. 
The metaphysical opposition between subjectivity and objectivity is 
replaced by . .  . transcendental correlation. In Kant the object, as 
"object in experience," is not something outside of and apart from 
cognition; on the contrary it is only "made possible," determined 
and constituted by the categories of cognition. Similarly, the 
subjectivity of language no longer appears as a barrier that prevents 
us from apprehending objective being but rather as a means of 
forming, of "objectifying" sensory impressions. Like cognition, 
language does not merely "copy" a given object; it rather embodies a 
spiritual attitude which is always a crucial factor in our perception of 
the objective. Since the naive-realistic approach lives and moves 
among objects, it takes too little account of this subjectivity; it does 
not readily conceive of a subjectivity which transforms the objective 
world, not accidentally or arbitrarily but in accordance with inner 
laws, so that the apparent object itself becomes only a subjective 
concept, yet a concept with a fully justified claim to universal 
validity.28 
Because Wittgenstein's picture theory forms the basis for his 
m o r e comprehensive idea that the essential structure of language 
is identical with the innate structuring capacities of cogntion, he 
can claim that logical thought gives objective validity to our 
world via the m e d i u m of language. Moreover , in Tractatus, 3 .221 
he makes a most important distinction between "asserting" and 
"speaking of" objects. "  A proposition can only say how a thing 
is, not what it is," and the " h o w  " is, not wholly unlike Cassirer's 
constitutive perception, neither the presentation of an object nor 
the copy of an object, but rather a rendering of objects in the 
world. 
O n c e this claim has been m a d e w e can n o longer see 
Wittgenstein's theory as proposing a naive epistemological 
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realism. His argument that "In the picture and the pictured there 
must be something identical in order that one can be a picture of 
the other at all" (Tractatus, 2.161) should be read in the light of 
his earlier statement that the "form" of a linguistic picturing is no 
more than "the possibility that things are combined with one 
another as are the elements of the picture (Tractatus, 2.151). This 
implies an important distinction between mere "naming" (where 
one word refers to one thing) and "picturing" (which gives us 
not things but combinations, not objects but states of affairs).29 
Clearly, then, w  e can distinguish between language as Sinn, 
meaning as logical relationship, and language as Bedeutung, 
meaning as naming. Naming, nevertheless, is a necessary basis for 
the higher level function of cognition in picturing, and Wittgen­
stein's failure to develop this idea is perhaps the weakest portion 
of the Tractatus. H  e merely assumes (as his o w  n Kantian a priori) 
that a formal correspondence exists between language as a logical 
structure and the world as states of affairs; his approach narrows 
to "instrumentalism" as he proposes to analyze only what he calls 
"complex propositions," the more sophisticated utterances that 
are composed of "elementary propositions." The latter m a y 
derive from a primal system of words as names, but this is, as 
M a  x Black claims, no more than a "metaphysical inference."30 
So limiting himself, Wittgenstein sets out to demonstrate that 
within the system of language there is a logical order. It is this 
logical structure that enables language to give us our world as states 
of affairs, but the logical basis of language is "hidden" (Tractatus, 
4.002) as is the formal relationship between "elementary 
propositions," "names," and the world of objects. Because of 
this, Wittgenstein's study of language is bracketed between 
extremes, between the general, but hidden, logical structure 
(which in the Tractatus is solidified into an "essentialist" 
philosophy, into the positing of a single, unified essential core for 
all language usage) and the fundamental basis of picturing seen as 
naming. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein further 
restricts his focus by seemingly abandoning both the picture 
theory and the essentialism of the Tractatus ; in this later work he 
argues that the structure of language is nothing more than a series 
of c o m m u n a l ratifications, a specific set of "games."31 By moving 
further into instrumentalism Wittgenstein escapes some of the 
mor  e pressing problems of the Tractatus. 
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But the early and late approaches are not wholly incompatible. 
Wittgenstein's later study of language games, of systems within 
systems established by c o m m u n a  l ratification, need not force us 
to see language again as a barrier between the subject and the 
objective world, as a denial of some form of picturing. If games 
are in any way situational, if they are controls placed on group 
actions, they must also be seen as controls, communally ratified, 
placed on, and thus involving, individual experience. Just as 
language games militate against, and repress, "private languages," 
they also order and control private contact with reality. The 
boundaries between individual and c o m m u n a l expression, 
private and c o m m u n a  l experience are necessarily vague and allow 
each extreme to encroach upon the other; there is no c o m m u n a l 
experience that does not imply individual participation. Follow­
ing the same logic, there cannot be any propositional arrange­
ment of particular things into states of affairs without the 
implication of a concomitant level of picturing or naming that 
situates the particulars to be so arranged. Language, therefore, is 
ambiguously both a barrier between us and reality and a means of 
bridging the gap, and it is both c o m m u n a  l and individual. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein's later theory does not necessarily 
deny the hidden functioning of language's logical structure. W  e 
must remember the argument of the Tractatus that puts that 
structure beyond the powers of descriptive language use. T  o talk 
about the hidden structure would be tautological, for it would 
necessitate the use of language to describe the essence of 
language. " T o be able to represent the logical form, w e should 
have to be able to put ourselves with the propositions outside 
logic . . . " {Tractatus, 4.12). A n  d since ftthe limits of my language 
mean the limits of m  y world" (Tractatus, 5.6), this would m e a n 
that to discuss the essential logic of language one would have to 
transcend the limits of one's o w  n world. 
That which expresses itself in language, we cannot express by 
language. 
The propositions show the logical form of reality. 
They exhibit it. [Tractatus, 4.121] 
What can be shown cannot be said. [Tractatus, 4.1212] 
It is not unjustifiable, I think, to see this as no more than an 
argument to bracket questions of essentialism even as Aristotle 
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bracketed questions of Truth by narrowing Plato's concept of 
imitation. Wittgenstein does not in his later philosophy abandon 
his search for logical structures even though he does abandon his 
early focus on essentialism. 
Reading the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations 
together allows us to draw from the differences between the two 
texts certain inferences about the nature of language. Between the 
functions of (hidden) logical meaningfulness and referential 
naming, language is a complex structure of m a n y structures. It 
ranges between solipsism, as broadly defined in the Tractatus, and 
the discontinuous series of c o m m u n a l games described in the 
Philosophical Investigations, and it is this range of possibilities that 
Richard K u h n  s uses to give Wittgenstein a curious but interest­
ing link with the phenomenologists.32 Wittgenstein's claim that 
"the limits of my language m e a n the limits of m y world" involves 
him in a revitalized and neo-Kantian sense of solipsism, and here 
he is not all that far from the phenomenology of Husserl. 
In fact what solipsism means is quite correct, only it cannot be said, 
but it shows itself. 
That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits 
of language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my 
world. [Tractatus, 5.52] 
W  e are confronted here with the phenomenological problem of

explaining h o  w the personal, inner or private, world of the

individual user of language relates to the broader, outer, social or

cultural context—the collective or c o m m u n a  l world. Wittgen­

stein's solipsism sounds too m u c h like romantic egoism. Yet w e

should note Jean Piaget's observation that this solipsism is

actually an extension of logical positivism that was dominated by

the desire "to reduce mathematics and logic to linguistics and the

entire life of the mind of speech."33 In m a n y ways this is the

reverse of Kantian idealism, which wanted to reduce speech to

the basic operations of the mind, and w e should, therefore, be

struck by the similarity of goals. W h e  n Wittgenstein defines

solipsism, it is impossible to tell whether it is radically ideal­

istic or positivistic.

Solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. 
The "I" in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point [one could 
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as easily say it expands to an infinite circumference] and there 
remains the reality co-ordinated with it. 
The philosophical "I" is . . . the limit—not a part of the world. 
[Tractatus, 5.64] 
Thus w e have in Wittgenstein's philosophy a series of oscilla­
tions between several sets of poles: between views of language as 
logical order and as naming; between solipsistic idealism and 
positivistic (picture theory) realism; between transcendentalism 
and instrumentalism. N o n e of these sets is quite congruent one 
with another, and each seems logically to involve all of the 
others. At this point K u h n s provides us with an insight that leads 
to a better understanding of Wittgenstein's complex theory. H  e 
suggests a most instructive comparison of Wittgenstein with the 
French Symbolists. ' 'Valéry 's idea that a p o e m is a machine for 
producing poetic states is analogous to Wittgenstein's idea that 
logic is a machine for making sense, that there exists a structure 
which is the structure of possible meanings."34 Wittgenstein's 
concept of logische Raum (the logical space of language) is 
analogous to the Symbolists' idea "that the internal, self-referring 
'poetic form' defined the linguistic world."35 T h e relationship 
between an individual text (utterance) and the hidden logical 
structure of all language is also not unlike the Platonic relation­
ship of shadow-image, "phantasma," to Ideal F o r m (also 
hidden), only Wittgenstein is m o r  e certain of a correspondence 
between the two and thereby trivializes Plato's transcendental 
problematics. Th  e individual text is never about the logic of 
logische Raum but shows it. T h e Tractatus itself is not about the 
logical form of linguistic propositions, but it is a form that shows 
logical form. Wittgenstein's "zettelistic" method of writing ("the 
inscribing of propositions on slips of paper" to be later arranged 
into a text) makes "any order . . . a possible order where a text is 
concerned, and therefore whatever order is established can stand 
for any order,"36 or for order in general, as long as what is 
expressed are probable states of affairs. Every proposition, 
indeed every utterance, presupposes the totality of all utter­
ances, presupposes the "world" without saying anything about 
it.37 A writer's (solipsistic) world, his individual picturing of 
states of affairs, is his world even as it silently shows worlds that 
are not his yet to which he belongs. W  e m a  y speak of a system of 
dependencies. T h  e individual's world, asserted in a Saussurian 
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parole, stands for and within the communally ratified world of 
Saussurian langue, which in turn stands for and within the hidden 
logical form of logische Raum (seen as the world/space of logical 
possibilities, as language in its most encompassing form, which 
w  e have designated by the term langage). 
F o r m  , in any of these manifestations or inferences, can never 
be static and can never be seen as either wholly inner (private) or 
wholly outer (communal). Comparing Mallarmé's Un coup de des 
with the Tractatus, K u h n s says, "the movement of the p o e m on 
the page is the movemen t of thought in the speaker and reader; 
the text is an imitation of itself."38 This involves the reader in a 
demanding "act of interpretation,1' an active engagement with 
text and world (in its multiple inferences). The means of ordering 
the text produces meaning, stands for the writer's world and the 
reader's world, and for the potential world that binds writer and 
reader in a very complex kind of dialogue. Paralleling Wittgen­
stein once more with the Symbolists, speaking particularly of 
Valéry, Kuhn s argues: "His poetry might be thought of as an 
incantation, a linguistic evocation of the self, bringing it into its 
reality from the edges of the world where it resides. The self 
comes out of negation and nothingness . . . and lives, if at all, in 
the poetry created by its violent fight against the negativity of 
existence."39 Language begins to take on a life of its o w n , and the 
concept bears striking resemblance to the ideas of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt w h o in good romantic fashion proclaimed that 
language "is something persistent and in every instant transitory. 
Even its maintenance by writing is only an incomplete, m u m  ­
mified preservation, necessary if one is again to render 
perceptible the living speech concerned. In itself language is not 
work (ergon) but an activity (energia)."40 Humboldt's priority of 
speech over writing and his romantic subjectivism will ultimately 
prove to be more problematic than he suspected, but his 
emphasis on the "transitory persistence" of language is of crucial 
importance w h e  n seen in connection with his insistence that 
language is motion and not fixed structure. Once more we 
confront the echoes of Coleridge's dynamic natura naturans as 
well as Derrida's "force." 
I can n o  w m a k  e a series of preliminary observations about the 
nature of language based on Wittgenstein's claim that a language 
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system has a logical structure which defines the limits of our 
world. 
1.	 Language as total verbal system (langage) refers to that 
hidden, logical system that comprehends all of the possibil­
ities for meaningful utterances; within that system are 
codified (through use) worlds within worlds, both indi­
vidual and communa l . The term system here is no more than 
the potential for order because it is hidden and is not a thing 
that can be described. Langage is that surplus of cognitive 
power that I described in part 1. 
2.	 The individual writer creates a text within this system of 
systems, but the text does not tell us what the world is but 
how it is. 
3.	 Within the logical sysem of langage language usage is 
dynamic expression; langage is energia not ergon. Energia 
must not be seen as an expression of the subject; it is the 
gift of langage. 
4.	 A s energia, langage must be seen as a process that gives 
meaning to our experience. It acts upon the listener or reader 
as a kind of incantation, involving that person in an act of 
interpretation. 
5.	 By means of the structure of the text our world takes on 
meaning. It can be argued that langage gives us our world, 
our place of being and dwelling, by means of its "energy" 
of knowing. 
6.	 Language usage, consequently, is a way of knowing, and the 
study of langage belongs to the discipline of epistemology. 
7.	 Below the logical structure of langage, in the realm of the 
constitutive function of consciousness (naming) langage 
itself cannot venture; for langage cannot discuss its o w  n 
origins; it m a  y only show us its nature. 
8.	 Conversely, langage also cannot transcend itself to describe 
its o w  n hidden structure. 
9.	 This leads Wittgenstein to conclude that "Logic is tran­
scendental" (Tractatus, 6.13). 
10.	 Furthermore, as with the French Symbolists, Wittgenstein's 
theory of language eventuates in the mystical, for ethics and 
aesthetics are also transcendental (Tractatus, 6.421). "There 
is indeed the inexpressible. . . . This shows itself; it is 
mystical" (Tractatus, 6.522). 
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Wittgenstein ends the Tractatus at this point, having m o v e  d 
from the lower limits of langage (the level at which he must posit 
a necessary relationship between words or " elementary proposi­
tions" and real things) to the upper limits of langage (where the 
logical form of langage transcends langage itself). True to his o w n 
philosophy he stops there by declaring: "Whereof one cannot 
speak, thereof one must be silent" (Tractatus, 7), although w e 
m a y n o w see that the text of the Tractatus itself stands for, albeit 
silently, that hidden ordering that is the logical basis of langage 
and the potential for all propositional statements seen as 
picturing states of affairs. Language (in its most familiar usage) is, 
therefore, always characterized by a powerful drive toward the 
real, not as a condition for the verification of meaningfulness but 
as (reminiscent of Plato) the ground of the logic of all 
propositional knowledge of the world (the meeting place of Sinn 
and Bedeutung in mimesis ). For Plato, the sophist's black art is his 
creation of a meaningful illusion, m a d e possible by the malle­
ability of language and the inconstancy of the world of 
appearances. Wittgenstein trivializes Plato's transcendental 
problematics, but the lure of the empirical remains a necessary 
projection, for the possibility of logical meaningfulness in the 
utterance of propositions as states of affairs implies the 
concomitant function of referential meaningfulness. States of 
affairs are propositions about the world, and "The W o r l d is all 
that is the case," according to Wittgenstein. Even the proposition 
seen as tautology, which needs no empirical justification with 
regard to its logical meaningfulness (its grammatical "truth"),41 
cannot ignore its thrust toward the world as referential 
meaningfulness subject to empirical grounding. 
T H E PHILOSOPHY O F L A N G U A G E : CASSIRER 
If in the Tractatus Wittgenstein limits the scope of his 
philosophical analysis of language and cognition, Ernst Cassirer 
admits of no such limitation. Fundamentally^ agreeing with 
Wittgenstein that language systems have a logical basis, Cassirer 
emphasizes (in contradistinction to the general "creativity" of 
Wittgenstein's "show" theory) the peculiar "creative" dimen­
sion of poetic language. For literary theory this is crucial, but the 
two m e n , taken together, give us an expanded sense of poetry and 
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language that finally provides us with a m u c  h deeper insight into 
problems of literary interpretation. 
Cassirer is avowedly Kantian and a student of Humboldtian 
linguistics. For Cassirer (as for the logical positivists and for 
Cassirer's N e  w Critical followers) there is a meaningful 
distinction between the language of poetry and the language of 
philosophy or science. But this distinction is not absolute. It is 
derived from Cassirer's sense (based on Kantian faculty 
psychology) that w  e m a  y distinguish between "aesthetic 
universality" and "the 'objective validity' which belongs to our 
logical and scientific judgments."42 T h e former describes our 
peculiarly aesthetic involvement with creative works, a Kantian 
"disinterested interest" in the object of aesthetic contemplation 
—an involvement with its form or structure for its o w n sake. T h e 
latter belongs to our world of operational values (to philosophy 
or science) whose objects are "used" and even "consumed" but 
not contemplated. Both eventuate in a particular version of truth. 
For aesthetics it is an "understanding" of things in themselves; 
for science it is a "theoretical description or explanation," a 
propositional or conventional truth that expresses "Knowl~ 
edge."43 Not unlike Wittgenstein, Cassirer has outlined here a 
distinction between "showing" and "saying" (between the 
" h o w " a thing is and the "what" it is). T h e truly creative 
dimension of language for both m e  n is that of showing. 
At this point Cassirer and Wittgenstein sharply diverge. 
Wittgenstein's Augustinian sense of language as logical order, as 
langage, leads him to see all language systems as potentially 
creative (giving us our world) on the level of logical structure. 
This, of course, necessitates his a priori assumption of a 
"picture" function. The aesthetic dimension of language he 
pushes into mysticism, and beyond the logic of langage. 
Cassirer's theory somewhat rearranges these relations. The 
logical structure of language, for Cassirer, belongs to the 
sophisticated development of language usage that reflects m a n '  s 
conceptualizing urges toward his world. It is a system of 
classifications that aims toward the accurate explanation of life, 
as, for example, in conceptual classifications like the pair: 
edible/inedible. For Cassirer, as for Wittgenstein, this is in its 
o w n way creative; but as it creates a rational world, a world of 
causes and effects and hence a world of temporal or linear 
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relationships, it grows away from the immediate, atemporal, 
intuitive creativitiy of the aesthetic uses of language. At the level 
where Wittgenstein merely posits the necessity of a referential or 
naming function for language, Cassirer founds his theory of 
language's *'constitutive" intuition. Clearly both m e  n realize the 
force of language reaching toward the world of things; but 
whereas Wittgenstein concerns himself (in both his early and late 
writings) with states of affairs, the relations between things 
pictured in language, Cassirer concerns himself with things 
themselves, with, as he says, objects in experience. 
The difference is a reflection of Cassirer's idealism as opposed 
to the positivism and instrumentalism of Wittgenstein. Cassirer 
sees the aesthetic use of language as a mor  e rudimentary 
creativity that is the basis of language in general—its 
psychological and historical genesis. O n  e might say that for 
Wittgenstein "logic is prior to all experience,"44 whereas for 
Cassirer priority is given to man's originary experiences, to the 
very foundations of h u m a  n consciousness. Unlike Wittgenstein, 
then, Cassirer attempts to lay bare the very origins of language 
before explaining m a n ' s more sophisticated linguistic skills. The 
connection between these two levels is clear. The scientific use of 
language grows out of man' s primitive consciousness as he strives 
to posit "the limits of things," and "this is accomplished as man's 
activity becomes internally organized, and his conception of 
Being acquires a correspondingly clear and definite pattern."45 
Prior to this conceptualization of Being, m a n '  s cognition of his 
world consists of what Cassirer calls "mythical thought." This 
primitive activity of mind manifests itself in the forms of 
"mythical invention" that "reflect, not the objective character of 
things, but the forms of h u m a  n practices."46 That is to say, the 
forms that mythical invention takes do not conceptualize Being 
into patterns of things, do not describe or explain; rather the 
forms reflect the process of h u m a  n cognition itself, the dynamic 
interrelation of m a n ' s consciousness and his world. Not unlike 
the theory of Bronislav Malinowski, Cassirer sees language as 
originating in a magical realm of functioning. The relationship 
between word and thing is, therefore "productive" rather than 
merely referential; to speak to reality (the world) is a m o d  e of 
bringing the world into presence.47 For Wittgenstein "things" in 
the world apparently c o m  e into presence only in the operation of 
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their being arranged into states of affairs,48 yet w e must ask if 
Wittgenstein and Cassirer are really very far apart in this 
particular concern with the power of language to call forth and 
situate m a  n in his world? 
The epistemological origin of consciousness and language is 
what Cassirer calls a "violent act of individuation." Apparently 
this falls into two stages. The first is the most basic act of self-
awareness, the separation of the perceiving subject from the 
undifferentiated flux of objective Being, a negative act of 
existential consciousness. T h e second is characterized by the 
assertion of the subjective will upo  n the separate world of 
objective Being, breaking the undifferentiated flux into categories 
and particulars, grouping reality into logically meaningful 
patterns. This twofold process seems to find an analogy in the 
developmentalist theory of Jean Piaget outlining the two 
fundamental structuring activities of every individual's 
epistemological growth. The first, which Piaget calls * 'simple 
abstraction," describes h o  w the mind derives knowledge from 
the object itself; the second, "reflective abstraction," is knowl­
edge that results from the perceiver's action upon objects, from 
his sense of abstract relations a m o n g objects. These two m o d e s of 
abstraction have, for Piaget, both a logical and a temporal 
relationship: simple abstraction is a primary function of the most 
rudimentary level of h u m a  n consciousness, m a n '  s primitive 
(infantile) awareness of himself as a separate entity in the 
manifold. "Reflective abstraction" is a secondary function that 
builds upon this primitive awareness by arranging objects of the 
outer world into logical systems, states of affairs.49 This reflective 
function asserts the individual's control over the world, or, 
perhaps with reference to Freud, at least it marks man' s desire for 
such mastery.50 
For Cassirer, although not quite so directly for Piaget, language 
is integrally a part of this consciousness and partakes of these two 
stages; w  e can, therefore, extend Cassirer's insights to m a k  e the 
following distinctions. The first stage of language is a form of 
mythical thought constructed o  n the I-thou relationship: the first 
person pronoun is opposed to a series of individual and 
discontinuous proper nouns that function as names for things. 
But these n a m e s are not e m p t y signs. In the primitive 
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consciousness they are conceived as an identity of word and 
object; they are, in the purest sense, metaphors because they 
assert a transcendental correspondence between the perceiving 
subject and the outer or perceived world. They assert a magical 
"at-oneness" even as they necessarily affirm the newly awakened 
self-consciousness that divides self and other. The primitive 
consciousness of self is, as w  e said, negative; but the metaphoric 
dimension of language is, for Cassirer, both negative and positive 
in that its assertion of transcendental at-oneness must contain 
also a self-conscious awareness of a fundamental apartness, a 
"lack," which motivates such an articulate reaching out toward 
the world. Cassirer's debt to Romantic language philosophy, and 
particularly to Humboldt , is most clearly revealed in the primacy 
he gives to the function of the "shifters" "I" and "you." They are 
treated as very primitive, cognitively originating, elements of all 
language. This concept has been challenged by modern linguists 
whose primary concerns have drifted away from the romantic 
fascination with the origins of h u m a  n consciousness,51 but such 
is the thrust of Cassirer's philosophy. H  e argues that the birth of 
consciousness and the origins of verbal systems of c o m m u n i  ­
cation are one and the same. "Mythic ideation and primitive 
verbal conception [have as a function] a process of almost 
violent separation and individuation. Only when this intense 
individuation has been consummated, w h e n the immediate 
intuition has been focused and . . . reduced to a single point, does 
the linguistic form emerge, and the word or the momentary god 
is created."52 
The second stage of language is dominated by man's will, for it 
reveals logical relationships between the previously unrelated 
proper nouns. It works by a process of abstraction to categorize 
man's infinitely expansive individual perceptions. Thus language 
begins to take on a métonymie quality where elements are 
grouped according to types, and the relationship between these 
grouped elements is one of part to whole. The elaboration of a 
logical grammar emphasizes the part/whole relationship by 
transforming the immediacy and singularity of metaphor into the 
sequentiality (or linearity) and multiplicity of metonymy . O  n 
this level—the level of logical grammar—it is easier to perceive 
the relation between language and cognition. It is the study of this 
level that forms the limits of Wittgenstein's analysis of language 
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and, Cassirer claims, led John Stuart Mill to assert "that grammar 
is the most elementary part of logic because it is the beginning of 
the analysis of the thinking process. According to Mill the 
principles and rules of grammar are the means by which the 
forms of language are m a d  e to correspond to the universal forms 
of thought."53 
O  n the secondary level of consciousness and language usage 
m a  n transforms the primary opposition of self and other into the 
more sophisticated opposition between particularities (the 
fragmented parts of objective Being). Here m a  n begins to m a k  e 
the primal cognitive separations that Lévi-Strauss, in his study of 
mythical thought, calls "binary oppositions," distinctions like 
night and day (which Cassirer cites) or raw and cooked (the most 
familiar example used by Lévi-Strauss). O  n the primary level 
Cassirer sees mythical thought and language as "two diverse 
shoots from the same parent stem,"54 and apparently Lévi-
Strauss would concur. But Cassirer temporalizes the theory as 
Lévi-Strauss does not, in order to seek the source of the "parent 
stem" in an originary act of h u m a  n consciousness. This returns 
language theory once more to the essentialist c a m p , and 
Cassirer's posited "essence" lies in the genetic foundations of 
h u m a  n thought, a primitive thought that is subject to 
development as well as sophistication. Wittgenstein's and 
Lévi-Strauss's "essentialism" is, contradictorily, a "metaphysical 
inference" positing a full-blown logical structure for language 
systems. 
At this point it is necessary to pause in order to consider a 
rather crucial distinction between Cassirer's idealism and the 
positivsm of Wittgenstein (along with its near kin in Lévi-
Strauss's structuralism). Cassirer's theory, like Piaget's, is 
developmentalist; it emphasizes the evolution of complex, logical 
language systems out of rudimentary, primitive cognitive 
awareness. Wittgenstein, w h  o deliberately cuts himself off from 
genetic speculations, treats language as a systematic whole, 
complete in itself and not as a development from some more 
basic origins.55 The latter theory parallels specifically Lévi-
Strauss 's sense that man's emergence into culture, and into 
consciousness, was marked by a cataclysmic appearance of a 
cognitive structure (and, consequently, a full-blown linguistic 
structure) that was whole and complete at the m o m e n t of its 
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birth. O  f course, this structure exists in any one m a  n or any 
single culture only in potentia; it defines a surplus of explanatory 
power that is the "ghost" of perfect knowledge. A s such, it is 
what Jacques Derrida called a "centerless" system,56 describable 
only through the approximation of abstract models (such as 
those posited by N o a  m C h o m s k  y for language) and not limited 
by a single, 'Visible" explanatory law. 
T h  e evolutionary theories of Cassirer and Piaget and the static 
structure theories of Wittgenstein and Lévi-Strauss are in direct 
conflict, but all are predicated on rather general hypotheses. The 
immediate results for a theory of literary interpretation are that 
the idealist emphasizes the unique, individual, "original" source 
of language usage in defining poetry, whereas the positivist 
emphasizes the general, systematic, and collective structure that 
defines language as a totality. W  e are returned here to the debate 
between the literary critics w h  o see poetry as the "father" of 
instrumental language and the linguists w h  o see poetry as an 
aberration of general, normal language usage. I a  m convinced, 
however, that a theoretical reconciliation of these two opposed 
and heavily armed camps is possible. T h e oppositions here must 
not be seen as mutally exclusive even though the lure of polemics 
has led the combatants to state their positions as if nothing were 
possible but either/or commitments. T h e debate between critics 
and linguists, geneticists and structuralists, idealists and posi­
tivists reflects a crucial tension in language itself, a tension 
between logical system and individual utterance, langage and 
parole, and, consequently, between prose and poetry. Signify 
cantly, Cassirer's developmentalism does not indicate that the 
rudimentary linguistic origins of language and thought have been 
wholly eclipsed by the sophisticated cultural or scientific struc­
tures that developed from them. Thus poetry is always possible— 
within or in opposition to the system. Despite the develop-
mentalist hierarchy in Piaget's description of simple and reflective 
abstraction, the relationship between the two is not only tempo­
ral; it is also and importantly logical—each necessitating the 
other. So, too, Lévi-Strauss's emphasis on general, collective 
structures has never denied the force of the individual w h  o lives 
consciously and unconsciously within the system. A  s I outlined 
in part 1, the collective myth structure, thinking its way into the 
minds of m e  n w h  o live within its province, does not eradicate the 
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fundamental individuality of the m e m b e r  s of that culture, nor 
even negate the privileged individualism of the myth singer. It is 
the singer w h o "shows" the myth. T h e primary result of this 
tension between system and individual is to redefine our concept 
of cultural, linguistic, and literary history, to emphasize the 
interplay of forces that conserve the energy of the individual will 
in the holistic system while risking in this conservatism the ever-
present possibility of revolution that would restructure the 
collective system in order to respond to different awarenesses or 
to delimit a different meaningful reality. 
Cassirer, then, adds another dimension to Wittgenstein's 
proposition: "The limits of m  y language m e a n the limits of m  y 
world." The general creativity of language as a system gives way 
to the privileged creativity of poetry that exists within the system 
but is not wholly determined by it. W h i c h came first, the unique 
poetic expression or the hidden logic of the full-blown system, is 
a question that w  e need not answer. In his haste to deconstruct 
the ontotheological bias of Western metaphysics toward "poetic 
expression" (what he generalizes under the term,speech), Derrida 
teaches us that the question of primacy is always and everywhere 
problematic. Derrida's torturous analysis of Rousseau's essay on 
the "origin" of language convinces us that speech cannot precede 
the logic of systematic discourse (which he generalizes under the 
term writing). "Writing precedes and follows speech, it 
comprehends it."57 In effect, Derrida confirms m  y broad reading 
of Wittgenstein. If "writing," seen as a hidden logical system, as 
logische Raum or langage, as potential for arrangement of states of 
affairs, defies description or explanation because it encompasses 
(transcends) all such description and explanation, then any 
utterance is, as Derrida says, a "trace" of the totality of all other 
utterances past and future; any text stands for all texts. "The trace 
itself," as potential for order, as spacing, "does not exist."58 Yet 
its logic is not effaced by articulation, nor, I would argue against 
Derrida, by the thrust of an articulation toward the expression of 
experience. The logic of the system that always remains hidden is 
displaced into utterances of states of affairs, into arrangements of 
particulars that have presence, if only in those arrangements. 
Moreover, this relationship between writing (langage) and speech 
(parole) must not be seen as a simple contest for power, as simple 
dialectics. If writing "comprehends" speech, it does so only as it 
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"shows" itself in speech. Writing does not c o m e into existence 
through speech any more than speech dies under the diffusive 
nonbeing of writing, although Derrida is certainly convincing in 
his argument that Western humanism has frequently employed a 
life versus death or being versus nonbeing metaphorics to 
describe the interplay of speech and writing. 
It is possible, therefore, that Jean Piaget's m o d e  l of 
epistemological development, wherein he claims that ontology 
recapitulates phylogeny, that the development of the individual is 
a paradigm for the development of the race, is also a model for 
linguistic history, but Piaget's concept of the eternal tension 
between particular and system, the struggle for "equilibrium" 
between what he calls "assimilation" and "accommodation," is 
m u c h more significant. It is better, I submit, to assume that m a n 
has always been possessed by his structures but not determined 
by them. But if the collective structure is not determinative it is 
necessary; it is the ground of h u m a  n culture, of "belonging"; it is 
the context of communication, and it also guarantees to m a  n an 
individual freedom. The two extremes define our "collective 
individuality," the structure that is expressed by difference and 
not sameness. Thus w e can be satisfied with neither radical 
romantic, existentialist individualism nor with classical, universal 
orderliness. 
Language has enormous capabilities. It can be explained 
neither by speculating merely on its primitive origins nor by 
positing only Wittgenstein's logische Raum. T  o be sure, Cassirer, 
through his concept of symbolic thought, attempts to define 
language as s o m e h o  w both of these extremes. Language, like 
myth, is at one level an expression of man's rudimentary 
awareness: "at this point, the word which denotes . . . thought 
content is not mere conventional symbol [or sign], but is merged 
with its object in an indissoluble unity."59 The poetic function of 
language so defined is fundamentally h u m a n  , and even though 
Cassirer explains it in terms of a primitive emergence (man's 
unsophisticated sense of mysterious "powers" surrounding him, 
of "momentary gods"), it is an abiding form of consciousness in 
all m e n . Such a function springs from and points up the general 
structure of language capabilities in m a n . Communication is 
predicated upon the existence of a linguistic structure shared by 
both speakers and hearers. Language as a whole, therefore, must 
The Centrality of Language 111 
encompass both of these extremes, ranging between the 
particular, personal response to discrete and familiar experience 
and the whole, collective system of perfect Knowledge, between a 
"surplus of experience" and the "surplus of explanatory 
structure." W h e  n Cassirer defines the limits of language, he is far 
more expansive than was Wittgenstein in his ever-narrowing 
instrumentalism, and Cassirer here puts little emphasis on the 
idea of developmentalism. 
Language moves in the middle kingdom between the "indefinite" 
and the "infinite"; it transforms the indeterminate into a determinate 
idea, and then holds it within the sphere of finite determinations. So 
there are "ineffables" of different order, one of which represents the 
lower limit of verbal expression, the other the upper limit; but 
between these bounds, which are drawn by the very nature of verbal 
expression, language can move with perfect freedom, and exhibit all 
the wealth and concrete exemplification of its creative power.60 
Between the extremes lies the realm of meaningful discourse, 
in the mutual relationship of defamiliarization (seen as 
constitutive intuition) and démystification (seen as activation of 
the potentials of langage); the articulation of meaning fixes the 
indefinite within the "sphere of finite determinations," holds the 
extremes in a tensional or balanced relationship and marks the 
limits of literature in its m e t a p h o r / m e t o n y m functions. The 
tension between these functions defines the distinction between 
pure poetry and pure prose, but this raises severe problems in the 
area of literary criticism. For the philosopher w h  o wishes, like 
Cassirer, to describe the aesthetic dimension of language this 
problem can be defined in two ways: (1) he cannot transcend 
language in order to speak of language itself, and (2) he must use 
the métonymie tendencies of prose to describe the metaphoric 
tendencies of poetry.61 Thus the philosopher and the literary 
critic frequently find themselves breaking out of the limitations 
of prose and into the realm of poetry. This is most certainly the 
fate of Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and is the basis for Richard 
Kuhns's association of Wittgenstein's "zettelistic" method of 
composition with the poetic theory of French Symbolists like 
Valéry. So m u c h more problematic is the fate of the literary critic 
whose task becomes that of achieving a balance between the 
prosaic reduction of the p o e m to m e t o n y m y (the N e w Critical 
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"heresy of paraphrase"62) and the poetic transformation of his 
prose analysis into metaphor (where criticism becomes a p o e m 
about a p o e m )  . It is truly problematic because w  e cannot assign 
privileged status to either poetry or prose; they are not different 
languages but different functions of language. M o r  e importantly, 
the dynamic tension between the two (between metaphor and 
m e t o n y m , assimilation and accommodation, defamiliarization 
and démystification) "shows" us that w e cannot have one 
without the other; for example, to defamiliarize experience is at 
once to demystify conceptual understanding. The philosopher, 
whose thrust is toward the latter, is forever constrained by the 
necessities of logic, the need to demystify his system by speaking 
it to indeterminate experience. The poet, w h  o risks absorption 
into the indeterminate, must draw defamiliarized experience 
outward toward the determinate idea. Great philosophy, 
therefore, is always somewhat poetic, whereas great poetry is to 
some degree philosophical. Moreover, to speak of a distinction, 
even merely a functional one, between poetry (metaphor) and 
prose ( m e t o n y m y  ) is a conceptualizing reduction of a 
relationship that in itself can only "show" itself. 
With these insights it is necessary to revise the preliminary 
propositions about language that I listed at the end of the 
discussion of Wittgenstein. 
1.	 The term langage refers to the system of utterances that gives 
us the world of both our individual and c o m m u n a  l experi­
ence. The term system indicates a potential for order 
rather than an existential shape and, therefore, as system 
langage cannot be explained or described. Langage embodies 
worlds within worlds, utterances that do not tell us what 
the world is but how it is. 
2.	 The metaphoric use of langage is represented by the poetic 
tendency of literature; it is the immediate, atemporal 
engagement of subjective experience, emphasizing the act of 
articulation or the paradigmatic function of language as the 
expression of meaningfulness. The métonymie use oHangage 
is represented by the prosaic tendency of literature; it asserts 
the relationship between objects in a logical series thereby 
emphasizing the syntagmatic function of language as logical 
(grammatical) meaningfulness. 
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3.	 The two uses of language are distinct but not antithetical. 
They characterize the difference between poetry and prose, 
a tensional relationship that is the basis for all utterances 
and defines the limits of langage (as logische Raum) and, 
therefore, man's capacity for signification. Poetry and prose, 
however, must be thought of as functions and not objects. 
The term poetry is closely allied with what traditionally 
has been called the "creative" function of language, but 
there is, as I have stated above, reason to say that in prose 
there is a specific kind of creativity seen as Wittgenstein's 
manipulation of "states of affairs" with its attendant 
métonymie presencing of things. The issue here is that 
poetry as creativity uses the potentialities of langage (as 
logische Raum) in order to defy and reform those culturally 
ratified linguistic systems (Wittgenstein's "games" or, 
more broadly, Saussure's langue) that have become static 
or repressive. This is possible because metaphor always lurks 
within m e t o n y m y  , because simple abstraction is the "logi­
cal" basis of reflective abstraction, because if langage 
is to give us the relations of our world it must also give us 
the particulars of relationship. 
4.	 All language functions as a dynamic m e d i u m of expression, 
as energia, not ergon, but in poetry and prose there is a 
functional distinction between the metaphoric and 
métonymie uses. 
5.	 A s energia, langage gives meaning to our experiences. 
Energia is the gift of langage to m a n , the gift of a dwelling 
place, of belonging, to all humankind. In literature the 
metaphor/metonym tensions reproduce the drive toward 
the flux of familiar experience, the strange or typical. 
6.	 A s energiay langage acts on the attention of the listener 
or reader, involving him in an act of interpretation. 
7.	 Language, consequently, is a way of knowing, and the 
study of langage belongs to the discipline of epistemology. 
8.	 Within the system of langage metaphor and m e t o n y m y 
exist in a tensional relationship. Neither metaphor nor 
m e t o n y m y m a y adequately explain one another; each m a y 
only "show" its nature. 
9.	 There are, therefore, limits beyond which métonymie prose 
and metaphoric poetry cannot go, but that need not be seen 
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as severe restrictions on the freeplay of langage as a dynamic 
system. 
10.	 Langage as a system can neither describe its o w  n origins 
nor its hidden structure. These, however, "show" them­
selves through usage, through the interplay of individual 
articulations (parole) and culturally ratified subsystems 
(langue). 
T H E M E T H O D O L O G Y O F LINGUISTICS: C H O M S K Y 
Having c o m  e this far in the development of a philosophy of 
language it is necessary to do some backtracking—even at the risk 
of being repetitious. M  y focus will shift accordingly, and in this 
section I will turn to the formal study of language k n o w  n as 
linguistics, specifically to methodological problems arising from 
the study of language.63 M  y focal figure will be the very 
influential N o a  m C h o m s k  y w h  o echoes both the essentialist and 
instrumentalist tendencies of Wittgenstein. C h o m s k  y is a self-
declared rationalist, an opponent of transcendental idealism in 
linguistic studies, and in m a n y ways dominated by a positivistic 
temperament. But if these are more or less characteristic of his 
general philosophy, there are variations on these tendencies that 
are instructive and necessary to the development of his 
methodology. 
If I m a y begin m  y study of C h o m s k y in médias res, perhaps the 
single, most important observation to be m a d e concerns his 
division of language into two broad categories: "deep" and 
"surface" structures. Roughly speaking he bases this distinction 
on his belief that "language has an inner and outer aspect. A 
sentence can be studied from the point of view of h o w it 
expresses a thought or from the point of view of its physical 
shape, that is, from the point of view of either semantic 
interpretation or phonetic interpretation." These two aspects are 
related on the level of structure. 
The former [deep structure] is the underlying abstract structure that 
determines its semantic interpretation; the latter [surface structure] 
is the superficial organization of units which determines the phonetic 
interpretation and which relates to the physical form of the actual 
utterance, its perceived or intended form. . . . Deep and surface 
structures need not be identical. The underlying organization of a 
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sentence relevant to semantic interpretation is not necessarily 
revealed by the actual arrangements and phrasing of given 
components.64 
Yet if the connection between the two is not "necessary," then 
h o w can w e study "deep structure"; what is its value to 
linguistics? 
This problem is crucial to the development of a methodology 
of language study, for that methodology must reflect the nature 
of language itself. C h o m s k  y here is being careful to remain 
faithful to the Cartesian rationalism that he defines as the basis 
for his o w n linguistic theory. H e wants to avoid the trap of neo­
idealistic aestheticism, like that of Croce, which collapses 
language into the inner operations of the mind, surface structure 
into deep structure. Thus he holds firmly to Cartesian dualism, 
which keeps separate the inner mental processes and the outer 
sensuous manifestations of those processes in language. This 
leads him to flirt dangerously near a form-content dichotomy 
that, ironically, is m u c h like that of Croce. The external physical 
form of language serves as mere clothes for an inner semantic 
concept—or for meaning. 
The mind-body dualism of Descartes is problematic here. John 
Lyons, in his study of C h o m s k y , refers to a radio interview in 
which the linguist simply dismissed the mind-body dualism as an 
illusory dilemma; yet this answer is unsatisfactory. A s Lyons 
says, C h o m s k  y is sufficiently within the "mentalist" school of 
Descartes to believe that the internal operations of the mind are 
at least partly free from the determining influence of either 
external or physiological stimuli. " O  n the other hand, he differs 
from Descartes and most philosophers w h  o would normally be 
called 'mentalists' in that he does not subscribe to the ultimate 
irreducibility of the distinction between 'body' and 'mind.'6 5 
This wavering dualism is troublesome for his linguistic theory 
when he asserts that there is some relation—but not a relation of 
identity—between deep semantic and surface phonological 
structures. The methodology of linguistic analysis that he 
develops depends upon the use of the outer "physical forms" of 
language to determine the inner "abstract structure" of meaning. 
Moreover, if the relationship of inner and outer structures is 
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vague or only intermittent, C h o m s k  y cuts himself off from the 
profound communicative dimension of language that is so crucial 
to his linguistic theory. Speaking on this matter, he borrows from 
H u m b o l d t , reflecting both Cassirer and Wittgenstein, a 
definition of a "dialogistic" relationship between speaker 
(writer) and hearer (reader) that defies the absolutism of a mind-
body dualism. "The received signs activate within the listener a 
corresponding link in his system of concepts . . . causing a 
corresponding, but not identical, concept to emerge ." 6 6 
"Dialogue" here sounds more mechanical than what Cassirer 
proposed, and the term corresponding is appropriately more 
conservative, but the relationship between the physical form of 
the language and the deep structure of thought must be a 
"necessary" one even to achieve "correspondence." 
I have belabored this point in order to take issue with 
Chomsky's o w n characterization of his linguistic theory as a 
development of Cartesian rationalism. For his methodology to 
work—and to support his faith in Humboldt—he might better 
describe himself as a Kantian rationalist; the possibility of 
transcending the subject-object (or mind-body) dualism is 
essential to his deep structure-surface structure theory. This is 
not an unjustified suggestion, since C h o m s k  y himself traces 
Cartesian philosophy directly through Kant to romantics like 
Humboldt.6 7 The enemy, it would seem, is not post-Kantian 
romanticism but nineteenth-century British empiricism with its 
"passive mind" philosophy. 
C h o m s k y  , therefore, brings in a covert idealism by arguing for 
an attempt, like that of the Port-Royal school, to discover a 
grammaire generate, a general grammar. "The discovery of 
universal principles would provide a partial explanation for the 
facts of particular languages in so far as these could be shown to 
be simply specific instances of the general features of language 
structure formulated in the 'grammaire générale.' Beyond this, 
the universal features themselves might be explained on the basis 
of general assumptions about h u m a  n mental processes or the 
contingencies of language use.. . . "68 The methodology described 
here is "inductive," positivistic or scientific. The discovery of the 
general grammar is m a d e by a process of simple abstraction from 
particular instances—or "facts." But w  e should note that the 
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explanatory power of the general grammar is limited, partial; it 
works only where specific instances of language usage can be 
clearly shown to derive from the general grammar. Since the 
general grammar is itself abstracted from specific instances, its 
explanatory power is tautological. 
T  o escape this vicious circle, C h o m s k  y pushes beyond the 
general grammar to an even higher—a metalinguistic—level of 
abstraction. H  e posits the possibility of an explanatory power 
based on "general assumptions about h u m a n mental processes"; 
these assumptions give us not merely a general grammar but a 
universal grammar. In order to avoid becoming tangled in purely 
descriptive linguistics—the tautological limitations of the 
abstract general g r a m m a r — C h o m s k y is forced, by his o w n 
methodology, to a Kantian metaphysical assumption, to an 
essentialism not unlike Wittgenstein's. H  e must, therefore, 
affirm as strongly as both Wittgenstein and Cassirer the intimate 
relationship between language and cognition. A n  d against the 
empiricist tradition he does defend the "active mind theory" of 
the romantics and its implications for the dynamic quality 
of language usage itself. H  e drives all the way into the episte­
mological basis of language. "In approaching the question of 
language acquisition and linguistic universals in this way, 
Cartesian linguistics reflects the concern of seventeenth-century 
rationalistic psychology with the contribution of mind to h u m a n 
knowledge."69 
Once the leap into essentialism has been m a d e , C h o m s k y 
articulates a general justification of his theory. H  e borrows from 
Charles Peirce the argument that h u m a  n knowledge is not simply 
a random development. Quoting Peirce he argues that "the 
history of early sciences shows that something approximating a 
correct theory was discovered with remarkable ease and rapidity, 
on the basis of highly inadequate data, as soon as certain 
problems were faced. . . . " By analogy, C h o m s k y applies this 
insight to his theory of language acquisition. "  A fortiori, the 
chances are even more overwhelming against the true theory of 
each language ever having c o m  e into the head of every four-year­
old child." Reviving the rationalist argument from first causes, he 
concludes that a universal grammar is "necessary." "Knowledge 
of a language—a grammar—can be acquired only by an organism 
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that is 'preset' with a severe restriction on the form of grammar. 
This innate restriction is a precondition, in the Kantian sense, for 
a linguistic experience. . .  . "70 
T h  e original, hesitating step into essentialism has n o  w been 
rigidified into a universal law that is a "severe restriction" on 
both cognition and the structure of grammar—that determines 
the forms of thought and linguistic expression and makes lan­
guage learning and communication possible. "It is because of the 
virtual identity of this underlying system in speaker and hearer 
that communication can take place, the sharing of an underlying 
generative system being traced, ultimately, to the uniformity of 
h u m a n nature."71 At this point, C h o m s k y has m o v e d very near 
the structuralist essentialism of Lévi-Strauss's innate reason. 
T h  e relationship between deep and surface structure that I 
cited at the beginning of this section can n o  w be more tightly 
drawn. This relationship depends on certain "transformational 
rules" that are potentially discoverable through analysis of the 
specific, physical, utterances of native language users. They differ 
from language to language,72 but the principle of transformation 
itself is universal. It is the active process of language generation 
that is grounded in the innate powers of h u m a n cognition— 
indeed, is determined by them. Although there are no empirically 
determinable limitations on the number of individual linguistic 
utterances that might be formulated, there is a severe restriction 
on the grammatical form of such utterances. C h o m s k y ' s search 
is for a finite grammar that will explain an infinite (or apparently 
infinite) numbe  r of individual speech acts. 
C h o m s k  y has, in his battle against an abstract Cartesian 
dualism, attempted to bridge the gap between the inner, or 
private, world and the outer, or c o m m u n a l  , world, and the 
relationship between deep and surface structure is instructively 
problematic. If deep structure is the expression of a thought, if it 
is described as "the underlying abstract structure that determines 
. . . semantic interpretation," it seems bound to the subjective 
world of the individual mind, what w e might describe as the 
speaker's "intention to m e a n . " Deep structure is, w e remember, 
also nonidentical with surface structure seen as the "phonic" or 
"physical shape" of an utterance that C h o m s k  y calls its 
"intended form"—what is clearly the outer, or communicative, 
dimension of language. Nevertheless, the inner is also the outer 
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insofar as a correspondence exists between them. M o r e crucially, 
the outer is also the inner in the identity of those universal rules 
of grammar, in the uniformity of the generative system. It is this 
tangle of possibilities that leads C h o m s k  y to trivialize the 
problematics of Cartesian dualism despite his struggle with that 
philosophy. 
There is, w e should n o w note, no r o o m in Chomsky' s theory 
for a traditional poetry/prose distinction. The determinative 
nature of the universal grammar rules all linguistic utterances. If a 
use of language is meaningful to a native speaker, it apparently 
must fall under the universal grammar. Unlike Wittgenstein, 
C h o m s k  y refrains from pushing the aesthetic outside normal 
language usage; he refuses to give it, as Wittgenstein does, an 
exalted, transcendental value. N o  r does he see language, as does 
Cassirer, as the product of the primitive transcendental 
consciousness, as a fundamentally poetic act of mind. Chomsky ' s 
"universal grammar" or innate reason reflects his concern with 
the "hidden" logical system of generative potentiality posited as a 
logical necessity and inductively derived. Consequently, 
C h o m s k y develops a more detailed conception of h o w the logical 
system of langage gives us, as Wittgenstein argued, the limits of 
our world. 
But Chomsky's Cartesian problematics offers m u c h more than 
this if w  e risk extending the theory in the light of m  y previous 
discussions. The interchangeable nature of inner and outer 
worlds and the different orders of "intentionality" associated 
with deep and surface structures introduce a complex language 
system that is not reducible to either mere transcedental 
systematicity nor mere constitutive intuition. In his concept of 
universal grammar C h o m s k y emerges as a theorist of cognitive 
structures parallel to Lévi-Strauss. Together (although 
Chomsky's sense of innate reason seems more rigid than Lévi-
Strauss's logic of binary oppositions) they have described the 
ideal of a systematic and wholly adequate (more than adequate!) 
structure of Knowledge. The completeness or holistic nature of 
the system would appear to restrict any possibility of "change" 
or "history" or "creativity."73 The regularity of the system tends 
to close out temporality by explaining change as mere 
transformation. Yet, following a lead from Derrida, the system 
must be thought of as a nonentity, as in potentia, as unrealized. 
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Also, transformational rules do not, one must suspect, m o v e by 
themselves; for just as Wittgenstein's logic, which gives us states 
of affairs, necessitates an active articulation toward particulars in 
order to arrange the particulars into states, a system of 
transformations shows itself as a system only through the 
intentions of m e  n to produce meaning, to speak the inner 
thoughts via the outer, c o m m u n a  l structure. This intentionality, 
furthermore, is circumscribed by conditions that are themselves 
both of the world and of the h u m a n mind, and w e might return 
here again to the wisdom of Aristotle's concept of tragedy for an 
instructive example. It is the actions of m e  n in the world 
(particularities or historical events) rendered through the 
intentional act of the tragedian (a performative act of 
communication externalized in the spectacle of stage production) 
into a form of universal validity, into probable impossibilities 
(the logic of things that cannot be experienced) that defines the 
limits of the art of imitation. But these limits are broad. Imitation 
is far from copying, for that which is imitated is subject to the 
constituitive intuition of man's mind, as the image of an image, 
or as true or false imitation. N o  r is this an individual or private 
activity, for the shared cultural logic of probable orders has, as 
Le'vi-Strauss argues, always already thought its way into men's 
minds, even into the local structures of their languages (langue) as 
potential for order. 
T h e surplus adequacy of Levi-Strauss's mythologie, of 
Chomsky ' s universal grammar, of Wittgenstein's logische Raum, 
even of Derrida's "writing," necessitates intentionality and the 
empirical realm of individual activity. The vastness, compre~ 
hensiveness, and incorporeal nature of the logic of potentials, of 
probable states of affairs, does not merely leave r o o  m for the 
particular; it requires particular incidents of expressiveness, 
requires corporeality, in order to show itself in the first place. 
Without consciousness, without the inner that is both a dwelling 
place for and a tool of the outer, the distinction between self and 
world, between mind and things, between the world as chaos and 
as order, cannot be m a d e  ; the questioning nature of these states 
cannot even be raised. O  n the other hand, to ask the question 
brings this whole problematic world into being. Perhaps this is 
w h y Derrida, the most demanding critic of the Western bias 
toward the inner, himself despairs of escaping its claim to 
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privilege.74 It is, he confesses, a need; w  e m a  y call it a "passion" 
that is, if nothing else is, definitive of M a n  . 
It is in this context of need, of an emptiness at the soul of m a n  , 
that w  e must interpret the term intentionality. T  o intend meaning 
is productive, an expression of desire extending beyond the 
individual, as the transformation of materials into products. 
Very m u c  h like the relation between deep structure thoughts and 
their surface, phonic structures, intentionality is an articulation 
of an inner emptiness (seen as a given potential for movement  ) 
that attempts to fill the void by expressing it, in a physical form, 
to an-other. At the same time this is an opening of the inner to 
the invasion of the outer as the promise of plenitude, as, in fact, 
energia. That which is beyond us, which is not the same as us, is 
also an absence within us, what Derrida calls the "trace." T  o 
speak of an "absence" that "is" within us places us again in the 
Platonic dilemma of saying "that which is not." 
This somewhat tangled set of relationships, true to the idea of 
langage as hidden logic, can best show itself in a series of 
paradigms. Consequently, I shall briefly outline one such 
structure in the following section. It is a multivalent model, 
however, that implies several others. 
A P S Y C H O A N A L Y T I C M O D E  L 
O n  e of the major traditions in post-Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory has concerned itself with the primacy of "ego 
development." This is a multifaceted movement  , filled with 
internal polemics, but the general focus on ego strategies for 
dealing with the world (society) brings the problematics of 
inner/outer interplay into the foreground as the principal 
concern of this tradition. For the mos t part, the ego 
psychologists have emphasized the process of individual 
adaptation to social demands, and this has produced both a 
theory and a therapy of the status quo.7 5 The argument against 
this movement charges that "ego adaptation" serves the interests 
of society's power structure by exploiting individual needs in the 
name of some sort of social "cure." For example, commercial 
marketing procedures are designed to both create (false) needs 
and provide products for the satisfaction of those needs. But this 
creation of need is more insidious than it m a y at first appear, for 
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the need to "consume1' products is a negative displacement of 
deeper psychic energies of creativity or production. W h a  t the 
commercial establishment does, in fact, is intensify the sense of 
inner lacking by diverting energies (drives, desires) to socially 
acceptable ends. This Freud saw as "repression." T h e 
displacement of created need onto the level of conscious or 
preconscious h u m a n activity (material consumption) collapses 
inner and outer by superimposing collective need (social self-
preservation or commerce) onto individual desire. In particular, 
advanced industrial society protects itself from entropie 
disintegration through self-generated overconsumption, giving 
this the n a m e of "progress." The difficulty is that such progress 
depends upon a shifting inequality within the system in order to 
create the drive of need and justify overproduction; it can be 
argued that unemployment, inflation and ecological waste are the 
inevitable by-products. 
M  y purpose here is not primarily to draw forth a moral or 
political argument; rather, I a  m proposing a simplified model that 
expresses the means whereby the psychology of ego adaptation 
becomes a tool of social repression. The breakdown on one level 
of the gap between inner and outer worlds produces a false sense 
of equilibrium, of psychic well-being. This cure is expressed as a 
sense of wholeness, completeness, or, most suggestively, as 
togetherness (a term displaced from its sense of social integration 
to serve as a metaphor for individual, inner, mental health). Ego 
adaptation therapy tends, in its m a n  y popularized versions, to 
serve the ends of social stability by creating pockets of 
"acceptable," and also commercial, "deviant" behavior. Art has 
traditionally been considered such an area of permissive self-
indulgence, but a more familiar form of social permissiveness can 
be found in the equally ancient function of the carnival. The 
carnival, viewed as a privileged time and place, serves as a 
sanctioned release of socially destructive energies, as an orgiastic 
Walpurgisnacht where "everything goes." It is also an event easily 
(perhaps inevitably) adapted to economic ends, and it serves as 
an analogy for all the privileged times and places of a host of so-
called primal scream therapies. Perhaps a more sophisticated 
version, ego adaptation theory has established a similar form of 
privileged time and place for psychoanalytic treatment. In the 
analytic session the psychoanalyst plays the role of objective, 
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nonjudgmental listener and thereby creates an atmosphere of 
permissiveness that seems to allow the release of socially 
destructive drives in a harmless way. This is, however, merely a 
displacement and not a cure. Such sessions are endlessly 
repetitive; they are, in fact, repressive and economically 
exploitative. 
Recently, a revisionist Freudianism has faced this ego-
adaptation theory squarely, but not simply by charging that the 
adaptationists have misinterpreted the master.76 In fact, the 
argument takes quite another direction. Th  e adaptationists are 
seen as "repressive" agents w h  o divert us away from the true 
depth of Freud's theory; they are, therefore, m o r  e Freudian than 
they k n o w . The attack moves generally in the following pattern: 
1.	 Freud's texts revealed (showed) the unconscious as hidden, as 
a primal lack at the soul of m a n  . 
2.	 The ego adaptationists have substituted Freud's texts them­
selves, as writing, for the unconscious that the texts merely 
showed. 
3.	 This substitution is the same as a repressive displacement, for 
it allows the act of interpretation of texts to take the place of 
a more threatening confrontation with the unconscious that 
the texts only show. 
4.	 Freud's "talking cure" (the analytic session) becomes an 
endless act of self-interpretation that displaces or represses 
the unconscious. 
T  o write about or interpret Freud's texts allows us to repress 
what his texts show as the lack or absence of the unconscious; to 
speak about our personal needs with an objective analyst allows 
us to repress those needs in the illusion that repetitive self-
expression satisfies those needs. 
The very fact of repetitiveness belies the "cure," and the 
exploitativeness of the analytic session belies the "objectivity" of 
the analyst. Displacement serves the interests of socioeconomic 
self-preservation, confining psychoanalysis largely to the 
affluent, upper middle class and providing this class with a 
paradigm, in the model of Oedipal authoritarianism, for its o w  n 
general self-preservation as power elite. The "talking cure," it is 
clear, depends upon the power of language (more accurately, 
langage) to generate endless expressions, on the surplus of 
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signifying capacity, on what Derrida would call language's power 
to ''defer" fulfillment.77 Thus language, as a structure of 
Saussurian differentiation whose overriding logic is hidden, 
never expresses fully, in any individual text or utterance, that 
hiddenness. Yet because of this Freud's texts cannot be inter­
preted in order to domesticate the unconscious into a onesided 
form of Oedipal lacking. Language, seen as wholeness-defering 
langage, is both plenitude and lacking, gives us both a world of 
logical order, satisfaction, well-being and a world of desiring and 
emptiness. In this way langage is always the locus of the 
encroachment of the outer on the inner, possessed of both the 
power toward domestication, social homogenization, repression 
and the power of showing the depths of individual, socially 
destructive desire. 
Derrida's remarkable analysis of Husserl's phenomenology 
provides us with a vivid example of this encroachment through 
its focus on the special status of the first person pronoun I. The 
signifier I has an ambiguous functioning in language usage, an 
"ideal" status, although not a romantic "idealistic" status like 
that assumed by Cassirer or Humboldt . W h e  n a speaker says "I" 
he expresses to himself his intuition of his o w  n unique, i m m e  ­
diate selfhood, an irreducible self-identity or self-presentation. 
But the same "I" as signifier has quite a different functioning for 
the hearer; it indicates for the hearer the "otherness" of the 
speaker's self-intuition. It indicates a presence that is absent to 
the hearer. W  e must define the function of the signifier I, 
therefore, as "ideal," as mor  e than any one of these functions and 
thus comprehending both: the one inner-directed, the other 
expressing absolute outwardness. The signifier I has a status 
wholly apart from any consideration of subject or object.78 Thus 
Derrida can say, "hearing oneself speak is not the inwardness of 
an inside that is closed upon itself; it is the irreducible openness 
in the inside; it is the eye and the world within speech."79 
Derrida's aim is to decenter man's consciousness of the world, to 
argue that the outer world's encroachment on the inner world 
demystifies the primacy of the romantic constitutive intuition, 
the "privilege" of speech, and even the claims of phenomenology 
to be the irreducible basis of the philosophy of knowledge. But 
by damaging phenomenology at the heart of its reductive 
methodology in order to pry open the inner world, Derrida has 
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not abolished the inner world entirely. N o  r is it clear that he 
wants to do so, for his technique, borrowed from Heidegger, of 
writing sous rature, of inscribing a privileged term ("Being," or 
"essence," or "presence," or "I," or "is") and then crossing it 
out, does not, in fact, erase so m u c  h as it indicates the ^ ssentisi 
absence of the term's privileged signification. The term, then, 
must be written in order to be crossed out, it must be seen (be 
present) as a necessary trace of an always deferred (absent) 
meaningfulness. There is, as Heidegger would argue, a necessary 
falling away from every appearing that marks the degeneration of 
being, or presence, or ego into the "other-than."80 Derrida, in 
this discussion of Husserl, sets aside the simple dialectic of inner 
and outer seen as a struggle for superiority and argues for the 
vision of an inevitable encroachment of one world on the other. 
Unless w e read Derrida this way his concept of freeplay is 
reduced to a meaningless "interplay of presence and absence."81 
W  e are justified here in defining a radically n e  w concept of 
intentionality: as the expression of an inner desire that is a given 
of our outer world. Language's inner/outer interplay "shows" us 
self and other not as competitors but as mirror images of one 
another.82 Each "shows" the other, and this emergence of self 
into and out of the cultural context makes possible both an 
existential self-awareness and the motivating force of historical 
change. The vision of the literary artist, self-reflexive and 
acculturated throughout, is manifest in his intention to mean; 
vision and meaning are "occasional," showing themselves at the 
historical m o m e n  t of inward will to speak but also showing the 
trace of always-deferred fulfillment. 
For literary studies this is a profound nondualism, one that 
Gerald Bruns has recently confronted with admirable boldness. 
Quoting Paul Ricoeur, Bruns situates m a  n as apart from and yet a 
part of his world, as defined by the interdependent yet conflict­
ing impulses of assimilation to the cultural/linguistic system and 
the effort to accommodate that system to individual experience. 
" M a n ' s adoption of language is in general a way of making him 
absent to things by intending them with 'empty' intentions, and 
correlatively, of making things present through the very 
emptiness of signs."83 Ricoeur's correlation here, recalling 
Heidegger's emphasis on man's being in the world, leads Bruns to 
propose a dialectical relationship between Derrida's demystified 
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metaphysics of presence (the nonprivilege of "speech") and his 
metaphysical antimetaphysics of absence (the comprehensive 
differentiality of "writing").84 But I would suggest that a dialectic 
is not quite enough. A dialectic describes only the motive of 
intentionality, the why of a thrust, which has ambiguous 
psychological implications, toward an outer reality. T h  e act of 
intentionality in its use of "empty intentions" drives a wedge 
between the self and the other in order to confirm the noncon­
tingent integrity of the self. Yet it also makes reference to the 
other as object of desire in experience, as potential for 
fulfillment, as the other of myself, thereby affirming the self's 
contingent "belonging" to the world. Is this, then, far from 
Cassirer's conception of metaphor, or from the general, romantic 
idea of metaphor as ineffable, as beyond writing, "absent," 
fleetingly "suggested" through poetic articulation? Language, as 
langage, comprehends the possibility for intentionality even as it 
shows itself through intentionality. Langage is the context for 
dialogue, for imitation and constitutive intuition, for culturally 
ratified langue and individual parole. Langage is the hidden space 
of logische Raum that fragments into both solipsism and realism, 
allowing for the transformation of the one into the other, for an 
extension of Wittgenstein's baffling tautological proposition: 
Solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The "I" 
in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains 
the reality co-ordinate with it. 
The philosophical "I" is . . . the limit not a part of the world. 
[Tractatus, 5.64] 
T h e "philosophical T ,  " of course, is not the same as the "I in 
solipsism." T h  e "philosophical  T " is the Derridian "I" that 
must be seen as both inner and outer; it is the "ideal" that 
comprehends both the "solipsistic I" and, if you will, the 
"realistic 1"; it is the possibility of inner/outer, the possibility of 
that intentionality that shows itself as the illusion of dialectics. 
N  o longer the romantic self-conscious Being, present to itself 
in the expression of the "I," the first person pronoun never­
theless has about it the lingering ("longing") trace of romantic 
idealism. "I" refers not to a person but, according to Emile 
Benveniste, "je se réfère a l'acte de discours individuel où il est 
prononcé."85 Thus , subjectivity arises in the act of discourse as 
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the product of the ideality of the pronoun "I," which marks the 
here and n o w of the utterance. " L e discours provique 
l'émergence de la subjectivité."86 That emergence, predicated on 
the functioning of the "I" as both personal and c o m m u n a l  , as 
endlessly repeatable, opens the space for what w e call "inten­
tionality" or what John Searle sees as a "speech act." Speaking 
directly of Derrida's theory of the endless iterability of language, 
Searle correctly speculates that such "freeplay" necessitates "the 
particular forms of intentionality that are characteristic of speech 
acts."87 Searle fails to develop this idea and seems to misread 
badly Derrida's, admittedly somewhat obscure, appropriation of 
"speech act theory."88 There is no real communication between 
the two. But the importance of intentionality as will (desire) to 
articulate, and hence as emergence of the self in and through 
discourse (communication, c o m m u n i o n , community) cannot be 
denied even as Derrida struggles to deconstruct every last vestige 
of romantic "presence." 
The multifunctioning of the pronoun I permits the emergence 
of the "self," moreover, not only in the familiar romantic guise 
of self-conscious subjectivity but also in a variety of other masks. 
If I m a y call attention once more to the discussion of Faulkner's 
Go Down, Moses in part 1, the three principal characters of that 
novel all m a y be seen as "emergent" subjects (as "I's") whose 
various characteristics reflect quite different cultural/linguistic 
functionings. Th  e traditional romantic "I" is the "I" of Ike 
McCaslin, the reflection of egoistical, self-conscious, and 
nostalgic yearnings for a primitive I/thou dichotomy and its 
promise of apocalyptic transcendence. The Derridian "I" is the 
"I" of Lucas Beauchamp, the expression of self as both individual 
and archetype (familial/communal), as both center and circum­
ference. Lastly, the "I" of S a  m Fathers w  e m a  y call Lévi-
Straussian as it derives personal "identity" through "typicality," 
through belonging. This latter emergence is directly opposed to 
the egoistical "I" of Ike McCaslin and is perhaps better written as 
a " w e . " 
The significance of these three "figures" (characters, signifiers) 
lies in our overall reading of the novel, a reading that goes beyond 
the simplistically historical observation that Faulkner is writing 
about the passing away of one culture and the emergence of 
another. History is more cataclysmic than that. The three 
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characters described above, furthermore, do not represent 
Faulkner's effort to think like an Indian (Sam), or like a black 
slave (Lucas). They are all expressions of Faulkner's culture, 
traces of three sets of defining h u m a  n relationships (Ike's pattern 
of d o m i n a n c e and withdrawal, Lucas's inversion of the 
master/slave roles, Sam's immersion in an idyllic/pragmatic 
"nature") that subsist in Faulkner's South long after the 
disappearance in fact of slavery and the frontier. It is accurate to 
say that Go Down, Moses tells the story of the death of one culture 
and the birth of another; there is a chronology, a history, in the 
plot or narrative structure. But at the juncture of the three "I's" 
w  e see a very different order of time and history, not a 
chronology that erases its past, rather one that bears traces of that 
past. The key, therefore, is an interaction of cultures through the 
interaction of characters, and this interaction forms an interface 
that shows an opening for a revolutionary rupture in the 
historical chronology. W h a  t emerges is necessarily unexpressed; 
it is neither the s u  m of these worlds (they are irreducible to one 
another) nor the displacement of a weaker culture by a stronger, 
more progressive, one through which "time" is defined. This 
unarticulated context of the novel opens outward in order that 
w  e m a  y discern the limits of Faulkner's problematical white 
southern world, a somewhat confusing and confused society 
driven by economic necessity and religious guilt. The contra­
dictions of this culture are terrifying for its m e m b e r s  , w h o  , like 
Faulkner, have been forced into a position of critical self' 
consciousness. Ideals of egalitarian brotherhood, it seems, must 
be generated out of the materials of racial repression, that is, out 
of the interweaving of incest and miscegenation, but this is no 
less than a wilful act of cultural and personal self-destruction. 
Faulkner's history, therefore, contains no easy transitions; it is 
revolutionary, disruptive, and, finally, virtually inconceivable, 
for it posits anew cultural (linguistic, cognitive) structure, anew 
set of h u m a  n relationships radically unlike all of those the traces 
of which show through the characters of S a m , Lucas, and Ike. 
Clearly this reaffirms the crucial importance of the very act of 
self-emerging, of intentionality, that takes place in and for the 
sake of culture. Th  e assertion of "I-presence" reveals the 
potentials of collective cultural identity both in the sense of 
belonging to a determinate system (a potential loss of self) and in 
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the sense of critically, revolutionarily, deconstructing that system 
and the "self" it defined. Derrida's démystification of "presence" 
m a y  , therefore, inevitably return us to the western metaphysical 
tradition it was designed to explode. If w e no longer puzzle about 
the origins of man's "poetic" self-consciousness, nor about the 
"priority" of speech over writing, poetry over prose, it is because 
these traditional questions have been rewritten. If the essential­
ism of Wittgenstein's logische Raum or C h o m s k y ' s universal 
grammar, and the essential irreality of Derrida's trace, can only 
"show" themselves, w e must wonder as does Derrida, about the 
"force" (what w  e once called "origin") of this showing. This 
question of motivation, perhaps of individual will, w  e n o  w call 
"intentionality," seen as a form of displacement directed toward 
some end, some-thing. T h e encroachment of outer on inner, the 
mirroring one of the other, does not collapse the two, any more 
than Saussure's langue and parole m a  y be collapsed, into 
inarticulateness, silence. The separation of inner and outer, self 
and culture, presupposes the entire, hidden system of differen­
tiation in a way that an individual speech act presupposes 
Derrida's system of "writing." It is, in fact, Derrida w h  o shows 
us this, as his highly articulate critical texts (like Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus) stand for (stand forth, stand before) that hidden 
system. At this juncture Cassirer enters again, at the point where 
w e can say that particular texts show themselves as articulations 
of the m o m e n t  , as the presentation of an experience that m a  y 
well melt away into deferred fulfillment, but that nevertheless 
"activates" the system, divides inner and outer, and manifests the 
richness (if fleetingness) of experience of time and place, of 
history. Cassirer calls this a violent act of individuation 
(metaphor). Heidegger calls it "speaking being." Vico meta­
phorically concentrates it into the thunderclap, and a moder  n 
interpreter of Vico, Edward Said, labels this a "beginning 
intention."89 
T H E POSSIBILITY O F HISTORY: PIAGET 
It is to the problem of history, the diachronic dimension of 
man's cognitive capacities, that Jean Piaget addresses himself, and 
it is Piaget w h o most clearly of all recent students of language ties 
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linguistics to epistemology. In this very general sense he furthers 
the tradition of linking language to those operations of mind that 
give us our world. H  e does not, as does Cassirer, speculate about 
a primal or innate origin of man's capacities for logical thought. 
H  e apparently rejects the various essentialist attitudes of 
Cassirer, C h o m s k y  , and Wittgenstein, preferring to argue that 
there are several logical systems, not just one, and that a universal 
or innate core for these systems is little mor  e than idle specula­
tion. This releases him from the confining stasis of Chomsky ' s 
theory (as well as from that of Lévi-Strauss) and allows him to 
argue for what he calls a "developmentalist" theory of h u m a n 
knowledge. 
Piaget rejects the idea defended by logical positivists that logic 
is fundamentally a kind of language. ' T h  e position in general is 
that logical and mathematical reality is derived from language. 
Logic and mathematics are nothing but specialized linguistic 
structures. [But] if . .  . w  e find logical structures in the coordina­
tions of actions in small children even before the development of 
language, w  e are not in a position to say that these logical 
structures are derived from language."90 Illustrating his claims 
with laboratory-controlled studies of the development of reason­
ing power in children, Piaget concludes that "intelligence pre­
cedes language," both "ontogenetically" in each individual child 
and, a fortiori, "phylogentically" in the h u m a  n race.91 
The theory that logical capacity precedes the development of 
linguistic skills seems to counter Cassirer's argument that 
language emerges along with man's most primitive cognitive 
development—as a product of his violent act of individuation. 
But Piaget, in fact, does not specifically refute Cassirer, nor does 
he devote m u c h time to what he calls "unnecessary" speculation 
about the primal source of h u m a n consciousness. There is no 
clear evidence, as w  e shall see, that Piaget's theory is in all ways 
incompatible with that of Cassirer. Piaget does, however, directly 
reject C h o m s k y '  s position (just the opposite of logical positiv­
ism) that "language is based on logic, on reason," and that this 
reason is innate. "I deny that these structures are innate. I think 
that w  e have been able to see [in laboratory observations] that 
they are the result of development. Hence the hypothesis that 
they are innate is . .  . unnecessary."92 Piaget's developmentalism 
in this sense helps us situate the concept of language as a total 
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system, helps us place the "givenness" of langage as the horizon 
of man's being but as in no way really "innate." 
There are, w e should recall, two stages in Piaget's develop-
mentalist theory: "simple abstraction" and "reflective abstrac­
tion." The first is remarkably close (although not the same as) 
Cassirer's sense of the dawning of primitive consciousness, the 
violent act of existential awareness based essentially on a 
dialectics of struggle between a "self" and an "other." "Reflec­
tive abstraction," also reminiscent of Cassirer, is a sophisticated 
development of the first stage, which exercises a kind of control 
over the outer world by grouping objects into logically 
meaningful categories (states of affairs). Moreover, for Piaget 
there are " m a n  y different logics, and not just a single logic." " A n  y 
one Logic . . . is too weak, but all the Logics taken together are 
too rich to enable logic to form a single value basis for knowl­
edge."93 O n  e might say that there is an individual logic for each 
experiential system, each way of confronting the world; but this 
would lead to a form of solipsism, and Piaget finds himself very 
m u c h in Wittgenstein's dilemma of showing that one logic and 
m a n y logics necessitate one another just as " m y " language/world 
presupposes "our" language/world. By rejecting the innate 
reason of C h o m s k y and Levi-Strauss, Piaget hopes to gain the 
possibility of real novelty in the evolution of the individual's 
(and M a n ' s ) capacity for knowing. Moreover, without making 
the relationship between language and cognitive development as 
intimate as does Cassirer, Piaget opens the door for individual, 
creative activity. Knowing, he claims, is active (though unlike 
Cassirer he means that it is "operational" or "instrumental"). 
"Knowing an object does not m e a n copying it—it means acting 
upon it. It means constructing systems of transformations that 
can be carried out on or with this object. Knowing reality means 
constructing systems of transformations that correspond, more 
or less adequately, to reality. Knowledge, then, is a system of 
transformations that become progressively adequate."94 
The phrase "more or less" adequate here is disappointing, but 
we must recognize the difficulty of the problem. Piaget will not go 
so far as to accept a naive "picture theory" even from a 
sophisticated philosophy like that of Wittgenstein. W h a  t is 
important for our purposes in this essay is Piaget's sense of an 
active engagement with reality by the knowing subject. 
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T h e idea of "adequation" also is troublesome, requiring some 
sense of final goal or n o r  m as a measure of "more-or-lessness." 
Th  e n o r m  , of course, is cultural, the m a n  y systematic logics, 
cultural langue, that tend to force adequation into ego adapta­
tion. But since these subsystems or logics do not project an all-
inclusive logic that determines the individual systems, the 
individual is free to restructure even the most recalcitrant logic of 
adequation. W h a t w e are given is not a universal grammar or 
innate structure but the potential for assertive transformations, 
the too rich signification of langage. Piaget is interested only in 
that cognitive phase that has begun to m o v e beyond Cassirer's 
primitive consciousness of "momentary gods." O  n this level he 
makes use of the mathematical principle of transformation to 
describe a truly active principle of cognition. 
Hie nativist or apriorist maintains that the forms of knowledge are 
predetermined inside the subject and thus again, strictly speaking, 
there can be no novelty. By contrast, for the genetic epistemologist 
[Piaget himself] knowledge results from continuous construction, 
since in each act of understanding, some degree of invention is 
involved; in development, the passage from one stage to the next is 
always characterized by the formation of new structures which did 
not exist before, either in the external world or in the subject's 
mind.95 
" S o m  e degree of invention" is crucial to Piaget's develop-
mentalism. Observable on the ontogenetic level, it also, by 
extension, characterizes the phylogenetic level and gives a histor­
ical dimension to m a n '  s structuring capacities. W  e m a y  , there­
fore, extend Piaget to argue that m a n is not bound by his 
"uniform nature," and in the process of his cognitive develop­
ment he continues to restructure the meaningful systems of his 
world. Lucien G o l d m a n n  , drawing sociological implications 
from similar psychological insights, expresses this interchange 
between self and world most clearly; "tout comportement 
humain est un essai de donner une réponse significative à une 
situation particulière et tend par cela m ê m  e à créer un équilibre 
entre le sujet de l'action et l'objet sur lequel elle porte, le m o n d e 
ambiant."96 So it is also in the realm of language, and here w e 
must once m o r e align language with cognition although without 
speculating on the origins of either. In the development of 
language capabilities a complex process emerges whereby the 
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given system of adequation is tested by the individual's 
articulation to experience. Thus all cultural systems are subject to 
Piaget's "continuous construction" (to the freeplay of langage), 
to the resistance that articulation itself expresses toward too 
repressive logics of adequation. 
There can be no reconciliation between Cassirer and Piaget on 
the question, " W h i c h comes first, logic or language?" But w e 
must recognize that each m a  n directs his attention to a very 
different dimension of cognition and language usage: Cassirer to 
poetry or noncasual utterances, Piaget to prose or casual 
utterances, and w  e m a y  , I think, justifiably question whether the 
two theories are exclusive on all levels. Cassirer defines a version 
of creative language use based on a prelogical emergence of self-
consciousness: the vital separation of self and other that activates 
the contradictory drives to maintain and dissolve that separation. 
At this unlocatable m o m e n t , which is the origin of h u m a n 
history and yet itself not historical, m a n '  s self-awareness is 
contingent; the inner and outer worlds are flickering mirror 
images of one another. It is the m o m e n t of metaphor in Cassirer's 
philosophy, a probable impossibility, the unity of difference. 
This m o m e n  t is dissolved into difference itself or deferred 
fulfillment by Derrida; it is a repeated and repeatable m o m e n  t 
that Derrida wants to see as the enduring and ahistorical 
condition of m a n , and for which he coins the term "differance."91 
But this condition, as I have argued, can only "show" itself, 
and that best in the tenuousness of Cassirer's metaphor, as 
presence and absence. Thus metaphor can be seen either as 
creating its o w  n presuppositions or as self-destructing into those 
presuppositions. Moreover, Piaget's first stage of logical develop­
ment, simple abstraction, necessitates its o w n presupposition in 
something like the violent individuation of Cassirer's metaphor 
(or, for that matter, Derrida's differance). O n  e cannot act upon 
objects without individuation, without affirming its violence and 
reaching out to close the gap. N o  r can this act be repeated—each 
repetition being different and, perhaps in one sense, psycho­
logically mor  e adequate (as proof of mastry or belonging to 
culture)—without affirming Derrida's vision of deferral 
(differance). A s this rudimentary stage gives way to "reflective 
abstraction," m a  n transforms himself into the user (consumer) 
of his world. But here too abstract systems fail to reach complete 
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adequacy; by their very nature they cannot, for they are the 
developments of the more rudimentary forms of consciousness, 
showing themselves in individual actions, subject to constant 
revision as a result of man's fundamental drive toward a deferred 
fulfillment. 
If w e m a y speak at all of the ''history" of m a n , w e cannot 
oversimplify it (as, for example, readers of Cassirer tend to do) 
into a linear evolution from primitive to sophisticated thought, 
from metaphoric poetry to métonymie prose, or from a state of 
nature to a condition of culture. The developmental process, 
Piaget argues, is repeated in every generation, ontogenetically in 
every individual. The rudimentary metaphoric expressiveness, 
Cassirer shows, remains within all m e n at all times. The 
systematic possibilities of prose ("writing") and logical thought, 
Derrida teaches, are not strictly developments from, but also are 
the * 'given" conditions of, all individuation, poetry, and knowl­
edge. Perhaps the most adequate explanation of this complex 
system is to be found in Cassirer's theory of the h u m a  n condition 
that everywhere and always ranges between "ineffables" of 
different orders, between rudimentary (selfConsciousness and 
abstract collective systernaticity. History, therefore, is a h u m a  n 
projection (is m a n - m a d e ) ; it is no more and no less than the 
record of man's struggle for adequation and is itself (as histori­
ography) a struggle for such adequation. Observable in the acts 
of the individual, history marks the interpénétration of the outer 
on the inner, but does not evidence the collapse of the one into 
the other else history would be silent; langage would not show 
itself. 
M o d e r n , perhaps better designated "post-modern," literary 
theory has been obsessed with the idea of "silence," but from 
two very different perspectives. I give only extreme examples. In 
the radical theory of Ihab Hassan, based on the neo-Freudian 
utopianism of N o r m a n O . Brown, a militant antiformalism leads 
to an overemphasis of the experiential, the sensual, the corporeal, 
or immediate at the expense of defending inarticulateness. 
Language as a formal and limiting system is associated with 
society, with repression and sublimation so that it is 
no wonder that language, which is traditionally man's largest 
repository of private as well as public meaning, should be held in 
discount. . .  . By minimizing the role of sublimation in the future 
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[the prophets of our time] also minimize the role of language... . The 
modern revolt against verbal discourse may be thus seen, at bottom, 
as a revolt against authority and abstraction: the civilization that 
Apollo sponsored has become totalitarian, and the tools he gave m a  n 
to live by have become machines fueled on abstractions. Because all 
meaning is ultimately rooted in the flesh—assertions may be 
regarded as affirmations of the body—meaninglessness is a 
correlative of abstraction.98 
Hassan, in the sixties one of the m a n  y voices of intellectual 
revolt in the United States, n o  w seems himself to have been 
silenced, but not by his o w n strategies. Rather he is the victim of 
a social/political revolution that m o v e d diametrically away from 
his idea of the sensuous inarticulate to what w e might term the 
structural inarticulate. This is the realm of Derrida's "deferred 
meaningfulness" and Levi-Strauss's "surplus of signifier." This 
philosophical shift m o v e s away from the existential by means of a 
remarkable extension of Saussure's idea of the "arbitrary" 
relationship between signifier and signified, between the 
diacritical system of potential meaningfulness and the realm of 
individual experience." This, as Fredric Jameson points out, is 
what Lévi-Strauss has in mind w h e n he argues, with Kantian 
overtones, for being aware of the "discontinuity" between 
"experience and reality"; "to reach reality one has first to reject 
experience, and then subsequently to reintegrate it into an 
objective synthesis devoid of any sentimentality."100 Derrida, of 
course, finds Lévi-Strauss not antiempirical enough to support 
his theory of signification as "freeplay," as the "disruption of 
presence."101 For Derrida, and even appropriately for Michel 
Foucault, the result of this thrust away from the existential is a 
tendency toward antisubjectivism, antihumanism, and anti-
historicism. W i t h an emphasis on deferral and anonymity, on a 
meaningfulness that is not articulated but that dwells in the gaps 
of articulation, comes another version of the writing of silence. It 
is not necessary, however, to opt for either of these extremes. 
Hassan and Derrida, through their very different fascinations 
with silence, have both hypostatized the arbitrary "bar" that 
Saussure rather innocently drew between signifier and signified, 
signified thought (concept) „ , , , 
—:—TF.— o  r :—r:— • But perhaps no one has treated 
signifier accoustical image 
Saussure's formula with m o r  e suggestive violence than Jacques 
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Lacan. For Lacan the relation between signifier and signified 
(S/s) does not so m u c  h describe a discrete state of affairs (the 
arbitrary association of one set of sounds with a thought, like the 
Saussurean example where the sounds of the word "tree" e m b o d y 
the concept of "treeness") as it signifies a "function." That is, the 
formula (S/s) does not itself transcend language to describe it; it 
rather functions as a sign of the condition of language use. 
Saussure's formula, literally inverted by Lacan, signifies the 
, , . , , , . 1 . Conscious and Preconscious 
problematics of the relationship: — 
Unconscious 
where the "bar" is "arbitrary" only in the sense that its existence 
as Freudian "censor" or "repression" is real enough but 
unlocatable.102 Th  e reason for this problematics is that for Lacan 
the "unconscious is structured like a language,"103 and like a 
language is apparently neither wholly inner nor outer, neither 
wholly conscious nor unconscious, neither wholly individual nor 
communa l  . T h  e unconscious for Lacan is remarkably within and 
outside the individual as "the discourse of the Other,"104 and 
this, I suggest, "necessitates" the Saussurean bar as a sign of the 
struggle, both inner and outer, between the individual and 
collectivity. T h  e "continual" formation of the ego (which 
process comprehends the echo-relationship of ontogenesis and 
phylogenesis in Piaget's theory, the struggle for equilibrium) is an 
expression of "need" both as individual desire for fulfillment and 
as collective (linguistic) deferral of fulfillment. 
Th  e necessity of the bar for Lacan is not unlike the necessity of 
some conception of the emergence of m a  n from Nature into 
Culture in Lévi-Strauss's philosophy, the positing of an originary 
m o m e n  t that nevertheless, as Lévi-Strauss realizes and Derrida 
emphasizes, must also be scandalously violated. The bar is a bar 
between Nature and Culture, between conscious and uncon­
scious, between individual experience and collective signifying 
structures only because w  e "need" it as a presupposition for its 
o w n denial. The bar for Lacan is seen as repression in two 
interdependent ways. The first is "métonymie," a form of 
Freudian displacement, in which the m o v e m e n t from signifier 
to signifier "hides" the location of the unconscious desire and 
thereby situates the bar of repression. The métonymie movement 
that will not allow the emergence of the repressed desire into the 
consciousness nevertheless expresses that desire through the 
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movement from signifier to signifier as a form of voracious 
consumption, a repression of a fundamental psychic need seeking 
fulfillment, which in turn is both promised and deferred by the 
diacritical nature of the signifying system itself. It is this "linear" 
flow that characterizes what I described in part 1 as the 
métonymie drive of narrative, the seeking for an ending that is 
perpetually deferred. It is, of course, echoed in Faulkner's hero 
Ike McCaslin, whose desire to end the flow of his family history 
conflicts directly with his desire to father his o w  n son, to begin 
the family once again in innocence. Ike's seeking to pay off the 
family's debts returns on him in that devastating repetition where 
his dreams of a world of plenitude, of homogeneity (the union of 
white and black) are shattered by his o w  n shouts of deferral: 
"Maybe in a thousand or two thousand years in America, he thought. 
But not now! Not nowl H  e cried, not loud, in a voice of amaze­
ment, pity, and outrage: 'You're a nigger!'" (Go Down, Moses, 
p. 361). Such "debts" are never paid; desire and need turn, 
through repetition, into exploitation. 
Ike's cry, furthermore, brings us to the other function of the 
bar of repression in Lacan's theory: metaphor. It is metaphor that 
expresses the very emergence of the process of signification from 
the unconscious into the conscious. Metaphor, as Jakobson 
argued, calls attention to itself as metaphor. It is, for Jakobson, 
the function of the selective activity of language usage that 
emphasizes both difference and similarity and is, for Lacan, both 
conscious and unconscious. Ike's cry "in a voice of amazement, 
pity, and outrage" marks the violence of such a "crossing of the 
bar" in Lacan's theory,105 but rather than the simple expression 
of repressed racial hatred, Ike's cry, "'You're a nigger,'" is 
metaphoric, signaling the repression of an unvoiced signifer even 
as the voiced signifier, " 'nigger,' " forces us to see that repressed 
signifier as a signified, as, very simplistically stated, "personal." 
W h a t is repressed, a most typical Faulknerian theme, is the entire 
history of the McCaslin family so tangled in the scandal of incest 
and here manifest again for Ike in the child of the white Roth 
E d m o n d s and the u n n a m e d yet "related" black w o m a n . Ike's cry 
is at once a condensation of this history into the metaphor of 
racial "otherness" and a division that shatters his dream of 
fulfillment; it is a metaphor that allows us to see the métonymie 
flow of eternal deferral, a metaphor the "presence" of which 
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reveals the "absence" that makes its showing forth possible. In 
this, metaphor serves a profound function, perhaps an essential 
one. It at once affirms the necessity of the bar in order that it be 
violated; it speaks in the momentariness of its articulation to 
experience that mutuality of presuppositions that m a k e  s every 
metaphor both the force that shows the structure of the signify­
ing system and an assertion of itself over against that system. 
T  o s o m  e extent, m  y view of the bar as necessary explains 
Derrida's distrust of the idea of "arbitrariness"; Lacan's shift 
away from Saussure is justifiable in terms of Derrida's argument 
against those dualisms between Nature and Culture, experience 
and signifying structure, speech and writing that almost always 
eventuate in the metaphysical elevation of the former over the 
latter, the treating of Culture, structure, writing as "fallen" or 
"deadening degenerations" of Nature, experience, speech. But 
Derrida's powerful argument in his Of Grammatology, taken 
within its o w  n terms, must not be seen as simply inverting this 
traditional metaphysics; Derrida does not simply privilege 
writing over speech. In his analysis of Rousseau he arrives at a 
position of mutual presuppositions. T h e bar is necessary as that 
which "shows" itself, in its transgressions, as repression, as that 
primal Faulknerian repression/transgression of the taboo of 
"incest."106 
Even that which we say, name, describe as the prohibition of incest 
does not escape play. There is a point in the system where the 
signifier can no longer be replaced by its signified, so that in 
consequence no signifier can be so replaced, purely and simply. For 
the point of nonreplacement is also the point of orientation for the 
entire system of signification, the point where the fundamental 
signified is promised as the terminal-point of all references and 
conceals itself as that which would destroy at one blow the entire 
system of signs. It is at once spoken and forbidden by all signs. 
Language is neither prohibition nor transgression, it couples the two 
endlessly. That point does not exist, it is always elusive or, what 
comes to the same thing, always already inscribed in what it ought to 
escape or ought to have escaped, according to our indestructible and 
mortal desire.107 
For Ike McCaslin the promised but unarticulated signified which 
must be repressed only to violently erupt is that tangled 
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experiential realm of incest and miscegenation, but this opening 
is culturally and personally destructive. 
W  e must not, of course, privilege any sign, even one so 
profoundly descriptive as "incest," for the signifier incest, as w  e 
have seen in the discussion of Go Down, Moses, is merely 
metaphoric, an expression of the activity of language engaged 
with experience. It is a term that m a  y well have only the function 
of a "rhetorical" strategy, divided from the world of things even 
as it reaches toward that world and teaches us the use of things. 
Thus even as metaphor (desiring) presupposes m e t o n y m y 
(consumption) it disrupts it (it does not replace it) in order to 
show it. Emile Benveniste, describing the function of the 
sentence as a fundamental unit of language usage, puts emphasis 
on the active force of "showing." "C'est dans le discours, 
actualisé en phrases, que la langue se forme et se configure."108 
Perhaps this same idea has been m o r e expressively and 
inclusively put by Kenneth Burke. Literature, like proverbs, 
Burke suggests, might well be seen as "strategies for dealing with 
situations. Insofar as situations are typical and recurrent in a given 
social structure, people develop names for them and strategies 
for handling them. Another n a m e for strategies might be 
attitudes. O n e tries to change the rules of the game until they fit 
his o w n necessities."109 Changing the rules of the game, as I have 
argued, is what langage as inclusive system, as deferred 
fulfillment, and as the potentiality of all games makes possible. It 
is the function of the game to "fit" necessities, to "show" itself in 
strategies or in "attitudes" toward experience and specific 
occasions. These rule changes describe the limits of history. 
Just as there is no one logic, for Piaget, that is adequate to all 
experience, so too there is no one system (game) that remains 
adequate for all m e  n at all times. W  e have, therefore, a history 
comprised not of neat homogeneous evolution, of universal 
sameness, but a series of emergences that form the cultural, 
cognitive, and linguistic contexts for those individual m e m b e r  s 
w h  o in their everyday activities continue to ratify their 
operational, explanatory powers. O  n its abstract level history is 
not unlike that "series of series" described by Foucault, the 
emergence of cognitive systems at certain places and times that 
draw an ordered set of propositions into the limits of 
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Knowledge.110 But a countering extension of Piaget's theory 
allows us to remain mindful of the ever-present individual within 
the collectivity. Beyond the level of "simple abstraction" is an 
admittedly more mysterious form of prelogical cognition that 
tends to fragment experience into Cassirer's "momentary gods." 
Herein w  e confront the essence of what Derrida calls "freeplay," 
for it is this movement counter to mere stereotypical collectivity, 
yet, in acculturated m a n  , always within collectivity, that 
threatens to recenter any static, culturally ratified system. 
Derrida's claim that there are no universal a priori centers is 
correct; man's history is a constant series of overlapping systems 
each holding to its elusive hegemony for its space and time.111 But 
this is not far removed from Piaget's idea of man's constant 
struggle toward equilibrium, a basic h u m a  n condition that resists 
on the one hand a lapse into primitive apocalypticism (the sin of 
Ike McCaslin) and on the other hand the loss of individual being 
through absorption into the tyrannous collectivity of stereotype 
(the fate of Roth E d m o n d s ) . 
The relation of language and thought that gives us our world 
makes language itself a model of h u m a n culture. The very 
structure of language contains within it the limits of a temporal, 
collective, and static system (though not a universal system as 
"sameness") and the possibility of an individualistic and 
dynamic freedom. The tension between the two makes possible a 
revitalized concept of history. This extensive characteristic is 
manifest in the concept of "style" (which will occupy us in the 
next part) through the métonymie and metaphoric functions of 
language. Thus w e might argue that language is composed of both 
poetry and prose, although apparently there is no absolute 
separation between them. T h e old N e w Critical radical 
organicism, itself a metaphor, fails to fully acknowledge this 
relationship and, as a result, fails to define the full power of 
language as both system and individual utterance. T o some 
extent, the old form/content dichotomy also must be refocused, 
for the relation of language and thought forces us to see the 
relation of form to content in terms of a broader spectrum of 
possibilities. Again, at the extremes (where distinctions are 
clearer but not absolute) m e t o n y m y must be seen as a process of 
structuring content in terms of linear, logical sequences; 
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metaphor structures content in terms of immediate, spatial, 
symbolic identities. The content of each is functionally different 
because of the cognitive formalizations called into activity; that 
is, the content of each impinges upon our minds as content only 
because it is structured as it is. There is, effectively,  no way to 
separate the two. 
Faulkner's Go Down, Moses once more serves us as an 
instructive example. If history as "collectivity" shows itself only 
through individual acts of consciousness, "intentions"; if, as I 
have argued through Derrida, the inner and outer worlds 
interpenetrate and mirror one another; then each individual is at 
once the totality and the possibility of history. Ike McCaslin's 
fate is the result of an internalization of the mor  e romantic ideal 
of inner/outer confrontation; this internalization is, I believe, 
what Lionel Trilling meant by the "opposing self."112 Ike's fear of 
the ledgers (what Derrida would call his "phonocentric" fear of 
writing) drives him to defy his o w  n history by constantly seeking 
immediate experience, by reaching for an ever-receding Nature. 
Faulkner's story is a powerful and devastating vision of modern 
life, particularly of the American dream. The death of the 
frontier, the exploitative violence that European m a  n wrought  on 
the n e w world, the collapse of the hope for rebirth into 
innocence, all are themes of Go Down, Moses. The narrative of 
Isaac McCaslin tells the "real" story of the death of Natty 
B u m p o  , the end of the dream of natural plenitude; only Faulkner 
will not allow Ike to die.  H e lives as the constant echo of our 
American heritage, giving the lie to the dream of innocence. The 
American myth is vitiated by language because the innocence of 
experience is corrupted by the "commonness" of utterance; the 
delusion of bountifulness is exploded by the twin images of 
scarcity and desire. 
It is "Pantaloon in Black" that draws into focus the complexity 
of Faulkner's novel and the philosophy of language that the novel 
shows.  W e have seen to what extent the story pits its hero Rider 
against the nameless sheriff, and h o  w in this confrontation are 
juxtaposed the idea of "individuality" and the idea of 
"stereotype." Rider's continual seeking for some relief from his 
personal sense of loss drives him into stereotype. His questioning 
violates his individuality; his self-doubt, fear, and hallucinations 
inevitably force the outer world, the "others," to encroach upon 
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the sanctity of his inner being. W  e are confronted again by 
Freud's paradox of the interplay of life and death instincts, for 
Rider is never so alive as in his headlong plunge toward death. 
M o r e significantly, Rider is never more individual, never more 
the " n a m e d  " person, than w h e  n he confronts the white world, 
forcing the sheriff to u n - n a m e him as another, as "Boy" or 
"nigger" (to echo Ike McCaslin's epithet from a different but 
related context). The sheriff's instinctive retreat into stereotype 
shows the inadequacy of that stereotype to deal with experience. 
"Pantaloon in Black" plays itself out on a stage of very 
complicated interactions, revealing the unlocatable point of 
intersection between parole and langage; between individual 
experience and the myth of the h u m a n condition. But these 
relationships are askew, turning back upon themselves as each 
mirrors or reflects the others, spiraling inside/outside and 
outside/inside like the twisting of D N  A chains. I offer the 
following diagram as a poor two-dimensional representation. 
Langage ("hidden") Myth of the Human ("hidden") 
Experience 
O n e must see this diagram as an illusion of perspective, for the 
figure is "actually" twisting on itself so that parole and langage are 
in some way on the same level as will then be also myth and 
experience. There are, therefore, no levels, and the pivotal point 
of crossing is an imaginative point where inner becomes outer. 
W h a t matters is the idea of a point where langue and horizon 
appear to intersect. It is here that the critic situates himself, 
observing that "nigger," as the displaced fragment of a 
differential system, as the mere possibility of distinction, as 
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"otherness," flows through the cultural horizon of the sheriff 
where it signifies "nonwhite" to force its way into the 
particularity, individuality, of the realm of parole and do battle 
with the proper n a m  e "Rider." But this flow is, as the arrows 
indicate, reversible, just as is the flow along the horizon axis. 
Moreover, each axis apparently deflects into the other, for 
Rider's personal experience as "named  " individual mirrors the 
impersonal myth of the h u m a n as primordial lack, as desire for 
the always deferred fulfillment of the W o r  d m a d  e flesh. There 
are, therefore, no clear limits to a cultural horizon and the langue 
that expresses that horizon—and no points of contact except 
those of cultural ratification; they are merely revealed, as langage 
and myth show themselves in parole and experience. 
The cultural functioning of langue, as opposed to the hidden 
logic of langage, is always on the edge of appearing as fixed and 
delimited. But langue fluctuates between the limits of national 
character and local color, and, therefore, is a ghostly cultural 
system, not unlike a cultural code. If langage tends toward the 
wholly arbitrary, langue tends toward the highly motivated—at 
its most stultifying, toward the stereotypical. Langage is capable 
of m a n y langue, sometimes overlapping or in conflict. W  e might 
borrow from information theory a definition of this idea of 
langage as a "situation of m a x i m u  m information," as the ideal of 
perfect freedom of choice poised to generate specific messages.113 
The problem is, of course, that this m a x i m u  m or ideal state is 
essentially nonfunctional. Umberto Eco argues that w e produce 
meaningful communication in part by delimiting choices, by 
designing (culturally) subsystems within the m a x i m u  m state of 
perfect freedom. "  A message selected from a very large number 
of symbols (among which an astronomical number of combina­
tions m a y be possible) would consequently be very informative, 
but would be impossible to transmit because it would require too 
many binary choices."114 Represented by the formula I=Nlog2 h, 
where I is information, N is the number of possible choices, and 
h is the number of symbols available, Eco states that "in order to 
make it possible to form and transmit messages, one must reduce 
the values of N and h."115 
Such a reduction is essentially a limit placed on the expressive 
power of the system, and for all practical purposes it is a limit 
placed on the experiential field to be encoded (a limit imposed by 
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the design of the subsystem). T h  e experiential field is not part of 
the semiotic subsystem, but limits placed on the semiotic 
subsystem tend to censor or repress the field of experience by 
limiting the range of what m a y be truthfully articulated. Thus the 
experiential field remains in fact unlimited, and as such is always 
an anarchical threat to any delimited system (langue). Referen­
tiality, as Eco describes it, is a necessary condition for the design 
of any semiotic system because the semiotic system is con­
structed to control the flow of information from the experiential 
field, and this is so even if referentiality is not a part of the 
system's "semiotic functioning."116 W  e have, then, here c o m  e 
full circle to repeat the Platonic and Wittgensteinian paradox that 
language can produce meaningful statements about states of 
affairs in the world regardless of the empirical truth or falsity of 
those statements. It is always possible to subdivide, to specify an 
experience below the range of a semiotic system's permissible 
functioning; to do so is to redesign the system; to do so reveals 
the desire to break through the culturally sanctioned limits of 
meaningfulness by allowing the infinite potentiality of langage to 
intrude upo  n the cultural historical functioning of langue. This 
desire, a response to the discovery of absence, the discovery of 
something missing in all subsystems, also can be designated as 
"invention" (the intention to produce change, creativity as 
revitalization). Invention is largely a matter of mapping from 
experiential stimuli to perception to expression; radical invention 
is a n e w way of seeing the world, a revolutionary articulation to 
experience that is prelude to " n e  w semiotic conventions."117 
T h e literary critic must be ever-mindful of these complex 
distinctions and interrelations as he engages in the interpretation 
of an individual literary work. But before I m o v e on toward more 
specific discussions of literary hermeneutics, it will be helpful to 
revise once m o r e the ten preliminary observations about 
language m a d  e earlier in this part. 
1.	 Langage, as logische Raum or myth, comprehends the 
systematic interpénétration of langue and parole (cultural 
horizon and personal experience). Langage gives us our 
world, the " h o w " it is. 
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2.	 Langage shows itself as langue only through intentional 
acts, through parole, through "articulation to experience." 
Langage (myth) comprehends richness of meaning as both 
a surplus of empty signifying power and a surplus of 
immediate experience. 
3.	 These are surpluses of different orders: ( 1 ) that of a signifier 
showing itself in metonym y as arrangements of states of 
affairs, as deferral of completeness, as narrative flow; (2) that 
of immediate experience showing itself in metaphor as 
intuition of the particularity of things, as the inexpressible 
desire for (hence, absence of) completeness, as momentary 
and lyrical arrest. Neither m e t o n y m  y nor metaphor exhausts 
the other. W  e can say either: (1) "metonymy cannot replace 
one metaphor with another metaphor without loss" or 
(2) "metaphor cannot identify one m e t o n y m with another 
metonym with out loss." 
4.	 Langage functions as a dynamic m e d i u m of expression, as 
energia not ergon, but in poetry and prose there is a func­
tional distinction between the metaphoric and métonymie 
uses. 
5.	 A s energia, langage gives meaning to our experiences. 
Energia is the gift of langage to all humankind. It m a y be 
corrupted into repressive langue, but it m a  y never be wholly 
appropriated to the ends of personal authority. In literature 
the m e t a p h o r / m e t o n y m tensions reproduce the drive 
toward the equilibration of defamiliarization and démystifi­
cation. Metaphor disrupts the métonymie flow of prose by 
raising out of the flux of familiar experience the strange or 
typical. This is the form of narrative history as a dis­
continuous series of emergences. Prose is métonymie, the 
logical or causal arrangement of perceived reality into 
patterns, the subsuming of the part under a general category 
of the whole (Knowledge). This is the m o d  e of systematic 
philosophy. 
6.	 A s energia, langage acts on the attention of the listener or 
reader, involving him in an "act of interpretation," and 
through its o w  n dynamic structure as text it structures his 
perceptions. This is not a passive activity, for the particular 
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instance always opens out onto historical systems; the 
immediate experience opens outward to the encroachment 
of the mythical. 
7.	 Language, consequently, is a way of knowing; the study of 
langage belongs to the discipline of epistemology. 
8.	 Below the logical structure of métonymie language, into the 
realm of metaphor, métonymie language itself cannot easily 
venture. This is the basis for the traditional struggle between 
literary criticism and poetry, philosophy and art. This 
struggle is, however, necessary; it shows the energy of man's 
h u m a  n condition. 
9.	 There are, therefore, limits beyond which métonymie prose 
and metaphoric poetry cannot go, but that need not be seen 
as a severe restriction on the creative freeplay of langage 
as individual articulation or dynamic system. 
10.	 Langage as system can neither describe its o w  n origins nor 
its hidden structure. These, however, show themselves 
through usage, through the intentionality of articulation to 
experience (parole) and through the repressive, delimiting 
possibilities of culturally ratified subsystems (langue). It is 
necessary to say that langage does not exist; it is itself 
necessary. 
Part Three 
Stylistics 
Although there is a vast body of material professing to be stylistic 
analysis, there is, as yet, no general agreement about the aims and 
scope of this paradiscipline. In recent years, perhaps rein­
forced by the N e  w Critical dichotomy of poetry and prose, 
stylistics seems to have fallen into two divisions: ( 1 ) the analysis 
of literary style, which has its peculiar aesthetic or poetic values, 
and (2) the analysis of a general or linguistic style, which has its 
rhetorical or prosaic values.1 This bifurcation reinforces the 
division (real or imagined) between literary criticism and 
linguistics. In this part m  y interest is in whether one m a  y 
legitimately define a * 'literary style," and this involves a close 
look at what Leo Spitzer called stylistics: the measuring of minute 
surface details of a literary text against our intuitive grasp of the 
text as a whole, and beyond that against the historical milieu of 
author and work . 2 Yet the focus on surface qualities does not 
relegate style to mere "decoration" as m a n y classical rhetorical 
theories would have it. Style is m o r e substantive than "figures of 
speech" that simply embellish the presentation of an argument to 
m a k e it m o r e pleasing and, hence, convincing. Style is a matter of 
technique, but it is not only technique. 
Clearly, I have raised again the dilemma of the form-content 
dichotomy. T h e trend in linguistically oriented approaches to 
stylistics is either to ignore or openly to affirm the dichotomy. 
Michael Riffaterre says, "style is understood as an emphasis 
(expressive, affective, or aesthetic) added to the information 
conveyed by the linguistic structure, without alteration of 
meaning."3 Richard O h m a n n is somewhat m o r e perceptive than 
Riffaterre, although finally of the same opinion. 
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W h a t is content and what is form, or style? The attack on a 
dichotomy of form and content has been persistent in modern 
criticism; to change so much as a word, the argument runs, is to 
change the meaning as well. This austere doctrine has a certain 
theoretical appeal, given the supposed impossibility of finding exact 
synonyms, and the ontological queerness of disembodied content 
. . . divorced from any verbal expression. Yet at the same time this 
doctrine leads to the altogether counterintuitive conclusion that 
there can be no such thing as style, or that style is simply a part of 
content.4 
Louis T . Milic borrows an analogy from information theory to 
demonstrate the function of style in sending a message. In a 
simple code consisting of only two symbols, A and B , and rules 
that restrict expression to two messages encoded as A A  A and 
B B  B (the redundancy a safeguard against transmission errors), 
stylistic variations can be seen as messages written A A  B or B B A  . 
The message A A B is recognized immediately as carrying the same 
cognitive content as the message A A A  ; the variation m a  y be a 
mistake, insignificant because it does not distort the message, or 
it m a  y be a stylistic choice of the author, also insignificant 
because it does not alter the information content.5 At best, it can 
function to add "emphasis" or "local color."6 
O h m a n n  , Riffa terre, and Milic represent an extreme view of 
the separability of style (form) and content, a view that 
eventuates, whatever the efforts to avoid it, in a version of the 
"decoration" theory. They see style, correctly, as manifesting 
itself in a surface quality, but, ironically, they rob it of any real 
value by reducing its influence over content. O h m a n n  , Riffaterre, 
and Milic reflect their debt to what Gerald Bruns has defined as 
the "rhetorical" tradition of stylistic theory.7 T h  e message, or 
informational content of a text, they argue, is fixed; it is 
unchanged by stylistic variations, but this too leads to an 
"altogether counterintuitive conclusion": because style is an 
isolable element of any text, it is finally insignificant or trivial. 
Conversely, under the pressure of N e  w Critical aesthetics, 
literary style is seen to be fused (to reuse the Coleridgean term) 
with content. It has an undeniable surface quality that can be 
grasped immediately by any sensitive reader; but the surface, as 
Spitzer argued, is wedded to content, and the organic wholeness 
of the text is, finally, irreducible. Here style is raised to its most 
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concrete level; the embodiment of the creative act of mind gives 
the text its privileged functionality, or what John C r o w e R a n s o m 
called "texture."8 It is not, therefore, in the theory of fused 
content and form that style disappears; rather it is in O h m a n n ' s  , 
Riffaterre's, and Milic's decoration theory that style almost 
evaporates in its triviality. Style is never so transparent. 
All language use is marked by style, and therefore, the terms 
literary and linguistic are misleading. W  e would, perhaps, be 
better served by Karl Uitti's distinction between "individual" 
and "interpersonal" style.9 Interpersonal style belongs to the 
realm of communication theory, where style must be as nearly 
separable from content as possible in order to avoid distortion of 
the message. The function of style here is for emphasis or 
clarification, but at its extreme it has little aesthetic value. 
Interpersonal style adheres to conventional formulae, to 
c o m m u n a  l and historically relevant devices or "figures"; but it is 
not superfluous, even if it tends toward the trivial, for without it 
the disembodied content would never find its way to the 
intended reader or listener. The ideal would be a kind of "white 
writing," or what Roland Barthes has described as "degree zero." 
O  n the other extreme, individual style pushes toward the level of 
pure poetry, where the symbolic function of language takes on 
the mysterious existence that Cassirer characterized as a tran­
scendental relationship between perceiver and perceived. Here 
our attention is shifted away from primary concern with the 
"what" of the message to the " h o w " of the expression. The 
symbol is not merely a n a m e for a thing, but is, in the poetic 
function of language use, at one with the thing it names. The 
separation of form and content, therefore, is mor  e problematical. 
At an ideal (or idealistic) level of poetic consciousness, style is 
wholly individual, the opposite of "degree zero." This is pure 
metaphor, the romantic dream of immediacy or presence, "that 
is, equivalence of the author's literary intention and carnal 
structure. . . . So that style is always secret; but the occult aspect 
of its implications does not arise from the mobile and ever-
provisional nature of language; its secret is recollection locked 
within the body of the writer."10 At this extreme, Barthes claims, 
it is improper to speak of a style, for there are m a n  y styles, each 
of which raises the "writer above History as the freshness of 
Innocence."11 Purely individual, purely metaphoric, and 
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completely personal style would mark a free m o m e n t in 
duration, the expression of the writer's identity as incorporeal 
'Voice." 
T w  o major concerns, then, define m  y interest in style as I 
m o v  e toward the construction of a literary hermeneutics. First, 
style manifests itself in its surface qualities, what might better be 
called the physical or sensual characteristics of language. C o n  ­
sequently, it is the most available (though sometimes the least 
observed) characteristic of any literary text; as Spitzer suggested, 
it is the starting point for interpretation. Second, style fluctuates 
between the discrete and the conventional. Behind style, in the 
realm of h u m a  n cognitive processes, are affective meanings 
characterized by their position along a line leading from 
metaphor to m e t o n y m y ; but on the sensually apprehendable 
surface, stylistic techniques are characterized by positions along a 
line leading from the individual to the interpersonal. 
Since no text, wherever it might lie along these continuous 
lines between extremes, ever becomes wholly individual (to be so 
would be to be totally obscure) or wholly conventional (a 
negation of the author's or speaker's identity), there is always a 
combination of individual and interpersonal qualities in its style. 
This is the essence of the text's communicative powers; there 
must be a context of the conventional as well as an individual 
expression. A study of style, then, encompasses the traditional 
divisions of interest in all literary criticism: the author, the 
w o r k , and the reader. F r o m this basis, returning to the 
preliminary observations with which I began m  y discussion of 
language in part 2 , I can describe the following triad of issues to 
be discussed in part 3. 
1.	 Style is the individual existential projection of an author's 
perception of his world. This perception is ordered 
(structured) in the cognitive-expressive transaction that takes 
place between the author and the cultural-historical and 
linguistic conventions of his day involving his conscious or 
unconscious "collective individuality." 
2.	 Style is the dynamic meaning-structure of the work itself, its 
surface or aesthetic qualities as work. 
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Style is the affective structure of meaning that sets up con­
trolled responses in the reader. This phase of the communica­
tive transaction enables the reader to enter the world of the 
work and finally to step through time and across space to 
enter the author's world as he saw it. 
STYLE A S EXISTENTIAL PROJECTION: T H E A U T H O  R 
Interest in the relationship between the individuality of an act 
of language usage and the general, cultural system of language has 
led to what m a n y linguists call the "deviation theory." Simply 
stated, this theory explains the individual aspects of any 
linguistic utterance as deviations from the general linguistic 
norm. The relationship is vaguely parallel to Saussure's distinc­
tion between parole and langue; in communication theory it is like 
the relationship between message and code. For the literary 
theorist, however, there is an unavoidable trap in deviation 
theory because it is impossible to differentiate poetic deviations 
from all other deviations. O  f course, the trap operates only if one 
wishes to articulate a theory of special (aesthetic) language usage, 
a poetics. 
The term poetics in itself is troublesome. Merely to use it is to 
raise the specter of the entire tradition of aesthetic theory, which 
originated with Aristotle and has as yet found no culmination. 
Does the term imply a theory of language usage (creativity) 
radically deviant from normal communication? Is the difference 
one of kind or degree, the former, of course, too radical to be 
designated "deviation"? C o m i n g at these issues from a linguist's 
point of view, Jonathan Culler has bravely undertaken to sort out 
the primary questions and to offer tentative conclusions to som e 
of these ancient problems. H  e is not altogether successful, but his 
struggle is instructive. 
In defining what he calls "structuralist poetics" Culler engages 
in a broadly sweeping critique of structuralism (with its linguistic 
or Saussurean biases), and he also promotes his o w n theory of 
literary reading, which he sees in terms of what he calls "natural­
ization." Naturalization is a m o d e of making a text intelligible; it 
assumes a motivation toward meaningfulness, the desire to m a k  e 
sense. Naturalization, moreover, can be aestheticized by viewing 
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it within the limits of a general, literary intertextuality; literary 
intelligibility is a function of cross-referencing between texts and 
general categories of texts. Culler borrows from T o d o r o v the 
term vraisemblance, which implies both our ability to perceive 
connections, resemblances, and a kind of statistical sense of 
probability (i.e., that a text w  e are reading is likely to echo other 
texts of a particular tradition). I will quote at length from Culler 
to illustrate the scope of his sense of intertextuality. 
O n  e might distinguish five levels of vraisemblance, five ways in which 
a text m a  y be brought into contact with and defined in relation to 
another text which helps to mak e it intelligible. First there is the 
socially given text, that which is taken as the "real world." Second, 
but in some cases difficult to distinguish from the first, is a general 
cultural text: shared knowledge which would be recognized by 
participants as part of culture and hence subject to correction or 
modification but which none the less serves as a kind of "nature." 
Third, there are the texts or conventions of a genre, a specifically 
literary and artificial vraisemblance. Fourth, comes what might be 
called the natural attitude to the artificial, where the text explicitly 
cites and exposes vraisemblance of the third kind so as to reinforce its 
o w  n authority. A n  d finally, there is the complex vraisemblance of 
specific intertextualities, where one work takes another as its basis or 
point of departure and must be assimilated in relation to it. At each 
level there are ways in which the artifice of forms is motivated or 
justified by being given a meaning.12 
W h a  t Culler argues here and elsewhere is that intelligibility 
depends o n recognition, o n conventional knowledge of a special 
kind. Motivation (as borrowed from Saussure) implies cultural 
stipulation; the intelligibility of any text arises from its b o u n d 
relationship to a s o m e w h a  t vaguely conceived literary langue. 
Motivation and intelligibility are the production and recognition 
of certain conventional strategies for making sense, strategies of 
cultural referentiality, formal integrity, generic type, and self-
conscious literariness (artificiality), all of which express society's 
aesthetic value system. S u c h conventions are e m p t y and 
superficial, finally; they are, I woul  d claim, matters of surface 
style, and Culler's poetics is itself little m o r e than a conventional 
theory of stylistic conventions, consciously cut off from anything 
resembling a true interpretive procedure. 
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Leaning heavily on the recent theory of Roland Barthes, Culler 
follows the trend of structuralism in collapsing all content into 
form ("stylistic surface"). " T  o read is to participate in the play of 
the text, to locate zones of resistance and transparency, to isolate 
forms and determine their content and then to treat content in 
turn as a form with its o w  n content, to follow, in short, the 
interplay of surface and envelope."13 Use of the term "play" 
here, however, is specifically differentiated from Derrida's 
concept of "freeplay" (which Culler sees as a kind of logical 
trick),14 and this raises several problems. O n  e cannot play 
Culler's reading game without knowing the rules, and such 
knowledge implies a kind of literary competence that has a 
limiting function like the cultural function of Saussure 's langue. 
Literary competence is cultural and artificial (unlike the implica­
tions of an innate linguistic competence in C h o m s k y '  s universal 
grammar, for example, or the innate reasoning capacities in Lévi-
Strauss's binary theory). Culler's literary langue is a holding 
action against the anarchic freeplay of langage; and, aware of the 
ideological implications of this theory, he attempts to defend it 
simply by anticipating the attacks of ideological opponents.15 But 
the issue here is not whether Culler's concept of competency or 
langue implies political and psychological repression; it does 
imply that. T h e issue is to what degree is Culler's theory useful 
for understanding literary texts? 
T h u s several implications of Culler's approach are of 
particular importance to our investigation here of the concept of 
style. The langue of competence for Culler functions in m u c h the 
same way as Frye's literary myth , as a closed system of possible 
conventions available to any intelligent (competent) reader in his 
struggles to understand a particular text. But whereas Frye 
attempts to give his closed system both historical and psycho­
logical justification, thereby breeching the system to locate a 
meaningfulness that is both cultural/historical and a reflection of 
individual desire, Culler carefully wards off any such extra-
systematic projection. A s a result, "meaning" is trivialized; one is 
bound within a system merely to recognize the possible givens of 
that system. T h e repressive nature of Culler's competency is 
(1) historically insensitive, unlike Saussure's langue, which is in a 
state of continual readjustment, and (2) hopelessly superficial 
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because meaning is not in any sense content or experience, but 
merely empty form, a set of algebraic counters organized into 
patterns (like the linguist's grammar rules). T h e suggestion of 
cultural referentiality is severely limited by the idea of arti­
ficiality. For Culler, style and content are not merely separate; 
contentless form is all the meaning w e have. 
Culler's theory emphasizes in part his reading of the narrative 
theory of Frank K e r m o d  e onto the "readerly-text" theory of 
Barthes. T h e key is closure on all levels. Competency is a closed 
set of possible intelligible forms; langue is a closed system of 
conventions (conventionalizing even the functions of social/ 
historical referentiality), and the individual text is marked by its 
o w  n drive toward closure, its "sense of an ending."16 Without 
this interrelated set of closures, intelligibility is at hazard. The 
style of literature, its essential "literariness," is to resolve 
(naturalize) all openness according to conventional wisdom. 
Meaning is a term w e should drop, as Culler does, in favor of the 
information theory jargon, intelligibility. Culler's structuralist 
poetics, therefore, results in the most radical of all decoration 
theories, for literariness can only be seen as manifest on the 
stylistic surface of a text and as readily available to any competent 
reader whether or not that reader can detect meaning in the text. 
It seems that w e must, with regard to style as well as to general 
language functioning as discussed in part 2, break through the 
limits of closed literary systems if interpretation and understand­
ing of literary texts can ever eventuate in meaning. T  o this 
purpose I have broadened the functioning of motivation by 
introducing into it the concepts of "intentionality" and "articula­
tion to experience"; that is, by introducing the idea of the author. 
A  s a consequence, it is impossible to speak of any determining 
system or langue, or of the process of naturalization as Culler 
defines it, without confronting a profound ambiguity. A n  y 
individual text (parole) both is situated in a cultural system 
(langue) and also creates or situates that system. A single parole, 
moreover, m a y situate (and be situated in) m a n y systems at once. 
Competency, as Culler defines it, is too limiting (if comforting) a 
concept; as the "system" that "makes literary effects possible,"17 
it trivializes the function of the author in making both conscious 
and unconscious choices. Like m a n  y linguistically oriented struc­
turalists, Culler's expressed interest in the idea of authorial 
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control is illusory, perhaps contradictory. Limiting conventions 
provide a context for the author to write against, Culler claims, 
and the author m a y even "attempt to subvert" those conven­
tions. But, alas, the context is ultimately "the context within 
which [even the author's subversive?] activity takes place."18 
Subversion is a hollow word, and the limiting literary context 
precedes and determines all literary expressiveness. 
Borrowing from both the structuralists and, perhaps less 
willingly, from the Anglo-American N e  w Critics, Culler extends 
his theory of naturalization to the lyric, and in so doing he 
expresses a very traditional attitude toward the authorial 
function in literary composition. A naturalized lyric reveals 
unambiguously its reflection of conventional surface qualities 
like popular verse forms and rhyme patterns, general patterns of 
metrical and phonic organization. " W  e naturalize such patterns 
in a very formal and abstract way by showing h o w various 
features contribute to patterns which help to assert the m o n u  ­
mentality and impersonality of poetry. . . .  " T h  e only "value" of 
this assertion, Culler says, borrowing from the aesthetic 
humanism of Wallace Stevens (hence, also from the lingering 
romanticism of K e r m o d e )  , is that it convinces us "that the 
making of fictions is a worthy activity."19 Th  e radical "imper­
sonality" of the theory (which belongs to both the N e  w Criticism 
and structuralism in their different ways) removes poetry (all 
literature) from the realm of the real and locates it irrevocably in 
the realm of the artificial. However one m a y struggle to relate 
fiction to life and h u m a  n experience, the former always seems to 
contain its o w  n justification for being. 
There is an unfortunate and undeniable aestheticism in such a 
fiction theory; the removal of the authorial function, and 
consequently the denial of nonconventional or empirical refer­
entiality, leaves us only with the surface of stylistic play. Th  e 
impersonality theory takes two different forms under the 
different influences of structuralism and N e  w Critical 
contextualism, but the effects on literary hermeneutics are 
similar just as the superficial operations of their interpretive 
procedures often appear to be alike. In Culler's structuralist 
poetics, for example, the first person implications of the lyric 
p o e m are conventionalized; the pronoun J functions as a 
"shifter" (like "here" and "there"), as an empty orientation 
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term. W h e  n the "I" calls attention to itself as so functioning, 
literary naturalization has occurred, and w  e are aware that w  e are 
reading poetry. Given Culler's emphasis on fictionality and 
textual closure (the p o e m '  s "monumentality," he calls it), this 
particular antireferentiality in his theory can be as N e  w Critical as 
it is structuralist. Given his borrowing from linguistics the idea of 
literary competency, his antiempirical bias, and emphasis on 
cultural conventionality, Culler's theory seems m o r e comfort­
ably in the structuralist c a m p  . In either case, impersonality 
virtually contradicts the issue of style. For the structuralist critic, 
impersonality emphasizes the play of language reflecting its 
general diacritical nature as opposed to language's expressive 
capacities. It emphasizes language's medium-as-message function 
as opposed to its content-carrying function. It emphasizes its 
systematic and nonempirical powers to generate endless m e a n ­
ings as opposed to its subservience to h u m a  n experience. F r o  m the 
N e  w Critical point of view, impersonality emphasizes the i m m e  ­
diate, experiential (aesthetic) nature of the act of reading as 
opposed to mediated communication. It emphasizes the ineffable 
mystery of the h u m a n spirit (man's "fictionalizing" capacities) as 
opposed to m a n ' s conventional and articulate wisdom. It e m p h a ­
sizes the density of language, its self-justifying, self-referential 
opaqueness as opposed to language's transparent referentiality. In 
both traditions style is radically dehumanized, dispersed into the 
systematic freeplay of langage tempered by the conventional, 
interpersonal limits of langue on the one hand, or apotheosized 
into the eternal, inexpressible, and sacred on the other hand. 
Culler's efforts are not consciously directed toward a union of 
these two traditions, but his desire to define a truly special sense 
of literariness (surely a legacy of Anglo-American aesthetics) 
within the boundaries of a structuralist philosophy makes his 
discussion usefully revelatory of the problems that modern 
literary theory faces in discussing literary style. Culler's positing 
of a conventional system of literary competency m a y , in fact, be 
the only solution to the dilemma, but it must not be seen as a 
trivial sort of deviation theory: the playfulness of fiction as 
opposed to the play of meaningful signification. Moreover, 
Culler's approach founders on internal contradictions, yet it is 
nonetheless considerably m o r  e convincing than traditional 
deviationist ideas. Samuel R  . Levin is representative of a 
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statistically oriented version of deviation theory; he argues that 
"a given linguistic element produces a stylistic effect because its 
occurrence has zero or near zero probability of occurring where it 
does."20 A high degree of probability defines the n o r m  , the basis, 
of course, for improbable deviations. There are several obvious 
problems in this theory, particularly w h e  n it is applied to literary 
texts. Primary a m o n g them is h o w to determine the n o r m (as it is 
a problem for Culler in defining conventional literary c o m p e  ­
tency). A n y n o r m is abstract; no individual utterance embodies 
a norm, nor is the n o r m simply a s u m of all individual utterances. 
For the most part, a major thrust of modern linguistics has been 
toward the formulation of a general linguistic norm. This is, 
fundamentally, a descriptive effort, championed by m e  n like 
Leonard Bloomfield and C h o m s k y , as opposed to prescriptive 
stylistics like that of Strunk and White's handbook, The Elements 
of Style. But the focus here is on language in general, and there is 
no r o o m for even a special literary competency like that 
promoted by Culler. 
The dilemma faced by Levin, therefore, is that either literary 
style is a special form of all stylistic deviations or literary style 
must be considered outside the realm of the normalizing system 
altogether. Levin argues bafflingly that "all deviations, poetic or 
otherwise, are ungrammatical, and ungrammatical sequences are 
deviant. But not all ungrammatical sequences are poetically 
deviant.1121 This distinction is of no help at all; it merely removes 
the question to another level requiring that a distinction be m a d  e 
between poetic and nonpoetic ungrammaticalness (which has an 
even m o r e absurd implication in the distinction between 
meaningful and nonmeaningful deviations). Levin "solves" the 
problem on this level rather weakly by positing what he calls a 
distinction in the "degrees of ungrammaticalness" between 
poetic and nonpoetic deviation.22 
It is perhaps better, although still not wholly satisfactory, to 
distinguish between deviations that are ungrammatical (or 
"agrammatical"), and therefore outside the system, and 
deviations that are, to borrow R o m a  n Jakobson's term, "anti­
grammatical."23 Agrammatical deviations can be cast off as 
meaningless, but antigrammatical deviations exist both within 
and outside the general system. Th  e result of this terminological 
shift is to emphasize both the individual act of language use 
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(parole) and the normalizing structures of langue. In this way w e 
might better understand what Barthes means by the argument 
that beyond the level of style there is implied "a vision which is 
eventually moral . . ." or * 'sociological."24 The literary artist in 
some way finds his identity as artist in the struggle between his 
personal style and the normal style of his language system; he also 
finds himself embroiled in the tension between his private moral 
responsibilities and commitments and the system of morality 
imposed upon him by his society. The two levels are intimately 
related if w  e take seriously Wittgenstein's claim that "the limits 
of our language m e a  n the limits of our world." T  o challenge the 
fixities and definites of language is to challenge the moral norms 
and restrictions of society. T  o be always somewhat in 
contention with society is, perhaps, the h u m a  n condition, but I 
italicize somewhat because this is always a matter of degree.25 
Such a schematic sense of oppositions, of course, is too easy; 
even in the realm of art it is too reductive. But the complexity of 
being a "good" m e m b e r of a society, which involves neither the 
surrender to a programmatic political determinism nor the 
assertion of inviolable personal freedom, is surely intensified for 
the inviolable personal freedom, is surely intensified for the 
literary artist. If language gives us our world, the use of language 
involves agonizing moral commitments; and it is this moral 
content, reflecting the artist's identifying voice, that underlies all 
serious literary productions. In his fine article, "Literature as 
Act," Richard O h m a n  n makes this point by expanding the 
terminology of "speech act theory" to define the expressive 
action of the literary artist as a peculiar kind of illocutionary 
performance. "Illocutionary action is action on a social plane. It 
relies for success on those things that m a k e up a society: for 
instance, definitions of role and relation, stable distribution of 
power, conventions of intimacy and distance, manners."2 6 The 
artist, alone in his study, cut off from the daily h u m d r u  m 
activities of familiar experience, can hardly avoid the tension 
between himself and his society as he engages the interpersonal 
norms of cultural language use with his o w n personal style. The 
degree to which he challenges the norms can only be k n o w n after 
the fact; that he will confront them is assured by the h u m a n 
condition, for no individual is so in touch with the abstract 
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structure (the surplus of explanatory power) of the general 
system of langage that he can write in the wholly impersonal 
anonymity of Derrida's "freeplay." T  o write "situates" langue, 
cultural values, and meanings, as it activates the infinite 
potentials of langage. T h e writer's moral c o m m i t m e n t m a y issue 
as m o r  e or less positive or negative, for himself or for the reader, 
but his commitment will be m a d e , and the necessity of this 
commitment , a fall from innocence and purity, reflects an 
essential historicism on both the cultural and stylistic levels. 
This historical dimension of literary style is not, as Karl Uitti 
claims, a n e w p h e n o m e n o n in language theory. Through m e n like 
Condillac and H u m b o l d t  , he sees it eventuating in the very 
influential w o r k of Edward Sapir. "His analysis of poetic creation 
as the creative deployment of resources involving two layers of 
an inner form versus the outer restrictions of the specific 
linguistic system . . . remains faithful to the most profitable 
dualisms m o d e r n thought has produced."27 That dualism has its 
source in Cartesian "mentalism" and the dichotomy of mind and 
body. It has pervaded m  y discussion from the beginning, 
surfacing in the form/content dichotomy and the poetry/prose 
or individual style/interpersonal style distinctions, as well as in 
the philosophical argument of part 2 describing the mutuality of 
inner and outer worlds. Transformed into the historical perspec­
tive of the interplay of individual m o m e n  t and continuous 
pattern it is, indeed, a profitable dualism, and clearly it works 
profitably for Sapir. 
Language is itself the collective art of expression, a summary of 
thousands upon thousands of individual intuitions. The individual 
goes lost in the collective creation, but his personal expression has 
left some trace in a certain give and flexibility that are inherent in all 
collective works of the human spirit. The language is ready, or can be 
quickly made ready, to define the artist's individuality. If no literary 
artist appears, it is not essentially because the language is too weak an 
instrument; it is because the culture of the people is not favorable to 
the growth of such personality as seeks a truly individual verbal 
expression.28 
The give and take between individual expression and social 
restrictions quickly becomes historical for Sapir, defining what 
he called linguistic "drift."29 
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This idealistic position is remarkably similar to that of the 
Prague Linguistic Circle. F r o m a more positivistic point of view, 
with its emphasis on the study of the synchronie system, the 
Prague theorists do not reduce the importance of the individual 
creative act. 
Le langage poétique [the poetic use of language] tend à mettre en 
relief la valeur autonome du signe . . . tous les plans d'un système 
linguistique, qui n'ont dans le langage de communication qu'un rôle 
de service, prennent, dans le langage poétique, des valeurs 
autonomes plus ou moins considérables. 
In the matter of the dialectic of poetry and general language, the 
Prague theorists are again at pains to define the importance of 
both terms. 
Le langage poétique a, du point de vue synchronique, la forme de la 
parole, c'est-à-dire d'un acte créateur individuel, qui prend sa valeur 
d'une part sur la fond de la tradition poétique actuelle (langue 
poétique) et d'autre part sur le fond de la langue communicative 
contemporaine.30 
The Prague theorists are less concerned than Sapir with the 
individualism of language usage, but they are also well aware that 
a literary langue (langue poétique) cannot operate wholly apart 
from the general pattern of social communication (as Culler 
proposes) and, therefore, no conventional system can wholly 
trivialize the role of the author in the communicative transaction. 
I would argue that the personality of the artist is never 
unimportant, not because w e can read from his biography 
directly into his individual works, or vice versa, but because on 
the level of his o w  n cognitive awareness w  e find the structuring 
principle of those works. This is w h y literary criticism has turned 
m o r e and m o r e to the philosophy and psychology of h u m a n 
consciousness for its principles of interpretation. It is crucial to 
remember, however, that consciousness and linguistic capacities 
are structurally related, and that to m a  p from the structuring 
power of the mind to the structure of the work, a modified 
version of Coleridge's identification of poetry and the poet in the 
poetic imagination, is less than an exact, one-to-one transfer. The 
innate grammar of the h u m a n mind posited by C h o m s k y has, 
theoretically, the explanatory power to justify his effort to isolate 
and describe it, but because there are dimensions to language 
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beyond the local systems of c o m m u n a l utterances, m u c h of the 
descriptive effort is speculative projection. In this sense these 
innate structures, and this is particularly true of Lévi-Strauss's 
theory, do not explain anything. They are no more than logically 
perceived "potentials" for cognition; they are rules that become 
meaningful only w h e  n they enter into the communicative 
transaction between subject and object, only w h e  n articulated to 
local or individual experience. Levi-Strauss's theory of binary 
oppositions is simply a principle of juxtaposition; meaning arises 
when the mind juxtaposes two or more perceived objects—an act 
that is at once a "situating" of the objects (as in Wittgenstein's 
states of affairs) and the implication of a desire or motivation or 
attitude toward that situation. 
There are, of course, m a n y forms of this activity. The 
existential-phenomenologist philosopher Maurice Merleau-
Ponty has m a d  e us aware of an act of juxtaposition that takes the 
form of bringing certain objects in the perceptual field into 
primary focus—or foreground—while relegating the rest to an 
undifferentiated background. This is, perhaps, the most funda­
mental version of cognitive attention, a separation and identifica­
tion of the world of things analogous to the literary act of 
"defamiliarization."31 There is also a temporal juxtaposition of 
items, a relationship established across time and thereby 
involving m e m o r y , and there is a more complex exclusive/ 
inclusive juxtaposition, the sorting out of items into groups or 
categories. N  o doubt there are more , reflecting Kant's theory of 
the fundamental categories of the understanding as well as 
supporting Piaget's thesis that there are m a n  y logics. 
Below this system of logics w  e find the rudimentary conscious­
ness that is the focus of Cassirer's philosophy, his projection of a 
first "violent act of individuation." Here is the most funda­
mental assertion of the ego, the awareness of the self as distinct 
from the other. Yet w  e need not overemphasize either the egoistic 
or the hierarchic/developmentalist aspects of Cassirer's theory. 
A s Heidegger claims: "The origin of language is in essence 
mysterious. A n d this means that language can only have arisen 
from the overpowering, the strange and terrible, through man's 
departure into being. In this departure language was being, 
embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the primordial poetry 
in which a people speaks being."32 It is not merely a primitive 
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activity; it is an enduring condition. Th  e emergence of the ego is 
also a situating of the collective context, and therein language and 
consciousness gain the power to manage and participate in the 
undifferentiated otherness. T h  e end of this projection of order is 
what Piaget called "reflective abstraction" and the program­
matic and c o m m u n a l function of language as thought. Moreover, 
this c o m m u n a l level is that which is most available to Chomsky ' s 
linguistic study—and to C h o m s k y a  n stylistic analysis. Here 
language, at its most "instrumental," disguises m u c h of its 
creative or poetic power; "originally an act of violence that 
discloses being, the word sinks from this height to become a mere 
sign. . . ,"33 But again the instrumentalist eclipse of poetry is 
never total. T h e world of literary art, w e remember, divides two 
extremes. T  o borrow from Heidegger once more , this is "the 
great poetry by which a people enters into history" and that 
"initiates the molding of language."34 
The poet's impulse is to open langue by an appeal to the 
freeplay of langage in order to activate what w e will have to call 
language's "poetic function," and this m a  y explain w h  y society, 
conservative of its operational systems, treats its artists as 
children, resists the poet's challenges that would seemingly repeat 
the socially repressed trauma of the violent birth of conscious­
ness or being. O n  e of the forms of this repression is to declare the 
poet a nonbeing by means of a theory of literary impersonality. 
The poet is always a radical w h e n he challenges the conventional 
in language and general culture.35 Yet his is an essential function 
and, as I have presented it, a broadly conceived form of deviation 
that never allows language and society to become static, that 
asserts our historical being by situating both langue and parole. 
His articulation to experience, his language, gives us his 
identifying style as well as society's conventions and cultural 
style.36 There is, of course, nothing of the mystically visionary or 
prophetic in this function. Th  e poet's relation to his culture's 
norms is an extremely complex arrangement; his challenge to 
those norms must not be seen simply as ideological or as always a 
conscious activity. T h  e literary artist m a  y reveal himself to be the 
most revolutionary at the very m o m e n t he feels himself to be 
most in tune with his culture. The poet's act of articulation to 
experience is an act of critical interpretation; he reveals the limits 
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of culture's norms, often exposing the contradictions that reside 
deep within, at the base of, cultural ideology. A  s always, the 
poet's identity, his style, is as m u c h given to him as it is created 
by him. 
STYLE AS D Y N A M I C M E A N I N G S T R U C T U R E : T H E T E X T 
In general, there are two significant questions that must be 
answered in the development of a viable literary hermeneutics: 
( 1 ) h o w do w e interpret a text and (2) h o w do w e evaluate it? But 
the latter is an extremely complicated activity involving both 
interpretation and the individual and cultural value systems that 
can be brought to bear on the text. Value judgments are 
intimately and unavoidably a part of literary interpretation, yet 
they are less objective (partly because they are subject to 
historical variations) and less easily methodized. M  y focus so far 
in this essay has been more or less on interpretive methodology, 
and I have, I hope, allowed the evaluative dimension of literary 
criticism to emerge as it will. N o w , however, it is no longer 
possible to ignore it. 
In discussing the stylistic structure of the individual text, I will 
start, once more, with the relatively value-free methodology 
spawned by N o a  m C h o m s k y ' s transformational-generative 
grammar. Samuel R  . Levin has attempted to differentiate 
between poetic style and "casual" language use by extending 
Chomsky's transformational models. H  e also borrows from 
R o m a  n Jakobson the idea that "the poetic function [of language] 
projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection 
into the axis of combination."37 This very important observation 
by Jakobson will occupy us in more detail below, but for the 
m o m e n  t it can be simplistically stated that Levin takes the 
"principle of equivalence" as it is applied to the structure or 
arrangement of structures within an individual text as the basis 
for his o w n stylistic principle of "coupling."38 Coupling 
describes h o w  , in syntagmatic units of an individual text, the 
positional arrangement of one syntagm parallels the positional 
arrangement of another (or others) thereby structurally establish­
ing equivalence between the two. M o r e simply, the poetic 
arrangement of words, what in the past w e have euphemistically 
called "poetic license," tends to force the reader to see certain 
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groups of words as equivalent—sometimes in contradiction to 
their conventional semantic import. 
Richard O h m a n n  , also defending the use of transformational 
grammar in stylistic analysis, lists three major "characteristics of 
transformational rules" that are valuable to the literary critic. 
1. "  A large number of transformations are optional" and will 
allow the critic to identify typical patterns used by individual writers. 
2. "  A transformation works changes on structure, but normally 
leaves part of the structure unchanged." Hence "sets of sentences 
which are transformational alternatives seem to be different 
renderings of the same proposition." Again this aids in the intuitive 
recognition of the stylistic variation which is simply a surface quality 
added to the informational content. 
3. "  A third value of a transformational grammar . .  . is its power 
to explain h o  w complex sentences are generated. . . . Writers differ 
noticeably in the amounts and kinds of syntactic complexity they 
habitually allow themselves. . . ,"39 
T h e approaches of both Levin and O h m a n n are interesting and 
valuable, but they are also limited by the nature of the trans­
formational principle itself. Levin admits that his idea of 
"coupling" ignores "features like meaning, metaphor, imagery, 
etc.,"40 a rather casual dismissal of what has traditionally been 
regarded as the very essence of poetry. His problem, basically, is 
in his rendering of Jakobson's "principle of equivalence." 
T w  o groups of words arranged in parallel are not necessarily 
equivalent in poetic discourse—at least they are not mathe­
matically (or logically) equivalent as Levin suggests. T h  e 
syntactic parallelism results in a semantic modification of 
meaning; neither element means quite what it meant in isolation. 
It is not easy to ignore meaning. 
H o w to read a poetic text must be analogous to h o w to write 
one. Levin wants to explain poetic "unity," that "contextual" 
unity which extends beyond the limits of the individual sentence 
(or the limits of a syntagm). But this unity is achieved in the 
writing by a process of continual readjustments between the 
parts, not by establishing a simple series of parallel structures. 
The poet begins by arranging a group of words in a meaningful 
order, perhaps several lines, a single line, or even part of a line. 
A s he writes, adding to and developing the intuitive thought that 
Stylistics 165 
set him at his composition, he must go back to rewrite what he 
first set d o w n . Throughout the process of selection, arrangement, 
and limitation there is a forward and backward movement , the 
old being rearranged to accommodate the n e w , while the limits of 
the n e w are refined by what has already been written. Is there not 
always a lingering trace of this process inscribed in all texts? Does 
this not indicate a very fundamental openness at the heart of even 
the most tightly constructed text? Levin's concept of equivalence, 
however, seems to describe a mere string of parallel structures. 
Rather than a tensional relationship between closure and 
openness, Levin's approach reduces organization to the idea of 
unrestricted addition. His method is purely statistical and value 
free. There is little or no way to distinguish between parallel 
structures or groups of such structures; they simply follow one 
another in linear fashion; their only measure is quantitative. 
A s a result, style has c o m e to m e a n nothing more than an 
intuitively recognizable pattern of optional transformations. Th  e 
stylistician's job is to catalogue the choices m a d e by an individual 
writer. O h m a n n '  s list of the advantages of a transformational 
stylistics emphasizes this rather mechanical type of analysis, and 
it does not satisfy the analyst of style w h  o intuitively 
distinguishes between highly individual and conventionally 
interpersonal styles. The catalogue of choices must also reflect 
the frequency with which the options are normally exercised. This 
would give us a statistical accounting for the difference between 
individual and interpersonal styles. But it also forces us to admit 
that certain transforms are "more normal" than others, and this 
results in the s a m e problems w e encountered above in 
establishing a statistical n o r  m that will be sufficiently stable to 
explain w h  y certain transforms are unusual. 
Michael Riffa terre, trying to avoid the tyranny of the general 
norm, sees style as a deliberate breaking of established and 
predictable syntactic patterns in the individual text. The reader, 
having been led to expect a certain pattern, is "surprised" by a 
"stylistic device" that alters that pattern. This requires a sense, 
not simply of a string of equivalent structures, but rather of som e 
contextual interplay between small segments of the text and the 
text as a whole. The notion is vaguely N e w Critical in its 
emphasis on contextual unity at the expense of the norms of 
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general language, but there are crucial differences. First, there is 
no way to distinguish between radical and mild breaks in the 
textual pattern; all stylistic devices are the same. Second, the text 
is fragmented into the predictable pattern and the individual 
stylistic devices that break that pattern; there is, then, no real 
textual unity in the N e  w Critical sense. Finally, without the n o r  m 
of general language use there is only one way to identify stylistic 
devices: by charting the response of native speakers, graphically 
marking in the text their * 'surprise" points. This affective analysis 
will occupy our attention m o r e completely below; for the 
m o m e n t I will claim only that this too gives us no way to 
distinguish between stylistic devices. T h  e measure is again wholly 
quantitative, for apparently the m o r  e surprises a text contains, 
the m o r  e individualistic is its style. 
Riffaterre also effectively cancels out the realm of conventional 
stylistics, and surely this is counterintuitive. Conventional 
stylistic devices, those special uses of language that have an 
assigned stylistic value, certainly exist. They change, even 
disappear, as society changes, but they are important to any 
culture for interpersonal communication. They range from the 
conventional, and significant, stylistic opening of a fairy tale, 
" O n c  e u p o  n a time," to "bankrupt expressions" like "in the last 
analysis," which Strunk and White have rather unsuccessfully 
(and, in the last analysis, unnecessarily) attempted to excise from 
the English langauge.41 There is nothing in either of these stylistic 
devices that would cause surprise in the native speaker. A s 
conventional devices, they are easily recognizable, essentially 
transparent phrases used either as an identifying marker ("Once 
u p o n a time" characterizes what is to follow as a particular kind 
of literature: a fairy tale) or simply for emphasis ("In the last 
analysis m a  n is d o o m e  d to suffer ecological disaster!"). 
O  n the level of such conventionality poetry cannot exist, yet 
the poet will, and it is a favorite device of m o d e r  n poets, use 
conventional stylistic devices in a context that "deconvention­
alizes" them. At this point the quantitative aspect of such devices 
is transformed into a qualitative value. T  . S. Eliot takes the most 
c o m m o  n and familiar elements of linguistic use, conventional 
greetings, and works them to his larger and "defamiliarized" 
purpose in The Waste Land: 
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Y o  u ought to be ashamed, I said, to look so antique. 
(And her only thirty-one.) 
I can't help it, she said, pulling a long face, 
It's them pills I took, to bring it off, she said. 
(She's had five already, and nearly died of young George.) 
The chemist said it would be all right, but I've never 
been the same. 
Y o u are a proper fool, I said! 
Well, if Albert won't leave you alone, there it is, I said, 
W h a t you get married for if you don't want children? 
Hurry up please its time 
Well, that Sunday Albert was home, they had a hot g a m m o n , 
And they asked m e in to dinner, to get the beauty of it hot— 
Hurry up please its time

Hurry up please its time

Goonight Bill. Goonight Lou. Goonight M a y . Goonight. 
Ta ta. Goonight. Goonight. 
Good night, ladies, good night, sweet ladies, good 
night, good night. 
Once again I a m led to conclude that, even on the stylistic 
surface, poetry struggles against prosaic linearity. The metaphor/ 
m e t o n y  m paradigm I used to describe the distinction between 
poetry and prose applies to m  y analogous distinction between 
individual and interpersonal style. The metaphoric nature of 
poetic language asserts semantic overlap, not mere logical 
equivalence, between the structural elements of the text. This is 
the deeper implication of Jakobson's theory, one that is beyond 
the explanatory power of transformational grammar. Instead of 
linearity, in poetry w e have circularity, a somewhat metaphorical 
notion supported by a long tradition of poetic theory from 
Lessing's Laocoon to Joseph Frank's "Spatial F o r m in M o d e r n 
Literature" and Murray Krieger's "The Ekphrastic Principle and 
the Still M o v e m e n t of Poetry."42 
The organic, self-sufficient p o e m promoted by N e w Critical 
aesthetics is also, however, a very limited concept of poetry. It 
has traditionally been most adequate as a description of those 
short lyric poems that are structured around the elaboration of a 
single metaphor. It fails, particularly in longer works like novels 
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and narrative poems  , to explain the crucial relationship between 
poetic language and ordinary discourse. O  n the other hand, the 
transformational approach to stylistics cannot effectively 
describe the short, metaphorically centered, lyric. The n o r m -
deviation theory is reductive in its consideration of the truly 
qualitative use of language in poetry. Consequently the two 
extremes m a  y be brought together only through the paradigmatic 
relationship of metaphor and m e t o n y m y . This forces us to focus 
our interpretive attentions on the text, wherein the structuring 
principles are manifest on the level of style, but also insists that 
w e not cut our interpretations free from the important 
dimensions of author and audience in the aesthetic experience of 
literature. 
STYLE A S T H E "AFFECTIVE" S T R U C T U R E O F M E A N I N G : 
T H E R E A D E R 
In turning to the third of the triad of issues that I defined as the 
central interests of stylistics, w e will become more aware than 
ever of the indissoluble relationship a m o n g all three. The 
affective level of style, which in terms of literary criticism 
involves the reader's act of interpretation, is perhaps the key to a 
general literary hermeneutics, but our discussion will take us 
back to the level of expressive language, to the author's 
projection of an encoded message and the form of the message 
itself. The affective dimension of style is the most often ignored, 
a victim in literary theory of N e  w Critical fallacy hunting (the 
"affective fallacy") and in linguistics of antibehaviorism.43 
Admittedly, the affective approach is dangerous, running the risk 
of turning literary interpretation, to say nothing of evaluation, 
into pure impressionism. O  n the other h a n d , it seems 
unavoidable, and it does not necessarily lead to such pitfalls. 
Riffa terre, a m o n g the linguists, has m o v e d most boldly into 
this area. Reviewing m a n  y of the problems in traditional stylistic 
investigation that w  e have encountered in our discussion above, 
problems of establishing norms, of identifying and analyzing 
devices that are truly stylistic and not simply aberrant usage, 
Riffaterre claims that only by studying the responses of a large 
number of native language users (or by defining an "average 
reader") can the analyst k n o  w what style is. "If linguistic analysis 
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cannot discriminate these [stylistic] elements from irrelevant 
ones, it is because their potential is not realized in the physical 
body of the message, but in the receiver. . . ."44 This theory is not 
mere impressionism, however, for Riffaterre sees it as part of the 
transaction between author and reader that is mediated by a 
structured text. "The author's consciousness is his preoccupa­
tion with the way he wants his message to be decoded, so that not 
only its meaning but his attitude towards it is conveyed to the 
reader, and the reader is forced to understand, naturally, but also 
to share the author's view of what is or is not important in his 
message."45 The concept of "shared" attitudes emphasizes the 
dynamic relationship that exists between author and reader; it is a 
relationship wherein the author, through his style, is able to 
compel the reader's attention—to "force" the reader to partici­
pate in the original mental activity that molded the text. Here 
Riffaterre seems to be echoing that very intense communication 
between author and reader described by Poulet as the reader's 
mind occupied by the thoughts of another. 
Traditional norm-deviation theories of style are inadequate to 
explain this transaction. In something like a N e  w Critical 
narrowing of focus, Riffaterre proposes that the stylistician 
"substitute" the text of the message (or the p o e m  ) for the 
linguistic n o r m .  4  6 A stylistic device is identified as "the insertion 
of an unexpected element." Style is a textual pattern suddenly 
"broken by an element which was unpredictable," unanticipated. 
O n e must presume that such a "breaking" is purposeful and that 
all breaks in the pattern are not the same; they can be 
distinguished by what Riffaterre calls their "degree of unpredict­
ability."47 T h e m o r e unanticipated the break, the m o r e 
impressive is the stylistic device. 
Riffaterre, therefore, is not proposing a N e w Critical 
explication de texte. True to his affective approach, he identifies 
textual deviations, or stylistic devices, by studying the reader's 
responses. His aim is to avoid what he calls Spitzer's 
impressionism, the analytic approach of the "philological circle," 
which begins with the isolation of a single important or 
outstanding detail of the stylistic surface of the text but then 
constructs a general hypothesis of the meaning of the text based 
on this detail and the critic's general intuitive sense of the work as 
a whole. Finally, thé critic, according to Spitzer, refines his 
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general hypothesis in a series of "to and fro" movements that test 
it against all of the other details of the text. H  e k n o w  s he has 
reached the right interpretation, Spitzer claims, by intuition—an 
"inner click."48 For Riffaterre, there are no value judgments 
involved in the selection of outstanding stylistic details, and there 
is no intuitive perception of the text as a whole. Only the fact of 
noticing a detail is important. T h  e stylistician has only to chart the 
"responses" (noting where they occur most frequently) of native 
speakers as they read the text. A s a result he achieves a statistical 
portrait of the "average reader." 
In this effort to avoid value judgments, however, Riffaterre 
seriously restricts his theory. H  e resorts to a rather empty 
behaviorism, a stimulus-response theory not far removed from 
Bloomfield. Moreover, both Riffaterre and Bloomfield were 
anticipated by the behaviorist criticism of I. A  . Richards. 
Richards, too, would ignore content; he argues that what a poet 
thought or believed is unimportant to the experience of readers. 
W h a  t really counts is the organization of his text and the 
intensity of response elicited by it. T h e greatest works for 
Richards are those which hold in balance the greatest number of 
potentials for action, or impulses, in the reader. Richards also 
posits an average, or "right," reader statistically created from the 
various responses of all actual readers, but he goes beyond 
Riffaterre, finally, by tying the "right" reader's response to a 
"standard" that is mor  e or less equivalent to the author's 
response to his o w n work . 4 9 
T h  e average reader and standard response of Richards and 
Riffaterre, however, seem to offer little improvement over the 
norm-deviation theory; the problem of distinguishing between 
stylistic devices remains. Still trying to keep their methodologies 
value free, Richards and Riffaterre claim that some responses are 
m o r  e intense than others, but is intensity alone a significant 
distinction? Is intensity a matter of textual structure, or is it 
simply an impressionistic measurement of the kind Riffaterre 
sought to avoid? 
In addition, is it possible to claim that reader response is 
wholly free from semantic influence—and m o r e importantly, 
from value judgments? Is a "surprising" stylistic shift sur­
prisingly good, or bad? If good it would enhance the content; 
if bad it would confuse or contradict it. At the base of this 
Stylistics 171 
problem is Riffaterre's form-content separation. "Style is under­
stood as an emphasis . . . added to the information conveyed . . . 
without alteration of meaning." Yet style as mere emphasis, it 
would seem, depends heavily upon the information conveyed for 
its surprise value. 
Riffaterre's rejection of the norm-deviation theory, even 
though his arguments against such a theory have merit, leads 
him farther away from the epistemological and aesthetic interests 
of the literary critic. The pseudoscientific objectivity of his 
analytic approach also robs his theory of any high-level interpre­
tive power, and he has ignored the poetic context/prosaic code 
relationship that is central to the study of literature. T h  e entire 
distinction between individual and interpersonal style has been 
transformed, by the stimulus-response theory, into a distinction 
between unpredictable and predictable structures or surprising 
and commonplace language usage. 
R o m a  n Jakobson suggests a slightly revised version of the 
poetry/prose distinction that will return us to this most basic 
question. Furthermore, Jakobson's approach emphasizes the 
broader aspects of stylistic analysis involving the author-work­
reader triad. ' T h  e principle of similarity underlies poetry; the 
metrical parallelism of lines, or the phonic equivalence of 
rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and 
contrast. . . . Prose, on the contrary, is forwarded essentially by 
contiguity. T h u s , for poetry, metaphor , and for prose, 
metonym y is the line of least resistance."50 There is nothing in 
this distinction that recalls the absolute separation of poetry and 
prose demanded by N e  w Critical organicism. Poetry, what 
Jakobson would call the "poetic function" of language, can occur 
in contexts that are, by c o m m o  n agreement, not poems. These 
might be called little poem s in the midst of prose, but because 
poetry differs from prose only on the level of function, there is 
no absolute distinction. The difference between poetry and prose 
is a matter of structure, although this involves, necessarily, the 
semantic dimension as well. 
The distinction between metaphor and m e t o n y m y , to which I 
have frequently referred, was developed by Jakobson from his 
analysis of clinical studies of certain speech disorders k n o w  n as 
aphasia. Concentrating on aphasia in the "encoder" (the speaker 
w h  o formulates the message to be transmitted to a listener or 
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"decoder"), he classifies disorders into two categories, parallel­
ing each of the two phases of the encoding process. The first 
phase is "selection," where the encoder, using the principle of 
"similarity," chooses from categories of more or less equivalent 
verbal elements those elements that will be combined into the 
speech chain or statement he wishes to transmit. The second 
phase is "combination," where the selected elements are arranged 
by "contiguity" into the statement. (For the decoder the process 
is reversed. H  e receives the message fully arranged and must 
break it d o w  n into its elements.) Th  e first phase is metaphoric, 
based on the principle of "equivalence" (in the broad sense that 
includes the poles of synonym and antonym), and the second is 
métonymie, based on sequential arrangement that emphasizes 
progression through a series of its parts (or associational parts). 
Unlike metaphor, which emphasizes the immediate and atem­
poral identity of elements, m e t o n y m  y derives from a chain of 
logical extensions moving from the categorical to the particular. 
These phases of communication are ordered temporally and 
logically; aphasie disorders of the second phase m a  y leave the 
operations of the first phase relatively unimpaired. The encoder 
is still able to m a k  e selections, but his speech is reduced to single 
units or childlike fragments. A  n aphasie disorder of the first 
phase, if extreme (aphasia universalis), can wholly block the 
encoder's linguistic operations. If the disorder is only partial, the 
speech m a y be reduced to single words or morphemes that seem 
to function metaphorically. These words have meaning only in 
the immediate presence of the perceived object; the word is so 
closely identified with what it represents that it ceases to exist if 
the object is removed. This two-step operation can also be 
observed in the speech development of children. Th  e selection 
stage appears earliest and consists of small metaphoric units. The 
combination stage follows (under the guidance of developing 
logical capacities as well as training) moving the child into the 
area of m e t o n y m y . 
Jakobson's insights have exciting implications for literary 
theory w h e  n viewed in the broader perspective of the philosophy 
of language and the prose-poetry distinction I have been 
attempting to develop. The metaphorical function of language, 
with the principle of equivalence as its basic structure, echoes to 
some extent Cassirer's conjecture on the primitive genesis of 
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language. The "violent act of individuation" that is accompanied 
by the first efforts at language use is, for Cassirer, a poetic 
expression that opens the way to multiple linguistic functions. 
First, it is language as a personal projection from the individual 
toward the newly recognized other, perhaps nothing mor  e than 
sound—but meaningful sound, like the child's cry for its mother. 
This is a fundamentally individuating action even if the c o m m u n  ­
ication involved is rudimentary. A  s Jakobson says, it is the "first 
verbal function acquired by infants; they are prone to c o m m u n i ­
cate before being able to send or receive informative communica­
tions."51 W h e  n this prelinguistic form of assertion enters the 
realm of language usage it bifurcates into two very distinct but 
interrelated functions. These are represented by the poles of 
metaphor and m e t o n y m and reflect the interdependence of two 
linguistic and cognitive functions that Piaget, w e should 
remember, characterized as logical as well as developmental in his 
"genetic epistemology." 
The realm of what w e traditionally call lyric poetry, above the 
rudimentary assertion of self yet below the logical and systematic 
structure of prose, seems always driving toward the violent 
individuation that forms the heart of romantic aesthetics; it is 
accompanied by an all-absorbing engagement with the particular­
ities of nature, a fascination with the primitive and the untutored, 
and a rejection of the conventional and static. The romantic 
emphasis is on the immediacy of lived experience (its individ­
uality), which in part defines the idealist's stance as opposed to 
the positivist's philosophy of language. The former, represented 
in part 2 by Cassirer, keeps an eye on the miraculous fusion of 
diversity into unity and situates metaphor at the basis of the 
lyrical experience and at the origin of language in general. This 
philosophy, however, articulates not the achievement of the ideal 
of the individual as m u c  h as the enduring desire for such an ideal. 
The positivist viewpoint, as in the theories of Wittgenstein and 
to some extent C h o m s k y , fastens the philosophy of language to 
métonymie functions, to the structure of arrangements of states 
of affairs. Here romantic desire is transformed into functional 
management, into group identity, games and rules, into the 
positivistic ideal of "belonging" to the world. It is not 
impossible, as I have argued from the beginning, to see these two 
very different approaches as mutually corrective, one of the 
174 Friday's Footprint 
other, rather than as mutually exclusive. The temporal and 
logical relationship that exists between metaphor and metonymy 
here reflects the Lacanian theory of metaphor as the violent 
eruption of language as signifying system, an eruption that 
situates the "bar" of repression (cultural, linguistic, psycholog­
ical) depicting the inevitable degeneration of metaphor into 
m e t o n y m  y and, paradoxically, the necessary presupposition of 
m e t o n y m  y for the emergence of metaphor. This functioning is 
particularly obvious on the level of stylistic analysis, where the 
interplay of metaphor and m e t o n y m is seen to deny either a 
position of privilege. 
M a n  y unanswered questions still remain, and in confronting 
these Jakobson further develops his insights into the nature of 
metaphor. "The set (Einstellung) toward the message as such, the 
focus on the message for its o w n sake, is the poetic function of 
language."52 This is another, more descriptive, way of saying 
what has often been claimed, that metaphor (and, a fortiori, 
poetry) is always about itself. Because metaphor embodies the 
fundamental cognitive operations of the mind (in itself and in its 
tension with m e t o n y m y )  , it preserves in its articulate and 
articulated structure these operations in potentia. A  s the essence 
of poetry, w  e m a  y recall, it is energia not ergon. Poetry about 
poetry no longer need be seen simplistically as autobiography or 
the p o e  m that recounts the ardor and joy of its o w  n composition. 
T  o be sure, poetry (metaphor) calls our attention not simply to 
poem s but to the full range and capacities of language itself. In 
this sense, poetic communication is at once more direct, more 
intense, and more rare than that of prose. George Henrick von 
Wright, quoting Peter W i n c h , describes this basic and profound 
communication as "empathie understanding," which is "not a 
'feeling'; it is an ability to participate in a 'form of life.'"53 I 
would extend this claim even further, for such a communicative 
transaction m a  y be participatory life itself, the c o m m u n a  l and 
self-conscious act of critical awareness that exposes the power of 
language (langage) to situate m a  n in the midst of "meaning." 
T  o conceive of metaphor as a form of cognitive organization 
solves one of the principal dilemmas of modern aesthetics. The 
N e w Critics, w e should remember, were forced by their doctrine 
of organicism to consider the short lyric p o e m  , structured 
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around an extended metaphor, as the purest form of poetry. Yet 
according to Jakobson, poetry exists only in the broader context 
of prose. "[Metaphoric] selection is produced on the basis of 
equivalence, similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and 
antonymity, while [métonymie] combination, the build-up of the 
sequence, is based on contiguity. The poetic function projects the 
principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of 
combination. Equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device 
of sequence."54 Poetry, with its basis in the "principle of 
equivalence," arises only through the "principle of projection," 
through the violence of metaphoric intrusion into the realm of 
métonymie prose. Poetry, however, is not simply metaphoric; a 
p o e m is not simply a metaphor, extended or otherwise. Pure 
metaphor, like the N e  w Critics' "pure poetry," is an ideal 
projection; for a romantic philosophy like Cassirer's it is the 
expression of a nostalgic desire in the sense that Schiller called 
"sentimental." Remarkably, such longing presumes a nonmeta­
phoric (métonymie, prosaic?) context as a ground for idealistic 
projection. W  e are returned once more to Derrida's paradox: 
one must project the priority of prose ("writing," the métonymie 
function) in order to define the originating force of poetry as 
located in prose. Therefore, there is no need to speculate about 
origins, certainly not on the level of style, and this explains w h y 
Jakobson sees a continual "competition" between metaphor and 
metonymy. 5 5 "Similarity superimposed on contiguity imparts to 
poetry its thoroughgoing symbolic, mutiplex, polysemantic 
essence. . . . In poetry where similarity is superinduced upon 
contiguity, any m e t o n y m  y is slightly metaphorical and any 
metaphor has a metonymical tint."56 The importance of this 
"principle of impurity" cannot be understated, for because of it 
Jakobson's "projection theory" of poetry never results in the 
radical disparity between poetry and prose, "literariness" and 
nonliterariness, that so restricts the N e  w Criticism. N o  r does 
Jakobson privilege any specific genre, as the romantic theorists 
privileged the lyric. 
Nevertheless, Jakobson's approach is not without troublesome 
ambituities. W h e  n the "projection theory" is read in combina­
tion with his general communication chart, there is implied, as 
Mary Louise Pratt astutely notes, some sort of special "poetical­
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ness" about the poetic function; if nothing else it is the 
dependence of poetry o n surface, stylistic devices such as 
"versification." 
Context (referential function) 
Message (poetic function) 
Addresser «• Addressee 
(emotive function) A (conative function) 
Contact (phatic function) 
C o d  e (metalingual function) 
Th e referential, emotive, and metalingual functions seem to be 
distinguished from each other in terms of subject matter. Utterances 
with these functions carry information about the "context," the 
addresser's inner state, or the code, respectively. The phatic func­
tion, on the other hand, is defined contextually by the speaker's 
intention to "establish, prolong or discontinue communication." T  o 
define conative utterances Jakobson proposes a logical criterion, that 
imperatives lack truth value, in addition to the criteria of 
grammatical surface structure and referent.57 
A  s Pratt argues, the poetic function is of a wholly different 
nature, "a focus on the message for its o w n sake." The 
dominance of this function makes any utterance poetic, but does 
the dominance of this function "exclude" the others, which are 
not marked by focus on themselves for their o w n sake? The 
radical nature of this self-reflexiveness would seem to close out 
the other functions, but can this be so if poetry expresses a desire 
to communicate that surely involves phatic and emotive 
functions and perhaps others? 
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Pratt's narrow reading of Jakobson emphasizes the radical 
isolation of the poetic function rather than what I have called 
Jakobson's "principle of impurity," but our differences here are 
finally minimal. Seeing Jakobson caught in the traditional 
(romantic, N e  w Critical) trap of dividing literary and non­
literary style, Pratt suggests that the poetic function fails to 
distinguish between truly poetic functions and cheap imitations 
like advertising jingles; both, she rightly notes, are prone to the 
self-conscious use of stylistic devices such as versification. She 
further suggests that the projection theory, so narrowly drawn, 
would profit from an extension that would include cultural/ 
historical context, as well as considerations of intention and 
affective response. Through m  y emphasis on the principle of 
impurity in Jakobson's theory, I a  m merely suggesting that 
Jakobson himself anticipated the inevitability of such an 
extension. 
The essential fact is that literary style cannot be seen as 
radically removed from the general system of communication. It 
is not at all clear that w  e can even define a special literary style 
other than through a concept like that proposed by Culler as 
"poetic competency." Such competency is nothing more than a 
subclass of values within the general cultural langue and is barely 
distinguishable as a subsystem. Literary style is at the service of 
the collective will, on the most functional level operating as a 
system of models for "good writing" (interpersonal style) and at 
the other extreme as "touchstones" of sublime expressiveness 
(personal style). W  e might borrow here a term from eighteenth-
century literary criticism and define literary style in this sense as a 
reflection of cultural "taste," but w e should not be fooled by 
simplistic arguments that literary taste is nothing mor  e than the 
result of a self-serving elitism of an academic fraternity. The line 
of demarcation between "highbrow" and "lowbrow" is anything 
but clear; moreover, the elitist academy is itself an indulgence of 
society, a projection of socioeconomic wishes and even the 
expression of society's high ideals. That the academy rarely fully 
satisfies these wishes and never lives up to these ideals is a 
problem that, although it is vitally significant, is too complex to 
consider here. W h a  t is significant is that with regard to literary 
taste the academy performs (or attempts to perform) the very 
tasks that society charges it to accomplish: it engages in the 
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codification of the aesthetic values that best seem to serve the 
interests and needs of the culture. 
In the revolutionary zeal of literary theory in the 1970s, the 
romantic ideal of literariness as "high seriousness," as marked by 
an "innately" and "mystically" h u m a n experience, has been 
overthrown. Perhaps w  e have been too hasty here, failing to cull 
from that which had grown too rigid in its ascendency and 
needed rethinking the mor  e interesting and still significant 
concepts of basic h u m a  n wishes and desires. Ironically, what 
replaces the romantic ideal is a concept of literariness defined by 
its special adherence to cultural expectations. Taste is, therefore, 
acquired and not innate, but the difference is ultimately a slight 
one since both continue to reflect some more basic h u m a n need 
to project or intuit a humanistic capacity to create and respond to 
art. The acquired taste theory is more complex than the innate 
taste theory, the former actually subsuming the latter. The 
determination of literariness in the former projects an elaborate 
storehouse of linguistic devices stipulated as literary, ranging 
from lists of stylistic techniques to broader cultural signs that 
allow us to m a k e preliminary judgments of value on the basis of 
such factors as jacket designs or even where books are sold 
(outdoor stalls, bus terminals, or college bookstores, for 
example). The elaborateness of this acquired system not only 
argues against the relative simplicity of romantic aesthetic taste 
but also disallows even the possibility of an ideal or "right" 
reader whose "competency" is complete, without blind spots. 
Jakobson's projection theory, expanded beyond the idea of 
mer  e self~reflexive literary texts, reveals the ever~receding 
boundaries of literary style and, more than that, exposes 
literariness as a characteristic of mind and cultural context. The 
projection theory must not be allowed to narrow to the purity of 
Kantian aesthetic contemplation. Involved in the surprise of 
metaphor's disruptive stylistic surface is the "projection" of a 
desire to communicate, what I have above termed motivation. 
There is a sense in which the disruptive poetic function is in itself 
a special sort of phatic device—a signal that "poetry" is being 
articulated! T w  o aspects of this motivation are seen in relation to 
the idea of "literariness" and the concept of literary style as an 
identifying mark . T h e first involves what m a n y theorists in 
various terms have defined as the intention to produce art. Eliot 
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sees it as a struggle to enter the Tradition, B loo  m as the * 'anxiety 
of influence," Said as a "beginning intention." In all, it is a 
seeking of a confirmation of an identity as artist, what on one 
level is "to be k n o w n by one's style." This confirmation is an 
extraordinary process involving extraordinary personal risk, and 
that calls attention to the second aspect of what I have called 
motivation: cultural ratification. Pratt discusses a similar twofold 
interre la redness in terms of the interplay of "illocutionary" and 
"perlocutionary" activities. T h e intention to produce art 
necessitates an audience's willingness to read the work as art. 
Such willingness exposes the power invested in the audience to 
grant or not to grant the artist an identity as artist. Artistic 
confirmation, therefore, is a special, cultural activity that hints at 
something like the indistinct range of literary competency or the 
fluctuating boundaries of a literariness within cultural langue. 
The risk involved is in part the one that has obsessed B l o o m as 
a form of anxiety. T  o be granted identity as artist ambiguously 
involves entry into the Tradition and yet resistance to all the 
models contained in the Tradition. The m o v e m e n t is partly 
mimetic (to write in the literary style of others) and partly 
revolutionary (to articulate one's o w  n style). The risk is personal 
and cultural. The artist challenges the cultural subsystem of 
literariness by disrupting cultural expectations, but on either side 
of success lies "anonymity." T o submit too m u c h to the dictates 
of the system makes one a mere imitator; to unleash too m u c h 
freeplay into the bound play of the system m a  y result in a total 
failure to communicate. Therefore, it is not so m u c h the 
assertion of an inventive n e w style that marks one's entry into the 
system (this is the point of view of the artist); rather, one is 
assured of a place a m o n g the artists only w h e n one has been 
imitated (this is the point of view of the critic). Bloom's anxiety 
theory perhaps puts too m u c h emphasis on the former whereas it 
is the function of the latter, as critical confirmation, that is most 
important. Umber to Eco speaks directly to this point. " W h e  n 
only one person in the world is able to falsify a mode of invention 
(i.e., not to copy a given painting, but to paint according to the 
same type of inventive procedure) the code proposed by that 
painting has not yet been accepted by a culture; w h e n it becomes 
possible to paint à la manière de, then the invention (as a code-
making proposal) has succeeded semiotically; a n e w convention 
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exists."58 S o m e w h a  t contrary to the tradition of "inimitable" 
style as the m a r  k of genius, here it is the very effort to imitate 
(successfully or unsuccessfully is of no matter), the recognition 
of the possibility of imitation, that establishes a convention, a 
" n e w " convention, by the way, that typically would bear the 
artist's n a m e  , as in "Faulknerian style." This process of confirm­
ation is also profoundly historical. Pratt's use of speech act 
theory leads her to liken it to the contractual relationship 
between audience and storyteller,59 what I spoke of in part 1 as 
the "occasion" for myt  h singing. W  e might note that because of 
the problems of distribution, written forms of literature and 
plastic art forms often must wait for cultural ratification resulting 
in a lag in the communication arc; but the procedures are the 
same: the identifying confirmation situates the artist at a time and 
place, within a shifting tradition of artistic values and general 
cultural expectations. 
Ironically, this identifying confirmation carries with it a 
negative implication. T  o be designated as an artist with a style 
worthy of imitation is tantamount to being put to death. Such 
identity conferring is fixating, stereotyping, a condition eagerly 
sought but almost always vigorously resisted w h e  n achieved. T  o 
be n a m e d an artist, to be interred in one's identifying style 
(Faulknerian) is to be deprived of life. If m  y language here seems 
excessive, take it as a counterreaction that urges that w  e be 
careful not to overinterpret the fact of "poetic projection" even 
as w e see it revealing the very dramatic desire for identity. The 
naming of the artist as artist is itself nothing m o r  e than a 
metaphor—a metaphor for "authentic" historical being, and the 
achievement of n a m e  d identity, as a deadening act of confirma­
tion, disguises at its heart (below the stylistic surface) a profound 
struggle that defies naming. That struggle, never n a m e d or only 
falsely n a m e d , is an essential absence that makes metaphor 
possible, only n o w w e must not see it as a simple stylistic device 
(like the interplay of proper names, stereotypes, and metaphoric 
tensions in "Pantaloon in Black" or the metaphoric functioning 
of Lucas Beauchamp's family icon discussed in part 1). Stylistic 
"deviations," as revolutionary or even anarchistic, are foremost 
the expressions of the need for metaphor, the desire for identity 
that is endlessly repeatable and defiant of stereotyping; the 
opening of the space for emergence into identity can only sho  w 
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its authenticity through deadening metaphorical superficialities. 
W h o  , then, is the author w  e " n a m e  " so easily and dismiss with 
such cavalier impersonality? Gerald Bruns notes that Barthes's 
answer to this question contains its o w  n essential mystery. 
Barthes focuses on what he calls the "diathetical analysis of the 
modern verb to write," which reveals a grammatical functioning 
in that verb not unlike that found in the sentence, "It is raining." 
The "subject" here "is neither active nor passive but is rather the 
purely grammatical agent of a self-motivating activity"; the 
sentence, as all literary sentences metaphorized by the self-
conscious use of the verb to write, "possesses a phantom or 
mythical subject." Bruns interprets: " w e no longer think of the 
speaker in a p o e  m or the narrator in the novel as the author w h  o 
exists outside the work as a transcendent originator of meanings; 
w e think of him instead as a nameless and departed god, an 
irrelevance, and in his stead w e attend to the figure whose 
identity is found precisely in the activity by which the p o e  m or 
novel unfolds."60 Actually, the issue is even m o r  e complicated, 
for w  e m a k  e a series of designations with regard to authors that 
are complexly interrelated. In part this series is characterized by 
the n o w famous critical distinction between "inondation" and 
"énoncé,"61 between the act of articulation and the fact of the 
articulation that contains a vestigial or repressive "I" as a mere 
grammatical marker. There is, therefore, an "I w h  o writes" and 
an "I w h  o (apparently) speaks" in the text. But there is more , for 
our ability to distinguish between a grammatical "I" (which 
functions like a first person narrator/character in a story or as a 
"shifter" on the level of style) and an "implied" author (on 
w h o  m w  e confer the deadening identity of the n a m  e of the artist) 
reveals to us the emptiness at the heart of all articulation, the 
unnamed and unnameable "authentic" self of an "I w h  o lives," 
and w h o is more than the artist as stylist. Here w e see the 
openness at the heart of intentionality both on the level of style 
(as the intention to produce art) and on the ontological level (as 
the intention to speak being, to enter the world of language, 
culture, the symbolic order). The whole concept of literary style 
and the identity of the artist reveals, reflects, and opens for us the 
more profound (and vital) question of emerging being discussed 
in part 2 as forming the basis of the philosophy of language in 
general. It is our only contact with "authentic being," not as a 
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determinate subjectivity nor as a "biographical individual" but as 
the lack or need for being that is both the primordial motivation 
for the generative m o v e m e n  t of language and the gift of language 
to m a n . 
The importance of our awareness of this tertiary level of 
authenticity is that it introduces into the theory of literary 
interpretation an idea of authorship, a humanistic dimension that 
is, finally, not distorted by solipsism or egoism. The authentic 
self is, paradoxically, an absence at the heart of expression, but 
the negativity of such an idea is only a matter of logical 
procedure. O n  e can arrive at a sense of such being only by 
inverting the logic of noncontradiction, the very method Derrida 
gleefully, playfully took from Heidegger. W h a  t results is a vision 
of being not as ego-isolate but as active, emerging-into, asekstatic. 
M a n y would call this "ego-loss,"62 but it is more significant to see 
it as a motivating assertion of the h u m a n , which situates the 
n o n h u m a n . There is a danger in this, the danger that w e will 
c o m e to believe our metaphors and claim dominion over all that 
w  e survey, but the corrective for this m a  y well be the essence of 
literature's cultural functionality (its "fictionality"). It is in 
literary activity that attention is called to the limits of metaphor, 
to metaphor's disruptive, stylistic, identity-conferring function 
that reveals a vital emptiness, a desire below the surface. This is 
the "force" of metaphor, which also "proves" the historical 
extensiveness (as opposed to intensiveness) of humanism. I a  m 
reminded of Jorge Luis Borges's wonderful story, "The Library 
of Babel," wherein the universe (all the universe m a  n knows) is 
allegorized as an infinite library containing all possible expres­
sions of h u m a n knowledge in the form of innumerable texts that 
exhaust the logical possibilities of linguistic utterances. Borges's 
library functions in a way similar to the functioning of what I 
have called langage, as a potential for meaningfulness vastly more 
powerful than m a  n himself. But despite the paranoiac worries of 
the story's narrator, the library does not wholly dispense with the 
h u m a n  . "Perhaps m  y old age and fearfulness deceive m e  , but I 
suspect that the h u m a  n species—the unique species—is about to 
be extinguished, but the Library will endure: illuminated, soli­
tary, infinite, perfectly motionless, equipped with precious vol­
u m e s  , useless, incorruptible, secret."63 M a  n always fears his 
extinction, the possibility that he will, for a variety of reasons, 
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disappear from the universe. The verbal universe of Borges's 
story, however, makes such extinction inexpressible, for a 
"perfectly motionless" and "useless" verbal universe is essen­
tially flawed, d u m b , inarticulate. It would in no way exist or 
endure without motion and use, without m a n to assert his o w n 
authentic being and at the same time situate the Library as 
powerful, signifying system. It is man' s activity driven by his 
need to achieve being, that creates (corrupts) the perfectly still 
universe in which he lives. That universe, of course, is not the 
physical world, which does very well without m a n  , but the 
"intelligible" universe, which is, logically, the only context 
within which m a  n can be defined. M a  n cannot, even so clever a 
m a  n as Borges, articulate his o w  n nonbeing; he cannot "speak" 
his o w  n "silence." H  e can articulate his o w  n emergence as 
historical being, for his metaphors disclose the vitality of his 
motivating (and motivated) force. Less than the "unique" being 
that his romantic dreams promised, m a n , nevertheless, is a 
necessary power within the powerful structure of any system of 
articulation.64 
W  e have here gone far beyond the efforts of Samuel Levin to 
employ Jokobson's insights in the explanation of poetic unity. 
Levin saw the projection theory only as a series of parallel 
structures coupled in linear fashion. But Jakobson's "principle 
of equivalance projected into the axis of contiguity" suggests 
m u c h more. T o m o v e beyond the unifying structure of a single 
metaphor inevitably risks the influx of s o m e métonymie 
qualities; the extension of metaphors over a long sequence 
defines temporality. There is, therefore, no reason to insist on 
the ideal of a pure p o e m (a single metaphor) promoted by the 
imagists and adopted by the N e  w Critics as the measure of 
creativity and the identifying function of artistic naming. W  e can, 
however, understand the N e  w Critical emphasis on the poet's 
drive toward purity, on the struggle to activate language's poetic 
functionality. The ideal will never be achieved, but the poetic use 
of language makes this failure the key to both the cultural and 
personal dimensions of "creative" writing. I a  m describing here 
an extended version of what Murray Krieger calls poetry's 
"ekphrastic principle." Krieger redefines the traditional prosodie 
term ekphrasis to m e a  n not simply a p o e  m that imitates plastic art 
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but one that achieves a sort of "archetypal" status by denying the 
linear nature of language in a metaphoric drive toward unity.65 In 
m  y extension "ekphrasis" becomes the metaphor that * 'belies" 
its o w  n "ek-stasis," which in its failure to fix, n a m e  , and 
"presence" opens for us the being-there of the author as an "I 
w h  o lives." 
Michael Riffaterre's observations on style are also useful on 
this point. T h  e breaking of patterns established in the text serves 
the vital function of calling attention to the text as (literary) text. 
Th  e "anticipations" of the reader are linear; the pattern once 
established promises to continue, but to shatter this pattern 
forces the reader out of his linear mental set and back to a 
reassessment of the recalcitrance of the particular, discrete 
m o m e n t that defies and demystifies the whole. Stylistic devices, 
therefore, are not mere decoration; and Riffaterre's theory pales 
beside the implications that poetic style has a profound meaning 
all its o w n  , that poetry connects us with the author's and our 
o w n essential being-there. By jarring our cultural mental set, by 
threatening our logical (métonymie) structures of language 
(inverting the principle of noncontradiction), it makes us aware 
of our existential condition as m e n  . Therefore, the stylistic 
breaks themselves must be more than merely disruptive; they 
assert a deeper meaningfulness in the metaphoric/metonymic 
tensions of the text. 
O  n the cultural level, a p o e  m that merely jars us for the 
demonic pleasure of disrupting our sensibilities would be 
viciously anarchistic. There are such poems  , but this is the 
dialectics of poet and society carried to its extreme. In fact this 
violates the very nature of metaphor, the essence of which is 
unity, albeit a " n e w  " unity. O  n the level of linguistics, the 
anarchistic p o e m would be simply agrammatical, totally divorced 
from the cultural system of language that defines the c o m m u n a l 
world. It runs the risk of being "meaningless"; at its worst it is 
wholly personal and psychotic. Metaphor, as w e k n o w it in our 
literature, revitalizes language; it does not destroy it. It challenges 
culture; it m a  y even replace it, but it does not negate it. This is 
the force that moves diachronically across the synchronie 
structure of culture, the force of the individual m o m e n  t that 
resists the dehumanization of fixities and definites and gives them 
new life. M  y analysis, therefore, has worked its way outward 
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again to the original question of poetry's relationship to general 
language use. Here w e confront the puzzling problem of history, 
but without the historical dimension literary interpretation 
remains incomplete. 
HISTORY AS EXISTENTIAL 
Literary criticism necessarily involves a historial perspective. It 
is something mor  e than the formalist absolutism of the N e  w 
Critics, which relates the individual work to history by mere 
analogy, and less than reductive sociological historicism, which 
explodes the boundaries of the literary context into the blur and 
flux of the work's temporal milieu. Traditional literary history 
has struggled between these extremes for centuries, but with little 
success. The varieties of historical perspective seem to be stymied 
by a dilemma, repeated by Barthes: w e are permitted to have 
either literary criticism or literary history but not both.66 Yet no 
one can deny the absurdity of such a theoretical separation. 
Literature, like m a  n himself, is boun d off in time; the creation of 
literature is temporal, for ( 1 ) it is itself a process that ultimately 
activates a corresponding process of thought in the reader, and 
(2) it is, in its epistemological dimension, existential, an 
individual m o m e n  t of articulation within a general context. 
The historical perspective that underlies m  y arguments in this 
text has its origins in Hegel and is refined under the influence of 
Heidegger; it is born of dialectical thinking only to necessarily 
transcend that logic. Th  e recalcitrant individual m o m e n  t never 
evaporates into the universality of T i m e  . N o  r is it ever fully free 
from it. Historiography is essentially a métonymie intellectual 
actvity; it demands that the individual m o m e n t be given a 
context—one that "makes sense."67 But the life of the mind 
refuses the easy lure of m e t o n y m y  , and it is this realization that 
enabled Croce, D e w e y , and m a n y others to claim that history 
must always be rewritten. The historian, if he is sensitive to the 
uniqueness of m o m e n t s of consciousness, stands at what Eliot 
calls the limitations of h u m a n understanding. Only the "saint" 
can easily occupy this most essential of paradoxical junctures.68 
The historian, bound by his temporal, logical, and métonymie 
language, must force his historical point of view to admit the 
timeless. His only option is to rewrite continually, and his 
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narrative must never deny the discrete m o m e n t in its rush to 
m a k  e systematic and self-regulating the general structure or 
pattern. 
The historian and the critic, therefore, are partners in a joint 
enterprise, for the critic brings to the historian's métonymie 
abstractions the constant reminder that the unique m o m e n  t 
"corrupts" the universal. Both retreat from the rebellious 
questioning of the artist, and neither should be confused with the 
artist, yet neither must fall into the logician's or philosopher's 
abstractionist methodology. T h e dilemma of the historian and 
critic, or that ideal hybrid creature, the historical critic, is that he 
must dwell between poetry and prose, metaphor and m e t o n y m , 
between the structure of individual h u m a  n consciousness and the 
structure of cultural systems. Perhaps he does so at the risk of 
resigning the glory of either. 
In this context Geoffrey Hartman's claim that m o d e r n 
formalists have simply failed to be formalist enough is very 
instructive. Th  e N e  w Critics were apparently content to confine 
their interests to the structures of individual works. The possi­
bility that behind these works were deeper structures that 
derived from the interplay of individual consciousness and social 
systems was largely ignored. Such a backward movement was 
condemned as radically idealist, leading to Crocean histori­
ography and the diminution of the work's importance. Yet it 
need not go so far in this direction; Crocean historicism runs the 
risk of becoming ahistorical. Again, history demands the balance 
between the individual and the universal. 
The poetic drive toward metaphor gives us the necessary 
dialectic for historical movement , for metaphor dissolves into its 
o w  n genesis, even to the suggestion of its rudimentary sources in 
the primitive act of individuation. It is, in this very movement , 
the essence of history, being-there, with all its spatiotemporal 
implications of the place and m o m e n t where being shows itself. 
For the true primitive (ancient or modern) , whose awakening 
self-consciousness drives him to seek unity with the outer world, 
metaphor functions as existential projection, not as a tran­
scendent ego but as an escape from the ego. A  s egoist, m a  n is 
d o o m e d ; the diversity of experience demands a never-ending 
series of unrelated momentary projections, each asserting a self 
and an other and eventuating in a discontinuous series of 
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apocalyptic m o m e n t  s m u c  h like those of Faulkner's romantic 
egoist, Ike McCaslin. For the egoist this is a devastating pattern of 
repetition (fate) and fragmentation. Yet from another point of 
view, it is the uniqueness of the individual m o m e n  t metaphorized 
on the stylistic surface of the literary text that enables us to say 
with the N e w Critics that the p o e m is whole and self-sufficient. 
This can no longer be interpreted as cutting the text free from 
time; rather it emphasizes the text's temporal existence: the 
humanistic struggle for self-consciousness within the pattern of 
all h u m a  n consciousness. T h  e m o m e n  t of consciousness can 
happen only as it does, whe  n and where it does. 
Herein lies the value of poetic communication. It is not simply 
that author and reader share a c o m m o  n linguistic code that 
enables the one to understand the message of the other. That 
there is such a shared code is self-evident. True communication 
lies beneath the code; what is shared is the existential condition 
of m a n , the ''concern" for the h u m a n . O  n the level of this exis­
tential awareness is founded a communication between author 
and reader that invites the latter to enter the world of the former, 
to live through the details of the author's world, which becomes a 
simulacrum of the reader's o w n h u m a n condition. The reader's 
and author's worlds are different, separated by time and space, 
but in the work the two worlds meet in a c o m m u n i o n of souls. 
The metaphoric text draws its life from the critical, self-
conscious interpénétration of author and culture, but once full 
born it breathes on its o w n , surviving the fading consciousness, 
the "authentic" being, that bore it. This metaphoric status tends 
to disguise the text's origins-as-emergence because the text seems 
to speak out of its time to readers in other lands and in other 
cultures. It thrusts itself into the future of readers yet to c o m e  . It 
defies our métonymie reductions and continually asserts its o w  n 
being as text, yet it also inexorably draws its readers back to its 
o w  n time and place, to the emptiness beneath its shining surface, 
to the force of articulation to experience that marks the limits 
and the possibilities of being-there for all humankind. 
Part Four 
Toward a Literary Hermeneutics 
Briefly stated, there are two basic, and traditional, concerns in 
hermeneutic philosophy; they have tended to divide the history 
of hermeneutic theory itself, but they are not fundamentally 
contradictory. Rather, they seem to reflect different layers of 
interest. Perhaps the oldest tradition is associated with Biblical 
exegesis, where the concern is with the interpretation of 
individual texts and their transmission (that is, with the history 
of the interpretation of a text). This is the narrower of the basic 
concerns and has parallels with the N e  w Criticism, although it 
never ignores historical meaningfulness altogether. It merely 
tends to restrict its historical perspective by isolating texts in 
particular historical m o m e n t s  . This tradition is still very m u c  h 
alive; Paul Ricoeur said as recently as 1965 that " w e m e a n by 
hermeneutics the theory of rules that govern an exegesis, that is 
to say, an interpretation of a particular text or collection of signs 
susceptible of being considered as a text."1 T h  e approach is 
doggedly scholastic and generally antiromantic; it promotes 
objectivity in interpretation, a positivistic attitude, and e m p h a  ­
sizes the importance of methodology as a series of logically 
defined interpretive steps that will, of necessity, lead the inter­
preter to the true meaning of the text. It is well represented by 
philosophers like Emilio Betti and literary critics like E . D  . 
Hirsch, Jr. Behind these m e  n are the works of Schleiermacher, 
and to s o m e extent Dilthey and Husserl. Its similarity to the 
positivistic and methodology-centered linguistics of C h o m s k  y is 
apparent, even if the stated goals are quite different. 
T h  e second basic concern, m u c  h younger in its full develop­
ment (although like all philosophical movements prone to trace 
its origins to antiquity), reflects m u c  h broader interests. Under 
the influence of Heidegger, and to a lesser extent of Merleau-
Ponty, this hermeneutic tradition seeks through the point of view 
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of the phenomenologists to focus on the fundamental activity of 
"understanding," in both its epistemological and ontological 
dimensions. It is epistemological because "understanding" has its 
base in the self-conscious act of knowing the world; it is 
ontological because this act of knowing originates in a 
Heideggerian assertion of being. This tradition often appears to 
be broadly metaphysical, psychologistic, and idealistic, although 
such designations must be wary of the Heideggerian "deconstruc­
tion" that challenges them. The tendency is to disregard the 
centrality of logical methodology and the emphasis of the older 
tradition on apodictic knowledge. S o m e of its leading exponents 
are Hans-Georg Gadamer, Rudolph Bultmann, and, more 
recently, Richard Palmer. 
HISTORY A N  D INTERPRETATION: FIRST V I E W 
The exegetical tradition of hermeneutics, the first of the two 
positions outlined above, defines its primary goal as the 
establishing of "norms" for determining "right" and "wrong" 
interpretations. The end is apodictic knowledge, and the 
methodology, what Emilio Betti calls "historical objectivity,"2 is 
designed to escape the damnation of subjective (romantic) 
judgments. A s a result, the methodology becomes mired in a 
relativistic historicism. Betti's historical objectivity is essentially 
a development of the hermeneutic theory of Wilhelm Dilthey. 
The interpreter, for Dilthey, must be able to transcend his o w n 
personality in order to enter into the consciousness of another 
being (the author) from another time and place. Only by doing 
this can one discover the true—and determinate—meaning of the 
text. "Meaning" must not be allowed to suffer interpolation at 
the hands of the critic, and in this sense the text is said to be 
"autonomous," having a meaning locked in time. This version of 
textual autonomy, obviously, is not N e  w Critical. 
The approach can best be grasped by outlining what Dilthey 
established as the three main areas of interest for hermeneutic 
theory. 
1.	 Erlebnis: simply "life" but in the broader sense of "existential 
consciousness" or what Richard Palmer translates as 
"experience." 
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2.	 Ausdruck: "expression" or perhaps more literally an exis­
tential projection. For Dilthey, expression was the realization 
of Erlebnis, its objective manifestation in one of man's 
*'gestures": art, politics, philosophy, and m a n  y others. 
3.	 Verstehen: "understanding." The crucial element of Dilthey's 
hermeneutic theory is understanding; it is this capacity of 
mind that allows us to grasp sympathetically the actual 
thought process of another mind.3 
Dilthey says of this third area of interest: "Understanding is the 
rediscovery of the I in the T h o u ; the mind rediscovers itself at 
ever higher levels of connectedness; this sameness of the mind in 
the I and the T h o u and in every subject of a community, in every 
system of culture and, finally, in the totality of mind and 
universal history, makes the working together of the different 
processes in the h u m a  n studies possible."4 For the purposes of 
hermeneutic theory, w e must understand that this I-Thou 
relationship (the end of all interpretation) is achieved only by 
passing through the concrete "expression"—the text itself. 
"Abov  e all . .  . the grasping of the structure of the inner life is 
based on the interpretation of works, works in which the texture 
of inner life comes fully to expression."5 The "autonomy" of the 
text in the exegetical tradition becomes primary, whereas the 
concept of "understanding" is no more than a basic assumption; 
the text is an objectified, formed, or structured expression of 
lived experience, the existential projection of a particular m a  n 
living at a particular time and place. 
Such autonomy is defended, however, at the expense of the 
interpreter's involvement; the text is free from interpretive 
superimpositions, but it is lost in the historical m o m e n  t of its 
creation. This historical relativism is admittedly the aim of the 
hermeneutic theory of E  . D  . Hirsch, Jr. H  e uses the term 
autonomy in the sense of Husserl's object of "intentionality." 
Hirsch quotes Husserl to the effect that "the same intentional 
object m a  y be the focus of m a n  y intentional acts."6 That is to say, 
the literary text remains essentially unchanged although it is 
subjected to a variety of different interpretations. M o r e impor­
tantly, the text is the product of the author's creative act, of, in an 
expanded sense, his "intention." It is on this basis that Hirsch 
defines the "meaning" of a literary work as the product of the 
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author's determining will (including all the conscious and 
unconscious factors of his environment that affect his will). 
Meaning, then, is historical, determined by the spatiotemporal 
locale of the author. There is also a secondary meaning for 
Hirsch, which he labels "significance." It is a "present" meaning 
arising from the critic's subjective judgment. Despite its basis in 
the idealistic assumptions of a possible "inter-subjectivity" 
voiced by Dilthey, proponents of hermeneutics, like Hirsch, 
insist that the methodology of the interpreter must be objective, 
scientific, and value free in contradistinction to the critic's 
subjectivity. Clearly, Hirsch divided interpretation and evalua­
tion in order to focus on the former without the befuddling 
problems of the latter, but he fails to explain fully what w e must 
all intuitively confirm, that such a theoretical bifurcation of 
interests has little of the same purity in practice. C a n an inter­
preter really avoid som e degree of subjectivity? 
The affirmative response to such a question is m a d e by Hirsch 
as a result of his primary emphasis on methodology. If an exact 
logical interpretive process can be established, there is little r o o  m 
for subjective wanderings. T h e methodology makes the interpre­
tation for us if w e follow the rules. Meaning becomes, in this 
positivistic notion, almost identical with the interpretive 
procedure itself, and the result is an extremely narrow kind of 
historical determinism. Admitting that his concept of intention is 
fraught with vagueries, that w  e cannot know what was in the 
author's mind as he wrote, Hirsch argues that w e must, on the 
basis of textual evidence, deduce what was most probably his 
intention. T h u s the methodo logy avoids the charge of 
"psychologism." Hirsch sees the text as an object in experience, 
but a determinate object that can be interpreted without 
conjectures on the psychological condition of the author. The 
methodology is statistical. Given several variant readings of a 
text, or a portion of a text, the interpreter's role is to establish 
"evidence" (including all the k n o w  n factors of the author's life, 
his works, his social-historical milieu) that can be used to 
determine the relative Tightness or wrongness of the variant 
readings. This evidence forms a closed context of possible 
meanings, and the correct meaning of an individual work is 
determined by that context. T h e interpreter can then decide 
which of the variant readings is most nearly correct by deciding 
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which of all possible interpretations satisfies the greatest number 
of determining possibilities. 
The methodology is value free because it is wholly quantita­
tive, a result of Hirsch's importation of Husserl's empiricism. It 
lacks the exactness that the ideal of apodictic knowledge might 
seem to demand; it delivers only a "high probability of truth," 
but Hirsch is a practical m a n in such matters. H e would not claim 
that even this statistical approach is free from the vagueries of 
evidence gathering. M o r  e importantly, the methodology is 
wholly relativistic, and in the end this denies any true autonomy 
to the text, that more radical N e  w Critical autonomy. The work 
must be seen as a product of its times, and art's contribution to 
the structuring of history is severely undercut. W  e are con­
fronted here with the picture of an artist spoken by his historical 
context. Everything is reduced to simple pastness; the context of 
the work is static and closed, and the continuity of past and 
present is ignored or even denied. 
HISTORY A N  D INTERPRETATION: S E C O N D V I E W 
Hirsch's understanding of autonomy contradicts m  y goal in 
this essay of establishing a historically sensitive hermeneutics. 
W  e can quickly agree that any work must be seen as in some 
sense free from the reader's (interpreter's) determining influence, 
but it is also free from the illusion of the determining influence of 
its o w n historical milieu. Paradoxically, the work is related to 
both past and present, for only in this relationship can it be said 
to be truly autonomous (irreducible to either the reader's or 
author's point of view) and at the same time a part of the contin­
uous flow of such objects in experience that m a k e up the 
dynamic flow of history. Perhaps, then, it is better to drop the 
term autonomous altogether, for it is distorting in either its N e  w 
Critical or relativistic usages. This forces us to a m u c  h broader 
sense of hermeneutics and perhaps a m o r e complicated 
methodology. The interpreter's approach, I would argue, is in­
evitably less logical and statistical than Hirsch admits, and flirts 
with the dreaded "psychologism." W  e might describe the literary 
text more accurately as "finite"; it is not "autonomous" because 
its very nature opens it to a vast world of experience and 
discourse. 
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T o accomplish such a theory w e must return to Dilthey's 
triadic relationship of Erlebnis, Ausdruck, and Verstehen. In so 
doing I reject Dilthey's limitation of the latter, "understanding," 
to the mere process of entering into the consciousness of the 
author, his lived experience or Erlebnis. Hence, from the begin­
ning I admit that the separation of interpreter's and author's 
consciousnesses is problematical, but the blending of the two 
consciousnesses leads us to a broader sense of communication 
than Hirsch provides through his dichotomy of meaning and 
significance. 
The virtue of Hirsch's methodology is that it is simple and 
logical (much like C h o m s k y ' s analysis of linguistic structures). 
But it generates problems for itself as a methodology. This is 
most clear in Hirsch's development of a genre theory, his answer 
to the problem of h o w w e "share" a meaning that is so narrowly 
circumscribed by the closed context of possible meanings—a 
context that m a  y well be very remote from our present sense of 
significance. Hirsch's difficulty here is similar to C h o m s k y '  s in 
explaining communication in language systems, and their 
solutions are remarkably alike. Both fall back on a general 
category of shared experiences or capacities. For C h o m s k  y this is 
rigidly determinative as it takes the form of "innate reason." For 
Hirsch it is milder, a matter of mere "convention" or "heuristic" 
devices that take the form of genre types. Both appeals are to the 
rationalist's argument from "necessity" in order to posit an 
explanatory general law that will "cover" all the individual 
variations k n o w  n as specific expressions.7 
Hirsch assumes that an author works within a finite category of 
experience (including the formal and thematic aspects of that 
category), which he calls an "extrinsic genre." This category can 
be k n o w n by the interpreter whose approach involves the 
elimination (by statistical probabilities) of all of the implications 
of the extrinsic genre that are "false" w h e  n applied to the specific 
text. By a process of gradually narrowing the focus, the inter­
preter arrives, finally, at the "intrinsic genre," which is apparently 
no m o r  e than the text itself as product of the author's 
determinate intention. 
Hirsch has here committed himself to the traditional impli­
cations of the hermeneutical or philological circle. Leo Spitzer, 
however, suggests that the philological circle necessarily involves 
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both a * 'psychological" and a "grammatical" dimension.8 The 
first risks the damning label of "intuition" or even "mysticism" 
as it seeks the necessary inner structure of the author's mind via 
his works; the second restricts itself to the stylistic surface of the 
text. The psychological dimension pushes toward the irrational 
but, in combination with the grammatical, has its ground firmly 
in the finite text of the work. " T o understand a sentence, a work 
of art, or the inward form of an artistic mind involves, to an 
increasing degree, irrational moves—which must, also to an in­
creasing degree, be controlled by reason."9 The intuitive aspect 
of the philological circle springs from the necessary "anticipation 
of the whole," which enables the interpreter to measure specific 
details against his intuitive assumptions about the text's unity. 
Schleiermacher, Spitzer claims, considered this in theological 
terms as a leap of faith; Hirsch, more secularly, calls it a 
"guess."10 
Hirsch's "extrinsic genre" is a broader context than the textual 
wholes Spitzer is here speaking of; but Spitzer also expands the 
vibrations between parts and wholes into the realm of social 
history, and at this point he develops an idea of literary "con­
text" very similar to what I have called "occasion" in part 1. 
Hirsch is well aware of the basic structure of this methodology, 
but the influx of the irrational (necessitated by the methodology 
itself) does not conform to his positivistic and statistical ap­
proach. O  n the deeper level, where a hermeneutic methodology 
must be developed, w e find that an analysis that measures details 
against the whole, cannot proceed without the intuition of the 
whole, that deep-seated sense of unity and identity that is essen­
tially metaphoric and thrusts toward the prelogical and irrational. 
The fate of Hirsch's hermeneutics, like that of Chomsky ' s 
linguistic analysis, is that its very methodology leads it, in part, 
away from objectivity. 
This being the case, w e might wonder w h y it is advantageous to 
restrict our interpretive approach to a narrow sense of "meaning" 
like that proposed by Hirsch. C a n w e not profitably expand 
hermeneutic procedure to include the problematical relationship 
between the reader's subjectivity, the text's finite existence, and 
the author's historical milieu? Dilthey's triad of Erlebnis, 
Ausdruck, and Verstehen can then be seen in the author-work­
reader relationship I have so laboriously developed above. The 
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result of such an expanded sense of literary hermeneutics 
supports G a d a m e r ' s assertion that interpretation "is an 
encounter with Being through language."11 Nevertheless, the 
eloquence of this claim should not open it to the charge of mere 
psychologism or mysticism, for the interpretive methodology 
remains grounded in the part/whole relationship of finite text 
and cultural context, work and occasion, and has its concrete 
basis on the level of grammar. The focus necessarily remains on 
the text, for it is the finiteness of that text, its m o v e m e n  t between 
past and present, that provides the key to the interpretive act as 
vehicle for communication between reader and author. There is a 
sense in which the act of interpretation defines the text, situates it 
in its cultural context, and thereby defines or situates the text's 
culture. Murray Krieger calls this anas if critical commitment;1 2 
but giving credit where it is due, the text can as easily be said to 
present itself, as one a m o n g m a n y texts, to m a k e itself available 
for interpretation. 
Textual interpretation is, then, a profound kind of "transla­
tion"—from authorial past meaning into present significance— 
endowing the text itself with a more comprehensive meaning that 
encompasses the potentials for both. Translation is not an 
inappropriate word. Rewriting a text of one language system in 
another, separate system has long been the interest of her­
meneutics. But even this narrow kind of translation must not be 
seen as the simple transfer of a message from one set of linguistic 
signs to another, semantically equivalent, set of signs, or as a 
game of transforming one set of codes into another. Such a 
semantic transfer is probably impossible; at best it results in so-
called literal translations, which are always unsatisfactory. A s 
Heidegger demonstrates in all of his philosophical writings, 
translation is never an "innocent process."13 Translation calls 
into question the very limits of interpretation, for not only must 
it operate on the informational level encoding and decoding, on 
the level of signifiers generated within the culturally motivated 
system of langue, it must also concern itself with the general 
semiotic functioning that treats of the relationships between 
signifiers and signifieds, more broadly, between articulation and 
experience, or word and world.14 Georges M o u n i n confines the 
field of interpretation to the latter operations, to a concern with 
the function of language as "index,"15 but I hope that approach 
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will seem too narrow a characterization following m  y discussion 
of the problematical interplay of parole and langue, language and 
experience. 
The translator, by means of striking at the very heart of 
language's capabilities, the play of signifiers as well as the 
phenomenological activity of signifying as "intentionality," 
crosses from his world to that of the author; he establishes 
communication on the deepest level, penetrating to the very core 
of the author's existence and making it compatible with his o w n . 
Surely this is nothing less than Gadamer's "encounter with Being 
through language," and it involves an intuition of the potentials 
of all h u m a  n consciousness as they are located in the author's 
horizon of consciousness. The translator must then be able to 
bring that consciousness to existence through his o w  n conscious­
ness. This is understanding at its fullest dimension and at its most 
problematical, for it involves not only the gap between language 
systems but also the historical and cultural differences between 
the author's world and that of the translator.16 
T H E H E R M E N E U T I C S O F VERSTEHEN: C O N S C I O U S N E S S 
Through the methodological paradigm of translation we 
confront the tradition of hermeneutic theory that necessarily 
involves historical consciousness. Moreover, in so doing w e do 
not find it necessary to abandon interest in the text, or language 
in general, for the intimate relation between consciousness and 
language itself—its metaphor /metonym tensions, which reveal 
the author's encounter with his particular world of temporal flow 
and discrete moments—becomes a tool for the interpreter as he 
strives to penetrate to the deep structure of meaning. The 
interpreter, nonetheless, begins with his o w  n consciousness as he 
confronts the text, and he is never free of it. A  s Richard Palmer 
says of Heidegger: "Understanding is the power to grasp one's 
o w  n possibilities for being, within the context of the lifeworld in 
which one exists. It is not a special capacity or gift for feeling into 
the situation of another person, nor is it [simply] the power to 
grasp the meaning of some 'expression of life on a deeper 
level.' "17 Understanding begins and ends in the interpreter's o w  n 
existential awareness, but always within the context of history. 
There is a crucial sense of will (or "intention") in Heidegger's 
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phenomenology, in the act of consciousness that places the self in 
history (on another level, in tradition), thereby making the being 
of self and relationships with other beings possible. "Only as a 
questioning, historical being does m a  n c o m  e to himself; only as 
such is he a self. M a n ' s selfhood means this: he must transform 
the being that discloses itself to him into history and bring 
himself to stand in it. Selfhood does not m e a  n that he is primarily 
an 'ego' and an individual. This he is no more than he is a w e , a 
community."1 8 M a  n is both, an individual whose very individu­
ality comes to be in a community—in history. Without the 
context of history he cannot be an individual and without the 
multiplicity of individuals there can be no historical context. 
Art, therefore, can be described in terms of "disclosure," for 
the foundation of every individual work (act of consciousness) is 
what Heidegger calls "Earth," and it is on the ground of Earth 
that m a  n builds his World , makes, through an act of historical 
consciousness, his works. This creative act makes a place in time 
for the works of m a n , just as it makes a place in history for m a n 
himself. The work of art captures formally the tension of 
consciousness as it struggles to bring forth W o r l d on the vivid 
but opaque foundations of Earth. The work is, then, part of its 
World and is composed of and on Earth, but it is also at the same 
time a situating of Wor l  d and Earth. It has its freedom as well as 
its belonging. Heidegger can, therefore, describe the individual 
work (being) as a strange, violent, disruptive emergence that 
nevertheless opens up the space/time continuum for the 
situating of a World that becomes the familiar dwelling place of 
the individual, a dwelling place that will subordinate the 
individual, even repress it as it also exploits the Earth for the 
World's purposes.19 Heidegger, of course, discusses these 
complex movements and countermovements as characteristics of 
language. His sense of the mysterious originality of poetry and its 
later codification into a poetic tradition is not far from that of 
Cassirer, even to the use of very romantic terminology to 
describe the relationship between the primordial nature of 
emergent being and the cultural/historical context of that 
original poetry. "The origin of language is in essence mysterious. 
A n d this means that language can only have arisen from the over­
powering, the strange and the terrible, through man's departure 
into being, embodied in the word: poetry. Language is the 
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primordial poetry in which a people speaks being. Conversely, 
the great poetry by which a people enters into history initiates the 
molding of its language."20 
W  e must remember here that Heidegger's use of the term 
origin is special, indicating an abiding power that is always 
available in language. Language contains the forces of both 
gathering together and dispersing in conflict, the tension of 
metaphor and m e t o n y m y that makes possible the emergence of 
the individual at a time as well as the absorption of the individual 
into the flow of temporality. Poetry, therefore, is not merely a 
metaphor; it is the force of gathering, violent estrangement, that 
creates a space for a metaphor, an opening in the fabric of being 
(context or text) that only a "pure" metaphor in its dynamic 
enduring could fill, if only such metaphors were ever at hand. In 
a very real way, as I have argued from the beginning, it is the 
failure of metaphors, their "impurity," that signifies intention, 
will, and emergence; on the stylistic surface it is the weakness of 
the metaphoric unity, its always-openness to metonymy , that 
best reveals its power. H o  w far, for example, should w e extend 
the unifying claims of " M  y love is like a red, red rose"; as far as 
blood and thorns, root rot and aphids? Th e dissolve is the other 
side of emergence, and literature most forcefully calls our atten­
tion to this powerful interplay. Without it w e would have no 
sense of the timeliness of time, nor of the true dimensions of 
history. 
A F U R T H E R N O T E O N L A N G U A G E 
Heidegger's student Hans-Georg Gadamer placed even more 
emphasis on the linguistic orientation of hermeneutics than did 
his master. Gadamer extensively developed the distinction 
between the poetic use of language and the instrumentalism of 
scientific discourse. Rejecting the latter as a vitiation of the true 
power of language he says, "everywhere [the] word is seen in its 
mere sign function, the primordial relationship of speaking and 
thinking is turned into an instrumental relationship."21 W  e are 
returned once more to the N e  w Critical distinction between 
poetry and prose, but it is no longer seen as absolute. The denial 
of that N e w Critical separatism is justified by a m o v e away from 
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textual formalism toward the structuralism of h u m a  n conscious­
ness. This is the expansive sense of formalism advocated by 
Geoffrey Hartman. G a d a m e r eschews the formalist analysis, 
which never sees beyond the autonomous text, never penetrates 
to the deep structure of consciousness. T h  e essence of language, 
he claims, is experience (Dilthey's Erlebnis); the poetic or primal 
use of language springs from the Heideggerian disclosure of space 
and time. 
But w e do not here abolish all distinctions between what w e 
have for m a n y years called poetic and philosophic languages. 
These are, Heidegger expresses it, always in the same "neighbor­
hood"; they are "held apart by a delicate yet luminous difference, 
each held in its o w  n darkness." They are "parallels" that 
"intersect in the infinite."22 The difference between the two is 
chimerical, n o  w this—now that, a kind of optical illusion not 
unlike the metaphoric use I m a d  e of the "principle of indeter­
minacy" from quantum theory in part 2. It is a question as to 
whether w e look at poetry as emergence or as object. The former 
is a poetic way of determining, the latter is a logical or philo­
sophical w a y of determining. Again Heidegger poses the 
dilemma: 
N  o thing is where the word is lacking. A thing is not until, and is only 
where, the word is not lacking but is there. But if the word is, then it 
must itself also be a thing, because "thing" here means whatever is in 
some way. . . . Or could it be that when the word speaks, qua word, 
it is not a thing—in no way like what is? Is the word a nothing? 
. . . If our thinking does justice to the matter, then we may never 
say of the word that it is, but rather that it gives. . . . W h a  t does it 
give? T  o go by the poetic experience . . . , the word gives Being. 
. . . [This is] the intuited secret of the word, which in denying 
itself brings near to us its withheld nature.23 
There is no question that w e sometimes (as stylisticians, as 
literary critics?) see the poetic word as a thing, as a presence that 
conceals its power to disclose the historical emergence of being. 
But w e must not allow that perspective to solidify; w e must 
perceive poetically, allow the poetic word to deny itself and 
reveal its powers of "giving," its original function as primordial 
naming. 
In this sense, as Murray Krieger has claimed, poetry contains 
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its o w n interpretation and remains to some extent always beyond 
the grasp of philosophical criticism, on the other side of 
" w o n d e r , " which is disclosed by the actual (perceptible) 
decomposition of what w e have too literalistically designated as 
the substantiality of metaphor.24 Heidegger proposes a remark­
ably expressive formula for this paradoxical interplay between 
poetry as emergent being, strange, uncanny, and language as the 
logical or familiar expressing "thingly" permanence. "The being 
of language : the language of being."25 Such a phrase, with all of 
its rhetorical/poetical suggestiveness, cannot help but remind us 
of similar poetic devices so popular a m o n  g the practitioners of 
eighteenth-century "heroic" verse. It is filled with the witty 
twisting of logic m a d e possible by grammatical inversion, and 
what emerges is something far beyond a dialectical struggle 
between the opposed half-lines that face one another across the 
inarticulateness of the colon. The same words on either side of 
the caesura do not have the same meanings, but each side necessi­
tates the other to situate its meaningfulness, even as it dissolves 
that meaningfulness into the "neutral" zone that opens between 
them. The distance between the word as thing (the being of 
language) and the word as giving (the language of being) makes 
possible the Heideggerian idea of poetry as speaking being. In the 
light of m  y earlier discussions, w  e can translate this poetic line 
into another expression, fully aware of the dangers of translation 
as well as its intimacy with the methods of interpretation. "The 
belonging of language : the language of belonging." This transla­
tion is not without loss; its distance from the original, however, is 
precisely the issue. The "belonging of language" is its fallen status 
as cultural systematicity, as langue, or even further as "literary 
value." These are the fixities and definites of interpretation, the 
scholastic rules that form the basis of literary handbooks. They 
are not without use; they are to be used. The "language of 
belonging," conversely, is that which defines our world, the 
familiar, delimiting, even repressive "world of our fathers." It is 
in part the realm of the function of the giving of identity; for the 
literary artist, it is the possibility of receiving the deadening 
" n a m  e of artist." Yet even if this version of Heidegger's paradox 
is sadly degenerate, its very inadequacy as a definition of the 
interpretive procedure opens up once more the path to "original 
poetry." In the inarticulate space marked by the colon the "text 
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for analysis" emerges as neither a composite of culture's rules 
nor an expression of the personal (stylistic) struggles of the 
author. N o  r is it possible to conceive of the appearance of this 
text as a simple dialectic of the two forces, for where is the place 
of transition, the fading of one into the other? The text is both 
and neither; it is the locus of the interpénétration of forces that 
dissolves into questions concerning the power of language to 
solidify into the thingly words of cultural rules on the one hand 
and the "given" power of self-assertion (will) that articulates 
itself as "seeking identity" on the other hand. Concealed within 
such a text is "being-there," the force of emergence into and the 
situation of history. 
This is the essential historicity of literary hermeneutics, a 
historical perspective that must be preserved in its full ambiguity. 
The text, in its tensional revelation of the battle between the 
author's drive toward primal consciousness (being-there) and, in 
opposition, the systematicity of society, reveals the possibility of 
history and provides the foundation for communication. The text 
stands mediately between the author's world and the reader's 
world and draws author and reader together in its o w  n unique 
structure while it asserts its o w n and m a n ' s being in time. "The 
claim of the text must be allowed to show itself as what it is. In 
the interaction and fusion of horizons the interpreter comes to 
hear the question which called the text itself into being."26 A s an 
event of consciousness the text "claims" a finite "presence" that 
defies any reduction of it to either wholly private or wholly 
public status. It is both; it shows itself not as a thing that is but as 
an opening, a space for being-there. The articulate text preserves 
the creative act that gave it being and invites the reader to disclose 
that creative power within it, but that disclosure opens 
thereupon a broader context, the occasion or W o r l  d (the 
enabling horizon of man' s always original emergence as being). 
T H E " T E X T " A S INTERPRETATION: IN DEFENSE O F 
R O M A N T I C I S M 
In The Order of Things, Michel Foucault characterizes 
romanticism as the "discovery of m a n "  ; he does so in order to 
attack all the other familiar "isms" that w  e associate with the 
romantic period, in particular: subjectivism, h u m a n i s m , 
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historicism, symbolism, and transcendentalism. Foucault is the 
defender of the rationalistic "systematicities" of the classical 
period (the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) against the 
irrationality of romantic self-indulgence. There is, despite his 
denials, a polemical purposiveness—something of a missionary 
zeal—in his writing. For Foucault the "discovery of m a n  " was 
not a triumph but a disastrous (and temporary) fall into the 
decadence of a sinful egoism. It resulted in the cult of the "self," 
in the claim that the thinking, feeling, speaking "subject" (man) 
was the measure of all things.27 Viewed broadly, there is some 
justification for Foucault's observations on the excesses of 
romantic theory, but he is, finally, too anxious to m a k  e his point 
and fails to acknowledge the philosophical complexity of 
romanticism's "discovery." T  o cite only one example, Foucault 
seizes upon the concept of organicism and uses it to characterize 
the romantic way of thinking. This is traditional, but unless one 
is careful, it is distorting. 
Organicism proclaims, as w  e have seen with the N e  w Critics, 
the principle of the "folding inward" upon the self, the 
emergence of all particular phenomena, including m a n , from 
hidden, mysterious origins that are the nuclei for each individual 
organic whole. Thus m a  n can be explained only by a search for 
origins, by retracing the interminably regressive steps back 
toward his birth into consciousness. Organicism, however, cuts 
two ways, a fact that Foucault glosses over. O  n the one hand, it 
promotes the worship of unique particularity and originality; in 
the arts it encourages the cult of "original genius," and it 
supports an exaggerated respect for the new , the avant-garde, the 
revolutionary, and even the strange and the grotesque. O  n the 
other hand, as it focuses on the particular it also proclaims the 
universal sameness of all phenomena, since the organic principle 
operates everywhere and at all times according to the same laws. 
It is possible, by embracing the paradox, to jump from awe in the 
face of the particular to sublimity w h e n confronted by the 
universal, from the immediacy of experientiality to the abstract­
ness of transcendentalism, from the perspctive of individual 
being to the perspective of cultural-historical becoming, from 
radical existential discontinuity to historicist continuity. It is true 
that m a  n thus becomes the symbol of all order and the reference 
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point for all interpretation, but the essential nature of his being is 
clouded by the mystery of time itself. 
Foucault would carve out for himself a place between the 
extremes; neither the individualist nor the transcendentalist, he 
eschews the subjective, the particular, and the humanistic as well 
as the universal, continuous, and divine. T  o do so, however, is 
not to reject romanticism but to c o m  e to dwell within its limits, 
to "bracket" the really tough questions in order to focus on the 
narrow ones that deal with the myriad systematicities that claim 
neither concrete existential viability nor universal justification. It 
seems a sterile occupation that forces him to walk a very thin line 
at the risk of being continually off balance. If one returns from 
Foucault's polemical treatment of romanticism to specific 
romantic texts, one is both enlightened and disappointed, for the 
strange and frequently ironic revision of eighteenth-century 
rationalism in Foucault's modern dress points up the true 
complexity of the romantic "vision." 
In his post-romantic masterpiece, Sartor Resartus, T h o m a s 
Carlyle embraced all of the romantic "isms" that so offend 
Foucault—and m u c h more . T h e extraordinary hero of this work, 
Diogenes Teufelsdrockh, is obsessed with the "discovery of 
m a n  " and repeatedly asks the ancient question, " W h  o a  m I?" 
giving it a full romantic flavor. 
W h  o a  m I; what is this me? A Voice, a Motion, an Appearance;— 
some embodied, visualized Idea in the Eternal Mind? 
. . . this so solid-seeming World, after all, were but an air-image, 
our M  e the only reality; and Nature, with its thousandfold produc­
tion and destruction, but the reflex of our inward Force, the 
"phantasy of our Dream. . . ." 
Stands he [man] not thereby in the centre of Immensities? [Pp. 
160, 169]28 
The influence of G e r m a n romantic philosophy is clear, and if 
more evidence is called for w e need only refer to the "egoism" of 
the Everlasting N  o and Everlasting Yea chapters, the senti­
mentality of the bildungsroman form borrowed from Goethe, and 
the notorious chapter on symbols where Carlyle's transcen­
dentalism comes to full flower. "In the Symbol proper, what w e 
call a Symbol, there is ever, more or less distinctly and directly, 
some embodiment and revelation of the Infinite; the Infinite is 
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m a d  e to blend itself with the Finite, to stand visible, and as it 
were, attainable there!" (p. 276). 
The book is an encyclopedia of romanticisms, but to read no 
further is to misrepresent both the complexity of Sartor and the 
romantic period. After all, what does it mean , exactly, to stand in 
the "centre of Immensities"? If this is a phenomenological 
question then Teufelsdrôckh can be read in terms of Georges 
Poulet's description of m a  n in his Metamorphoses of the Circle. 
M a  n stands alone, in silence, confronted by the multiplicity of 
the experiential world, which he must mold into an order around 
himself as center, which he must articulate into meaningful 
patterns of language.29 If w e take Carlyle's "work philosophy" a 
step further w  e approach the phenomenological theory of 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in the idea that "doing" is the measure 
of m a n  ; m a  n thus discovers himself through his "creative," 
bodily motions into the world.30 T  o slide into Heideggerian 
language, "work" can be seen as coming into "presence," man's 
achievement of "being-there" in time or history. If w  e emphasize 
Carlyle's transcendentalism w e gain another, though not 
contradictory, perspective, for m a  n as the symbol of G o  d in the 
world becomes the n e w A d a m , the namer and orderer of life's 
plenitude under the auspices of divine law. 
These interpretations, amon  g others, are all possible—that is, 
defensible; they are forms of critical or philosophical discourse 
that express very m u c h the same romantic idea. M a  n is "cen­
tered" in these theories either as the force or order in a universe 
that he creates wholly for himself or as a mediator between 
heaven and earth, but it takes only a moment '  s reflection to 
realize that this "discovery" of man's centrality has very little 
stability. Early in Sartor Carlyle sets up the course of his 
discussions in such a way as to call all explanatory systems, all 
definitions of m a n , into doubt. Chapter 5, "The World in 
Clothes," purports to defend the famous "clothes philosophy," 
yet as the sometimes skeptical, sometimes adoring "editor" of 
Teufelsdrôckh's manuscript plays one system off against another 
w  e learn, in fact, that the vaunted clothes philosophy itself is 
derived from a more general definition of m a  n as the "tool-using 
Animal." W h a t w e are actually given in this chapter is a half-
serious, half-satirical glimpse of man's confused world of system­
aticities, of the plurality of discourses through which w  e 
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articulate humanism. Between the absurdly simplistic idea that 
m a n is the laughing animal and the more complex but still inade­
quate idea that m a  n is the tool user, there exists a seemingly end­
less field of explanatory systems. If m a  n is the center of all of 
these theories, he gains from it an elusive presence at best. 
Furthermore, in this brief catalogue of theories, to which list 
w  e could add endlessly, w  e find a startling anticipation of the 
recent systematics of the French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-
Strauss. Carlyle's "editor" argues "Still less do w e m a k e of that 
other French Definition of the Cooking Animal: which, indeed, 
for rigorous scientific purposes, is as good as useless. C a n a 
Tartar be said to cook, w h e n he only readies his steak by riding 
on it?" (p. 152). Carlyle, of course, had no way of knowing the 
complexity of Lévi-Strauss's crucial definition of the "raw and 
the cooked," or the definition of m a  n that emerges from his 
binary oppositions of nature and culture. But if this dismissal of a 
proto-Lévi-Straussian theory carries no real force, Carlyle's 
inclusion of it absorbs even Lévi-Strauss into the mainstream of 
the romantic obsession with discovering and defining m a n  , and it 
leads us to wonder whether or not the task has even yet been 
accomplished. 
I a  m here, admittedly, playing with Carlyle's use of irony, but 
irony m a y be the most important characteristic of the romantic 
and post-romantic eras. While a plurality of defining systems 
seems inescapable given the cataclysmic nature of the romantic 
"fall," the adequacy of any one system is always in doubt—is, 
crucially, always subject to the accidental nature of lived 
experience, to the additional detail or particularity that will not 
fit into the system or to the appearance of a rival system. The 
romantic willingness to dwell between the extremes of 
particularity and universality, to embrace discontinuity and 
continuity, insures this vacillating movement and makes history 
possible. The ironic tone expressed by Carlyle's "editor" toward 
the definition of m a  n as the "Cooking Animal" turns back upon 
the "clothes philosophy" itself. It also explains the necessary 
vacillation of the "editor," w h o at once shows admiration and 
skepticism for the philosophical system he is presenting. 
The "immensities" that Carlyle speaks of do not define m a n so 
m u c  h as call attention to his orders, to his uses of language, sign 
systems, and symbols. Ranging between the extremes of 
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particular, chaotic experience and universal orderliness, m a  n is 
capable of defining his " m e  " only in more or less adequate 
systems that establish his relation to a world that slips and flows 
from his grasp. These systems, or "discourses," form what 
Foucault calls "an immense density of systematicities, a tight 
group of multiple relations."31 Sartor, because it is a discourse 
about discourses, reflects on the inadequacy of any individual 
system and ironically on itself insofar as it presents itself as a 
system, but it thereby establishes the firm ground upon which 
m a  n emerges into being; through his articulation of "self" into a 
world. Attendant u p o n this hesitating definition of m a n , 
moreover, is the ironic self-criticism of the text, which clearly 
anticipates the skepticism of a more modern philosopher like 
Jacques Derrida, w h  o both proclaims the necessity of seeing m a  n 
as a language-using animal, the necessity of hypostatizing the 
verbal sign, and also doubts language's power to confer being on 
m a  n or the world in which he seems to dwell.32 
Sartor is not merely a treatise on symbolism, transcen­
dentalism, or historicism, although it embodies all of these 
discourses by distancing them from the text, by removing them 
to the status of an-"other" text that is the object of the text that 
w  e read. I submit, then, that the " m e  " of which Carlyle speaks in 
Sartor is not easily defined in terms like Foucault's discovery of 
m a n  . W h a  t Carlyle tells us is that romanticism never discovered 
m a n  , but it did initiate a profound humanism in its ironic 
awareness of man's historicity as a language-user. Romanticism is 
not a m o v e m e n  t but the assertion of the possibility of 
movements; it is not the discovery of m a  n but of the positive and 
negative limits of subjectivity; it is not the worship of continuity 
but the honest confrontation of discontinuity; it is not a 
simplistic reduction of language to thought or individual 
cognition but the awareness of language as both a genuine "tool" 
and an almost mythical context—each extreme necessary for the 
emergence of the " m e  " into the world, however tentative and 
subject to decay this emergence m a  y be. 
Carlyle's concept of the " m e  " is a complex proposition. It is 
the "self" or "individual," alien, alone as the "only reality." It is 
Teufelsdrockh, the shy, withdrawn scholar, whose origins are 
mysterious and whose future is u n k n o w n . Carlyle's " m e  " is also 
a borrowing of Coleridge's echo of divine consciousness, and this 
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typical romantic vacillation between particular and universal 
parallels precisely the extreme limits of the clothes philosophy. 
Clothes (as linguistic signs), on the one hand, carve up the 
undifferentiated chaos of the experiential world into Kantian 
space-time categories, yet clothes (as symbols) must be pierced 
through so that w  e m a  y experience the divine " O n e .  " Is this far 
from "the being of language: the language of being?" W h o  , then, 
is Teufelsdrôckh? H  e is, most obviously, the hero of a work that 
Carlyle called a "kind of Didactic Novel."33 A s the dilettantish 
professor of "Things in General" he clearly satirizes the tradition 
of G e r m a  n idealistic philosophers w h  o were universal system 
builders; as a consequence, the systematic nature of his o w  n 
philosophy is subject to ironic doubt. There is, of course, no real 
distinction between Teufelsdrôckh and his clothes philosophy; 
to speak of one is to speak of the other. H e  , like his philosophy, 
is a "mighty maze"; his being never becomes distinct because "a 
noble complexity, almost like that of Nature, reigns in his 
philosophy" (p. 148). H  e is boundless in the way that his 
philosophy is boundless; a professor of things in general, he is all 
things in general. H e is at best a metaphor, a " n a m e , " which has a 
peculiar kind of presence in the text but no "thingness" nor 
"centrality." "Teufelsdrôckh has . . . contrived to take-in a well-
nigh boundless extent of field; at least, the boundaries too often 
lie quite beyond our horizon" (p. 148). 
If Teufelsdrôckh provides no heroic center for Sartor, he has a 
more profound function, within the text and beyond it. Carlyle 
tells us that this book "contains m o r e " of his "opinions on Art, 
Politics, Religion, Heaven, Earth, and Air than all the things"34 
he had written to that time. Such a pastiche cries out for form 
because it has neither the neat Aristotelian plotting of a novel nor 
the rigid logical development of a didactic tract. W h a  t is needed, 
of course, is a clothes philosophy. Thus Teufelsdrôckh's all-
encompassing philosophy suggests a total orderliness or finite 
structure of "surplus" explanatory power that would be 
adequate to all occasions; it is the illusion of order surrounding 
the multiplicity of "things." T h  e clothes philosophy, even as it is 
ironically distanced, casts, through the ghostly presence of 
Teufelsdrôckh, a semblance of universal orderliness over Sartor; 
and Carlyle's text, like the clothes philosophy, asserts itself as a 
"Library of General, Entertaining, Useful or even Useless 
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Knowledge" (p. 149). It is no doubt the prototype for that very 
similar library that Borges named * 'Babel." Borges negatively and 
Carlyle directly situate " m a n  " in that library, the former out of 
the necessity for motion, emergence that also situates (opens the 
space for) the library, the latter out of the historian's need to 
recognize that m a  n "is" only because he "belongs." "The being 
of language: the language of being" : : the belonging of language: 
the language of belonging. Teufelsdrôckh, without origins or 
ends, w h o dwells nowhere and everywhere, surveys a boundless 
world of m e  n and books, of m e  n in books. "The joyful and the 
sorrowful are there; m e  n are dying there, m e  n are being born; 
m e  n are praying,—on the other side of a brick partition, m e  n are 
cursing; and around them all is the vast, void Night" (p. 138). 
Like all characters in literary works Teufelsdrôckh comes to be 
a character by virtue of the text itself, but there is obviously a 
significant difference in the way Carlyle uses this device in Sartor. 
Because Carlyle's hero must in some way exceed the boundaries 
of his text while he also remains within it, Teufelsdrôckh is both 
the namer and the named, the author and the character; through 
Carlyle's series of frames within frames (Teufelsdrôckh's 
philosophy, Hofrath Heuschrecke's letters and tracts, the editor's 
manuscript, and Carlyle's text), through the overlapping and 
intersecting of discourses, it becomes impossible to determine 
which frame contains all of the others, which text is the 
encompassing one. Each ironically comments upon the other, 
and where inadequacies are revealed in one discourse another 
seems to fill the gap. Moreover, and this is crucial, there is room 
for even more, for even greater experiential particularity (which 
supports the illusion of Sartor as completely adequate discourse), 
and for other discourses (perhaps the reader's, or Levi-Strauss's, 
or Foucault's). This is the structural basis for Sartor's rhetorical 
appeal and the force behind its quintessential hermeneutical 
assertiveness; Murray Krieger, borrowing from Rosalie Colie, 
has, after all, defined the "art of interpretation as the filling of 
gaps."35 The reader, like the editor, is confronted with a 
demanding task, the measuring, one against the other, of two 
orders of "immensities": one of experiential plenitude and the 
other of discursive systems each projecting beyond itself a 
universal adequacy. 
The purpose of such a centerless text is not to define m a n ; 
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Carlyle has postponed indefinitely the wonderous "discovery" 
that Foucault speaks of. Even though the text has no center, all 
"subjectivity" has not necessarily been abolished. The irony of 
such a center less system is that it seems to d e m a n d subjectivity. 
The textual "black hole" is not a void but a vortex; it is the 
possibility—even necessity—of a "virtual" center, of a voice that 
speaks being. It is not merely space, openness, dispersion, 
emptiness but the gathering into greatest density, solidity, being 
within openness. The text seeks to draw us into man's most 
h u m a  n activity, the author's act of articulation, and if successful 
it reveals to us therein the textual limits of the author's 
subjectivity. Sartor is autobiographical (as well as biographical) 
insofar as it shows the presence of Carlyle engaged with his 
world, and, through the text, engages the reader in the author's 
vision. Without the presence of his voice, the activity of his 
articulation, w e would have no text, but, equally, without the 
reader's engagement, which completes the communicative 
transaction, the author's voice would remain silent. The reader's 
attention, therefore, is drawn not to Teufelsdrôckh nor to 
Carlyle, but to the text as act, as system bounded by and 
encircling the density of life, which opens outward into the 
terrifying onrush of pure temporality yet closes against this chaos 
by asserting its real presence as text. Unlike Foucault's 
"anonymous" discourses, Carlyle's Sartor breathes with the life 
of Carlyle's world. It is truly work. Carlyle argues, "Hence, too, 
the folly of that impossible Precept, Know Thyself; till it be 
translated into this partially possible one, Know what thou canst 
work at" (p. 238). 
A s "work" it also demands m u c h from its reader; the act of 
interpretation is, like the dynamic nature of the text, a continuing 
process with no guarantees of total understanding. T h e text of 
Teufelsdrôckh 's philosophy comes to us, w e should remember, 
not as an ordered treatise but in six paper bags containing scraps 
of paper and labeled with six zodiacal signs, and, once again, 
Carlyle uses this device to reflect his o w  n text. There is, perhaps 
merely fortuitously, a parallel between Teufelsdrôckh's six bags 
and the serial publication of Sartor. T h  e hint of universality in the 
zodiacal signs is undercut by the fact that there are only six used, 
just as the hint of completeness in Sartor is undercut by its 
fragmentary appearance in print. M o r e significantly, however, 
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Carlyle has here anticipated Ludwig Wittgenstein's "zettelistic" 
method of constructing the text of his Tractatus. The reader of 
such a text, like Carlyle's editor, is called upon to actively 
participate in the forming of it. Th  e myriad explanatory and 
interpretive schemes of the text speak for the possibility of all 
interpretation, and the order of it stands for the possibility of any 
order. Th  e range of Carlyle's text is deliberately broader than 
that of Wittgenstein; Carlyle is not willing to bracket the realm of 
symbolism or transcendentalism, but both m e  n have a clear sense 
of the presence of the subjective and the call for interpretation. 
Carlyle's text whirls precipitously from the ridiculous to the 
sublime, from political and social c o m m e n t a r y to pure 
philosophical speculation, from detail to system so that the 
reader, dizzied by the range of thought and feeling, is caught up in 
the spectacle of life's fullness. W h a  t emerges is not Knowledge in 
the sense of conventionalized structures of order but the very 
activity of knowing, and this plunges the reader into the 
profoundest kind of communication. Quoting Novalis, Carlyle 
says that "it is certain m  y Belief gains quite infinitely the m o m e n t 
I can convince another mind thereof" (p. 272), but the term 
convince need not be taken to m e a  n "domination." W  e need to 
be convinced only of the richness of the Belief, of the dynamic 
and searching nature of its activity; that is, the great writer 
convinces us not so m u c h by the content, the what, of his 
discourse but by the process, the how, of its saying. W  e are not 
bound to believe what he believed but as he believed, to be 
awakened to the extraordinary force of his engagement as m a n , 
his commitment as writer, whereby he projects himself into (and, 
because of his originality, out of), his o w  n historical point in 
time. 
The romanticism that promotes such a theory is itself a daring 
philosophical commitment. It has been both fondly and derisively 
characterized as a fall from grace, and, in a way, so it is. For the 
romantic like Carlyle, through the irony of his discourse, there is 
an implicit admission that the W o r  d of G o  d has fallen to the 
level of man's language. It is, then, m a  n w h  o creates m a  n and his 
world through his acts of articulation. But this creation is thereby 
subject to time itself, which necessitates a continual reproduction 
of the " m e , " a continual recreation of man's world. A s 
Teufelsdrockh bemoans, a m a  n must always "thatch anew" the 
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very being he gives himself. This is the punishment m a  n suffers 
for his fall into language, and it is, unfortunately, almost always 
accompanied by the sin of pride as m a  n discovers that he is the 
only measure of his achievements and failures. 
M o d e r  n m a  n has, I fear, been unable to rid himself of the guilt 
accompanying his fall. Forced to rediscover himself at every 
m o m e n t , he finds himself with a most difficult role to play, and 
one cannot blame him for his recent efforts to deny his 
subjectivity, to remove his guilt-ridden " m e  " into the collective 
anonymity of laws and systems. This so-called ego loss, as a 
breaking d o w  n of the psychosocial structures of repression that 
define the ego, has sometimes set for itself a too easy enemy, for 
the romantic egoist never really confronted the outrageousness of 
repression that his self-assertiveness concealed. The romantic 
concept of being did become rigidly dialectical, rigidly commited 
to the universality of the psychosocial paradigm of master and 
slave;36 and this the modern theorist of ego loss could well 
disassemble into its more complex and meaningful suggestive­
ness, but ego loss in any more confining sense comes at great 
sacrifice, comes only with the loss of man' s articulating powers, 
his voice—only with the loss of true being to a world of 
accidental, anonymous systematicities. If m a  n has already killed 
G o d  , he is n o  w in the process of destroying himself, of 
dehumanizing his very being in a desperate effort to shake off his 
guilt. 
But is this not a greater sin than any dreamed of in 
romanticism? Rather than an acceptance of the accidental it is a 
removal of the terrifying threat of time to a meaningless, 
atemporal set of laws, structures, or systems of propositions that 
give us "orders" without "things." Romanticism, on the other 
hand, transforms accident into necessity, and, therefore, accident 
is never only a matter of chance but is also a principle of 
systematicity itself, very m u c  h in the sense that the term is used 
in musicology. "Accident" is the insertion of a foreign element 
into a natural (naturalizing?) context, a willful alteration of the 
key signature that breaks the pattern without resulting in chaos. 
It adds complexity, depth, richness, and "meaningfulness" to the 
passage. The foreign element is not naturalized by the dominant 
system of which it has become a functioning part; it is part of the 
totality of the piece yet is outside it; it is, then, a willful 
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accidentalism that expresses the very possibility of change, of the 
unexpected and strange m a d  e compatible but not merely 
familiar. 
Such accidentalism is the very essence of the literary artist's 
creativity, and indeed his being. It opens all systems to his 
challenge and gives space for the emergence of his voice in his 
text. For the literary artist there are no movements , only the 
possibility of m o v e m e n t  , and, therefore, his act of articulation is 
not historical but expresses the very possibility of history. Joseph 
Conrad, addressing this problematic sense of literary creativity 
argued: "Fiction is history, h u m a  n history, or it is nothing. But it 
is also more than that; it stands on firmer ground, being based on 
the reality of forms and the observation of social phenomena 
. . . , 
37
 There is nothing easy about this creativity, for it defies 
systematic reductions, critical impositions, and scholarly 
stagnation. N o  r can it easily resolve itself into a self-satisfied 
egoism. In the full irony of Heidegger's paradoxical/poetical 
formula, one gains one's individual being-there only dependently. 
Interpretation of m a n '  s literary efforts to express this multiform 
being, moreover, demands a risky participation from the reader, 
the wagering of his o w  n subjectivity against its rediscovery; but 
given this, the reader penetrates beyond interpretation into 
understanding, into a true historical communication. Further­
more , by opening outward to both life's fullness of particularity 
and the endless range of m a n '  s systematicities, the artist, and the 
texts through which he expresses himself, cannot be confined 
within narrow limits. The greatest literature strives to achieve a 
modestly privileged position in culture at large so that it is an 
acculturating object. Literature above all of m a n '  s endeavors 
expresses not so m u c  h the irreducibly h u m a  n but rather the 
motion of humanism. 
T E X T A N D C O N T E X T IN INTERPRETATION 
T h  e crucial issue in Foucault's rejection of romanticism is 
finally not the triumph or failure of the "discovery of m a n  " but 
the means available for any definition of m a n . W  e find in his 
polemics the limits of this defining activity; m a  n can be 
characterized either historically, as only a m o m e n  t in time, or 
abstractly, as only a collectivized, dehumanized " w e .  " T  o put this 
Toward a Literary Hermeneutics 213 
same dilemma in other terms, m a  n can be defined either 
existentially, as a fragment of the manifold of experientiality 
subject to the destructive force of temporality, or rationally, as a 
fragment of an orderly structure arranged spatially across the 
flow of time. The former tends toward history and the latter 
toward myth, but in fact, these two perspectives are not as 
distinct as the infamous debate between Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Claude Lévi-Strauss seems to indicate.38 Both m e  n are prisoners 
of their o w  n terminology, for in the effort to carve out a stable 
position each falls victim to man's fundamental inability to 
separate the concepts of space and time. It is, moreover, the 
refusal to m a k e such a separation that marks Carlyle's Sartor 
Resartus, that informs his two orders of immensities and makes 
his text an exemplary literary act. 
The portion of the structuralist m o v e m e n t that has evidenced a 
militant antihumanism and antiexistentialism handicaps itself in 
its polemical pose.The general concept of system, derived in part 
from Saussure's insight into the diacritical nature of the system of 
verbal signs, plunges m a  n into a world of structural relationships 
without beginning or end, into what Foucault has called the 
"already begun."34 For Derrida such a system can have no 
privileged center that gurantees m a  n a world of meaningfulness 
and value; hence, man's h u m a n condition is a revamped version 
of the old existentialist conundrum of condemned freedom, only 
what remains is not Sartrian "nausea" but Nietzschean 
"freeplay."40 A  s with Foucault's "relativistic systematicities," 
there is no room for the subject and no place for existential 
meaningfulness. There is no Hegelian, transcendental telos, no 
Freudian privileged unconscious nor Jungian archetypal 
guarantees, no Cassirerian origins, no Marxian idealism or 
materialism; all the ideological demigods of our modern world 
nave been pulled d o w n  , and m a  n is left with the significance (if 
meaninglessness) of the system, or its manifestation in liguistic 
codes. H u g h M  . Davidson, however, quite accurately charac­
terizes Roland Barthes's structuralist universe of linguistic codes 
in a way that also reveals the significant flaw that emerges within 
the extreme structuralist position. The systematic nature of 
language codes, like the concept of system itself, "sounds and is 
. . . quite mechanistic, but Barthes has found a way to animate 
the machine. His main concern has shifted from structure to 
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structuration, seen as an autonomous activity with a life of its 
o w n , almost independent of m e n , for, as he has said, m a n is no 
longer the center of structures."41 That this "machine" is an 
idealized projection and its "animation" is too often merely 
illusory, I hope I have been able to demonstrate in m y discussion 
of Chomsky ' s activity of transformation in part 2 . Yet the 
possibility of motion within the system/machine speaks of 
the necessity for an animating force that the system/machine 
generates within itself. It is the Heideggerian opening for being or 
the humanistic flaw that breaks the silence of Borges's great 
"useless" library. Failing to give attention to this opening, 
structuralist writing frequently evidences a serious ennui, a placid 
acceptance of the world that structuralists have defined for 
themselves, and a frightening, almost neurotic, antipathy to the 
personal. A  s a result, structuralist critics struggle desperately to 
write themselves out of existence. 
I hasten to add here that Foucault represents an extreme 
position in this movement . In m a n y respects his protest is not 
unlike that of the Anglo-American classicist writers of the early 
twentieth century. T . E . H u l m e , T . S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, and  W . 
H  . A u d e n  , also attacked romanticism for its fragmenting 
individualism and its egotistical hubris. They emphasized the 
importance of belonging to the tradition, of comparative literary 
studies (as opposed to nationalistic historicism), and, as w e have 
seen in part 3, they developed a poetic style and theory that is not 
unlike the structuralist theory of the impersonal writer.42 But 
these classicists were finally no more than anticipators of the 
newer classicism that defines Foucault's approaches to culture. 
For Eliot the tradition was always infused with the "individual 
talent," and the general emphasis on comparative study was 
narrow if not eccentric. Th  e impersonal stance of the writer, 
moreover, was never fully antiexperiential. T h e ideal of 
existential commitment, moral responsibility, and historical 
development pervades Eliot's poetry. It is still the artist, holding 
to a man-centered, post-Kantian universe, w h  o must strive for 
the vision of the saint. If Eliot finally embraces a system of 
universal significance, it is an orthodox, Christian scheme 
dominated by a god devoted to m a n and not to the expansive 
cosmos. 
Foucault's concept of the "already begun" and Derrida's 
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parallel idea of the freeplay of language codes (both men's 
militant antihumanism and antisubjectivism) clearly reflect the 
influence of Levi-Strauss on the h u m a  n sciences, but Levi-
Strauss is far less radical (as Derrida laboriously points out), far 
less narrow in his perspective. Rather than a sweeping dismissal 
of romanticism, his polemical focus has been directed primarily 
against a specific development of romanticism: against the 
subjectivist vision of French existentialism. This has been a 
favorite target for Foucault as well; his concept of the already 
begun inverts the infamous idea, articulated by Sartre, that 
"existence precedes essence."43 The effect of Foucault's argu­
ment is to rob existentialism of the crucial emphasis Sartre wants 
to place on the necessity of individual commitment and respon­
sibility, of the very possibility of willed progress or revolution, 
but it is Lévi-Strauss w h  o most instructively engages Sartre in 
debate. For Lévi-Strauss, the idea of the already begun is more 
pervasive than the somewhat restrictive cultural concept ad­
vanced by Foucault; it springs from his early discussions of the 
idea of " m a n a  " and is developed into his general theory of the 
"zero-signifier" or the idea of a "surplus of signification" that I 
discussed in part 1. M a n '  s existence, or perhaps better stated, 
man's self-consciousness, is preceded by a kind of "essence," 
Lévi-Strauss argues, in the form of a structured cosmology. It is 
not clear whether this precedence is merely a matter of a preset in 
the mind (an innate structuring capacity) or a system m u c  h vaster 
than m a n into which he is born but over which he has little 
c o m m a n d . In either case, the structuring potential for meaning­
fulness engulfs m a  n with a systematicity far m o r  e powerful than 
his finite consciousness. 
It is perhaps easier (and surely appropriate) to describe Levi-
Strauss's concept by contrasting it with Cassirer's more romantic 
idea of " m a n a .  " Cassirer defines " m a n a  " as a "supernatural 
power." "In this light, the whole existence of things and the 
activity of mankind seem to be embedded, so to speak, in a 
mythical 'field of force,' an atmosphere of potency which 
permeates everything, and which m a  y appear in concentrated 
form in certain extraordinary objects, removed from the realm of 
everyday affairs, or in specially endowed persons, such as 
distinguished warriors, priests, or magicians."44 This field of 
force Cassirer sees as anonymou s and pervasive, present in m a n  y 
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societies no matter h o  w remote from one another in time and 
space. It is the "background against which definite daemonic or 
divine images can take shape."45 O  n this level, Cassirer is not far 
afield from Lévi-Strauss w h  o sees m a n  a as a floating signifier, an 
indeterminate potential meaningfulness that makes possible our 
lower level concentration of its power into particular, nameable 
concepts. Both m e n agree that this power is beyond mere words; 
it is a mystical realm of silence. 
But at this point the two diverge sharply. Cassirer thinks of 
m a n  a in mythico-religious terms. It is the ground of conscious­
ness that emerges along with man's first traumatic awareness of 
the self as separate from the all-embracing and anonymous other. 
Mana-consciousness has both a positive and negative aspect; it is 
expressive of the desire for oneness, for a return to the 
comforting w o m  b of Nature on the one hand, and of repulsion, 
separation, and taboo on the other. It is a virtually irrational 
sense of loss and gain, which for Cassirer is a condition of 
consciousness that can be transcended only at the other extreme 
of man's full development by his powers of rational projection. 
Language, w e should r e m e m b e r , operates between these 
extremes, between the poetic level of pure metaphor and the 
prosaic level of logical metonymy . For Levi-Strauss m a n  a is not a 
condition of consciousness but the prior context for 
consciousness. The floating signifier (mana as a field of force) is 
discovered by m a n , as infinitely functional, w h e n he comes to 
consciousness (an ever-present awakening, not a historical 
event). A s a result it remains an anonymous context that confers 
on m a  n no privileged position in the cosmos. Rather than 
focusing attention on m a n as the language user w h o struggles to 
transcend himself (and his language through language), Lévi-
Strauss reduces m a  n to a mere part of the grand schema that 
precedes and survives him. This leads him specifically to reject all 
those subjectivist philosophies of reflexive self-consciousness 
that attribute to m a  n the responsibility for creating his world 
(Cassirer) or the responsibility for projecting a better world 
(Sartre). 
O  n the crucial issue of man's active role in the universe, 
therefore, Levi-Strauss and Sartre find themselves grasping 
diametrically opposed points on a spinning wheel, but one 
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cannot help noting that these points are positions without 
particular privilege on the same circle. Despite their differences, 
both espouse very similar propositions with regard to man'  s 
present condition as m a n  . Lévi-Strauss's cosmological vision 
posits that m a  n was born into an a priori systematicity; only 
man's self-delusion has caused him to fall into egoism and 
selfishness, and has bolstered him with the false hope of progress. 
M a  n is enslaved by his institutions, not the least of which are 
those evolved from the structure of language; he is trapped by his 
culture, which is no more than a corruption of his egalitarian, 
economical, and ecological myths.46 Sartre finds m a n in the 
middle stages of his development from savagery. Contrary to 
Lévi-Strauss's lingering Rousseauism, Sartre sees man' s natural 
state in a Hobbesian perspective, as warring and exploitative. 
M a n '  s freedom from a priori values and meanings (like Ivan 
Karamozov's claim that without G o  d all is legitimate) allows him 
selfishly to exploit others in order to satisify his o w  n need, to fill 
his preternatural lack. Culture has become, then, a systematic 
enslavement of the m a n y by the few. For both Sartre and Lévi-
Strauss m a n is enslaved, and for both, some remedy must be 
found in an ideal world. 
If there is a real difference between these views it arises from 
their prophetic implications. Lévi-Strauss seeks for m a  n a 
freedom not inferior to that posited by Sartre; only, for Lévi-
Strauss, that freedom is freedom from Sartre's historicism and 
dread of responsible choice. Sartre argues that m a  n is uniquely 
m a  n "because he is able to be historical" (wherein history is no 
prior condition for m a n )  ; m a  n is uniquely m a  n because he can 
project for himself a future that is better than his present.47 
Sartre's fear of Lévi-Strauss's anthropology is one with his fear of 
all gnosticism. H  e challenges m a  n to free himself from the 
enslavement of his institutions, to transcend himself and 
ultimately his bound historicity. If he is somewhat pessimistic 
about man' s chances, it seems more to reflect a distrust of easy 
solutions and totalizing, fatalistic systems, than the "mythizing of 
history" charged to him by Lévi-Strauss. For both m e n history 
carries a burden of suffering. 
Yet I a  m tempted to argue that, despite their m a n  y differences, 
the terms of the existentialist-structuralist debate have actually 
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drawn the two m e  n closer together. Sartre argues persuasively 
that the true role of his existence philosophy is to act as a 
dialectical challenge to Levi-Strauss's anthropology. 
Anthropology will deserve its name only if it replaces the study of 
h u m a  n objects by the study of the various processes of becoming-
an-object. Its role is to found its knowledge on rational and compre­
hensive non-knowledge; that is, the historical totalization will be 
possible only if anthropology understands itself instead of ignoring 
itself. T  o understand itself, to understand the other, to exist, to act, 
are one and the same movement which founds direct, conceptual 
knowledge upon indirect, comprehensive knowledge but without 
ever leaving the concrete—that is, history or, more precisely, the one 
w h o comprehends what he knows. This perpetual dissolution of 
intellection in comprehension and, conversely, the perpetual rede­
scent which introduces comprehension into intellection as a dimen­
sion of rational knowledge at the heart of knowledge is the very 
ambiguity of a discipline in which the questioner, the question, and 
the questioned are one.48 
Lévi-Strauss, unlike s o m  e of his followers, has never wholly left 
the ambiguity of his discipline. In Tristes tropiques, perhaps his 
greatest b o o k , he seeks to write himself out of existence in a 
positive action, by an intense self-consciousness that allows h im 
to dissolve his self in comprehension without denying the 
countermovement that introduces comprehension into his very 
subjective experience. T h e structuralist methodology of Levi* 
Strauss does not deny existence any m o r e than Sartre's existence 
philosophy ignores the comprehensive abstract knowledge of 
anthropology. T h  e following passage f r o m the Scope of 
Anthropology reveals the extent to which Lévi-Strauss's definition 
of a "pure anthropology" finds its articulation in personal, 
particularized experience. 
O  f all the sciences [anthropology] is without a doubt unique in 
making the most intimate subjectivity into a means of objective 
demonstration. W  e really can verify that the same mind which has 
abandoned itself to the experience and allowed itself to be moulded 
by it becomes the theatre of mental operations which, without 
suppressing the experience, nevertheless transforms it into a model 
which releases further mental operations. In the last analysis, the 
logical coherence of these mental operations is based on the sincerity 
and honesty of the person w h  o can say, like the explorer bird of the 
Toward a Literary Hermeneutics 219 
fable, "I was there; such-and-such happened to men; you will believe 
you were there yourself," and wh  o in fact succeeds in communicat­
ing that conviction.49 
Those w h  o attack the philosophers of existence by claiming that 
experience is an illusion are themselves deeply deluded by their 
vision of orderliness. There is no such blindness in the 
philosophy of Levi-Strauss. 
I return n o w once more to m  y claim that literature is a 
privileged form of discourse. This is not to say that literature has 
any direct line to Truth nor that the literary work encompasses 
more of life more accurately than other h u m a n endeavors. M  y 
claim is essentially a modest, if important, one: that literature is a 
peculiar kind of h u m a  n endeavor that can be defined only in 
terms of its o w  n experiential value. It is a part of the totality of 
h u m a n history and Knowledge, coextensive with m a n y other 
parts, yet irreducible in its insistence on its o w n finite existence. 
It is the purpose of literature, however, to constantly remind us 
that w e belong to a complex world of meanings and values where 
choice and responsibility are the burdens of our humanity. N  o 
system, no totalized structure, however grand, can relieve us of 
our humanity. If Lévi-Strauss teaches us that m a  n dwells in a 
world that was not intentionally m a d e for man' s benefit, w e are 
admonished even more strongly that m a  n must assume his 
commitment to himself and that world, and Le'vi-Strauss has 
provided not a refutation of Sartre nor a denial of the privilege of 
literary humanism, but a plea that m a n and the literary endeavors 
he so persistently projects must accept the role assigned to them. 
In such a world no action is trivial. 
Specifically in part 2, and frequently elsewhere in this essay, I 
have associated literature with the realm of language itself, as 
occupying a middle position between Cassirer's two extremes of 
conscious activity: the lower level of ineffable, indeterminate 
experience and the upper level of ineffable, determinate, and 
transcendental knowledge. Literature embraces the conflict 
between these realms within the freeplay of metaphor and 
metonymy, risking the irrational obsession with particulars on 
the one hand and the rational obsession with universals on the 
other hand. It sways between the radicalism of anarchy and the 
radicalism of conservatism, but it is never wholly one or the 
other. It is wrong, I believe, to confuse literature with pure 
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perception, philosophy, myth , or history, but it is blindly narrow 
to forget that literature, as a quintessential testing of language's 
capacity for meaning, touches all of these realms of experien­
tiality and discourse. Literature is not, therefore, mere language; 
it is not a particular kind of game played by an eccentric 
manipulator of language's codes. Literature has a privileged role 
a m o n  g all discourses precisely because it embraces, at all times, 
the extreme possibilities of self-consciousness and anonymity. 
This is w h  y neither a pure romanticism nor a pure classicism, 
neither an existentialism nor a structuralism, is adequate to a 
fully developed literary hermeneutics. It is m o r  e instructive to 
look at the impurities of such theories, for here one senses the 
deeply humanistic urges in both Sartre and Levi-Strauss reaching 
toward one another. Even if literary discourse is not "mirrored" 
experience, nor history, nor myth , it m a y be said to be a 
profound imitation of all three. T h  e literary artist is far mor  e self-
conscious than the philosopher or historian, far m o r  e so, for 
example, than the exaggerated picture of the objective, scientific 
anthropologist painted by some misguided followers of Lévi-
Strauss. (It is this critical self-consciousness, the lure of 
metaphor, that infuses Tristes tropiques with its powerful literary 
qualities.) A fear of "literariness" has led Barthes and Foucault to 
posit ideal worlds and to blindly live in them; it has distorted the 
creative talents of John Barth into the writing of novels about 
novels. These m e  n have failed to learn one crucial lesson taught 
by the structuralist ideology that they, in their different ways, 
espouse—a lesson forcefully emphasized by Derrida. W  e are all 
victims of language's enslaving tendencies; w e are trapped by the 
"prison-house" of language,50 bound off from reality and truth 
by what Sartre calls our fetishizing of the "word ." All language, I 
believe, reaches toward authentic experience at one extreme and 
toward totalizing systematicity at the other, but it is confessedly 
inadequate to both. Literature, by its very nature, resists 
fetishizing by calling attention to itself as both a possibility for 
articulation to experience and as a fragmentary, degenerate 
m e d i u  m that resists such articulation. 
In his recent study of what he calls "structural autobiography" 
Jeffrey M e h l m a  n argues rather convincingly that Sartre's 
philosophy represents a kind of egoistic martyrdom. In The 
Words Sartre's obsessive concern with his "lack of a father," his 
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lack of a "supergo" as he calls it,51 disguises a m o d  e of 
philosophical self-justification. It is a form of psychic "resis­
tance" to the Symbolic Order (the Oedipal father-function), 
which intensifies and explains the egoism of Sartre's perspective 
as pour soi. Th  e missing father, the missing cultural order that the 
father symbolizes, results in what Sartre calls the overpowering of 
de trop} the "contingency" of experience that Sartre's alter ego, 
Roquentin, reacts to with "nausea."52 M e h l m a  n has clearly 
identified certain philosophical and psychological excesses in 
Sartre's thought, but those excesses are, in fact, countered in the 
later developments of Sartre's philosophy. T h  e old existentialist 
idea of m a n ' s alienation, the necessity of commitment to the 
subjectivity of the "other" was essentially a static dialogistics, 
although one impregnated with experiential meaningfulness. 
Sartre has n o w evolved a more complex sense of this dialogue by 
transforming the old binary confrontation into a trinary struc­
ture of communication. The self-other conflict takes place only 
in the context of identifiable sociohistorical structures. Fredric 
Jameson, speaking of the Critique de la raison dialectique, de­
scribes the importance of this advance. "By showing that inter­
personal experience can never precede group experience, it 
immediately forces the argument of the Critique to transcend the 
individualistic level at which the analyses of Being and Nothingness 
had been undertaken, and moves at once to the ways in which the 
solitary individual tries to overcome his ontological and socio­
economic weakness by the invention of collective acts and 
collective units."53 O  f most importance here is the overthrow of 
the rigid "existence-precedes-essence" formula of the early 
philosophy. Essences creep into this n e w schema in the form of 
cultural-historical structures, and if Levi-Strauss is correct, such 
experiential-historical systems are always in an organic relation­
ship with the universalizing mythic structures that are pervasive 
in h u m a n society. 
T h  e tensions besetting the individual subject, therefore, are 
both personal (I-thou dialogues) and collective, and at present I 
see n o way (and no need) to resolve them or collapse them into a 
unity. This is the basis of m a n '  s finitude (a rather orthodox 
definition of m a  n that both Sartre and Levi-Strauss profess), and 
it is this finitude that the finite literary text reproduces. Every 
literary artist (the term is unavoidably honorific) is necessarily 
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committed and revolutionary, but commitment and revolution 
m e a  n neither existential aloneness nor militant iconoclasm. If 
m a  n is trapped in the prison-house of language, enslaved by his 
cultural institutions, it is the freeplay of signifiers within the 
structure that enables the anonymous to give way to the 
emergence of being—even to the thrust toward identity 
(whatever the mixed blessing such a confirmation bestows). O n  e 
cannot simply renounce one's position in culture, and one must 
not live blindly and anonymously in culture's givens. The former 
is a willful denial of finitude, a dehumanizing surrender of the 
particularity assigned to m a  n by a world he did not create but of 
which he is a distinct part. Such a denial is an expression of the 
sinful pride of romantic egoism wherein m a  n loses both his sense 
of belonging and his power to alter the terrifying state of his 
existential alienation. This is the fate of Faulkner's Ike 
McCaslin; his blindness to the consequences of his withdrawal 
from life traps him more forcefully than ever in the perpetuation 
of the very evils he sought to end. N  o matter h o  w admirable his 
goals as they are presented in the abstract, they are impotent at 
best—and destructive at worst—when they achieve no being 
through action. O  n the other side one cannot "decide for" ego 
loss, for anonymity; any such decision is an assertion of the ego, 
however faintly so. W  e should again recall Borges's dilemma in 
"The Library of Babel"; his convincing demonstration that m a n 
cannot articulate his o w  n nonexistence without breaking the 
silence of that nonexistence. Once more I will call on Heidegger 
to describe the situation. "Saying [in the sense I have used the 
term langage, as system or design] is in need of being voiced in 
the word. But m a  n is capable of speaking only insofar as he, 
belonging to saying, listens to Saying, so that in resaying it he m a  y 
be able to say a word. That needed usage and this resaying lie in 
that absence of something in c o m m o  n which is neither a mere 
defect nor indeed anything negative at all." F r o  m the point of 
view of the "subject," w  e cannot " k n o w  " the nature of langage 
(Saying); that is a transcendental view like Wittgenstein's idea of 
logische Raum. That is, also, "not a defect . . . but rather an 
advantage by which w e are favored with a special realm, that 
realm where w e  , w h  o are needed and used to speak language, 
dwell as mortals."5* 
O u r discussion here returns us one more time to Faulkner's 
Toward a Literary Hermeneutics 223 
story "Pantaloon in Black" whose pivotal function in the text of 
the novel illustrates the very principle I a  m trying to define. A  s 
the reader juxtaposes the worlds of Rider and the sheriff, he 
experiences the tension between the individualized hero (whose 
identity cannot be reduced to generalized history) and the 
sheriffs stereotyping of that hero into an a n o n y m o u  s cul­
tural pattern. Through the agonizing struggle of Faulkner's 
metaphorical/metonymical style, an agony that reproduces the 
profound feelings of his hero, the m o m e n t  s of expansive 
meaningfulness held precariously against the inevitable flow of 
time, w  e see Rider emerge as a particular, individual being out of 
the buzz and flux of the world in which he dwells. The sheriff's 
reductions of this hard-won identity are irritating, and morally 
reprehensible, but they are the means through which w e 
experience Faulkner's purposeful "accidentalism," the insertion 
of a particularized, individual element into a systematic world 
that can neither absorb nor reject it. This is the "gift" of langage, 
that its place of dwelling is for all m e n  , that belonging is truly 
egalitarian. The sheriff's troubled questioning is evidence of this 
intrusion and serves to intensify our awareness of Rider's heroic 
"presence." 
Moreover, sweeping across the full range of language's 
capabilities, from defamiliarized, metaphoric individuality to 
demythologized, métonymie anonymity, "Pantaloon in Black" is 
a paradigm of the "finite text." Literature's privileged finitude 
will allow us neither the illusion that the wor  k is a discrete, 
organic object with symbolic pretensions nor a game of trans­
forming existing codes into pale shadows of themselves. Literary 
discourse is a radical version of what Ricoeur calls a "language­
event"; it is temporally specific (finite), proclaims a subjective 
voice, reveals the world of endless systematicities as its back­
ground, and addresses itself dynamically, hermeneutically, to 
a reader.55 
T h  e finite text is not, of course, simply ephemeral. It is not an 
object in any literal sense. Its finitude, its Heideggerian coming 
into being, derives from its holding in tension two infinities of 
different orders. Literature resists the infinite particularities of 
discrete metaphors by embedding them in the infinitely 
expansive orderliness of m e t o n y m y . Such a text is the result of a 
delicate balance, of the creative labors of the writer manifest in 
224 Friday's Footprint 
his style. At this point, therefore, w e must abandon the narrow 
conception of hermeneutics (with its comforting scientific 
methodology) advocated by Ricoeur, Betti, and Hirsch. The text, 
itself inadequate to experience, to the orderly discourses of 
history and to myth , nevertheless offers itself as a focus for them 
all, and as a consequence, interpretation defies precise 
methodology. Literature's privileged functioning invites rather 
than closes off the vast worlds of moral and political action, 
scientific and philosophical thought. It tests the potential 
meaningfulness of all systems by speaking them to particular 
experience, and threatens its readers with an awareness of 
"immensities" of radically different kinds. If the text has no ontic 
status, it is surely ontological; if it embodies no single system of 
knowledge, it is nonetheless epistemological in its design. 
A m o n  g the immensities of m a n '  s world, literature can achieve 
the enduring qualities of its finite being only through its 
weakness. Not in its dependence on ink and paper, but in spite of 
its dependence on these materials, does the dynamic force of the 
work rise to the status of text; in the act of articulation 
literature's privileged status is earned. N  o longer can w  e think of 
literature as an ideal ordering of life's chaotic plenitude; it is 
frequently that, but it is also and always a challenge to its o w  n 
ordering powers. In this it presents us not life, but an experience 
that belongs to life; its privileged status comes not from its power 
to s u m up and round off experience, but from the fact of its 
difference. Literature belongs to culture but it is not merely a 
reflection of it; it belongs to language but it is not merely 
language. It is the rightful place of h u m a  n action, the place of the 
articulation of the freedom to be and to belong, and of the 
concern that all m e n o w e to this ideal of freedom. This power of 
weakness Shakespeare, perhaps the most enduring writer of the 
western world, k n e  w well. 
Since brass, nor stone, nor earth, nor boundless sea, 
But sad mortality o'ersways their power, 
H o  w with this rage shall beauty hold a plea, 
W h o s  e action is no stronger than a flower? 
O  ! h o  w shall summer's honey breath hold out 
Against the wrackful siege of battering days, 
W h e  n rocks impregnable are not so stout, 
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Nor gates of steel so strong, but Time decays?

O fearful meditation! where, alack,

Shall Time's best jewel from Time's chest lie hid?

Or what strong hand can hold his swift foot back?

Or w h  o his spoil of beauty can forbid?

O  ! none, unless this miracle have might,

That in black ink m  y love may still shine bright.

Sonnet 65 
Here the personal experience holds its o w  n in the dynamic 
qualities of the poet's art, in the fragility of the p o e  m as substance, 
for that ink and paper are no m o r e than a rough but essential 
manifestation of the true p o e m , the power of feeling and thought, 
personal experience and abstract idea, the "trace" of one w h  o 
was (and "is") there, the m a r k of Friday's footprint. 
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stein, and Cassircr, w  e encounter the clash 
between system and individual utterance; in 
C h o m s k  y and Piaget, w  e acquire definitions of 
the notions of structuration and develop-
mentalist historicism; in Lacan, Derrida, and 
Althusser, w  e observe the complexity of cultur­
al/individual interplay, of the psychological 
interpénétration of outer and inner worlds. 
Style emerges as the repository of this prob­
lematic nature of language; and an investiga­
tion of the theory of stylistic analysis posited 
from Leo Spitzer to R o m a  n Jakobson, Roland 
Barthes, Jonathan Culler, Michel Riffaterre, 
and Richard O h m a n n , a m o n g m a n y others, 
discloses that the traditional distinctions m a d  e 
a m o n  g ideas of style seem distorting. For style 
encompasses functions found distinctive as an 
"act of articulation." 
In the concluding section, it becomes clear 
that, though literary interpretation embodies 
no neat unified methodology, it must proceed 
from a complex and unified set of assumptions 
about language, thought, and cultural/histori­
cal identity. Interpretation is m a d  e necessary by 
a rupture in the fabric of the cultural/mythical 
context caused by the "articulate" voice of the 
author. O  n the one hand, thé text's essential 
weakness as object, its inadequacy to the lin­
guistic and cultural context from which it de­
rives, demands interpretation as an endless act 
of completion. O  n the other hand, the text's 
daring thrust toward discrete experience calls 
attention to the fleeting yet fundamentally 
h u m a  n m o m e n  t of meaningful communication. 
Thus the privileged ideality of the literary text 
is not its objective or "ontic" status, but rather 
its showing forth of the full range of the 
capacities of language and m a  n to produce 
meaning. 
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